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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the protection of privacy in Malaysia against 
invasion by the press. The study argues that there ought to be a form of legal protection 
against invasion of privacy by the press. Protection of privacy should be viewed as 
complementary to a system protecting the exercise of free expression rather than 
opposing to such a system. The study establishes that the existence of institutional design 
within the constitutional framework creates a regimented restriction on freedom of 
expression vis-ä-vis freedom of the press. The orientation of the restrictions, which is 
based on expediency and necessity, gives prominence to relativism. Arguably, this would 
thwart potential development and the course of human rights in Malaysia. 
The study also examines the protection of privacy and freedom of expression in the 
United Kingdom. The development of privacy in the United Kingdom, which is moving 
towards accepting privacy as a right, could be used as a model in developing the law in 
Malaysia. Legal development on privacy is arguably tenable in Malaysia considering the 
fact that privacy-related interests are being protected under the common law principles as 
such in the United Kingdom. The study argues that the law should be in accordance with 
the local particularities on a contextual basis as against the transplantation of foreign 
principles. The study also argues that the approach of reflective equilibrium, whereby 
both universalism and relativism are taken into account, is appropriate in case of 
Malaysia considering the indigenous socio-political milieu. 
The study concludes that in the absence of legislative commitment, privacy could be 
better protected under institutional mechanism by way of co-regulation under the 
province of Media Council or the Human Rights Commission. In view of this matter, the 
study will scrutinise the effectiveness of the institutions in providing protection to 
privacy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE FRAMEWORK OF STUDY 
1.0 THE SUBJECT OF STUDY 
Communication of information through the media has been pervasive since the invention 
of the printing press. Historically, printing press was originated in China when it was 
fast invented in 1041. However, the mechanical printing press as known today was 
invented in the West in 1450s by a German, Johann Gutenberg. ' The new invention, 
which paved the way for rapid printing of written materials, also contributed to the 
proliferation of information during the Renaissance Europe. The exponential 
development and advancement in the technology of communication has led to the 
dissemination of information on a large scale and at rapid speed. One of the main players 
in this field is the press. 
The formation of the press in the form of commercial organisations has changed the 
nature of information and news. Information and news have become part of commodities 
transacted in the market economy. 2 The commoditisation of information and news 
creates a competitive environment among the press to become the first to report news and 
disseminate information that could interest as many people as possible. The reward in so 
doing is lucrative particularly in the form of public subscriptions. In this relation, the role 
of the press as the public watchdog is at times, mixed with the interest of being a 
commercial organisation. 
As commercial organisations the press needs to look after and protect their commercial 
and business interest. The commercial interest includes the interest of the shareholders 
particularly in case of the press that are formed as corporate bodies. Sometimes, the 
press manipulates news and information in the process of news reporting and news 
making for ulterior motives. An example of news making can be illustrated by the 
1 http: //encyclopedia. thefreedictionary. com/Printing%2gpress 
2 See Curran, J. (1998) Newspapers and the Press. In Briggs, A and Cobley, P. (eds. ) The Media: An 
Introduction. Harlow, 83. 
1 
scandal of the Daily Mirror in the UK when the newspaper published a faked photograph 
portraying the alleged abuse of prisoners by British soldiers during Iraq war in 2004. 
In order to meet the datelines, to deliver the latest news and information, the press either 
through their ignorance or with knowledge, encroach into freedom of others by invading 
their privacy. Naturally, the press relies on freedom of expression as the grandiose 
protection in legalising and defending the invasive act. The press defends their invasive 
act by invoking the public interest as a shield to vindicate them from being held liable. 
From the press point of view, an effort to introduce the law on privacy is an unwelcome 
development because it curtails the press freedom to publish. The law would then 
institutionalise protection on privacy, which is regarded as part of restrictions on the 
press. 
On the other hand, the issue of privacy is not a matter of culture or nationality but of 
rights and needs. Arguably, it would not be acceptable to disclose all personal 
information of a person in the name of freedom of expression or freedom of the press. 
Ironically as privacy becomes a major concern in the era of modern information and 
communication technology, the threat on individual privacy by the media increases by 
the day. New technologies have created the potential for invasion of privacy on a scale 
that could scarcely have been imagined before. 
For the public at large, the issue of privacy is not merely about the celebrities, public 
figures, rich and famous individuals. It is also about the lives of ordinary people in 
extraordinary situations, which to the press may fulfill the standard of newsworthiness. 
For example, some aids patients and victims of rape may want to be let alone. 
Understandably, due to their circumstances, they may not be willing to disclose their 
identity and their traumatic experience. Personal information from interesting stories or 
unfortunate events that spring from the lives of these people may become the headline 
news for the press to publish. On the other hand, individuals have the right to lead their 
lives without undue invasion. In this regard, the problem is that the law on privacy is 
3 Milmo, D. and H. Carter, Mirror editor sacked over hoax. Media Guardian, 15 May 2004. 
http: //media_guardian. co. uk/site/story/0,14173,1217377,00. html 
2 
both a restricting mechanism clamping on freedom of expression, and also as a protection 
of dignity by not having personal information divulged unjustly. 
By analogy, if reputation is acceptable as an interest worthy of legal protection under the 
law of defamation then why not privacy? Another intriguing question is to what extent 
privacy should be protected? This is pertinent because emphasis on privacy would 
inevitably causes chilling effect on freedom of expression. In order to answer the above 
questions, the study will discuss the tests of "offence" and "harm" to determine the extent 
of privacy. The study inclines to apply the "harm" test for reasons that will be discussed 
in chapter 3. 
This study accepts the notion that freedom of expression and rights of privacy are widely 
recognised as fundamental human rights. The recognition is embedded in international 
and regional instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) respectively. Though the 
importance of the rights is acknowledged under the banner of the United Nations, yet, the 
universality of the rights is a subject of division amongst several countries such as the 
UK and Malaysia. Such division appears due to the different emphasis on fundamental 
rights in both countries. For instance, the development of privacy as a human rights issue 
in recent years in the UK has seen a considerable concern for privacy, which is 
progressing towards accepting a right of privacy. Such development is not happening in 
Malaysia. This is perhaps due to the right of privacy being undervalued in the latter 
country. Malaysia appears to have a different emphasis on the nature of fundamental 
rights. Arguably, the prioritisation of the economic, social and cultural rights over the 
civil and political rights could be a contributing factor to the present state of privacy as 
being undervalued in Malaysia. Unlike Malaysia, the UK recognises both kind of rights 
as fundamental and accords equal treatment under the Human Rights Act 1998. Further 
discussion of this point will be pursued in Chapter 5. 
In the context of Malaysia, the study seeks to establish that although Malaysia recognises 
personal liberties as constitutional rights, priority is given to the interests of the society 
rather than to the interests of the individual. This is in reference to the vast power 
3 
bestowed by the Constitution to the legislature in restricting the liberties under the 
provision of `necessity and expedient'. In pursuance of this, it is necessary to look at 
how the courts as the last bastion of liberty, exercise judicial activism to protect the 
rights. The locution of judicial activism in this thesis connotes the pro-active role of the 
judiciary in ensuring that rights and liberties are protected beyond the normal constraints. 
In Malaysian context, such activism can be illustrated when the courts are willing to 
expand the meaning of right to life under the constitution to encompass the quality of life 
that is to include privacy. On the other hand, judicial pragmatism refers to judicial 
commitment in b5 about the best result in the present cases 
A further issue that the study will focus on is the competing interests between freedom of 
expression and privacy. The lack of clarity on privacy is one of the factors that cause a 
formidable clash between both interests: privacy and freedom of expression. The clash is 
unavoidable since the purpose of protecting privacy is to retain personal information. On 
the contrary, the crux of freedom of expression is to disclose information. In this regard, 
the clash between freedom of expression and privacy arises out of the desirability to 
protect privacy while ensuring that freedom of expression is adequately safeguarded. 
There is a vexed question as to which should prevail. Which is more important between 
the protection of free and unfettered press in exercising freedom of expression and the 
individual right to privacy? 
It is with this interest in mind that the underlying theme of the study evolves around the 
proclamation that privacy can be better protected and freedom of expression can be 
adequately safeguarded. However, the development must be in a contextual basis, 
sensitive to the relevant local particularities. 
1.1 THE SCOPE AND AIM O1' STUDY 
The scope of the study is confined to freedom of expression and privacy in relation to the 
print press as suggested by the title. The locution of freedom of expression in the study 
connotes similar expression as freedom of speech. Although the short title of section 12 
° Article 10 (2) (a) of the Malaysian Constitution. 
5 Posner, R. Pragmatic Adjudication. (1996) 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1. 
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of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 uses `Freedom of expression', Article 10 of the 
Malaysian constitution, however, adopts `Freedom of speech'; the writer argues that there 
is no real distinction as to the meaning. 6 Both locutions are used interchangeably in the 
study. 
In relation to this, freedom of expression is to include freedom of the press. Freedom of 
expression, which is the thrust of press freedom, underpins the role of the press in a 
democratic society. Thus, freedom of the press is an institutionalised right to freedom of 
expression. 7 The word `press' in this study includes newspapers, periodicals and 
magazines. According to section 2 of Malaysian Printing Presses and Publication Act 
1984 (PPA) newspaper means: 
Any publication containing news, intelligence, reports of occurrences or 
any remarks, observations or comments, in relation to such news, 
intelligence or occurrences, or to any other matter of public interest, or any 
magazine, comic or other forms of periodical printed in any language for 
sale or free distribution at regular or irregular intervals, but does not 
include any publication published by or for the Federal or any State 
Government or the Government of Singapore. 
Besides the conventional print press, an on-line press exists as a result of technological 
advancement in the area of information and communication. The preservation of privacy 
has grown more difficult and demanding, as society has to face the challenge of 
increasingly complex and intrusive technological advances. The existence of on-line 
press exacerbates the complexity of privacy issue. This type of press exists in the form of 
an extended version of the conventional print press or as a new version of press. 
Examples for the Malaysian extended versions are Utusan On-line, 8 The Star On-line, 9 
and Berita Harlan On-line10, whereas the UK versions are Guardian Unlimited, " The 
Independent On-line Edition, 12 and Times On-line. 13 In addition, Malaysiakini. com is an 
6 Barendt, E. (1985) Freedom of Speech Oxford, 38. 
7 Nash, C. Freedom of the Press in Australia. http: //democratic. auclit. am. edu. au/nasbpaver. pdf. 
8 http: //www. utusan. com. mv/ 
9 http: //www. thestar. com. my/ 
http: //www. bharian. com. my/ 
11 http: //www. p-uardian. co. uk/ 
12 http: //www. independent. co. uk/ 
13 hllp"//www. timesonline. co. uk/ 
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example of a new edition of on-line press in Malaysia that has no printed version. 
However, there is a legal conundrum with regard to the on-line press regulation. The 
absence of standardisation of rules and regulations in this area could raise a question of 
conflict of laws. For instance, unlike the UK, Malaysia has no data protection law to 
protect personal data. Thus, certain private information or personal data, such as in 
Campbell v MGN, 14 is unprotected and could be published in Malaysia. As far as 
Malaysia is concerned, the meaning of press is governed by section 2 of the PPA, which 
may not cover the on-line press. 
Privacy on the other hand is an elusive concept. Privacy is difficult to define because it's 
meaning varies widely according to context. But the study vehemently argues that the 
importance of privacy is worth legal protection. Since the study focuses on the invasion 
of privacy by the press through publication of personal information, the scope of privacy 
is, thus, confined to informational privacy. This is not to suggest that the concept of 
privacy can be sufficiently clarified based on this aspect of privacy alone. Further 
deliberation on privacy will be made in chapter 4 of the study. 
This study aims to reform and develop the law on protection of privacy against the 
invasion of the press in Malaysia. The law should be in tandem with the widely 
recognized protection such as under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), yet sensitive to the 
local conditions. The study argues that though Malaysia is not obliged to apply the 
ECHR, the positive obligation under the ECHR with regard to freedom of expression and 
privacy could be emulated by Malaysia. This argument finds its justification in the 
constitutional guarantee on freedom of expression as the right of the Malaysian citizens. 
Thus, the commitment to uphold the right, which is strong under the ECHR, should 
commensurate the proclamation of the right as a fundamental liberty in the Malaysian 
Constitution. In order to achieve this, the study will first analyse the state of protection of 
freedom of expression and privacy under the UK and Malaysian law. Secondly, the study 
will examine the intriguing issue of competing interests between freedom of expression 
and privacy in the UK and Malaysia. The study seeks to establish the fact that the 
14 [2003] QB 633. 
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protection of privacy is piecemeal and incomplete in contrast with the constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression particularly in Malaysia. 
In addition, the study will also analyse the application of techniques to accommodate the 
competing approaches in order to determine the issue of competing interests. The study 
seeks to defend the view that general balancing is unsatisfactory to resolve the issue of 
conflicting fundamental rights between freedom of expression and privacy. It also 
assesses the effectiveness of self-regulation in protecting right of privacy against the 
invasive act of the press. Last but not least, the study also examines the suitability of 
applying self-regulation in relation to the press, as practice in the UK, a country of 
different legal ambience. 
1.1.1 CONSTRAINT AND DIFFICULTY 
The scarcity of materials in terms of academic discussions and debates on privacy in 
Malaysia is the main difficulty encountered by the writer. This is established through 
library research based on catalogue and web-surfing on the internet by searching under 
the phrase "right of privacy" and "privacy" up to date. Research through Malaysian legal 
reports, The Malayan Law Journal and The Current Law Journal, found only one case 
Public Prosecutor v Haji Kassim, 15 where invasion of privacy was mentioned in the 
context of Article 5 (1) of the Federal Constitution. Unfortunately, the court did not 
deliberate on the point because the real issue was admissibility of evidence. Moreover, 
discussion on privacy by local writers (Malaysian) is either summarised or included as a 
peripheral issue. 
The writer finds that most of the writings on privacy in Malaysia are related to the 
proposed personal data protection law. The introduction of such law in the near future 
would undoubtedly change the landscape of Malaysian law whereby protection of 
informational privacy becomes part of the features of the law. However, the question as 
to what extent it will protect freedom of the press and privacy is still vague as the law is 
13 [ 1971 ]2 MLJ 114. 
7 
still in its preliminary stage. Therefore, discussion on privacy in Malaysia in this study 
could be considered as a preliminary work for a future researcher in this area. 
To the knowledge of the writer there is no study on right of privacy in Malaysia that has 
been conducted before. Neither has there been any comparative study being done on this 
subject up to date. Nevertheless, there is a recent book on `Privacy and Data Protection: 
A Comparative Analysis with Special Reference to the Malaysian Proposed Law' by 
Munir and Yasin (2002). 16 The book however does not present a comparative study on 
the subject of freedom of the press and privacy. The main subject of the writing is on data 
protection law, where privacy in the Malaysian context is discussed in general. 
The fact that there is lack of discussion on privacy in Malaysia contributes to the scarcity 
of materials on the subject. This is one of the reasons that motivate the writer to embark 
on this study. Considering that right of privacy in Malaysia is underdeveloped, the study 
then is conducted based on a comparative approach. The next discussion will focus on the 
rationale and appropriateness of the approach in relation to the study. 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
1.2.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The study adopts a comparative analysis as the methodological approach. This method is 
applied because the study relates to fundamental rights and it seeks to reform and develop 
law involving such rights. Moreover, the method is a useful tool for law reform. '7 In this 
context, Manning contends that a comparative analysis is necessary in order to avoid 
mistakes. 18 He also argues that the experience of courts in another country is useful in 
case of human rights and fundamental freedom. 
16 Munir, A. B. and Yasin, S. H. (2002) Privacy and Data Protection: A Comparative Analysis with Special 
Reference to the Malaysian Proposed Law. Malaysia, Sweet and Maxwell. 
17 Kahn-Freund, 0. On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law. (1974) 37 MLR 1,2. 
"'Manning, M. (1983) Rights, Freedom and the Courts: A Practical Analysis of the Constitution Act 1982. 
Toronto, 12. 
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This study relies on the approach proposed by Zweigert and Kotz. 19 They suggest that 
when there is a specific comparative problem that the study is devoted to, the author: 
... first lays out the essentials of the relevant 
foreign law... and then uses 
this material as a basis for critical comparison, ending up with conclusion 
about proper policy for the law to adopt, which may involve a 
reinterpretation of his own system. 20 
Instead of presenting a comparative analysis on relevant issues in each chapter, 21 the 
study analyses the issues in each respective jurisdiction, Malaysia and the UK, and offers 
separate comparative analysis at the later stage. This is to enable the lay readers to get 
familiar with and for better understanding on the issues and its development in the 
respective jurisdictions. Moreover, the aim of the study is not merely to find similarities 
and differences of practices and laws of different jurisdictions but to reform and develop 
law on the subject that is underdeveloped in Malaysia. Therefore, the writer views that by 
laying the backdrop of the practices, issues and development on the subject in one 
country would help to achieve the projected aim. Nevertheless, the writer will highlight 
some important points in due course, as the discussion progresses, particularly on the 
similarities and differences between the two jurisdictions in the respective chapters. 
The approach is considered appropriate as the subject of the study relates to human 
rights . 
22 This is because it enlightens the law at the national level by relaxing a fixed 
dogma and complacency. It helps to develop principles consistent with the recognised 
international standard in pursuing a unitary sense of justice. The benefit of this approach 
is that it allows the procurement of knowledge23 of another legal system for the purpose 
of law reform in one's own system. The comparative approach can lead to the 
identification of gaps in knowledge and may point to possible directions that could be 
followed. It also helps to sharpen the focus of analysis of the subject under study by 
suggesting new perspectives. 
19 Zweigert, K and Kotz, H. (1998) Introduction to Comparative Law. Translated by Weir, T. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
2otid, 6. 
21 Reitz, J. C. How to Do Comparative Law. (1998) 46 AJCL 617,634. 
u Webb, A. Comparative Analysis of Data Protection Laws in Australia and Germany. (2003) 2 JILT. 
Lq: //eli. warwick. ac. uk/jilt/03-2/webb. htmi 
23 Sacco, R. Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law. (1991) 39 AJCL 1,5. 
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Furthermore, comparative approach is a catalyst for developing ideas and solution. It is 
an inspiring mechanism for legal transformation that takes into account the differences in 
socio-economic and politic-cultural of respective jurisdictions. It recreates the legal 
landscape by avoiding transplantation. This is one of the problems envisage in a 
comparative approach which the writer focuses on next. 
The writer is aware that there are problems using comparative approach especially when 
it involves a recommendation to introduce a new law modeling on a foreign law. The fact 
that a comparative approach has to deal with a foreign law does not necessarily mean that 
transplantation of foreign laws and principles is the appropriate way. To apply a foreign 
model developed to suit a particular social, political and cultural condition of one 
country, as an instrument of social or cultural change is inappropriate. 4 Thus, 
transplantation is inappropriate in a country that does not subscribe to a peculiar social 
and political structure (Kahn-Freund, 1974). In this context, Zweigert and Kotz caution 
that effort to adopt a foreign solution must answer the question whether it will work in 
the country that adopts it 25 Although foreign laws and principles may be appealing, it 
will be worthless if it could not be practically applied. Nevertheless, transplantation could 
offer a practical benefit for the purpose of standardisation of law particularly in the area 
of business and commerce under the international trade. 
On the other hand, the application of foreign principles that suggest a solution to a 
problem should not be rejected on the ground that it is foreign and therefore 
unacceptable. 26 Even though the goal is not to unify the individuality of a legal system, 
nonetheless, it provides an avenue for reasons and rationales 
In addition, Beer cautions the problems confronting comparative studies where there is a 
tendency toward legal chauvinism and cultural insularism. 7 According to Beer, legal 
chauvinism represents a belief that a particular legal system constitutes the best general 
model for the world in terms of justice, rationality, efficiency, sophistication and 
24 Kahn-Freund, n. 15,5. 
u Zweigert, n. 17,17. 
26 ibid. 
27 Beer, L. W. (1984) Freedom ofEzpression in Japan. Tokyo, 21. 
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adherence to a given constitutional ideology. This attitude is prevalent during the 
colonialist dominance. 
Unfortunately, a similar attitude is subtly emerging today whereby Western legalism 
through democracy and fundamental freedom is being exported to other developing and 
third world countries. The fight against terrorism intensifies the propagation of 
democracy to other countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and other middle-eastern 
countries. Such act is not well received by other sovereign countries such as Malaysia. It 
is perceived as a form of cultural imperialism since the propagation of democracy is from 
the lenses of Western's liberal philosophy point of view. In this regard, comparative 
approach is pertinent in order to establish whether a dichotomy of Western and Eastern 
perceptions on fundamental rights has any coherent foundation. 
On the other hand, cultural insularism or relativism relates to a conviction that a 
resolution of a legal problem must be in accordance with local particularities without 
reference to outside experiences and principles. 28 The writer argues that this will only 
deter the development of domestic legal principles, particularly in dealing with the 
complexity of legal problems at international level. The insensitivity of legal chauvinism 
or universalism towards local particularities and the uncompromising aspect of relativism 
require intermediate approach that could take into account both universalism and 
relativism. 9 This approach, which the writer subscribes, is based on reflective 
equilibrium by reference to John Rawls. 0 The approach promotes consideration of all 
terms without privileging either universalism or relativism in the process of 
determination. 
This leads to the next discussion on the application of foreign laws and principles, 
particularly the English law in Malaysia in the context of relativism. 
28 Beer, op. cit., supra, 21-3. 
29 See Mullender, R. Human Rights: Universalism and Cultural Relativism. (2003) 6 CRISPP 70. 
3o Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory ofJustice. Oxford, 48. 
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1.3 THE RECEPTION AND APPLICATION OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 
IN MALAYSIA 
1.3.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Malaysia is a developing country, which gained her independence from the British in 
1957. There is a historical connection between Malaysia and the UK in relation to the 
legal system. To forge a better understanding of the relation, it is necessary to look at the 
historical perspective. 
Beginning from 1511 until the independence, the Peninsular of Malaya (Malaysia before 
independence) was under four different occupations. The occupations by the Portuguese, 
Dutch and Japanese had no impact on local rules and regulations compared to the British. 
The British influence started when Francis Light landed on Penang soil, a state under the 
rule of Kedah Sultanate. Later, Penang was ceded to the British through the East India 
Company. At this stage, the English law applicable to the British subjects influenced the 
administration of Penang. The Treaty of Bangkok formalised the British rule over 
Penang soil in 1826 between Siam and Britain. The introduction of English law in 
Penang was made possible through the First Royal Charter of Justice in 1807. The 
English law was then applied to the British and non-British subjects. In this context, the 
Privy Council in Yeap Cheah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo31 said that: 
It was really immaterial to consider whether the island should be regarded 
as a ceded or newly settled territory for there is no trace of any laws 
having been established there before it was acquired by the East India 
Company. In either view the Law of England must be taken to be the 
governing law, so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of the place 
and modified in its application by these circumstances 32 
The application of English law was extended to the Straits Settlement, comprised of 
Penang, Malacca and Singapore, through the Second Royal Charter of Justice in 1826. 
The application of English law to the Federated Malay States in Peninsular Malaya was 
formalised by the introduction of the Civil Law Enactment in 1937. Section 2 (1) of the 
Enactment provides for the application of common law and equity `... as administered in 
31L. R. 6PC381. 
32 Ibid, 393. 
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England at the commencement of this Enactment... shall be in force in the Federated 
Malay States... ' The Enactment was amended in 1956 to enable its application to the 
whole states in the Federation of Malaya. 
1.3.2 THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 3 CIVIL LAW ACT 1956 
Currently, the application of the English law in Malaysia is governed by the Civil Law 
Act 1956 (Revised 1972). Section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 provides: 
Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by 
any written law in force in Malaysia, the Court shall - 
(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of 
England and the rules of equity as administered in England on the 7th day 
of April 1956; 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of 
general application shall be applied so far only as the circumstances of the 
States of Malaysia and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to 
such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary. 
The incorporation of the common law of England enables the courts in Malaysia to apply 
the law subject to two important conditions. First, only in so far as the circumstances 
permit and second, save where no provision has been made by statute law. The provision 
permits the acceptance of the common law of England in Malaysia subject to the 
qualification that it may be lawfully modified in the future by any written law. 33 In this 
regard, Wu Min Aun argues that the proviso of local circumstances is `sensible and 
essential given the cosmopolitan nature of Malaysian society. '34 It enables the courts to 
insulate English principles that are incompatible socially and culturally with local society. 
Maxwell CJ acknowledges this in Chou Choon Neoh v Spottiswoode35 when the judge 
noted that in case of marriage and divorce for instance, it would be `impossible to apply 
our law to Mohammedans, Hindoos, and Buddhists without the most absurd and 
intolerable consequences. ' 36 
33 Fusing Construction Sdn Bhd v EON Finance Bhd & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 95. 
34 Wu, M. A. (1999) The Malaysian Legal System. Kuala Lumpur, 105. 
35 (1869) 1 Ky216. 
36 Ibid, 221. 
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This background serves as a basis for the study to argue that the application of foreign 
laws needs to be insulated by local conditions. On the other hand, reliance on local 
conditions should not be an excuse to refuse the universality nature of certain foreign 
laws particularly in relation to human rights. 
Section 3 (1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 is to be interpreted together with Article 160 (2) 
of the Malaysia Constitution or vice versa. Article 160 (2) provides inter alia: 
"Law" includes written law, the common law in so far as it is in operation 
in the Federation, or any part thereof, and any custom or usage having the 
force of law in the Federation or any part thereof. 
This definition only authorizes the reception of common law '... in so far as it is in 
operation in the Federation ... '. The Federal Court in Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v 
Kekatong Sdn Bhd37 ruled that if Article 160 (2) is not interpreted together with section 3 
(1), it would render the section otiose as far as the modification of the common law is 
concerned in the future. 
The approach of Malaysian courts to the development of common law is to be found in 
the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani CJ in the Supreme Court case of Chung Khiaw Bank 
Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor. 38 In this case the court refused to follow the 
question of public policy in considering illegality of contract under the common law 
since the courts in this country are bound by the statutory provisions of the Contracts Act 
1950. The judge said: 
Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 directs the courts to apply the 
common law of England only in so far as the circumstances permit and 
save where no provision has been made by statute law. The development 
of the common law after 7 April 1956 (for the States of Malaya) is entirely 
in the hands of the courts of this country. We cannot just accept the 
development of the common law in England. 39 
Thus, the application of the common law of England after the cut-off date is within the 
discretionary power of the courts on the basis of persuasive authority. This is further 
37 [2004] 2 MLJ 257,265. 
38 [1990] 1 MLJ 356. 
391bid, 361. 
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illustrated by the case of Sri Inai (Pulau Pinang) Sdn Bhd v Yong Yit Swee & Ors. 40 In 
this case the Court of Appeal disagreed with the application of section 3 of the Civil Law 
Act 1956 by the High Court. The court overruled the High Court's decision in refusing 
the principle in an English case AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden41 on the ground that it 
was a case decided after the coming into force of the Civil Law Act 1956. The court 
found that the High Court overlooked the decision of the Federal Court in Lembaga 
Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors42 that applied AC Billings case. This 
decision was binding on the court under the doctrine of precedent. 
The above cases show that the Malaysian legal system is receptive towards the 
application of foreign principles in developing the system especially in the area where 
there is no legal provision. Raja Azlan Shah FJ observed that `We look at other 
Constitutions to learn from their experiences, and from a desire to see how their progress 
and well-being is ensured by their fundamental law. '43 It has been noted that 
comparative law has played an important part in the progress of the Malaysian legal 
system through the process of reformation and development. Thus, it is safe to say that 
importation of outside laws is being practiced but only if it passes the requirement of 
local circumstances. Arguably, this requirement is very subjective. It is for Parliament to 
change the law if it deems the circumstances justify such change. 
Nevertheless, any changes should be in accordance with the Constitution. In Malaysia, 
Parliament derives its legislative powers from the Constitution. 4 Article 4 (1) of the 
Constitution proclaims that the supreme law in Malaysia is the Constitution. Any law 
passed by Parliament, which is inconsistent with the Constitution, is void to the extent of 
the inconsistency. Faruqi argues that the principle of constitutional supremacy in 
Malaysia is more notional than real 45 This is because of the reluctance of the courts to 
invalidate legislation on the ground of unconstitutionality. The attitude is apparent, for 
40 [2003] 1 MLJ 273. 
41 [1958] AC 240. 
42 [1984] 1 MLJ 283. 
43 Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187,189. 
4' Article 66 of the Federal Constitution. 
45 Faruqi, S. Liberal enough to give life to the law. The Star, 2 °d September 2001,40. 
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instance, in AG v Chiow Thiam Guan46 the court ruled that if Parliament deems it 
necessary that the death penalty should be mandatory it is not within the province of the 
court to adjudicate upon the wisdom of such a law. The court said that `The law may be 
harsh but the role of the courts is only to administer the law as it stands. ' On the contrary, 
in the UK Parliament is sovereign. The sovereignty of Parliament means that it has an 
absolute power to legislate on any matters. 47 The courts are under a duty to apply the 
legislation passed by Parliament and could not invalidate an Act of Parliament. This 
position is reiterated by Lord Reid in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke, 48a case concerned 
the declaration of independence by the Rhodesian government from the UK Parliament to 
legislate for Rhodesia. 
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
The study is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the issues that the writer 
seeks to pursue. It also rationalises the aim and objectives of the study, which is to 
develop and reform the law on freedom of expression and privacy in Malaysia. - The 
meaning and scope of the study as suggested by the title is dealt with in this chapter. To 
give a sense of clear direction, the study is centered on the theme that privacy can be 
better protected and freedom of expression can be adequately safeguarded yet 
development must be sensitive to the local particularities. This chapter also justifies the 
method of comparative approach adopted by the study. It explains the benefits and 
usefulness of the approach in relation to the subject matter of the study. It also describes 
the relationship between the Malaysian legal system and the UK from historical 
perspective and at present. This provides the background in order to understand and 
discern the similarities and differences in the subjects of the study relating to the practice 
of freedom of expression and privacy in the UK and Malaysia. 
Chapter 2 presents the state of freedom of expression in the UK. In this chapter, the 
practice of free speech and expression in the UK is critically examined. The chapter 
begins with the rationales and justifications for freedom of expression. This is necessary 
46 [1983] 1 MLJ 51: 52. See also Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187,188. 
47 Bradley, A. W. and Ewing, K. D. (1998) Constitutional Law and Administrative Law. London, 58. 
49 [1969] 1 AC 645,723. 
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in view of the fact that freedom of expression is vital in a democratic society. It also 
investigates the protection and restrictions on freedom of expression before and after the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. It seeks to establish whether there exists a 
form of hierarchical rights that makes freedom of expression more important than 
privacy. Though there is no such form of rights, the study seeks to reveal that strong 
emphasis is given to the right based on judicial and extra judicial pronouncements. The 
chapter also examines freedom of the press and assesses the practice of a self-regulatory 
system. In addition it also investigates the influence of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in relation to the practice of freedom of expression at the national level. 
Chapter 3 examines the state of freedom of expression in Malaysia. It discusses the 
meaning and scope of freedom of expression under the constitution. This is to lay a 
background for further discussion on the protection and restrictions of the right. It seeks 
to reveal that although freedom of expression is a constitutional right, wide parameter of 
limitation impinges on its practice. Emphasis on the well being of the nation allows wide 
interpretation of restrictions, which at times is used for ulterior interest such as to 
maintain political power. It also examines the approach by the judiciary in protecting the 
fundamental right particularly in the interpretation of the constitutional constraints. The 
chapter also focuses on the freedom of the press. Though there is no specific 
constitutional protection of press freedom, discussion is offered on the provision of 
freedom of speech. The chapter analyses the impact of several restrictive laws on the 
exercise of press freedom in Malaysia. It also investigates the influence of the executive 
in the interpretation and application of the laws. It reveals that the press is heavily 
regulated and constrained at two stages: formation and operation. 
Chapter 4 continues the approach as adopted in Chapter 2 whilst focusing on the state of 
privacy in the UK. The chapter examines the protection of privacy before and after the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The incorporation of the Convention rights, which include the 
protection of privacy, leads to incremental development for protection of privacy. 
Though the Act does not provide horizontal protection in clear terms, there is a 
constructive development moving toward accepting privacy under the existing legal 
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framework. This chapter also analyses whether the law on breach of confidence is a 
sufficient framework to accommodate privacy. It also examines the invasive act of the 
press, which is a contributing factor toward the development of privacy law in the UK. 
This chapter investigates the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights 
particularly on right of privacy. The chapter also reveals that the incorporation of 
Convention rights has changed the legal landscape of the UK law on human rights. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the state of privacy in Malaysia. There is no specific provision on 
right of privacy in the constitution. In relation to this, the chapter analyses the 
constitutional provision in Article 5, which provides for right of life. The application of 
purposive approach by the courts will enable the inclusion of privacy under the extended 
meaning of life. The chapter also examines the piecemeal and incomplete protections 
accorded to privacy interest under statutory laws and common law principles. It seeks to 
argue that in the absence of statutory protection, common law principles that are 
recognised by Article 160 (2) of the Constitution may provide the necessary protection. It 
also assesses the power of the Human Rights Commission as a statutory body in 
providing institutionalized protection on right of privacy in Malaysia. 
Chapter 6 considers the issue of accommodating competing interests. It concentrates on 
three possible approaches to resolve the issue. The chapter examines the balancing 
approach as the common approach to the issue. This chapter argues that the approach is 
inappropriate due to distortions in the exercise of balancing approach. In addition, it also 
examines the principle of proportionality as an approach that may provide satisfactory 
resolution. Furthermore, the chapter also discusses another accommodating principle 
based on incommensurability. The latter approach does not require balancing exercise, 
instead it provides for resolution of competing interests by way of choice. 
Chapter 7 presents the critical analysis on the freedom of the press and privacy in 
Malaysia and the UK. It analyses protection of privacy based on three models. It seeks 
to establish that universalism, as a model does not reflect the actual requirement of local 
needs and conditions. Reliance on local particularities as the model for protection of 
human rights may be unreasonable considering the fact that modem society evolves. The 
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Malaysian government is more in favour of this model in protecting the interest of the 
nation and its people. The justification for such a stance is that foreign elements are 
incompatible with the local culture and social lives. The chapter seeks to argue that the 
third model on reflective equilibrium provides a pragmatic approach in protecting human 
rights. This model manages to integrate the universal principles with the local needs and 
conditions by concentrating on the compatibility aspect rather than the differences. It also 
seeks to submit that the press in Malaysia needs liberalisation in term of regulation. This 
is to allow the press to function effectively in creating a vibrant democracy. The chapter 
will argue that self-regulation in Malaysia is not appropriate under the present conditions. 
Chapter 8 will conclude that the provision of necessity and expedience in Article 10 (2) 
of the Malaysian Constitution impairs the development of the law particularly in relation 
to freedom of expression and the press. As such, the power of the courts to check any 
transgression of fundamental rights is limited due to the constitutional supremacy. The 
chapter will also reveal that the provision gives a wide power to the legislature and the 
executive to set the parameters of the exercise of the freedom of expression and the press. 
In this regard, the writer will conclude that there is a necessity to liberalise the press. The 
chapter will also recommend for the creation of a specific body to regulate the conduct of 
the press in its relation with the public. This should exist in the form of a statutory body 
instead of an independent self-regulatory body on a co-regulation basis. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with a recommendation that there should be a specific law on 
privacy in Malaysia. The writer will also suggest that the law could be incrementally 
developed by the courts in the absence of the willingness of the government to introduce 
the law. Considering the lack of commitment by the government on privacy as a 
fundamental right at the time the study is conducted, the introduction of the law on 
privacy could be informed by the dynamism of the common law. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE UK 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression is a right of fundamental importance in a liberal-democratic 
society such as in the United Kingdom (UK). Most obviously, this right serves the 
interests of individuals in the society. Yet, it also serves wider interests such as the 
public interests in a vibrant democratic discourse. However, the importance of freedom of 
expression does not make it an absolute right. Now given effect in the UK by operation 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), Article 10 (1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) declares that `Everyone has the right to freedom of expression'. 
Nevertheless, the article also recognises several interests deemed to be necessary in a 
democratic society, as exceptions to the exercise of freedom of expression. These 
interests are, for instance, national security, territorial integrity or public safety, disorder 
or crime, health or morals and reputation or rights of others. 49 
Traditionally, the common law perceived freedom of expression as a negative right. On 
this point, Berlin regards negative liberty as freedom from interference. 50 This notion 
imposes limitations on the extent of freedom that people can enjoy. It does not recognise 
freedom of expression as an intrinsic personal right that can be invoked in case of 
infringement. In other words, it is a residual of what is prohibited by the law. 51 In this 
regard, Lord Donaldson explained in AG v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) 52 that `the 
starting point of our domestic law is that every citizen has a right to do what he likes, 
unless restrained by the common law or by statute. 'S3 Thus, freedom to express or hold 
opinions as well as to receive and impart information is exercisable only within the 
confines of law. 
49 Article 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
50 Berlin, I. (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. London, Oxford University Press. 
51 Lord Irvine. (2003) Human Rights, Constitutional Law and the Development of the English Legal 
System. Oxford, 21. 
s [1990] 1 AC 109. 
53 This remark reflects Hobbesian point of view where `freedom lies in the silence of law'. See 
Macpherson, C. B. (ed. ) (1968) Leviathan. Middlesex, Penguin Books. 
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The threat of erosion of the right is greater because prohibitive laws can always be 
introduced by the sovereign legislature. 54 Protection of fundamental rights under this 
residual approach is less convincing as it depends on the will-power of the government. 
Socio-political and economic interests often influence the will-power. In this context, 
Dworkin argues that a government may have a `mundane and corrupting insensitivity to 
liberty. '55 Thus, as far as the UK is concerned, there is a need for protection of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
On the other hand, it is untenable to say that freedom of expression is intended to accord 
every citizen an absolute right to speech, write or print whatever he might please, without 
any responsibility, public or private. Civil society embracing democratic values cannot 
subsist under such circumstances. In such a society, freedom to express and publish 
relates to conduct of an individual that concerns other people. In this relation, there are 
situations when restrictions are necessary to protect other countervailing interests, public 
or private, such as security and crime, or reputation and privacy. The basic question that 
needs to be addressed is should the exercise of the freedom be allowed to its fullest 
meaning or is restriction required? 
This chapter will examine the state of freedom of expression in term of its application 
and restrictions in the UK. It also discusses the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA) on freedom of expression, the role of the Act as an impetus to the shift of 
approach in dealing with freedom of expression in the UK. Investigation also will be 
conducted on the exercise of freedom of the press, particularly on the efficacy of self- 
regulatory system as practiced in the UK. However, before turning to the details of the 
UK law, the rationales for freedom of expression should first be examined. 
2.1 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Justifications from political or moral perspectives have been employed to reject or 
support the inhibition of freedom of expression. Justification for freedom of expression 
can be classified into two, instrumental and intrinsic. The most common defence of 
34 See per Lord Reid in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] AC 645,723. 
55 Dworkin, R. (1988) A Bill of Rights for Britain? London, 9. 
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freedom of expression relies on the former. Instrumentalism or consequentialism treats 
freedom of expression as valuable because it contributes to some desirable state of affairs 
(Barendt, 1985; Greenawalt, 1989; Raz, 1991). On the other hand, instrumental 
justification does not make people possess any intrinsic moral right to say whatever they 
wish. The core argument by instrumentalists is that the value of freedom of expression is 
an acquired value, as a mean co-exists with other valuable ends. 6 The justifications put 
forward by this argument, inter alia, are pursuit of truth, autonomy or self-fulfillment and 
democracy. Arguably, instrumentalism is fragile in the sense that it allows other interests 
to inhibit the right rather than protecting it. It is also limited because protection is mainly 
focused on one category of expression, political speech. 57 
2.1.1 TRUTH 
The search for truth is made possible through the market place of ideas where all kinds of 
information is available free and uninhibited. John Milton propounds the justification on 
truth in his celebrated writing, Areopagitica. 58 Milton's argument on truth is used in the 
context of abhorrence against a system that imposed prior approval and licensed by the 
Crown for all books printed. 
The defence of freedom of speech based on truth is closely associated with John Stuart 
Mill in his writing On Liberty. 59 The crux of Mill's argument is that freedom of speech 
in its full meaning can lead to the fording of truth. He argues that there should be the 
widest possible latitude for freedom of speech regardless true or false as both types of 
speech help in the pursuit for truth. Restrictions on freedom of speech will only inhibit 
the pursuit of truth and impede the ascertainment of accurate judgment. 60 
56 See Greenawalt, K. Free Speech Justifications. (1989) Col. LR 89. See also Mullender, R. (2002) 
Freedom of Political Expression. In Alder, J. General Principle of Constitutional and Administrative Law. 
Houndmills, 458. 
57 Dworkin, R. (1999). Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Oxford, 201. 
58 Rhys, E. (ed. ) (1927) Areopagitica and other Prose Works of John Milton. London, J. M. Dent & Sons 
Ltd. 
59 Gray, J. (ed. ) (1998) John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 60 Ibid, 21. 
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The justification of free speech on Mill's account is instrumental because he believes that 
the publication of a possibly true statement is the highest public good. Mill also believed 
that truth could be revealed through the so-called free market of ideas. Free market idea 
is considered as an opportunity where open discussions can lead to truth. This is 
articulated by Justice Holmes in Abrams v United States61 when he said that `the best of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, 
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can safely be carried out. '62 
In a modem society, this can be equated to open discussions with technology sources 
through the information super-highway on internet. Nevertheless, it is hard to defend the 
attainment of truth when unequal accessibility exists in laissez-faire. 3 The openness of 
the market gives advantage to the dominant party to control the dissemination of 
information. For instance, the government or the owner of the media is in the position to 
suppress news coverage or project certain agenda. Moreover, preferred ideas can always 
dominate the market by way of powerful manipulation for political or commercial 
interests. It is doubtful if there is a level playing field under this situation. Thus, the 
notion of the free market has to be considered with some scepticism. TM In today's context, 
the market is influenced by commercial considerations, which treat information like any 
other profitable commodities. The attainment of truth through market model may not be 
feasible if the concern is on distribution of information through this manner. 65 
The exercise of freedom of speech in a wider sense, regardless of true or false, as 
propagated by Mill is incongruent with the aspiration of tolerance in maintaining peace 
within a plural society. Though vigorous discussion would enable the truth to emerge out 
of false speech, the immediate adverse effect of false speech on public order, for instance, 
need to be balanced against the long term benefits of uninhibited discussion. 66 
61(1919) 250 U. S. 616. 
62 [bid, 630. 
63 Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford, 810. 
64 William, B. (1979) Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship. Cmnd 7772, para 5.19. 
65 Campbell, T. (1994) Rationales for Freedom of Communication. In Campbell, T. and Sadurski, W. (eds. ) 
Freedom of Communication. Aldershot, 24. 
66 Barendt, E. (1985) Freedom of Speech. Oxford, 10. 
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2.1.2 AUTONOMY 
Another justification for freedom of speech, which has an intrinsic value, is autonomy. 
Freedom of expression is valued in liberal thought because it empowers the autonomy of 
67 personhood. It is an integral part of individual self-development and fulfillment. 
Autonomy of a person to form judgment exists if he is free to consider for himself 
various arguments from different courses of action. 68 
This theory seeks to defend freedom of expression from interference that may curtail the 
exercise of independent judgment. This is because freedom of expression promotes 
individual autonomy, which is a valuable end in itself. The ability to choose one's own 
course in life without interference is a virtue of human dignity. Thus imposition of 
restriction will only injure dignity and a thwart to self-fulfillment. 69 Some writers 
consider this theory from the non-consequentialist point of view and defend the theory in 
its narrow sense (Scanlon, 1972; Brison, 1998; Dworkin, 1999). 
However, Greenawalt argues that autonomy contributes to other satisfactions that are 
morally good. 70 Freedom of expression helps to achieve an independent judgment and 
informed decision-making, an aspect of traditional liberal theory. As a responsible moral 
agent, a person should be given the opportunity to make his own decision without 
interference. Thus, suppression of speech should not be exercised on the ground of 
harmful belief or indulge in harmful acts. In order to make an independent judgment he 
should be free to discuss and debate openly. Only then is he capable to arrive at his own 
moral conviction. 
Argument from autonomy rules out any kind of dictation or external interference. 
Therefore, the element of sovereignty in making a decision as to what to believe is vital 
in order to become an autonomous person. Autonomy also requires a person to be able to 
exercise an independent judgment before accepting the views of others. From a 
67 Scanlon, T. A Theory of Freedom of Expression (1972) 1 Philos Public Af 204. 68 Barendt, op. cit., n. 64,19. 
69 Hirsch, A. V. Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offense to Others. (1986) 
Mich. L R, 705. 
70 Greenawalt, K. Free Speech Justification. (1989) Col. LR 89,119. 
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communitarian point of view, a person needs to apply rationality in exercising his 
sovereignty in making decisions and weighing conflicting interests. This is because the 
independent judgment of an autonomous person might not be entirely the exercise of his 
sovereign faculty. Rather it is influenced by external factors that affect his rationality. 
7' 
An autonomous person who is in full possession of his faculties ought to bear the 
consequence of his own judgment. If he could not be deprived of his independent 
judgment, he also could not assign the responsibility for the harm he could cause to 
others. To do so would tantamount to relinquishing the status of rational, sovereign and 
autonomous agent. 
2.1.3 DEMOCRACY 
Freedom of expression is a necessary and a vital element of a democratic society. From a 
constitutional standpoint, democracy means that a government is subject to conditions of 
equal status for all citizens. 2 The argument from democracy asserts that freedom of 
expression is essential in providing the citizens with the information they need in order to 
exercise their choice and to engage in the necessary deliberative process in making the 
choice. But the view from the minority plays a role in keeping the government under 
scrutiny and alerting the public to any malpractice that affect their interests. Thus, the 
exercise of free expression under constitutional democracy sometimes permits the interest 
of minority to prevail over the power of majority. 
73 Democratic society flourishes 
socially as well as politically when freedom of expression is given ample space without 
undue curtailment. An example to support the point is the debate in the UK on the 
legitimacy of the war in Iraq, which informed the people to assess the performance of the 
government. 
The process of democracy allows public opinion on matters that not only affect their 
personal interests but also the public interest. The space and respect given by democracy 
has made it the most influential vehicle for the exercise of freedom and liberty. It can be 
71 Kymlicka, W. (1991) Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford, 61. 
n Raz, J. Free Expression and Personal Identification. (1991) 2 OJLS, 323. 
73 Allan, T. R. S. (2000) Common Law Constitutionalism and Freedom of Speech. In J. Beatson and Y. 
Cripps (eds. ) Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information. Oxford, 17. 
25 
said that the argument from democracy presents three sets of interests. First, is the 
interest of the speaker in exercising his liberty to participate in the process of democracy. 
Second, is the interest of the government in measuring their effectiveness and even 
popularity based on criticisms and public reactions. Third, is the interest of the public in 
being well informed so that they are better able to make judgment on issues affecting 
them as a whole. 
Notably, democracy involves people in shaping the government. It allows the people to 
voice-up their concern on issues that affect their interest. Discussion on issues of public 
interest by pressure groups such as Liberty UK, Amnesty International and Article 19 
organisation, sometimes give impact on the government's action. The peoples' liberty 
and equality are the embodiments of this collective framework that must be respected. 
Their participation in the process enables them to communicate their ideas, propositions, 
responses and even criticisms. In making democracy a functional process, freedom and 
liberty to express, thus, must be protected. In this regard, it is not just the right to express 
but the exercise of that right that reflects the functional part of democracy. 
Democratic society plays a role to check and balance elected institutions. It is against the 
tenets of democracy to restrict public opinion and participation in a just and transparent 
government. For this reason, the call for open and accountable government is common. 
On the other hand, a vibrant democratic right such as freedom of expression may not 
flourish if democracy is only confined to a representative system. 74 It also allows the 
executive to become a powerful body in situation where there is a vague separation of 
power. In this regard, Rawls observes that `power is corruptible, fallible and inefficient, 
it should not be trusted. It should be hedged and fenced. '75 Under a powerful executive, 
the scope of freedom of expression is determined in accordance with policies set by them. 
The effect would be that public participation might no longer have a forceful impact. The 
participation is limited to consultation of democratic input, which may be of less value in 
framing the policies. 
74 Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
75 Rawls, J. (1970) A Theory ofJustice. Oxford, 428. 
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As much as democracy upholds freedom of expression, it also necessitates regulations on 
free expression. This is because plural values are recognized in democracy. The needs to 
preserve social harmony and public order are a constitutive part of a democratic society. 
Therefore, the people must be prepared to waive certain rights and freedom for the sake 
of the society as a whole. It is difficult to maintain that inhibition of freedom of 
expression is against democratic values since the inhibitions exist through a democratic 
process under the representative system. On the other hand, democracy does not condone 
total freedom of expression. For instance, in order to avoid a harmful effect on racial 
harmony in a plural democratic society, racial and hate speech need to be constrained. 
This can be illustrated with the events of racial riots in the UK and Malaysia, in 2001 and 
1964 respectively, where in both cases racial and hate speech triggered bloody incidents. 
Democracy is pragmatic in the sense that it allows the exercise of freedom and at the 
same time necessitates restriction on the basis of toleration. 76 
Open discussions and debates contribute toward social change, which may provide fair 
opportunity for the people to participate. It also prevents institutional stagnation by 
authoritarianism under which public discussion is orchestrated in pursuant to the interest 
of the authority rather than the governed. 77 People respond and react when their interests 
are affected. For instance, in the UK the government's plan to introduce a mandatory 
possession of identity card receive mixed response from the public. The skeptics argue, 
inter alia, the identity card would erode the human rights especially with regard to 
invasion of privacy. 
Moreover, expression of a state of unhappiness should not be restricted especially when it 
involves public expressions on communal matters. This is a form of public participation, 
which serves as check and balance to any collective and transparent governance. 
Nevertheless, if the communicative activities cross the legal limits and affect other 
recognized interests, public or personal, restriction is a legitimate course of action. On 
76 Harris, et al (1995) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. London, Butterworth, 377. n Kersch, K. I. (2003) Freedom of Speech: Rights and Liberties under the Law. Santa Barbara, 212. 
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this premise, perhaps democracy is the most persuasive justification for freedom of 
expression. 78 
2.2 THE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE UK 
2.2.1 PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Traditionally, the protection of freedom of expression in the UK is accorded by the 
common law. The freedom is secured through judicial decisions, which determine the 
rights of individuals and the courts protect those rights by granting appropriate remedies. 
However, the courts are powerless in protecting the rights when Parliament introduces 
restrictive laws that affect the rights. This is because in the UK, Parliament possesses 
absolute power to legislate any law under the principle of Parliamentary supremacy. 79 
The courts have no power to abrogate law enacted by Parliament. This is illustrated by 
the recent decisions of the House of Lords that ruled against the Anti-Terrorism law in 
the UK. 
From this perspective, freedom of expression is a negative right that is merely the residue 
of freedom left after restrictions imposed by the law. This renders the exercise of freedom 
of expression relying on the commitment of the legislature in upholding individual 
liberties. This position is explained by Lord Donaldson when he said that `the starting 
point of our domestic law is that every citizen has a right to do what he likes, unless 
restrained by the common law or by statute' 80 
The UK approach in relation to freedom of expression is influenced by Dicey81 who 
regards individual liberty in term of residual character. Under this approach, a person is 
free to do anything as long as there is no legal restraint. The absence of a positive right 
renders it subservient to other competing public and private interests. According to the 
traditional view, the legality of restrictions on the right cannot be challenged since the 
power to determine the scope of the right rests with Parliament. 
78 Barendt, E. (1985) Freedom of Speech. London, 23. 
"Mullender, R Parliamentary supremacy, the constitution and the judiciary. (1998) 45 NILQ 138. 
80 AG v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109,283. 
81 Dicey, A. V. (1959) Introduction to the study of the law of Constitution. London, Macmillian. 
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On the other hand, the government through the influence of the executive can also set 
limit on freedom of expression in order to protect other interests. This is possible by 
proposing new laws, which have the effect of restricting the right, to Parliament. The 
government also can leave the matter to the courts to develop legal principles on the basis 
of common law system. 2 
However, there are some types of speech that enjoy protection in positive terms. 
83 The 
protection of individual liberty in the UK is described in Liversidge v Anderson84 where 
the safeguard of the British liberty is in accordance with the particularities of the people. 
This is also reflected in the system of representatives and the responsible government, 
which has evolved. This approach is illustrated in the classical case Beatty v Gillbanks. 
85 
In this case a march organised by the Salvation Army was forbidden because it would 
attract a large hostile crowd of people, thereby causing a breach of peace. The organizer 
ignored the order not to assemble and they were bound over to keep the peace for having 
committed the crime of unlawful assembly. On appeal, the order binding them over was 
set aside because the court found that they had done nothing wrong. The court held that 
they couldn't be prohibited from assembling merely because their lawful conduct might 
induce others to act unlawfully. Previously, freedom of expression in the UK was not 
guaranteed by a written constitution such as in the United States of America or Malaysia, 
but it is now guaranteed under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
In the UK, freedom of expression acquires high regards, as it constitutes an important 
part of individual liberties. Lord Goff emphasises this in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd 
(No 2) when he stated that `freedom of expression has existed in this country perhaps as 
long, if not longer, than it has existed in any country in the world. '86 It is highly regarded 
by Lord Steyn as intrinsically important because `it is value for its own sake. '87 This 
82 The surrogating of privacy under breach of confidence is an example to the point. 
83 Debate and proceedings in Parliament are protected against legal action. Media reporting on 
parliamentary proceedings are subject to absolute privilege. Reports of courts proceedings are protected as 
long as it is fair, accurate and without malice. Parliamentary papers and their publishers receive statutory 
protection. 
[1942] AC 206. 
85 [1882] 9 QBD 308. 
86 [1990] 1 AC 109,285. 
197 Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328,337. 
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simply means that the importance of freedom of expression does not rely on the 
consequentialists account. Hoffmann LJ gives similar emphasis when he opined that in 
case of a clash between freedom of speech and other interests, where there is no clear 
exception defined by the law, the former is a `trump card which always wins. 89 While 
this may not be true, it suggests that there is a strong presumption in favour of freedom of 
expression. Nevertheless, the judicial depiction of freedom of expression is arguable. 
Lord Bridge in Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind89 said 
that: 
Most of the rights spelled out in terms in the Convention, including the 
right to freedom of expression, are less than absolute and must in some 
cases yield to the claims of competing public interests. Thus, Article 10 
(2) of the Convention spells out and categorises the competing public 
interests by reference to which the right to freedom of expression may 
have to be curtailed 90 
The existence of several restrictive laws, such as Official Secrets Act 1989 and Public 
Order Act 1986, raises concern over the complacent view on the exercise of freedom of 
expression in the UK. 91 The laws allow for limitations on personal liberty for the purpose 
of protecting wider interest of the community. This raises a question of the UK's 
commitment in protecting freedom of expression. The violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention by the UK in several cases shows that the inhibition of freedom of expression 
is inconsistent with the Convention acceded by the government. 2 Perhaps the UK should 
be more sensitive in preserving fundamental liberties considering the fact that it was the 
first country to ratify the ECHR in 1950. 
8S Rv Central Independent Television plc [1994] 3 WLR 20,30. 
89 [199 1]1 AC 696. 
90 Ibid, 748 
91 Barendt, op. cit., n. 76,304. 
92 See Bowman v UK (1998) 26 EHRR 1, Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK 
(1993) 20 EHRR 442, Observer and Guardian v UK(1992) 14 EHRR 153 and Sunday Times v UK (1979) 
2 EHRR 245. 
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2.2.2 THE SCOPE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 1998 
Protection of freedom of expression in the UK enters into a new phase after the 
enforcement of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Act alters the foundation of individual 
rights in the UK. It affirms fundamental rights by introducing a right-based scheme. 
Under this approach, individuals are entitled to claim and defend their rights against 
infringement. Freedom of expression is now protected by operation of a statute that gives 
further effect to ECHR rights. In this respect, Lord Keith in Derbyshire County Council 
v Times Newspapers Ltc93said: 
I find it satisfactory to be able to conclude that the common law of 
England is consistent with the obligations assumed by the Crown under 
the Treaty in this particular field. 94 
Recognition of freedom of expression as an individual right under the Act imposes an 
obligation to ensure its protection. However, this is subject to the exceptions in Article 10 
(2) of the ECHR. The right acquires a fundamental status that must be given effect by the 
courts. This is in contrast with the traditional view under Dicey's approach where the 
exercise of freedom of expression is not on the basis of positive right. The incorporation 
of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the Act provides explicit statutory 
protection for freedom of expression. The Act imposes a duty on public authorities in the 
UK to act compatibly with the Convention rights 95 The courts have to give specific 
consideration to freedom of expression in order to ensure the application of the 
Convention rights. Article 10 (1) of the Convention provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authorities and regardless frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
93 [1993] AC 534. 
94 Ibid, 553. See also per Lord Goff in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109,283. 
95 Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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Under this provision every individual has the right to say and hold opinions as well as to 
receive and impart information without undue interference. A person can always invoke 
the right to protect his interest against other countervailing interests such as privacy. 
Although the protection given is in a positive form, it does not make the right absolute. 
There are duties and responsibilities that come with the exercise of the right 96 The value 
of freedom of expression is relatively reduced in case of conflict with interests under the 
purview of legitimate exceptions. These exceptions are mentioned in Article 10 (2) which 
includes: 
1. National security 
2. Territorial integrity or public safety 
3. Prevention of disorder or crime 
4. Protection of health or morals 
5. Protection of reputation or rights of others 
6. Prevention of disclosure of information received in confidence 
7. Maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
This is in contrast with the situation before the implementation of the Act where freedom 
of expression could be restricted on any ground as long as the restriction is imposed by 
law. Previously, there was no question on the nature of restriction even though it was 
draconian and autocratically imposed. For example in Brind v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department97 the government banned live media interviews with supporters of the 
IRA. The House of Lords held that, although the ban was probably misguided, it had 
some rational basis as a means of denying publicity to terrorists and was therefore valid. 
Moreover, the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy in the UK, where Parliament has an 
absolute power to create any law, impedes the prospect of challenging the legality of 
restriction on freedom of expression. However, the courts may now declare any 
legislation to be incompatible with the Convention rights under section 4 (2) of the Act. 
Even though a declaration of incompatibility does not have any impact on the validity, 
operation or enforcement of the legislation, " it may result in political pressure, 
domestically and internationally, for the government to change the law. Nevertheless, the 
96 Article 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 97 [1991] 1 AC 696. 
98 Section 4 (6) (a) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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final decision to bring any domestic law in conformity with the Convention is the 
prerogative of Parliament. 
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, restrictions must fulfill the requirement of 
`proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. '99 It allows a dissentient individual to argue 
for their Convention rights where the legality of restriction on freedom of expression can 
be questioned. 
2.2.3 POLITICAL EXPRESSION 
Article 10 of the Convention does not 'create a hierarchical classification of expression. 
The scheme of protection under the provision covers all types of expression. '°° But 
classification of expression is necessary because the degree of protection is influenced by 
the value attaching to expression. 101 The value is given relatively by reference to the 
purpose and interest of the expression. With regard to this, there are three broad 
categories of interest in expression. They fall under political, commercial and artistic 
expressions. '°2 
There is a difficulty to create a clear boundary between political speech and other forms 
of expression. In this regard, Hare argues that it is unsatisfactory to define political 
speech based on the intention or identity of the speaker. 103 Sometimes the real intention is 
a commercial motivation whereby the main contributors to political speech are 
newspapers. On the other hand, Barendt views that political speech should refer to 'all 
speech relevant to the development of public opinion on the whole range of issues which 
an intelligent citizen should think about. ' 104 
99 Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para. 49. 
100 Muller v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 212. 
101 Bailey et al (1991) Civil Liberties: Cases and Materials. London, 298. 
102 Harris et al (1995). Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. London, 397. Section 12 (4) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 provides for three types of expressive materials. They are journalistic, literary, 
and artistic. Political speech may come under the journalistic category. 
103 Hare, I. (2000). Is the Privileged Position of Political Expression Justified? In Beatson, J. and Cripps, Y. 
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It is safe to say that political expression relates to matters pertaining to the nation and its 
relation with the people. This narrow view was formed by the Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand in the case of Lange v Atkinson105 and was adopted by the House of Lords in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd. 106 The Court confined political speech only to 
'statements made about the actions and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to 
Parliament and those with immediate aspirations to be members, so far as those actions 
and qualities directly affect or affected their capacity.. . to meet their public 
responsibilities. ' 107 
There is a presumption that political expression is more important than other categories 
of speech. 108 Lord Bridge of Harwich in Hector v A-G of Antigua and Bermuda'°9 
observed that: 
In a free and democratic society it is almost too obvious to need stating 
that those who hold office in government and who are responsible for 
public administration must always be open to criticism. Any attempt to 
stifle or fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most 
insidious and objectionable kind! 0 
Political expression typically receives a high level of protection. " It dominates the area 
of and scope of discussion on matters pertaining to public issues. Expression of this kind 
is not only a matter of political parties or politicians. It also covers the process of 
democracy and the utmost important is the well being of the nation. 
In the UK, political expression acquires a high value that merits protection. 112 This type 
of expression is viewed as the `core' 113 of free speech, `lifeblood of democracy' 114, and 
105 (1998) 3 NZLR 424. 
106 [1999] 2 AC 127. 
107 [bid, 428. 
108 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407,419. 
109 Hector v A-G ofAntigua & Bermuda [1990] 2 AC 312. 
10 Ibid, 318. 
11 See Derbyshire v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534, Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 
127 and R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2002] 2 All ER 756. 
"Z Hare, op. cit., n. 100,105. 
113 Lord Keith in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 1011,1020. 
114 Lord Steyn in Rv Sec of State, exparte, Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400,408. 
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`bedrock principles'. lis Lord Steyn portrays its function as `a brake on the abuse of 
power by public official. It facilitates the exposure of the errors in the governance and 
administration of justice of the country. ' 116 The courts give more weight to freedom of 
political debate because of its importance in democratic society. 117 This is emphasised by 
the court in Rv Home Secretary, ex p. Simms. ' 18 The House of Lords in this case held 
that a prisoner has a right to a visit from a journalist in order to campaign for his 
conviction to be quashed. Lord Steyn said that it facilitates the exposure of errors in the 
governance and the administration of justice of the country. The House of Lords in 
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers' 19cautions the impact on free speech if 
public bodies are able to sue their critics where it could silent legitimate public criticism 
of their activities. 
Protection of political speech is available under common law as well as statute law. 
Protection based on common law system shows that the United Kingdom has adequate 
measures to deal with freedom of expressions. 120 Common law is perceived as flexible 
and receptive to the changing circumstances informed by moral argument. In one classic 
case relating to expressive conduct in Beatty v Gillbanks121 the court held that it was 
unlawful to prohibit people from assembling merely because their lawful conduct might 
induce others to act unlawfully. Lord Bridge in A-G v The Guardian, 122 in his dissenting 
judgment, expressed his confidence in the capacity of common law to safeguard the 
fundamental freedom essential to a free society including the right of freedom of speech. 
There are areas in which wide freedom of expression enjoys statutory protection in 
English law. This is in the context of Parliamentary proceedings and court proceedings. 
Members of Parliament are accorded absolute privilege against libel actions. They enjoy 
immunity from legal action over allegations they make in the course of Parliamentary 
115 Laws LJ in R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2002] 2 All ER 756. 
116 Rv Secretaryfor the Home Department, ex parte, Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328,337. 
17 See Lingers v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, Goodwin v UK 
(1996) 22 EHRR 123 and Oberschilk v Austria (1998) 25 EHRR 357, 
18 [2000] 2 AC 115. See also per Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 1 AC 127, 
202. 
'" [1993] AC 534. 
120 Common law principles such as defamation, breach of confidence and negligence. 
121 (1765) 19 St Tr 1030. 
122 [1987] 1 WLR 1248,1286. 
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proceedings. 123 Nevertheless, public responses and criticisms through media sometimes 
prove as an effective way in making the members of Parliament accountable for their 
statements. In the UK, the latitude on freedom of expression is shown in the remark of 
Sedley LJ when he said: 
Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the 
contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the 
provocative provided it does not provoke violence. Freedom only to speak 
inoffensively is not worth having. 124 
On the other hand, there are situations where political expression is restricted for the 
purpose of other countervailing interests such as security and public order. The 
commitment of the government in protecting freedom of expression came under scrutiny 
in Farrakhan v Secretary of State for Home Department. 125 In this case, the Home 
Secretary refused Mr. Farrakhan entry because his admission would have an effect on 
community relations. There is also the risk that meetings attended by him would stir 
disorder. Though there was no proof of the imminent risk, the court concluded that the 
Secretary of State provided sufficient explanation for a decision that did not involve a 
disproportionate interference with freedom of expression. 
The government's reasoning on expression that could pose a risk to public order may be 
seen as inconsistent and discriminatory. The government allowed the presence of Dr. 
Yusof Qardhawi, an influential Islamic cleric, though there were allegations that his 
controversial views on Iraq war and anti-semantic could affect public order. 126 In this 
context, the courts were reluctant to interfere with the imposition of restriction by the 
executive. This can be deduced from the judgment of Lord Phillip MR when he said: 
When applying a test of proportionality, the margin of appreciation or 
discretion accorded to the decision maker is all important, for it is only by 
recognising the margin of discretion that the court avoids substituting its 
own decision for that of the decision maker. 127 
123 The press and media broadcast also enjoy immunity when they carry reports of Parliamentary debate. 
124 Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) 7 BHRC 375,383. 
125 [2002] EWCA Civ. 606. 
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Arguably, a similar degree of protection accorded to political expression is available in 
case of artistic expression, which we now turn to. 
2.2.4 ARTISTIC EXPRESSION 
Freedom of expression includes artistic expression. This type of expression relates to 
human creativity that covers not only books, theatrical works and paintings, but also 
posters, films and photography. 128 Article 19 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights provides for information and ideas `in the form of art' within the 
right of freedom of expression. In addition, section 12 (4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 
requires the court to give particular regard to the importance of the right to freedom of 
expression in situation which involves material of, inter alia, artistic in nature. The Court 
in Muller v Switzerland129 explained that: 
Admittedly, Article 10 does not specify that freedom of artistic expression, 
in issue here, comes within its ambit; but neither, on the other hand, does 
it distinguish between the various forms of expression... it includes 
freedom of artistic expression-notably within freedom to receive and 
impart information and ideas-which affords the opportunity to take part in 
the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas 
of all kinds. 130 
The absence of hierarchical order of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR means that 
artistic expression is also covered under the scheme of protection. For instance, in 
Karatas v Turkey131 the applicant, a Turk of Kurdish origin, published an anthology of 
poems entitled `The Song of a Rebellion'. He was convicted of disseminating propaganda 
against the indivisible unity of the State. The medium used, poetry, is a form of artistic 
expression and the content had a political dimension. The applicant was a private 
individual expressing views through poetry to a small audience rather than via the mass 
media. The Court found that the applicant's conviction was disproportionate to the aims 
being pursued and as such violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
128 Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H. (2002) Privacy and Freedom of Expression. Oxford, 177. 129 (1988) 13 EHRR 212. See also Karat as v Turkey (1999) 36 EHRR 6, pars 49. 130 Ibid, pars 27. 
131 (1999) 36 EHRR 6. 
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Even though artistic expression forms part of the concept of freedom of expression, it is 
not jealously protected as political expression. 132 Perhaps the reason for a lesser value 
being attached to artistic expression is because the interest it covers is narrow. It acquires 
less weight in case of conflict with other interests. For instance, in relation to the 
protection of morality, obscene and indecent materials are prohibited under section 2 of 
the Obscene Publication Act 1964.133 In Muller v Switzerland134 the applicants had 
mounted an exhibition of contemporary art, which included three sexually explicit 
paintings depicting fellatio, sodomy and sex with animals. The exhibition had been 
widely advertised and was open to all, with no admission charge. The catalogue specially 
printed for the preview, contained photographic reproductions of the paintings. On the 
day of the official opening, the principal public prosecutor lodged proceedings 
demanding that the paintings be destroyed on the grounds that they were obscene. 
Following criminal proceedings, the paintings were confiscated and the applicants were 
fined. The European Court of Human Rights considered that the paintings widely 
depicted sexual relations, particularly between men and animals. The Court recognised 
that conceptions of sexual morality have changed. It did not find the view taken by the 
Swiss courts that the paintings were liable grossly to offend the sense of sexual propriety 
of persons of ordinary sensibility to be unreasonable. Thus, the imposition of the fine did 
not constitute a violation of the right to freedom of expression. 
In addition, a wide margin of appreciation is given to national states by the ECtHR in 
assessing the necessity of restriction on artistic expression. In Handyside v UK135 the 
applicant was charged and found guilty under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 for 
publishing an obscene book `The Little Red Schoolbook'. The ECtHR found that the UK 
government was not in breach of Article 10. The Court held that `despite the variety and 
the constant evolution in the United Kingdom of views on ethics and education, the 
competent English judges were entitled, in the exercise of their discretion, to think at the 
relevant time that the Schoolbook would have pernicious effects on the morals of many 
132 Barendt, op. cit., n. 101,300. 
133 See also section 2 of the Theatres Act 1968 and section 11 of the Post Office Act 1953. 
134 (1988)13 EHRR 212. 
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of the children and adolescents who would read it. ' 136 The Court was reluctant to 
interfere with the discretion of national states in determining the protection of morals in a 
democratic society. 
Furthermore, the provision of Article 10 (1) of the Convention that permits the imposition 
of licensing requirement on broadcasting, television and cinema also affects artistic 
expression. While the provision focuses on institution rather than its activities, it creates a 
potential threat whereby the government can impose certain conditions upon the issuance 
of license. For instance, section 1 (2) of the Cinemas Act 1985 provides: 
A licensing authority may grant a licence under this section to such a 
person as they think fit to use any premises specified in the licence for the 
purpose of film exhibition on such terms and conditions and subject to 
such restrictions as... they may determine. 
In addition, artistic expression can be restricted by the British Board of Film 
Classification (BBFC), which set the criteria for granting a certificate and viewing 
classification. In 1989, the BBFC denied a certificate to a video film, Visions of Ecstasy, 
which contained a scene of sexual imagery on the crucified figure of Christ and vivid 
expression of sexuality on the part of a nun. 
However, restriction on artistic expression is not as strict as on commercial expression. 
This is because the content of the latter expression may include various issues from 
political, economic and social matters. This is illustrated by the BBC's decision to 
broadcast the controversial `Jerry Springer - The Musical' on the ground, inter alia, 
artistic significant and thus outweighed the offence caused to Christians. 137 
2.2.5 COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 
The concept of freedom of expression, which embraces the freedom to receive and 
impart, 138 covers the form of communication as well as the content. Commercial 
expression is defined as an `expression that is directed to furthering the economic 
136 Ibid, para 57. 
"' Freeman, S. BBC `right' to screen Jerry Springer musical. Times online, 30 March 2005. 
http: //www. timesonline. co. uk/article/0.. 2-1547719.00. html 
138 Article 10 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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interests of individuals and enterprises... ' 139 The core object of commercial expression is 
business and economic rather than the proposition of ideas. 140 This forms the basis for the 
argument that commercial expression acquires less value, within a democratic 
framework, and thus receives less protection. '4' Furthermore, regulation on this type of 
expression does not diminish the core value of free expression. 
Munro argues that it is difficult to canvass a satisfactory definition of commercial 
expression. 142 He also argues that it is not satisfactory to rely on a subject-matter 
approach or medium and form of expression approach because of the category crossover 
and overlap of expression. Unclear delineation may occur in advertisement that contains 
information that can be interpreted as commercial as well as political information. 
Another approach that stresses on the intention or motives of the speaker143 is also 
inconclusive. This is due to the difficulty in ascertaining intention and the existence of a 
mixture of motivation. In the absence of prioritization of some category of speech `the 
attitude to commercial speech in English law is a stance of neutrality'. 144 The case of 
Tolley v JS Fry and Sons Ltd'45involves commercial expression in torts under English 
law. This case relates to the caricature of the plaintiff, a famous amateur golfer, featured 
in an advertisement for chocolate. The court held that the advertisement was an innuendo 
that he had unworthily permitted his likeness to be used commercially for reward. 
Though the expression in this case can be categorized as commercial, the legal action was 
under defamation law. It is immaterial for the purpose of liability in defamation to 
consider the category of expression. 
In addition, common law principles may also inhibit commercial expression through the 
tort of passing off. For instance, in Sim v H. J. Heinz Co. Ltd 46concerning unauthorised 
impersonation of the plaintiffs characteristic voice in a television advertisement 
139 Harris, et al (1995) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. London, 403. 
140 Janis, et al (2000) European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials. Oxford, 200. 
'4I Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford, 199. 
142 Munro, C. The Value of Commercial Speech (2003) 62 CLJ 134,153. 
143 Scanlon, T. M. Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression. (1979) 40 UPitt. LR 519,540. 
1« Munro, supra, 142. 
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promoting the defendant's product. The plaintiff argued that his voice as an actor was 
part of his stock-in-trade. Therefore, he was entitled to protect it as part of his good. 
The categorisation of expression appears possible under section 12 (4) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The provision clearly mentions the classification of journalistic, artistic 
and literary materials. Unlike the position in the English law where there is no clear 
delineation of commercial expression, the ECtHR weighs commercial expression lightly. 
The Court accords a lesser value to this type of expression compared to political 
expression. In this context, Harris, et al observes that: 
... commercial expression 
is not regarded as so worthy of protection as 
political or even artistic expression and that some considerations which 
make expression valuable in the political context may not apply in quite 
the same way in the commercial environment. '47 
A wide margin of appreciation is given to the states in relation to commercial expression. 
In Markt Intern v Germany148 the applicant published a trade magazine, which contained 
an article describing the experience of a chemist who was dissatisfied with a mail order 
firm and sought a refund. The Court decided that the interference was justified whilst the 
article as information of a commercial nature was protected under Article 10. In addition, 
the Courtin Casado Coca V Spain149 found that the penalty imposed on a barrister for 
distribution of advertising material could be justified under Article 10 (2). The regulation 
of advertising by barrister does not fall outside the wide margin of appreciation, which 
the states have on this matter. 
It is rather unfortunate that the status of commercial expression in the UK was not 
determined in the case of Colman v UK'50. In this case, the applicant, a medical 
practitioner in a private general practice, wished to advertise his services. He wrote to the 
General Medical Council (GMC) seeking its advice and requested that the Council 
reviewed the existing rules on practice advertising. In reply the GMC declined to review 
its rules and warned him that if he advertised in the press, he would be subjected to 
147 Harris, op. cit., n. 136,402. 
1411 (1989) 12 EHRR 161. 
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disciplinary action. Following the Government's recommendation that the GMC relax its 
restrictions, the Council settled the matter with the applicant. 
On the other hand, in Jacubowski v Germany'5'the applicant argued that the prohibition 
imposed against distribution of his circular was a violation of Article 10. Such a margin 
of appreciation appears essential in commercial matters, in particular in an area of 
complex and fluctuating unfair competition. The court reiterated that `a certain margin of 
appreciation is to be left to the contracting states in assessing whether and to what extent 
interference is necessary, but this margin goes hand in hand with European supervision 
covering both the legislation and the decisions applying it'. 152 
Perhaps the touchstone for commercial expression is the furtherance of economic 
interests. In Rv Advertising Standard Authority Ltd, ex p. Charles Robertson 
(Developments) Ltdt53 the court had the opportunity to deliberate on the classification of 
commercial and political expression. However, the court found that the distinction 
between political and commercial expression is of no assistance in determining the scope 
of the Advertising Standard Authority's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Moses J said that: 
... that 
distinction may (certainly once the Human Rights Act comes into 
force) be of importance in deciding whether action taken by the ASA 
interferes with the freedom enshrined in Article 10... 154 
The right to commercial expression is protected by the Convention. Restrictions must be 
justified. The issue of protection of commercial expression in relation to Article 10 of the 
Convention emerges in R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Health. '55 In this case the court recognises that commercial expression is of less 
significance than political or artistic expression. The principal argument in this case is 
that the limitation on advertisement at point of sale infringes Article 10 of the 
Convention. The court held that restriction on promotion of extremely harmful but 
historically lawful products is proportionate to the objective of promoting health. In 
151 (1994) 19 EHRR 64. 
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making the decision the court takes into account the enormous health risks and economic 
costs to society caused by smoking tobacco. 156 
Arguably, the vindication of protecting political expression more than artistic and 
commercial expression is informed by the utilitarian impulse. The protection accorded to 
this type of expression is due to its contribution in a democratic society. It is a pre- 
requisite of a healthy democratic society that there should be no undue restraint on free 
expression. This includes the freedom of the press as a medium and source of 
information. This leads to the next discussion on freedom of the press. 
2.3 SECTION 12 OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: A PRIMARY RIGHT? 
Protection of freedom of expression in the UK is further affirmed by section 12 of the 
HRA. Originally, section 12 was not part of the Human Rights Bill. It was only 
introduced later at the Committee stage by way of amendment to pacify the concern of 
the media over press freedom and the conflict with the right of privacy. The inclusion of 
the provision is mainly to protect press freedom. Section 12 (1) provides: 
This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief 
which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression. 
The freedom of expression that section 12 seeks to protect is not confined to press 
freedom alone. It relates to the Convention right relating to freedom of expression in 
general. As such the protection includes all types of expression covered under Article 10 
of the Convention. It includes communications by verbal or written words, which cover 
television programmes, ' 57 film, l58 videos, 159 pictures, 160 dress 161 and images. 162 
Furthermore, section 12 (4) succinctly provides that freedom of expression should be 
given particular regard by the court in connection with material of a journalistic, literary 
1-56 Ibid, para 52. 
'57 Hodgson V United Kingdom (1987) 51 DR 136. 
iss Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34. 
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and artistic nature. The emphasis on freedom of expression in this provision raises a 
question whether the right has priority over the other Convention rights. There is no 
distinction in term of order between freedom of expression and other Convention 
rights. 163 The rights are not set in any hierarchical or prioritisation order. The majority of 
the Court of Appeal in Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee'TM rejects the view that freedom of 
expression has priority over other Convention rights. However, there could be a 
presumption that freedom of expression prioritises other societal interests such as 
reputation. 165 As Simon Brown LJ said: 
It is one thing to say-that the media's right to freedom of expression, 
particularly in the field of political discussion "is of a higher order" than 
"the right of an individual to his good reputation", it is, however, another 
thing to rank it higher than competing basic rights. 166 
Section 12 recognises that the right to freedom of expression should be qualified. It also 
provides for a scheme of accommodation where other interest can override the exercise 
of free expression. Hence, privacy is only one of a number of qualifications. 
2.4 RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Freedom of expression is not only a symbol of democratic society but is the lifeblood of 
the society. Whilst freedom of expression enjoys legal protection in the UK, the existence 
of several restrictive laws, criminal or civil, raises concern as to the erosion of the right. 
Though it is important to protect freedom of expression in a democratic society, it is 
equally important to restrict certain expressions within the same society. The Royal 
Commission on the Press 1977 recognises this when it observed that the press should 
accept the limits to free expression set by the need to reconcile claims that may often 
conflict. 167 
163 See per Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967,1004. 
164 [2003] 2 All ER 318. 
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A functional and vibrant democracy does not only reflect on the practice of freedom of 
expression, but it also requires regulations on it. Arguably, restriction on freedom of 
expression is necessary in order to avoid harmful effects on public and private interests. 
Public interest does not mean anything that may be of interest to the public. In relation to 
this, Lord Denning MR in London Artists Ltd v. Littler168explained that: 
Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be 
legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may 
happen to them or others; then it is a matter of public interest on which 
everyone is entitled to make fair comment. 169 
Nonetheless, Lord Philips MR in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers'7° held that a 
prominence on the public stage does not mean that one's private life is open for 
disclosure by the media. 
The issue that needs further probing is, thus, the extent of the practice of freedom of 
expression. It is acceptable that restraints on freedom of expression should be imposed 
but only to the extent that they are necessary and justified by compelling reasons. '71 In 
this regard, Lord Keith in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2)172 found that the 
damage to the public interest involved in a publication of damaging materials, such as 
procured by Peter Wright and published in his book the `Spycatcher', outweighs all other 
considerations. Therefore, if the importance of the right is taken seriously, any legislative 
restriction should be narrowly interpreted. Restriction should be placed only when there 
is a clear and present danger such as in situations below. 
2.4.1 NATIONAL SECURITY 
National security is one of the exceptions that can limit freedom of expression in the UK. 
This interest is vital in preserving the well being of the nation as a whole particularly in 
times of emergency. In this context, Lord Denning described the value of the interest by 
'68 [1969] 2 QB 375. 
'69 Ibid, 391. 
10 [2002] EWCA 1373, pars 41. 
'" Rv Secretary of State, ex p Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400,407. 
172 AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990 1 AC 109. 
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saying that `even natural justice must take a back seat'. 173 The issue of national security 
is considered by the court in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. 174 The main issue in this 
case was the legitimacy of injunctions granted to restrain newspapers from publishing 
information about the British security services which was derived from the manuscript of 
a proposed book written by a former secret intelligence officer. The government's 
argument was that Peter Wright was bound by a lifelong duty of confidentiality and 
breach of this duty ought to be restrained by an injunction. This is to maintain the public 
interest in the national security. The court found that the nature of the materials received 
in confidence could be damaging to the security service. The House of Lords upheld the 
interlocutory injunctions against the three UK newspapers; The Observer, The Guardian 
and The Sunday Times. 
This case shows that, there is a necessity to limit freedom of expression on the ground of 
national security. 175 Another such concern is the impact it has on the public interest and 
the well being of the nation in a democratic society. 176 Restriction on freedom of 
expression is, thus, necessary to avoid serious and irreparable consequences to national 
security. 
In addition, combating terrorism is an important public interest. '77 The tragedy of 
September 11 in the United States illustrates the needs to prioritise national security over 
personal liberty. Nonetheless, the restriction should be subjected to scrutiny such as 
under proportionality. The grave impact of terrorism on national security legitimises the 
suspension of personal liberty. In the UK, the government has introduced the Anti- 
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which empower detention without trial of 
suspected international terrorists. 178 However, the controversial aspect of the 2001 Act is 
that it provides a distinct course of action, which discriminates against suspected 
international terrorists. They are allowed to leave the country on their own accord or face 
'73R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hosenball [ 1977] 3 All ER 452,457. 
174 [1987] 1 WLR 1248. 
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imprisonment. It is argued that if the Home Secretary is satisfied with their involvement 
in terrorism activities that warrant their arrest, they should not be given a choice to leave 
in the first place. 
National security is within the executive domain. 179 The government has a wide power to 
decide the nature of national security and activities that pose a threat to such security. 
Decisions on security matters at national level have received a wide margin of 
appreciation under the European Convention. 180 This is because the courts have no 
expertise when it comes to questions of national security. Both the domestic courts and 
the ECtHR recognise that decisions of the legislature and the executive are entitled to a 
high level of deference. The courts appreciate that action often has to be taken on a 
matter of urgency. 181 Simon Brown LJ pointed that `the very words "national security" 
have acquired over the years an almost mystical significance. The mere incantation of the 
phrase itself instantly discourages the court from satisfactorily fulfilling its normal role of 
deciding where the balance of public interest lies'. 182 
Besides the employment of legal mechanism, extra-legal mechanism such as the Defence 
Advisory notice system (DA notice), previously known as the D notice, also affects the 
exercise of freedom of expression in the UK. It creates a practice of self-censorship by 
the press. 183 The system relates to certain information that the government considers 
sensitive on the ground of national security. 184 It requires the press to refrain from 
publishing it. However, the effectiveness of this system requires co-cooperation from the 
press. 
The practice of the DA notice does mean that the public is prevented from questioning 
the conduct of security services. This is so when Lord Nicholls in AG v Punch Ltd'85 
19 The Zamora (1916) 2 AC 77. 
'so Brind and McLaughlin v United Kingdom (1994)18 EHRR CD 76. See also Vogt v Germany (1995) 21 
EHRR 205. 
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183 Bailey, op. cit., n. 171,404. 
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recognises that security service is not entitle to immunity from criticism. The public has a 
right to know of incompetence in the service as in any other government department. 
However, reliance on national security in limiting the right can be scrutinised by the 
requirement that restrictions must be `necessary in a democratic society'. The claim of 
national security should not be accepted without question. Otherwise it can be used to 
inhibit freedom of expression, which includes the right to impart information without 
interference, by public authority. 
Another urgent situation that qualifies the freedom of expression in the UK is in relation 
to secret information. The Official Secrets Act 1989 restrains all kind of information 
relating to security and intelligence services from public disclosure. Under the Act 
information is linked to the position of a person rather than to the nature of the 
information. Even if the information no longer poses threat or harm to national security, 
it is still protected under the Act. This is because of the indefinite restraint on disclosure 7 
and the absence of time limit for the purpose of lifting up the restraint. In this context, 
the use of the Official Secrets Act 1989 to prevent disclosure of information is 
inconsistent with the right to receive and impart information. 
Arguably, the restraint of information under the above situation does not meet the 
proportionality test that specifies a number of requirements. 186 Sedley J in Rv Secretary 
of State for the Home Department ex parte McQuillan, 187 explained that not all national 
security considerations are necessarily of the same weight and importance. The 
proportionality test requires the government to show a pressing social need in a 
democratic society. 188 Information which is no longer a threat or harmless to national 
security due to change of event or time factor, thus, should not be suppressed. 
Suppression of information in such a manner would bolster a culture of secrecy. 189 it 
thwarts free flow of information that is useful to the public in forming their judgment 
particularly in relation to matters pertaining to their interest. 
'86 Alder, J. (2002) General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law. Houndmills, 565. 
187 [1995] 4 All ER 540. 
188 Rv Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247. 
189 Whitty, N et al (2001) Civil Liberties: The Human Rights Act Era. London, 360. 
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In addition, the Act can be used to intimidate a person from disclosing classified security 
information. For instance, the Act was used against Katherine Gun, a translator in 
GCHQ. She was accused of disclosing a request allegedly from a US national security 
agency official for help from British intelligence to tap the telephones of UN Security 
Council delegates during the period of fraught diplomacy before the war. 190 It can also be 
a tool to withhold embarrassing information and malpractices in the government from 
being exposed. '91 This is inconsistent with the commitment as proclaimed by the 
government towards freedom of information where `the traditional culture of secrecy will 
only be broken down by giving people in the United Kingdom the legal right to know'. 192 
In this regard, Judge LJ in Rv Central Criminal Court, ex p Bright193 stated that: 
Inconvenient or embarrassing revelations, whether for the security 
services or for public authorities should not be suppressed... When a 
genuine investigation into possible corrupt or reprehensible activities by a 
public authority is being investigated by the media, compelling evidence 
would normally be needed to demonstrate that the public interest will be 
served by such proceeding. 194 
The application of the Act to prevent whistle-blowing involving information that exposes 
malpractices is undemocratic. It is a matter of public interest for the people to receive 
information relating to a government that ought to be accountable. The Act was also used 
against Tony Geraghty, an author and journalist; in connection with his book The Irish 
War. He was arrested under the Official Secrets Act 1989, his home was searched and he 
was locked in a cell of a local police station before they questioned him. 195 Both cases, 
Geraghty and Gun, collapsed after the prosecutor offered no evidence. But the effect of 
intimidation and hardship may deter a person from divulging information classified as 
security information. 
190 GCHQ whistleblower cleared. The Guardian, 25 February 2004. 
http: //www. ouardian. co. uk/Iraq/Story/0.2763.1155681.00. html 
19' Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, 554. 
192 Your Right to Know: Freedom of information. Cm. 3818,1997. 
193 [2001] 1 WLR 662. See also AG v Punch Ltd [2003] HRLR 14. 
"4 Ibid, 681. 
195 Select Committee on Armed Forces Minute of Evidence, HC 154-11. 
htip: //www. parliament. the-stationery-office. co. uk/pa/cm200001 /croselect/cmarmed/ 154/ 1021302. htm 
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In addition, section 5 of the 1989 Act extends to individuals including journalists. In 
order for a disclosure to be illegal, it must also be proven (a) that the disclosure was 
damaging; (b) that the defendant disclosing the information knew or had a reasonable 
cause to believe, that it would be damaging; and (c) that the defendant disclosing the 
information knew, or had a reasonable cause to believe, that it was protected against 
disclosure by the 1989 Act and that it had come into his or her possession as a result of an 
unauthorised disclosure. Arguably, the press can invoke the prior publication defence to 
show that further damage from the disclosure could not occur. 196 Another restriction that 
the press encounters in exercising the freedom of expression is contempt of court. 
2.4.2 CONTEMPT OF COURT 
The definition of contempt of court is interference with the due administration of 
justice. 197 The conflict between the administration of justice and freedom of the press in 
informing the public on issues affecting them is a delicate issue to resolve. The conflict 
arises between two public interests. On one hand there exists a need to preserve 
administration of justice to protect public interest, on the other, however, freedom of the 
press to inform the public will be affected by restraining publication. Though freedom of 
expression is regarded as the lifeblood in a democratic society, it is not a license to 
scandalise the courts and bring it to disrepute. 
The law of contempt of court impinges on the freedom of the press in two possible 
situations namely, scandalising the court and prejudicing active legal proceeding. 198 The 
former involves the publication of information that undermines public confidence in the 
judicial system, whereas the latter relates to prejudicial impact of publication on 
proceedings in courts. Public discussion of a case on trial through the media amounts to 
trial by media, which undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. 199 
Exposition and publication of relevant facts may jeopardise the interest of the parties 
16 Whitty, op. cit., it. 185,361. 
197 AG v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273,322. 
198 Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H. (2001) Privacy and Freedom of Expression. Oxford, 131. 
'99 Per Lord Reid in AG v Times Newspapers Ltd [ 1974] AC 273,300. 
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involved in getting a fair. In Rv Thomson Newspapers Ltd, ex parte AG200an article was 
published containing derogatory remark about the accused. The court held that that the 
gravity of contempt in relation to pending proceedings depended on the likely prejudice 
to a fair trial. Since the photograph and words were related to the man's activities in 
connection with race relations that were involved in his trial, the contempt was very 
serious. 
The law of contempt of court is a temporary embargo on publication of information that 
would disrupt fair hearing and interfere with administration of justice. 201 Adverse 
publicity through press reporting of case on trial invites public reactions that may 
undermine justice by way of fair hearing. Sensational media coverage is one of the 
contributing factors that may distract the course of justice. Pre-trial discussion by the 
media, which amount to substantial risk, that impede and prejudice the course of justice is 
a contempt of court. The law of contempt of court is governed by the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981 and common law. The existence of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 is the 
result of the decision in Sunday Times v United Kingdom. 202 The court concluded that the 
restraint on publication of an article regarding the drug `Thalidomide' failed to satisfy the 
social need in a democratic society sufficiently pressing to outweigh the public interest in 
freedom of expression. 
Media exposure of a suspect in crime may cause a substantial risk to the administration of 
justice especially when it involves the revelation of past convictions. 203 Even though this 
is within the ambit of the law of contempt, the media can be protected by section 5 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981. It provides protection to stories that are a discussion of 
public affairs as long as the risk of prejudice to a particular case is merely incidental to 
the wider discussion. Although this provision recognises freedom of expression but it 
does not make the right prevails over the interest of justice. The element of risk 
determines the scope of freedom of expression in this context. 
200 [1968] 1 WLR 1. 
201 Robertson, op. cit., n. 187,346. 
202 (1979) 2 EHRR 245. In AG v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 the House of Lords restored the 
injunction to publish the article which had been discharged earlier by the Court of Appeal. 20 AG v MGNLtd [1997] 1 All ER 456. 
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An order for disclosure of sources of journalistic information is another kind of restraint 
on freedom of the press. The press argue that protecting sources of information is a basic 
tenet of journalistic ethics, 204 whilst the courts develop the common law which threatens 
journalists with imprisonment for withholding their news source. Application for 
disclosure of source is based on the Norwich Pharmaca1205 principle where a person 
through no fault of his own gets mixed up in the wrongful acts of others so as to facilitate 
their wrongdoing has a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full 
information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoer. Failure to disclose the source 
on court order will make the journalists liable for contempt of court. However, section 10 
of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for a presumption of necessity in favour of 
journalists to withhold their source. The provision states: 
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of 
contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information 
contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be 
established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in 
the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder 
or crime. 
Although the provision accords protection to source of information, there are four 
interests that can unveil the confidentiality of the source. The interests are (a) justice, (b) 
national security, (c) the prevention of disorder and (d) the prevention of crime. 
From the discussion on restrictions on freedom of expression so far, there is one common 
sub-theme relating to institutional design. The discussion reveals that although freedom 
of expression in the UK is not a priority right, there is, however, a strong indication from 
the judicial commitment that shows the strength of the freedom of expression in the 
country. 
204 Code 7 of the National Union of Journalists code of conduct states that `A journalist shall protect 
confidential sources of information'. See http: //www. nuj. org. uk/inner. php? docid=59 205 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133. 
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2.43 JOURNALISTIC SOURCE 
The public interest in the role of the press is not merely confined to reporting events and 
imparting information. 206 It has a role in exposing inter alia, impropriety and 
miscarriages of justice. This is part of investigative journalism, which requires protection 
of source of information. The press enjoys a qualified protection against disclosure of 
sources under the law of confidentiality. 207 Disclosure of journalistic source may 
jeopardize the function of the press as the `watchdog' for the public because it will deter 
people from relaying information that may expose their identity. In this regard, Robertson 
argues that `If sources, frightened of exposure and reprisal, decide not to talk, there will 
not only be less news, but the news which is published will be less reliable. It will not be 
checked for spin. '208 This is the basis for the contention to justify the privilege not to 
disclose sources of information. 209 
However, the courts are reluctant to order disclosure unless there is a necessity to meet a 
pressing social need. The court in AG v Clough210rejected the claim to immunity by a 
journalist. The approach of the courts, to the link between freedom of the press and a 
privilege not to disclose sources of information, as pronounced by Lord Wilberforce in 
British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd211 when he said: 
A relationship of confidence between a journalist and his source is in no 
different category ... But 
in all these cases the court may have to determine, 
in particular circumstances, that the interest in preserving this confidence 
is outweighed by other interests to which the law attaches importance. 12 
Protection of journalistic sources is vital and is a facet of freedom of the press. This is 
emphasised by the court in Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd. 213 The main issue in this 
case is whether the public interest in identifying the source was sufficiently compelling to 
206 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers [1985] AC 339. 
207 Toulson, R. G. and Phipps, C. M. (1996) Confidentiality. London, 165. 
208 Robertson, op. cit., n. 187,255. 
209 The Supreme Court of Canada doubted the argument that there will be a `drying-up' of news sources in 
case of failure to extend testimonial privilege to journalists. See Moysa v Alberta (Labour Relations Board) 
(1989) 60 DLR 1. 
210 [1963] 1 QB 773. 
211 [1981] AC 1096. 
212 Ibid, 1168. 
213 [2002] EMLR 24. 
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override the public interest in protecting the media's sources of information. The court 
found that there was an overriding need for the disclosure sought in the interest of 
justice214 and for the prevention of crime. The act of altering highly confidential 
information by inserting false market sensitive information in order to create a false 
market in the shares was a serious criminal offence. The court also concluded that a real 
risk of repetition exists if the source is not identified. 
Plainly, there is a close association between the protection of sources and press freedom. 
The court in Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd made this point215 The court 
acknowledges that protection of journalist's source is a basic condition of freedom of the 
press. However, the disclosure of the source had to be justified by the claimant by an 
overriding requirement in the public interest, amounting to a pressing social need, to 
which the need to keep sources confidential should give way. In this case the Mirror 
published an article containing extract from medical record of a patient kept by the 
claimant. The claimant sought disclosure of the journalist's source. The court held that 
although there was a clear public interest in preserving the confidentiality of medical 
records that alone could not automatically be regarded as sufficient to override the 
protection due to journalistic sources given by Art. 10 of the European Convention. It 
would be an exceptional case if a journalist was ordered to disclose the identity of his 
source without the facts of his case being fully examined. 
In contrast, the court in Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN216applied the decision in 
Goodwin v United Kingdom217 where the necessity for any restriction of freedom of 
expression had to be convincingly established. In particular, limitations on the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources called for the most careful scrutiny by the court. 
Accordingly, disclosure should only be ordered to meet a pressing social need and when 
it is proportionate to a legitimate aim. The court held that the care of patients at Ashworth 
was fraught with difficulty and danger. The disclosure of the patients' records increased 
214 The interest of justice means interest that is justiciable. See per Sedley LJ in [2002] EMLR 24, pars 84. 
See also XLtd v Morgan-Grampian [ 1991 ]1 AC 1,44. 
215 [2003] EMLR 36. 
216 [2002] UKHL 29. See also John v Express Newspapers Ltd [2000] EMLR 606. 
217 (1996) 22 EHRR 123. 
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the level of the difficulty and danger. To deter a similar wrongdoing in the future, it was 
essential that the source be identified and punished. Accordingly the order for disclosure 
was necessary and proportionate. 
It appears from the cases above that the courts, as independent institutions, play a vital 
role in ensuring the exercise of freedom of expression. The courts could scrutinise 
restrictions on the freedom by narrowing the scope of limit under the requirement of 
pressing social need and proportionate to the legitimate aim. 
2.4.4 INFLAMMATORY SPEECH 
Freedom of expression in a democratic society is not confined to favorable and 
inoffensive speech. It also covers speech that is offensive, shocking or disturbing. 218 
Nevertheless, unregulated expression may have a negative implication prejudicial to 
social harmony in a plural democratic society. This is apparent in the case of 
inflammatory speech, which is a ground for restricting freedom of expression. 
Inflammatory speech was an issue the court has to decide in Thomas v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd. 219 In this case the article published by the defendant referred to the 
claimant as a "black clerk" and incited racial hatred against the claimant. The claimant 
alleged that she had received a number of racist hate letters as a result of the articles and 
that the articles had caused her to be terrified and scared to go to work. The claimant 
claimed damages under section 3 the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The court, in 
dismissing the appeal from the defendant, found that the claimant had an arguable case, 
that the defendants harassed her by publishing racist criticism of her which was 
foreseeable likely to stimulate a racist reaction on the part of their readers and cause her 
distress. In reaching his decision Lord Phillips applied the test that requires the publisher 
to consider whether a proposed series of articles, which is likely to cause distress to an 
individual, will constitute an abuse of the freedom of press, which the pressing social 
needs of a democratic society require, should be curbed. 
218 Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR I. Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway (2000) 30 EHRR 878. 
219 [2002] EMLR 4. 
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Publishing material likely to incite racial hatred is an offence in the United Kingdom 
under the Public Order Act 1986. According to section 17 of the Act racial hatred means 
that hatred against a group of persons in Great Britain defined by reference to colour, 
race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins. Section 5 of the 
Public Order Act 1986 makes a person guilty of an offence if he: 
a- uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly 
behaviour, or 
b- displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress thereby. 
The approach adopted by Parliament in the case of racial hatred has now been applied 
more broadly. Part 5 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which came 
into force on 14th December 2001 created new offences; 'religiously' aggravated assault, 
criminal damage, public order and harassment. The Act amended Part 2 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1988 so that the existing offences under Sections 29 to 32 of the 1988 Act 
described as 'racially aggravated' are committed if they are aggravated by either racial or 
religious hostility. This development shows that the wider public and communal interest 
is more important than individualism in a liberal society. 
Furthermore, inflammatory speech contributes to the eruption of racial riot in Oldham 
and Burnley in May and June 2001.220 The effect of this type of speech is harmful to 
public goods particularly when it causes public disorder and disintegrates the plural 
society. The effect of such a speech was considered by Blackstone in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England when he said `to punish.. . any dangerous or offensive writings, 
which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious 
tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and 
religion, the only solid foundation of civil society'. 21 Arguably, the impact of 
inflammatory speech may present a justifiable reason to limit freedom of expression. 222 
220 Harris, P. Oldham, capital of racial tension. Observer, 10 June 2001 
http: //observer. guardian. co. uk/uk news/story/0,6903,504478.00. html 
22' Blackstone, W. (1826) Commentaries on the Laws of England London, 152. 
2n Dworkin, R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. London, Duckworth. 
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In this regard, Mill suggests that limitation on freedom of expression is necessary to 
regulate the action and words of members of a political community based on the harm 
principle. According to him `the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others'. 223 Harm is an intrusion into an interest that a person has. Feinberg argues that 
harm constitutes a wrongful and unexcused invasion of interest 224 An interest is 
something in which one has a stake. The risk to someone's stake provides the reason for 
objecting harmful conduct. Freedom of expression can be classified as a welfare interest 
that is ranked the highest on account of Feinberg's harm principle 225 It is only when 
speech causes a direct and clear violation of rights that it can be limited. The application 
of the harm principles permits few sanctions on the exercise of freedom of expression. 
This is because it requires a demonstrable link between speech in question and direct 
harm to others. 
On the other hand, inhibition of freedom of expression based on offence226ought to be 
wider. This is because it covers all offensive form of speech. Moreover, offence is 
difficult to be determined objectively in a plural society. Thus, the uncertainty of offence 
renders it an improbable principle in ascertaining the scope of freedom of expression. 
This is because it would extent the inhibition on freedom of expression based on taste 
rather than fact. What might be an offensive subject to one group may not be so to the 
others. For instance, to wear a Nazi's uniform with swastika in the UK may be an 
insensitive and offensive conduct to certain groups of people. But to restrict such 
conduct would be a step too far in a liberal society. The court in DPP v Percy deals with 
such a conduct227 This case involved an expressive act of defacing American flag. The 
district judge found that there was a social need to prevent the denigration of objects of 
veneration and symbolic importance for one cultural group. However, on appeal the 
court held that the conviction had not been compatible with the right to freedom of 
223 Gray, J. (1991) John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford, 14. 
224 Feinberg, J. (1984) Harm to Others. Oxford, 105. 
225 Ibid, 42. 
226 Feinberg, J. (1985) Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
227 [2001] EWHC 1125. 
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expression. A similar line of argument can be extended to the next discussion on whether 
obscenity is offensive or harmful. 
2.4.5 OBSCENITY 
Obscenity and sexually related matters are also regarded as reasons for proscribing 
freedom of expression ! 28 In the UK, the Obscene Publication Act 1959 criminalises the 
publication of obscene materials if it is `such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons 
who are likely, having regard to all the circumstances, to read, see or hear the 
matter... ' 229 However, section 4 of the Act provides exception where the publication is 
justified for the public good on the ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, 
art or learning. The public good justification predicates plural values where a benefit to 
wider interest is more important than the negative effect to individuals. 
Reliance on the `deprave and corrupt' test is a subjective standard which depends on the 
end users rather than ordinary people in general. 230 It has been given a narrow 
interpretation by the court in Rv Anderson. 231 In this case the appellants, the editors and 
publishing company of a magazine which contained some items relating to lesbianism, 
homosexuality, oral sexual intercourse and drug taking, were indicted on counts of 
conspiracy to corrupt public morals in producing a magazine containing obscene items 
with intent to corrupt young persons, of publishing and having for gain an obscene article 
contrary to section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The appellants also were 
charged with enclosing an indecent or obscene article in a postal packet contrary to 
section 11 of the Post Office Act 1953. The court did not agree with the view that the 
meaning of obscene includes repulsive, filthy, loathsome or lewd. In a related case Rv 
Richard Clive Neville232 the judge stressed that `for the purpose of that Act "obscene" 
means, and means only, a tendency to deprave or corrupt'. Thus, the scope of obscenity 
ug Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981, Protection of Children Act 1978, Theatre Act 1968 and 
Broadcasting Act 1990. 
229 Section 1 (1) Obscene Publications Act 1959. See Rv Hicklin (1868) LR 3 QB 360. 
230 Barent, E. (1985) Freedom of Speech. Oxford: 256. See also Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media 
Law. London, 157. 
231 [1971] 3 All ER 1152. 
232 [1971] 56 Cr. App. R. 115. 
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is narrow so that some publications, though sexually explicit, do not necessarily amount 
to obscenity. 
The objective of prohibiting obscene publications is to protect society from moral 
decadence. The conundrum of this prohibition is the difficulty to set a moral standard 
especially in a liberal pluralist society. 233 The conditions of such a society make it 
incomprehensible to adopt a moral standard based on cultural, religious and ethnic factors 
of certain part of society. Nevertheless, contemporary societal values to a certain extent 
play a role in drawing the standard of morality. In relation to obscenity, this can be 
expressed through the finding of the jury whose function is to consider whether a 
publication is obscene or not 234 The court in Rv Martin Secker Warburg Ltd235held that 
in deciding whether the book had the tendency to corrupt and deprave those into whose 
hand it might fall, the jury had to consider whether or not the book sought to present a 
fair picture of aspect of the contemporary American thought in relation to the problem, 
whether or not it is desirable that on this side of the Atlantic we should close our eyes on 
the facts because we did not find then altogether palatable. 
The latitude on obscenity as discerned from the above discussion shows that the UK may 
be more receptive to sexually explicit materials that are prohibited in other society such 
as in Malaysia. This could be illustrated by the publication of photographs of semi-naked 
women in tabloid newspapers and the relaxed attitude towards distribution of sexually 
explicit publications, which are accessible by the public in the UK. This study argues that 
there is a public interest in maintaining certain basic moral standard to preserve human 
dignity. Furthermore, the effect on human dignity in term of harm on decent people by 
way of depravity and moral corruption, in contrast with shocking or disgusting, 236 
necessitate the inhibition of freedom of expression in this area. 237 
233 Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford, 923. 234 See Rv Calder and Boyars Ltd [1969] 1 QB 151. 
235 [1954] 2 All ER 683. 
236 The corrosive effect of deprave and corrupt is more than shock and disgust. See Robertson, op. cit., n. 
226,159. 
237 Home Office Departmental Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship. 1979 Cmnd. 7772 
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Obscenity disturbs Muslims and Roman Catholics alike. On this premise, there is a basis 
to proceed into the next area of concern. 
2.4.6 BLASPHEMY 
Blasphemy is another area that has an impact on the exercise of freedom of expression. It 
is regarded as an unnecessary impediment on the right to freedom of expression. 238 The 
239 law on blasphemy concerns scurrilous vilification and insulting attack on religion. The 
nature of the law of blasphemy is under scrutiny when there are several attempts to 
abolish it. 
In 1979 there was an attempt to abolish the offence on the ground that the law is not 
relevant in modem society. However, the House of Lords rejected the proposal fearing 
that it could open the gate for blasphemous publication 240 In 1986, the Law Commission 
produced a report on law of blasphemy where the majority of the Commission opined 
that a reformed law of blasphemy is irrelevant and serves no useful purpose to modem 
society. However, Lord Scarman disagreed when he argues that there is a need to respect 
and protect different religious beliefs in plural society. 4' 
In the UK, blasphembus expression is applicable only to Christian faith. 242 The court in 
the case of ex affirms this. parte Choudhur, 43 when it upheld the application of the law 
of blasphemy to Christianity. The court refused to extend the law to other religion 
because of `insuperable problems and would be likely to do more harm than good. ' The 
court's finding is unconvincing. Perhaps the fear of cross-religious blasphemy is 
misplaced if blasphemy is confined to the believers of the same faith. A person of 
another faith should not use the law against sacrilegious attack. Other appropriate law 
dealing with public order in particular racial and religious aggravated offence can deal 
238 Elias, P. and Coppel, J. (2000) Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: Some Thoughts on the 
Glen Hoddle case. In Beatson, J. and Cripps, Y. (eds. ) Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information. 
Oxford, 54. 
239 See per Lord Scarman in Rv Lemon [1979] 1 All ER 898. 
240 H. L. Deb, 1978, vol. 389, cols 279-350. 
241 Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd [ 1979] AC 617. 
Z42There was support for the view that it should be extended to other religion. See H. L. Deb, 1978, vol. 389, 
cols 311,315. 
243 Rv Bow Street Magistrates' Court, exp. Choudhury [1991] 1 All ER 306. 
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with any such attack. 244 In addition, the confinement of the law of blasphemy to one faith 
is inconsistent with the notion of equality before the law. 
The backdrop of British society, where the practice of a variety of religious faiths is 
acceptable, reveals the crudity of the notion of dominant judeo-Christianity faith. It is 
difficult to defend the confinement of blasphemy to Christianity when the existence and 
practice of other religions are given due recognition. There is an inconsistency when 
religious practices are respected245 and to a certain extent accorded legal protection, but 
the sanctity of the religion is denied protection. 
The law of blasphemy is relevant only if religion is a sanctified part and parcel of an 
individual life. The special feelings that people hold about religion could make an offence 
of blasphemy as necessary. 246 However, in modern secular society where liberal values 
such as individualism are revered, the application of law of blasphemy against people is 
unlikely. 247 
Even though the law is still in existence, the application is subdued. Legal action on the 
ground of blasphemy is a rarity. 248 The most recent is the case of Whitehouse v Lemon. 249 
This case involved a poem about a homosexual's conversion to Christianity, which 
metaphorically attributed homosexual acts to Jesus Christ. The House of Lords upheld 
the conviction and ruled that the publisher's intentions were irrelevant, and that there was 
no need for the prosecution to prove any risk of breach of the peace. 
A margin of appreciation is accorded to the state in relation to inhibition of freedom of 
expression in this matter. In Wingrove v United Kingdom, 250 the British Board of Film 
refused a film portrayed highly erotic scenes purporting to represent the visions of Saint 
Teresa on the grounds that it was blasphemous. The main contention was that the 
government could not provide a justification under Article 10 (2). The court held that the 
244 Redmond-Bate v DPP [1997] 7 BHRC 375. 
245 For instance, Muslims children are allowed to wear religious attire to school in the UK. 
246 The Law Commission's Working Paper No. 79: Offences against Religion and Public Worship, 1981. 
247 Robilliard, J. A. (1984) Religion and the Law. Manchester, 41. 
248 Robertson, op. cit., n. 226,211. 
249 [1978] 68 Cr. App. R. 381. 
250 (1997) 24 EHRR 1. See also Otto-Preminger-Institue v Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34. 
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law passed the test of being `prescribed by law' despite the consideration that there was 
ambiguity regarding the nature of blasphemy. 25 1 The authorities were given a degree of 
flexibility in determining whether or not the facts of any given case fell within the scope 
of blasphemy. The court recognised that state authorities would have a wider margin of 
appreciation when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters that were liable 
to offend personal belief. 252 
On the other hand, the ambiguity of the law of blasphemy poses a chilling effect on the 
right to freedom of expression where delineation of criticism and insulting religion is 
unclear. 253 Robilliard argues that `In practice it is an impossible task to prove offence, as 
it is too hard for the jury to put themselves in the position of a reasonable member of the 
'2sa particular religion defamed... 
The effort to accommodate competing interests as discussed above is also a feature of 
defamation law, which is the next focus of discussion. 
2.4.7 DEFAMATION 
Defamation is another area that has a direct impact on freedom of expression. It concerns 
a `defamatory statement which injures the reputation of another by exposing him to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or which tends to lower him in the esteem of right-thinking 
members of society. '255 
In relation to this, the media, particularly the press, is under constraint due to the 
unpredictability of the law on defamation. The unpredictability with regards to 
defamatory assertion, reputation, burden of proof and damages, put the press under 
constraint in publishing statement that may expose them to legal proceedings for libel. 
For instance, there is the uncertainty of the definitive meaning `right-thinking' members 
of society. To associate the test to a class of society is difficult in a modem pluralistic 
251 lbid, para. 42 
252lbid, para. 58. 
253 Kearns, P. Obscene and Blasphemous Libel: Misunderstanding Art. (2000) 15 Crim. LR 652. 
2m Robilliard, op. cit., supra, 37. 
255 Deakin, S. et al (2003) Tort Law. 5th ed. Oxford, 645. 
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society. 256 This may lead to self-censorship in the disclosure of information that is 
inconsistent with the idea of freedom of expression. 
Moreover, the readiness of the courts to protect personal reputation even without the 
proof of actual damage affects the press in having to pay substantial damages to 
compensate the plaintiff for the presumed injury to reputation. In John v Mirror Group 
Newspapers257the Court of Appeal reduced the quantum of damages award for the false 
report in the Sunday Mirror on the plaintiff's eating disorder. The court awarded damages 
even when there is no evidence of actual harm to his reputation as an entertainer. 
The House of Lords in Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd258 ruled that there is no need for the 
plaintiff to prove damage. Yet, he may recover substantial damages even if there is no 
one unlikely to believe the allegations. Lord Reid said that: 
It is true that X's reputation is not diminished but the person defamed 
suffers annoyance or worse when he learns that a defamatory statement 
has been published about him. 59 
The presumption of damage shows the protective attitude of the courts in preserving 
personal reputation. However, it is a disadvantage to the press when they are liable even 
in the absence of evidence of injury to reputation or personal integrity. 260 Hence, the 
existing law is an unfair restriction on freedom of expression. This has serious 
implications for investigative journalists261who want to expose fraud, corruption, 
hypocrisy and other kinds of secret wrongdoings. On the other hand, it is necessary in a 
democratic society to curb carelessness and irresponsible publication by the press for the 
purpose of their commercial interest. At this juncture, Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd262 remarks that `... the sad reality is that the overall handling of these 
2-56 Ibid, 646. 
257 [1996]2AllER35. 
258 [1971] 1 WLR 1239. 
u9Ibid, 1246. 
70 Barendt et al argues that the burden of proving damage should be on the plaintiff. See Barendt, E. et al 
(1997) Libel and the Media. Oxford, 196. 
26' Lord Nicholls acknowledges investigative journalism as part of the vital role of the press. See Reynolds 
v Times Newspapers [1999] 2 AC 127,200. 
262 Ibid. 
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matters by the national press, with its own commercial interests to serve, does not always 
command general confidence. ' 263 
There is a lack of precision in relation to what amounts to a defamatory statement 264 The 
courts have formulated three different tests in order to determine whether a statement is 
defamatory. The tests are based on whether a statement tends to, first, injure the 
plaintiff's reputation by exposing to hatred, contempt or ridicule, 265 secondly, causes him 
to be shunned or avoided, 266 and thirdly, lowers him in the estimation of right-thinking 
members of society. 267 A broad interpretation of defamatory assertion impinges on the 
freedom of the press to indulge in news that interest the people. This creates unnecessary 
difficulty for the press. 68 The press also faces difficulty in reporting political information 
when the House of Lords in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltdz69 refused to include such 
information as part of the qualified privilege. 270 The wide scope of what could be a 
defamatory statement is perhaps one of the reasons that `London is the libel capital of the 
world'271 and promotes `Libel tourism'. 72 
The changing perceptions of what is acceptable in the society, due to for instance the 
change of social value, render reliance on right thinking members or ordinary members of 
society as inconclusive. It creates an assumption that there is a homogeneous society who 
could reflect on issues in uniformity. 273 In the present plural society engulf with 
multiculturalism such homogeneity is difficult if not impossible to achieve. 
There is a question of value judgment in determining whether statements are capable of 
being defamatory. The content and context of the whole statement require considerations 
263 Ibid, 202. 
264 Milmo, P. et al (2004) Galley on Libel and Slander. 10th ed. London, 8. 
'S Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6M&W 105,108. 
266 Youssoupof V MGMPictures Ltd [1934] 50 TLR 581,587. 
267 Sim V Streclh [1936] 2 All ER 1237,1240. 
2" Barendt, E. What is the Point of Libel Law? (1999) 52 CLP 110,120. 
269 [ 1999] 2 AC 127. 
270 Wright (2001) argues that the refusal is a conservatism and inconsistent with the interests of the 
common convenience and welfare of society. See Wright, J. (2001) Tort Law and Human Rights. Oxford, 
158-9. 
271 Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, 71. 
272 Berlins, M. `My friend went to London and all I got was a lousy suit'. 
httn: //www. indexlineonline. org/news/20040629 britain. shtml 
273 Barent, op. cit. supra. 
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\ 
from the contemporary social standards point of view. Robertson comments that `Ideas 
about immorality and what constitutes dishonourable conduct change over time, but the 
views of judges change more slowly than most. '274 Previously, an assertion of 
homosexuality was associated with immorality and dishonourable conduct that makes a 
person liable for defamation. But the same assertion might not be an issue in defamation 
in the present social climate due to the change of perception. 
Another aspect of defamation law that impedes the freedom of the press is the issue of 
damages. A large award is a hindrance to freedom of expression. It poses a `powerful 
chilling effect on expressive activities'. 275 The court in Rantzen v Mirror Group 
Newspapers reviewed the trend of awarding disproportionate damages. 276 The court 
substituted the jury's award to a more modest amount. The power of the court to 
substitute its own award is given by section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. 
The court also found that Article 10 of the ECHR requires that damages award in libel 
actions should not exceed the level `necessary to compensate the plaintiff and re-establish 
his reputation' 277 
Even though excessive and disproportionate damages are no longer a prominent feature 
of the law, there is another form of potential threat to free expression in the form of legal 
cost under the scheme known as `no win no fee'. Generally 'no win no fee' is used in the 
context of conditional fee agreements (CFAs). Under such agreements, if a claimant wins 
his case, he must pay his solicitor's fees and any expenses for items such as experts' 
reports and barrister's or other solicitor's opinions. On the other hand if he loses, he need 
not pay any fee to his solicitor. However, he may have to pay his opponent's legal costs 
and both sides' disbursements. 278The scheme is widely used in personal injury cases to 
enable poor people to institute legal action. 
274 Robertson, op. cit. supra, 80. 
275 Mullender, R. (2002) Freedom of Expression and Competing Private Interests. In Alder, J. General 
Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law. Houndmills, 497. 
276 [1993] 4 All ER 975. 
277 Ibid, 994. 
278 http: //www. dca. gov. uk/confeeagr/fags. htm 
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However, there is concern about the operation of this arrangement in libel cases. 279 'Me 
nature of the scheme where the press may incur a huge legal cost impinges on the 
freedom of the press. This is expressed by Lord Justice Brooke in King v Telegraph 
Group Ltd280 when he said it is unfair for the press, the defendants, to pay unreasonable 
and disproportionate costs in the event they lose and with `no reasonable prospect of 
recovering their reasonable and proportionate costs if they win. 9281 In this case, the 
appellants asked the Court to make some kind of special order for their protection 
because the claimant had brought this action under a `conditional fee agreement' (CFA) 
without taking out an `after the event' (ATE) insurance policy. The issue in this case is 
the appropriateness of arrangements whereby a defendant publisher will be required to 
pay up to twice the reasonable and proportionate costs of the claimant if he loses or 
concedes liability, and will almost certainly have to bear his own costs if he wins. The 
court admitted that such a system is bound to have a chilling effect on a newspaper 
exercising its right to freedom of expression, and to lead to the danger of self-imposed 
restraints on publication. 282 Nevertheless, the court decided not to interfere with the wish 
of Parliament that litigants should be able to bring actions to vindicate their reputations 
under a CFA, and that they should not be obliged to obtain ATE cover before they do so. 
Though the Human Rights Act 1998 guarantees the people in the UK freedom of 
expression as a qualified right, the enjoyment of it is compromised by considerations of 
cost and associated risks. From the discussions, thus far, it shows that if the UK is a 
model for freedom of expression but, arguably, it is a far from being a perfect one. This 
leads to the next discussion relating td press freedom in the UK. 
279 Dyer, C. Media groups challenge no-win no-fee libel deals. The Guardian, 27 September 2004. 
httD: //www. guardian. co. uk/uk news/story/0.3604.13 
280 [2004] EWCA Civ. 613. 
281 Ibid, para. 101. 
282 Ibid, para. 99. 
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2.5 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Freedom of the press has been referred to as `essential to the nature of a free state', 283 `the 
great bulwark of liberty 284 and `great national possession'. 285 The role of the press as a 
purveyor of information and public watchdog vindicates the importance of freedom of the 
press in democratic society. 286 This has gained judicial recognition such as in Francome 
v Mirror Group Newspapers. 287 In this case, Sir John Donaldson described free media to 
be `an essential foundation of any democracy'. In addition, the press also makes vital 
contribution in developing democracy by providing factual information needed for people 
to form balanced and informed judgments. 
It has been noted earlier that freedom of expression includes freedom to receive and 
impart information. In order to ensure free flow of information, freedom of the press is 
necessary on the ground of public interest. Moreover, the public has the right to receive 
information that is protected by the Convention . 
288 In Gaskin V United Kingdom289 the 
government contended that Article 10 does not confer a right to receive information from 
the State if the State does not wish to provide it. The court held that Article 10 prohibits 
restriction on a person from receiving information which others may be willing to impart, 
but does not confer on an individual the right to information which others are not willing 
to impart. The court in Lingens v Austria290stressed the role of the press to impart 
information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public interest. 
It went on to say that freedom of the press provides the public one of the best means of 
discovering ideas and attitudes of political leaders. 
Freedom of the press is part and parcel of the concept of freedom of expression. Smith 
argues that the press siould acquire a special and privileged position because of the part 
283 Blackstone, W. Commentaries on the laws of England, Book IV, 151. 
2U Per Lord Denning in Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1. 
285 Per Lord Wilberforce in British Steel Corp. v Granada Television Ltd [ 1981 ] AC 1096,1168. 
286 Smith, A. The Press, the Courts and the Constitution. (1999) 52 CLP 126,129. 
287 [1984] 1 WLR 892,898. 
2n Guerra v Italy (1998) 4 BHRC 63. 
289 (1990) 12 EHRR 36. 
290 (1986) 8 EHRR 103, Jersild v United Kingdom (1994) 19 EHRR 1, Fressoz and Roire v France (1999) 
5 BHRC 654. 
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that it plays in participatory democracy. 291 But it is implausible to give privilege292 to the 
press by relying mainly on its contribution to the society; the constructive role in 
informing, educating, entertaining and representing the public. 93 In this regard, Lord 
Denning said that: 
The freedom of the press is extolled as one of the great bulwarks of 
liberty. But it is often misunderstood.. . It 
does not mean that the press is 
free to ruin a reputation or to break a confidence, or to pollute the course 
294 of justice or to do anything that is unlawful... 
Moreover, to accord a distinct position to the press would amount to giving primacy to 
freedom of expression. This is incongruent with the provision of section 12 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and Article 10 of the Convention which propagate equality rather than 
primacy. Brooke LJ lamented that `right to freedom of expression is not in every case the 
ace trumps, it is a powerful card to which the courts of this country must always give 
appropriate respect. '295 Thus, it is safe to say that freedom of the press in the UK is the 
product of the predominance of the law of the land. 
In the UK, prior-restraint, which is restrictions in advance of publication, on the press in 
term of licensing has long been abolished since 1695 296 This allows the press to operate 
without the government's control. -iowever, the government can exert pressure and 
control in other ways such as legislative constraints on media content. Though there is no 
specific legislation regulating the press, the existence of several statutory laws, such as 
Official Secret Act 1989, Contempt of Court Act 1981 and Defamation Act 1996, has an 
impact on the freedom of the press. The application of the laws causes the press to 
exercise censorship297 to avoid punishment and penalty. Recently, the government 
expands restraint on inflammatory expression to include religiously aggravated 
291 Smith, op. cit., n. 284. 
292 Gibbons, T. Freedom of the Press: Ownership and Editorial Values. (1996) PL 279,289. 
29 Article 10 (2) of the Convention recognizes the need to restrict freedom of expression in democratic 
societies. 
2% Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1. 
295 [200112 WLR 992, para. 94. 
'm The House of Commons refused to continue the Licensing Act. See Dicey, A. Introduction to English 
Constitutional Law, 268. 
297 Editorial cutting is a form of censorship prior to publication. 
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expression through the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 298 It is unclear as 
to whether scurrilous attack on any religion comes under the purview of this offence. 
The employment of institutional pressure on the press has an impact on press freedom. 
This is illustrated by the sacking of Piers Morgan as the editor of the Daily Mirror for the 
publication of photographs allegedly as a proof of the involvement of British army in 
abusing the prisoners of Iraq war. Such pressure also exists when the BBC terminated 
Robert Kilroy-Silk as a presenter of chat show over his article in the Sunday Express that 
is imbued with racial sentiment. Both instances reflect the scope of freedom of expression 
and press freedom in the UK. Though the government has no power to shut down the 
press for publishing inflammatory materials or invasive act, it can exert control by 
regulating the press through legislations. 
The abolition of licensing requirement also paves the way for private ownership of the 
press. Concentration of ownership in the hand of few proprietors such as Lord 
Beaverbrook, Lord Rothermere and Rupert Murdoch characterized the oligopoly of the 
British press. The implication of ownership concentration is that it influences the 
operational aspect of the press. 299 For instance, partisan support to political party in term 
of press coverage and donation is not uncommon. Furthermore, editors are sacked for 
failure to uphold the aspirations of the owners 300 
On the other hand, private ownership provides distinct advantage to press freedom. It 
creates financially independent press that relies on the market force rather than the 
government. Economic independence ensures the press to operate freely without 
governmental control. 301 However, it does not ensure that the press is free from political 
pressure. This is because there are certain issues, such as reputation and privacy, which 
are beyond the market control. Such a pressure propelled the inception of self-regulation 
of press industry with the establishment of the Press Council. 
298 Section 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
2' Gibbons, T. Freedom of the Press: Ownership and Editorial Values. (1996) PL 279. 
300 Grant, M. (1990) The Politics of the British Media. In Jones, B. (ed. ) Political issues in Britain Today. 
Manchester, 60. 
301 Gibbons, T. (1998) Regulating the Media. London, 47. See also Curran, J. (1998) Newspapers and the 
Press. In Briggs, A. and Cobley, P. (eds. ) The Media: An Introduction. Harlow, 88-9. 
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2.6 PRESS SELF-REGULATION 
The importance of a free press as a vital source of public information is widely 
recognized. Nevertheless, the press can sometimes damage individual's interest in 
reputation and dignity by publishing untrue or prejudicial materials. The first Royal 
Commission on the Press scrutinised the conduct of the press and the quality of 
journalism. 02 The Commission proposed the establishment of Press Counci13o3 that can 
monitor the conduct of the press through a code of conduct. 
The ineffectiveness of the Council as a self-regulatory body led to a recommendation for 
a statutory complaints tribunal by the Calcutt Committee304. The Council is perceived as 
a champion for the press rather than protecting the public from the press malpractices. 305 
Unfair and unethica1306conduct of the press adds to the demands for more statutory 
control. The threat of substituting regulatory mechanism from self-regulation to statutory 
was made on several occasions307due to the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the present 
system. 
Self-regulation is jealously guarded and supported by the press industries because it 
provides an assurance against statutory control. 308 In addition, it also ensures that the 
press is able to manage its own affairs without direct control of the government. Perhaps 
self-regulatory mechanism is workable in the UK because of the concerted effort by the 
press industries to ensure the competency of the system; 309 and the reluctance of the 
government to regulate the conduct of the press. 10 This is substantiated with the 
introduction of section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to safeguard freedom of the 
press. This is achieved by requiring the courts to have particular regard to journalistic 
302(1949) Cmnd. 7700. 
303 The first Press Council commenced operation in 1953. 
3°4 Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, HMSO 1990, Cmnd. 1102. 
305 Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, 678. 
3°6 Kay v Robertson [ 1991 ] FSR 62. 
307 The second Royal Commission on the Press, Cmnd. 1811,1962 para. 325, the Lord Chancellor's 
Department Consultation Paper, 1993, the National Heritage Select Committee, 1993 and recently the 
Culture, Media and Sports Select Committee on Privacy, Cm 5985,2003. 
http: //www. culture. gov. uk/creative industries/OuickLinks/publications 
308 Robertson, G. (1983) People against the Press. London, 3. 
309 The incorporation of Presbof shows the commitment to uphold self-regulation. 
310 See government's response to the Fifth Report by Select Committee on Privacy. 
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materials and relevant privacy code. 11 Interim relief should not be granted to restrain 
publication unless the applicant is `likely to establish that publication should not be 
allowed'. 12 It imposes a burden on the applicant in order to restrict freedom of the press. 
The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was established in 1991 to adjudicate 
complaints against the infringement of the press code of conduct. It was established after 
the failure of the previous Press Council in dealing with the press conduct. However, the 
effectiveness of PCC as a self-regulatory body is under scrutiny. 313 The fact that the code 
of practice is drafted by the newspaper and periodical industry314evinces the dominance 
of the press. People outside of the industry should involve in drafting the code to portray 
a degree of neutrality. Without such involvement, the code is perceived as leaning 
towards protecting the interest of the press Sts Furthermore, the influence of the industry 
members such as the Press Standards Board of Finance316(Pressbof) may not diminish the 
image of PCC as representing the interest of the press. As such the public may still be 
skeptical of the ability of the PCC to resolve issues regarding press misconduct. 
Although the PCC provides an avenue for dispute resolution involving the press, there is 
a question of commitment. This is so when the PCC refused to monitor the press for 
breaches of its code. 317 Though the code is incorporated into editors and journalists 
contract of employment, 318 the PCC has no power to prevent the occurrence of breach of 
code. It can only remedy the situation after the event. 
In addition, there is also a question of inconsistency in its adjudication. This can be 
illustrated in two decisions of the PCC involving Anna Ford and JK Rowling319relating 
to issue of reasonable expectation of privacy. The PCC dismissed a complaint by Anna 
311 At present, the only code relates to privacy is the PCC's code of practice. 
312 Section 12 (3) of the Human Right Acts 1998. 
313 Calcutt, D. (1993) Review of Press Self Regulation. 
314 The code binds all national and regional newspapers and magazines. hgp: //www. pcc. orp,. uk/cop/cop. asp 
315 See comment by Peter Crawford, a lawyer in Amanda Holden case. Reported by in Byrne, C. `Treat 
celebrities normally', says lawyer. The Guardian, 10 February 2003. 
http: //media. guardian. co. uk/pressprivacy/story 
316 The financial contribution by the press industries to Pressbof enables the PCC to operate as self 
regulatory body. 
31 Robertson, op. cit., n. 301,683. 
318 Introduction to the Code of Practice. http: //www. 12cc. org uý k/cop/intro. html 
319 hqp: //www. pcc. org. uk/rgports/adiudsearch. gM 
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Ford on the ground that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because the beach 
is publicly accessible though it is secluded. In contrast, the PCC upheld a complaint by 
Rowling, even though OK! Magazine had submitted evidence that all beaches in 
Mauritius were public by law, and had cited the PCC decision concerning Anna Ford. 
Nevertheless, the PCC accepted that other holiday apartments did not overlook the beach 
and that the family had deliberately chosen low season to avoid unwanted attention. 
Furthermore, the adjudicatory power of the PCC is focused on settling disputes. The 
PCC has no compensatory power to award damages, to order an apology and to award 
costs. The press can take advantage of repeating unethical conducts by using the 
complaint to the PCC to re-publicizing the breach 320 The lack of power to sanction is a 
handicap that contributes to the lack of credibility321 of the commission. An apology by 
the press is not a satisfactory redress for irrecoverable loss of privacy nor is it a 
satisfactory deterren322 3 
On the other hand, empowering the PCC with such power would undermine the 
foundation of self-regulation that is based on voluntary participation. It would involve an 
element of coercion `savouring more of governmental control' 323 Arguably, such a 
power is necessary to avoid the PCC being turned into a sanctuary for unfair and 
unethical conduct of the press. The interest of the press, particularly through tabloid 
journalism, in the personal affairs of public figures, 324 royal families325 and celebrities 
raises concerns that the press has gone beyond legal limit by invading privacy and 
reputation. In this context, the court in Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers326 
observed that `the media is peculiarly vulnerable to the error of confusing the public 
interest with their own interest. ' Press coverage on personal affairs is a form of 
320 Cloonan, M. Regulating the Press: The Calcutt Reports. University of York. 
http: //www. york. ac. uk/depts/poli/currentug/syh/csO 12. yrk 
321 Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights. Oxford, 815. 
322 Dworkin, G. Privacy and the Press. (1961) 24 MLR 185,187. 
323 Munro, C. Self-regulation in the Media. (1997) PL 6,16. 
324 In 1992, the press exposed embarrassing private affairs involving the Liberal Democrat leader Paddy 
Ashdown and Secretary of State for National Heritage David Mellor. 
325 In 1991, the People, a tabloid press, published photographs of Princess Eugenie running naked in the 
garden of her home. 
26 [198411 WLR 892. 
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capitalization of news as commodities for commercial gains. 27 In this relation, Hoffman 
LJ said: 
Newspapers are sometimes irresponsible and their motives in a market 
economy cannot to be unalloyed by considerations of commercial 
advantage. 328 
On the other hand, the scope of public interest as contained in the PCC code of practice is 
wide enough to vindicate investigative journalism into the affairs of others. On this point 
Gibbons argues that `Stories about the Royal Family can be justified because it is a public 
institution. Stories about hypocrisy by public figures can be justified because they reveal 
the way that the public is being deceived. '329 However, there are situations where there is 
no objective public interest in revealing private information and personal affairs of public 
figures. For instance, the publication of naked pictures of celebrities330 does not serve any 
public interest except to increase circulation of newspapers by serving the prurient and 
prudish interest of the society. 331 
The problem of self-regulation mechanism under PCC is not with its applicability but 
rather more on its effectiveness. Although PCC is a self-regulatory body supported by 
the press industry, it does not mean that the PCC is willing to dictate the press. The 
Commission is reluctant to specify the requirement that adjudication should be published 
with `due prominence'. The PCC leaves determination on this matter to the editors' 
interpretation. 332 The influence of the press industry over PCC is a stumbling block in 
liberalising the PCC to become an independent body in its true sense. However, the press 
naturally would want the body they voluntarily support and pay for to see things from 
their perspective as well. 
327 The entrepreneurship objectives of the press often overshadow their idealistic role. See Tierney, S. Press 
Freedom and Public Interest: The Developing Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
(1998) 4 EHRLR 419. 
328 Rv Central Independence Television plc [1994] 3 All ER 641,202. 
32' Gibbons, T. (1998) Regulating the Media. London, Sweet and Maxwell. 
330 Amanda Holden, an actress, was pictured topless and received settlement from the Daily Star. Sara Cox, 
a radio DJ, was pictured nude on honeymoon also receive settlement from the People. 
331 Robertson, G. (1993) Freedom, the Individual and the Law. London, 104. 
332 Appendix 1- The PCC. Replies to the Committee's Fifth Report 2002-03. HC 213. 
http: //www. parliament. the-stationery-office. co. uk/pa/cm200304/croselect/cmcumeds/213/213. pdf 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, the UK law has been strongly protective over individual rights such as 
reputation at the expense of freedom of expression. The residual character does not entitle 
the people to claim the right. However, the Human Rights Act 1998 institutionalised 
freedom of expression to the extent that the Act gives greater protection to free 
expression as a guaranteed fundamental right. Though the Human Rights Act 1998 does 
not prioritize freedom of expression, it has however acquired primacy status through 
judicial commitment in protecting the right. 
On the other hand, the emergence of a pluralistic society calls for accommodation of 
interests. Uneasy compromise occurs which sometimes suppress freedom of expression 
out of concern for other interests of higher importance such as security and public order. 
This is a matter of exercising practical choice that is undoubtedly difficult especially for 
the ruling government. However, institutional protection of freedom of expression in the 
UK is the fortress for the people to seek refuge in case of infringement of their 
fundamental rights. It could be arguably said that there are three factors that enable the 
enjoyment of free expression in the UK. First is the impact of the Human Rights Act 
1998, which creates a right-based scheme. Second is the influence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in according leverage on freedom of expression under the 
protective Article 10, and third is the commitment of the judiciary in protecting the right 
to free expression by giving effect to the right as embedded in the statutory provision. 
In this regard, the leverage on free expression as enjoyed in the UK may not be of the 
same degree in Malaysia. Though Malaysia practices a right-based scheme under the 
written constitutional provision, other expedient and necessary overriding interests dictate 
the commitment on freedom of expression. This will be discussed in the next chapter in 
which the practice of freedom of expression in Malaysia is examined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN MALAYSIA 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech and expression is vital for citizens of democratic countries. The 
freedom enables the people to take part within a democratic framework, to cherish the 
ideals of a government by the people for the people. Democracy is worthless if it does not 
allow free expressions on all matters pertaining to political and social aspects of the 
people. To have freedom of expression is to allow the people to exercise their democratic 
rights on the basis of well-informed decisions. As such democracy without freedom of 
speech and expression is untenable. 
Malaysians take pride in the fact that they practice parliamentary democracy. They have, 
since their independence in 1957, held free general elections as enjoined in the 
Constitution. The same system has enabled the country to prosper from the status of an 
under-developed to a developing country. Democracy flourishes when people are given 
the space to participate in the system. Democracy has also contributed to the fact that 
Malaysia is now recognised as one of the fast growing economic countries in the Asian 
region. 
However, there is a vexed question as to why in a progressing country like Malaysia, 
should any issue of public interest be suppressed? If the society is expected to mature 
and become a developed society, as envisaged under the Vision 2020,333 the people 
should be allowed to make an informed judgment on matters affecting their interest 
without undue restrictions. For this to have any prospect of becoming a reality, freedom 
of expression must be pragmatically exercised rather than just a mere proclamation of its 
existence in black letters. As a developing democratic country, Malaysia embraces 
certain aspect of liberal democracy such as freedom and liberty. Arguably, the Western 
333 This is a national policy towards making Malaysia as a fully developed nation by the year 2020. 
b. 9p: //www. pmo. p-ov. my/website/webdb. nsf/vALLDOC/BA705 I FF90767AD848256E84003129CA 
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liberal democracy as reflected in Dworkin's334 writing may not be the sort of model that 
suits the Malaysian socio-political environment. The right-based approach in the Western 
model gives prominence to the empowerment of individual rights. On the contrary, the 
Malaysian Constitution qualifies the rights on the ground of communitarian interest as 
stated in Article 10 (2) 335 Siti Norma J in Lee Kuan Yew v Chin Vui Khen & Anor336 
rejected the effort by the defendants to relate the approach to freedom of expression with 
the First Amendment of the USA. She found that the First Amendment is `totally and 
radically' different from the local provision of Article 10.337 Furthermore, the First 
Amendment is not of any persuasive value. 
Notably, a benign development of rights can take place in Malaysia, but progress should 
proceeds incrementally at a slower pace than in the West particularly the United States of 
America (USA). Radical change in legal landscape by adopting the approach as 
prescribed by Dworkin could induce the growth of unmanageable racial and cultural 
tensions. Although it is better for grievances and problems about politics, economics and 
social matters to be opened for discussion and debate, a lesson ought to be learned from 
Malaysian history when in 1969, the nation bloodiest racial riot occurred as a result of 
sensitive issues being stirred up. Malaysians, who remember the details of this riot, are 
fully aware that racial feelings are only too easily stirred up by constant harping on 
sensitive issues like language, privilege and religion. 
Malaysia as a democratic country, 338 firmly upholds the right to freedom of speech and 
expression. This is enshrined in the Federal Constitution in Article 10 (1). This 
constitutional right enables the citizens to express their minds and thoughts on various 
aspects. But the importance of freedom of speech and expression does not make the 
334 Dworkin, R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. London, Duckworth. 
335 The communitarian interest is reiterated by the Malaysian Prime Minister when he explained the 
national determination under the Vision 2020 policy to practice community-oriented democracy. See, Dato' 
Seri Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Continuity, Change and Cooperation: Malaysia and Japan Working 
Together. 10 July 2003, Tokyo. 
http: //www. pmo. Qov. my/WebNotesApp/tpmmain. nsf/O/ac l4767aa2Ofea2648256d720012ecde? OpenDocu 
ment 
336[1991]3MLJ494. 
337 thld, 503. 
338 The government is elected based on representative system through free election. See the Federal 
Constitution, Chapter 4. 
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freedom an absolute right. In all democratic states, even in a country that proclaims the 
right as a positive right such as the USA, there are certain forms of restrictions imposed. 
The distinction between these jurisdictions is perhaps pertaining to the latitude and 
parameter of limitation. With regard to freedom of speech, Malaysia has always had a 
myriad of laws capable of suppressing free speech. Before examining the restrictions on 
free expression in Malaysia, it is pertinent to forge a better understanding on the exercise 
of the right. 
3.1 HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Freedom of speech and expression is one of the basic features of fundamental liberties in 
Malaysian Constitution. 339 The Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Reid 
(Reid Commission) recommended the constitutional protection to freedom of 
expression. 340 Arguably, the recommendation for protection of speech and expression by 
the Reid Commission is not founded on the intrinsic nature of the right as a pre-requisite 
of a democratic society. The right is guaranteed due to uncertain apprehension in certain 
quarters of the society. However, the Commission believed that such apprehension is to 
be unfounded. 341 The Commission observed that: 
... the rights which we recommend should 
be defined and guaranteed are 
all firmly established throughout Malaya and it may seem unnecessary to 
give them special protection. But we have found in certain quarters vague 
apprehension about the future. We believe such apprehension to be 
unfounded, but there can be no objection to guaranteeing these rights 
subject to limited exceptions in condition of emergency and we 
recommend that this should be done. 342 
Perhaps the casual consideration by the Reid Commission of freedom of speech and 
expression may be due to the fording by the Commission that it is already `firmly 
established throughout Malaya. ' The Commission may base its judgment on the 
presumption that the right that was widely practiced under the British ruling could safely 
339 Ibid, Article 10. 
340 Ibrahim, A. and Joned, A. (1987) The Malaysian Legal System. Kuala Lumpur, 54-55. 
341 See Bari, A. Freedom of Speech and Expression in Malaysia. (1998) 28 INSAF 149,152 
342 The Report by the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1956-1957. Cited in Tan, K. and 
Li-ann. (1997) Constitutional Law of Malaysia and Singapore. Kuala Lumpur, 743. 
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continue to be "practiced after the independence. 343 It appears that the initial stand of the 
Commission was that the freedom warrants no special protection. The protection was 
given mainly because of the fear by certain quarters of its practice after the independence. 
As a result, the Constitution, which was promulgated on the 31st August 1957, had 
incorporated an equivocal freedom of speech and expression as one of the fundamental 
rights bestow upon its citizens. The residual characteristic of the right is the legacy of the 
British system in Malaysia. 
Freedom of expression under the Constitution is a positive right that cannot be denied by 
the government. However, other interests curtail the enjoyment as stated in Article 10 (2) 
(a) of the Constitution. The Article provides: 
Such restriction as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the 
security of the Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other 
countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the 
privilege of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide 
against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence 
Thus, the real issue is not the question of the existence but, rather, the exercise of the 
right. The exceptions as stated in Article 10 (2) (a) determine the extent and context of 
the exercise of freedom of expression. Since Parliament has the power to determine the 
scope of exceptions, the extent of executive influence, thus, needs further inquiry. 
Arguably, the executive branch in Malaysia acquires wide power to determine the extent 
of freedom of speech under Article 10 of the Constitution. Though there is a separation of 
power among three main bodies, the executive, legislature and judiciary under the 
Constitution, there is no clear separation between the executive and the legislature. 
Notably, the imposition of restrictions through arbitrary exercise of power will only erode 
the right. Consequently, the functioning of a democratic system may be at risk of being 
replaced by an autocratic system. Restrictions on freedom of speech may deprive the 
citizens from receiving balanced information that could enable them to form their 
judgment. In this regard, freedom of speech and expression is particularly important to 
343 The Commission was too optimistic about the right. See Harding, A. (1996) Law, Government and the 
Constitution. London, 45. 
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create a well informed society; a pre-requisite for a vibrant democracy. On this premise, 
there is a need to have a clear meaning and scope of free speech. This is the focus of the 
following discussion. 
3.2 THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
In Malaysia, freedom of speech and expression is a nebulous fundamental right 344 This is 
enshrined in Article 10 (1) (a) of the Malaysian Constitution: 
Every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
Even though there is an explicit guarantee of freedom of speech and expression, the 
Constitution does not elaborate on the meaning of the right. The provision is wide enough 
to cover all modes of communication. Raja Azlan Shah J. in Public Prosecutor v Ooi Kee 
Saik & Ors345 explains the right by saying that `the right to freedom of speech is simply 
the right which everyone has to say, write or publish what he pleases so long as he does 
not commit a breach of the law. '346 
Speech and expression can be in the form of verbal and non-verbal activity. 347 It involves 
communication by word of mouth, signs, symbols and gesture; and through works of art, 
music, sculpture, photographs, films, videos, books, magazines and newspapers. 48 It is 
the freedom to communicate one's idea through any medium. Symbolic speech such as 
flag burning349does not involve verbal communication. What it uses is a form of non- 
linguistic symbol to inform and communicate to others. Thus, expression has both 
content and form. On the other hand, conduct is expressive if it attempts to convey 
meaning and the meaning is the content. 
344 The provisions in Article 5 to 13 are the fundamental liberties under the Federal Constitution. 
345 [1971] 2 MLJ 108. 
346Ibid, 112. 
347 Raz, J. (1994) Free Expression and Personal Identification. In W. J. Waluchow (ed. ) Free Expression: 
Essays in Law and Philosophy. Oxford, 1. 
348 Faruqi, S. Free Speech and the Constitution. (1992) 4 CIJ34,36. 
349 DPP v Percy [2001 ] EWHC 1125. 
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The concept of freedom of speech and expression also encompasses freedom of the 
press 35° The role of the press as a feeder of information to the society on various issues 
relates to speech and expression in the wider sense. Nevertheless, there is no special 
privilege accorded to the press 351 
3.3 THE SCOPE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
Freedom of expression covers any expression however unpopular, distasteful or contrary 
to the ideas of the ruling government. A free society cannot function with coercive legal 
censorship in the hands of persons who are inclined to use the power of the censor to 
suppress opposing viewpoints. Nevertheless, Gopal Sri Ram JCA expresses the view that 
the courts should keep in tandem with the national ethos as reflected in the written laws 
passed by an elected legislature 352 
Freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution is specifically conferred to the 
citizens 353 The implication of Article 10 (1) (a) that provides `Every citizen has the right 
to freedom of speech and expression', thus excludes the non-citizens from receiving 
constitutional protection. Consequently, foreigners in Malaysia are not entitled to claim 
the right by invoking the constitutional provision. They also cannot seek protection under 
the Constitution if they are charged with violating the restriction on freedom of speech. 
From the Constitution's point of view, the government is entitled to curtail their freedom 
of speech and expression as they are subjected to the Malaysian laws. 
It would follow from this that not only the non-citizen but also an artificial person such as 
corporations, even though incorporated in Malaysia, would not be entitled to claim the 
right. This is because citizenship354 is confined to natural person. 355 At this juncture, 
350 per Abdul Hamid LP in New Straits Times Press (A ß Sdn Bhd v Airasia Bhd [ 1987] 1 MU 36,39 
351 J Heng Consulting Services (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v The New Straits Times Press(" Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 
481. 
352 Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd (1999)1 MLJ 371. 
353 Unlike personal liberty, abolition of slavery and forced labour, freedom of religion and right to property, 
these rights are available to citizens and foreigners alike. See Farugi, S. (1999) Human Rights and the 
Constitution. In S. Rachagan and R. Tikamdas (eds. ) Human Rights and the National Commission. Kuala 
Lumpur, 140. 
334 Under the Malaysian Constitution there are four ways a person can acquire citizenship. It can be by 
birth, descent, registration and naturalization. See Article 14,15,16 and 19 of the Federal Constitution. 
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reference to an Indian authority is helpful as Article 19 (1) of the Indian Constitution is 
considerably similar to the corresponding provision in Article 10 (1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution. The Supreme Court of India in Bennet Coleman v. Union of India stressed 
that: 
... the editor, the printer, the Deputy Director who are all citizens and 
have 
the right to freedom under art 19(1) can invoke those rights for freedom of 
speech and expression, claim by them for freedom of the press in their 
daily publication... 356 
International instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (ICCPR) and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) recognise the 
necessity for restricting freedom of expression. Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR 
acknowledges that the exercise of the right comes with special duties and responsibilities. 
Any restriction imposed on the right shall be in accordance with the law. Matters 
pertaining to rights and reputations of others; national security, public order, public health 
and morals, are given prominence in limiting the scope of freedom of expression. Under 
the European jurisprudence these limitations are couched by the doctrine of 
proportionality. 
In the Malaysian context, the purpose of the restriction is to safeguard other interests that 
are deemed to be more important. In this regard, Raja Azlan Shah J in PP v Ooi Kee 
Saik357 said: 
It also would seem to be true, as a general statement, that free and frank 
political discussion and criticism of government policies cannot be 
developed in an atmosphere of surveillance and constraint. But as far as I 
am aware, no constitutional state seriously attempted to translate the 
`right' into an absolute right. Restrictions are a necessary part of the 
`right' ... 
freedom of speech and expression is, in spite of formal 
safeguards, seriously restricted in practice 358 
355 The right is confined only to citizens and 'not in terms extended to the press. ' See Tan, op cit., n. 349, 
643. 
356 AIR 1973 SC 107. 
357[1971]2MLJ108. 
358 Ibid, 110 
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Apparently, unregulated freedom of expression could create tension in society. This is 
more profound in a society with diverse cultures and religious background such as 
Malaysia. 359 The government is confronted with responsibility to create an environment 
of tolerance and harmony for the betterment of the people. Thus, to a certain extent, 
regulation on freedom of expression is necessary to preserve the standard and quality of 
life in a plural democratic society. 
However, any abuse of the justification for restricting freedom of speech and expression 
undermines the constitutional right. The imposition of restriction under autocratic 
regulation more often than not suppresses the people from exercising their rights to 
express and receive information. Although freedom of speech and expression is not 
absolute, 360 restrictive regulations would defeat the purpose of guaranteeing the right 
under a constitutional framework. In order to preserve the Constitution as the supreme 
law of the land, restrictions on free speech should be narrowly interpreted. This is 
pertinent in the case of Malaysia with its vision to create a developed society under the 
grand Vision 2020. 
On the other hand, the Malaysian plural society requires stability in the political, 
economic and social aspects. There are situations where restriction is required to maintain 
stability in the society. For instance, the gap in economic procurement between the racial 
groups propelled the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 to create 
stability. 361 The NEP had two prong objectives, firstly 'poverty eradication regardless of 
race' and secondly, 'restructuring society to eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function'. The NEP was supposed to create the conditions for national unity by 
reducing inter-ethnic resentment due to socio-economic disparities. The policy sparks 
discontentment because it creates privilege and favouritism in multiracial society. In 
practice, the NEP policies were seen as pro-Bumiputera (natives), the largest indigenous 
ethnic community. But, sometimes these situations are being manipulated to achieve 
ulterior objectives such as the preservation of political supremacy. 362 Public order and 
359 Public Prosecutor v Pung Chen Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566,580. 
360 Bari, A. Freedom of Speech? Yes, but with constraints. The Sun, 4 May 1997. 361 Sundräm, J. (2001) Malaysia's New Economic Policy and `National Unity'. Switzerland, UNRISD. 362 Ibid, 14-15. 
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security are commonly cited to necessitate restrictions on questioning the implementation 
of such a policy. Justification of public order and security by a powerful executive 
without judicial scrutiny is a recipe for autocracy. In this context, reliance on public 
order and security may be seen to be a facade to legalise restrictions on freedom of 
speech and expression. 
Freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute. 
Article 10 (2) (a) empowers Parliament to limit the scope of the right through legislation. 
The article provides: 
(2) Parliament may by law impose- 
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of clause (1), such restrictions 
as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, 
public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges 
of Parliament or any Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt 
of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence. 
There are two main provisions in the Constitution that restrict freedom of speech and 
expression. First, the restriction on specific grounds as stated in Article 10 (2) (a). The 
provision allows Parliament to enact laws that have the effect of restricting the right, 
which in the opinion of Parliament is necessary and expedient. The ground for restriction 
must be based on: 
(a) The interest of security of the Federation or any part thereof 
(b) Friendly relations with other countries 
(c) Public order 
(d) Morality 
(e) Protection of the privileges of the Parliament or Legislative Assembly 
(f) Contempt of court 
(g) Defamation or 
(h) Incitement to any offence. 
The existence of the requirement `necessary and expedient' would practically make 
Parliament as the ultimate decision-making body. The prerogative power of Parliament in 
this matter is vast. Parliament is not obliged to prove the necessity and expediency of the 
law in restricting freedom of speech and expression. As such, the courts are powerless to 
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annul the law, as there is no requirement of reasonableness 363 On this point, Chan J. in 
Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy 364 said `the validity of any law which 
Parliament under Article 10 (2) (a) has deemed necessary to pass to impose restriction on 
freedom of speech shall not be questioned. 065 
Nonetheless, perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that Malaysians do have the right to 
freedom of speech and expression but not the freedom after speech. 366 This is because of 
the residual character of the right and the wide scope of restriction that is emphatically 
stated in Article 10 (1) (a), clause (2) (a) and clause (4). 367 To elaborate on this matter, 
the next discussion will further probe on the restriction of free expression under the 
Constitution. 
3.4 CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONS 
The right of Malaysian citizens to freedom of speech and expression under the 
constitution is framed in pragmatic terms. Whilst the right is guaranteed, it does not 
necessarily mean that it can be exercised in any way as one likes. Qualification of the 
right is equally important to prevent harmful effect on the interests as stated in Article 10 
(2) (a) and clause (4). The incorporation of the interests reflects the need to secure a 
tolerant environment, based on the reality of Malaysian society. 
The interests pertaining to security, friendly relations, public order and morality are more 
appropriate to be deliberated by the Parliament rather than the courts. These are the 
domains of Parliament of which the executive is accountable to. It is for the executive to 
determine as a matter of policy whether activities are prejudicial to national security. 368 
Decision on national security should be left to the executive because this is an area which 
the courts have no expert knowledge. Arguably, the courts are not representative bodies 
363 Unlike Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, which has almost similar provision with Article 10 of the 
Malaysian Constitution, restrictions are qualified with the requirement of reasonableness. This empowers 
the Indian courts to scrutinize the legitimacy of any restriction on free speech. 
364 [1986] 1 MU 512. 
365 Ibid, 517. 
366 Jewa, S. (1996) Public International Law: A Malaysian Perspective. Kuala Lumpur, 593. 
367 Bari, A. Freedom of Speech and Expression in Malaysia after Forty Years. (1998) 27 INSAF 149,151. 
369 Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1978] 1 MU 30. 
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properly to be entrusted with policymaking power and governance. Their judgments are 
best informed within the limit of rules and principles. The courts are reluctant to indulge 
in matters deemed to be within the legislative power. The Federal Court in Loh Kooi 
Choon v Government of Malaysia observes this369 when Raja Azian Shah FJ said: 
The question whether the impugned Act is 'harsh and unjust' is a 
question of policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and 
therefore not meant for judicial determination. To sustain it would cut 
very deeply into the very being of Parliament 370 
Matters of national security are different from matters of national interest. National 
interest may be likened to that of public interest. But national security has always been 
considered by the courts to require special treatment 371 In this regard, Lord Fraser had 
summed up a proposition in the English case of Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v 
Minister for the Civil Service372 when he said, "Those who are responsible for national 
security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires. It would obviously 
be undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law 
or otherwise in public. "373 
Even though matters on national security remain within the prerogative power of the 
executive, this does not imply that the executive in Malaysia is beyond legal scrutiny. 
Question of legality of the executive conduct is well within the courts' jurisdiction. This 
is illustrated in the case of Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & 
Ors. 74 In this case, despite the press statement of the respondent that the appellants were 
detained because they were a threat to national security, the appellants were not 
interrogated on the militant actions and neither were they questioned about getting 
explosive materials and weapons. Instead, the appellants were mainly asked about their 
political activities for intelligence gathering. The court found that there was much force 
369 [ 1977] 2 MLJ 187. 
370 Ibid, 188. This was followed by the High Court in Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Menteri 
Dalam Negers & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 364,376. See also per Salleh Abas LP in Theresa Lim Chin Chin & 
Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293,298. 
371 Abdullah, M. D. National Security Considerations under the ISA 1960 - Recent Development. 
http: //www. mlj. com. my/free/dzaidin. htm 
372( 1985) AC 374. 
373 Ibid. 
374 [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
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in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the detentions were for the 
ulterior purpose and unconnected with national security. Steve Shim CJ said that `The 
executive, by virtue of its responsibilities, had to be the sole judge of what national 
security required. Although a court would not question the executive's decision as to what 
national security required the court would nevertheless examine whether the executive's 
decision was in fact based on national security considerations. '375 
The pragmatic approach of the court streamlines the executive prerogative so that it 
conforms to the requirement of law. The approach would enable the courts to assert its 
function in upholding the supremacy of the constitution particularly in relation to the 
fundamental liberties. Although the courts have no power to determine the circumstances 
that amount to national security, it can decide on the question of whether executive 
conduct has a nexus with the requirement of national security. This is illustrated in the 
case of Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Jamaluddin Bin Othman. 376 The 
Supreme Court found that a mere participation in meetings and seminars could not make 
a person a threat to the security of the country. As regards the alleged conversion to 
Christianity of six Malays, even if it was true, it could not by itself be regarded as a threat 
to the security of the country. 
Restrictions on freedom of speech and expression are permitted for the purpose of 
preserving foreign relationships. Matters pertaining to good relations with other foreign 
countries are dictated by the government's foreign policy. In this regard, the executive 
will determine the extent and nature of a relationship with other countries. 77 Though 
there is no specific law to regulate freedom of expression on this ground, administrative 
instruments in term of foreign policies will normally serve as guidelines. Bilateral 
relationship is important not only for political purposes but also for economics as well. In 
relation to this, Malaysia had a tragic experience when a good relationship with a 
neighbouring country, Indonesia, broke down in 1964. This led to a confrontation, which 
threatened the security of both countries. 
375 Ibid, 481. 
376 [1989] 1 MLJ 418. 
37 For instance, Malaysian citizens are allowed to travel to all countries except Israel. This is stated in their 
international passport. 
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The interest in maintaining good relations with other countries override the exercise of 
free speech and freedom of the press. This is apparent when a chief editor of a local 
mainstream national newspaper was sacked because of an article written by him that 
caused uneasiness on the part of the government of Saudi Arabia. 378 This illustrates that 
criticisms on foreign countries that could jeopardise good relationship and rapport are 
monitored. But latitude is given to allow criticism when the government is involved in a 
strained relationship with other countries. For instance, relations between Malaysia and 
Britain deteriorated in the 1970s over various issues, including attempts made by the 
government to gain control over several large British-owned companies in the country. 
Consequently, Malaysia propagated a campaign of `Buy British Last' 379 
Another justification for restriction of freedom of expression is on the ground of public 
order. Public order refers to the tranquility and security that every person feels under the 
protection of the law. 380 Public safety is part of the wider concept of public order. It 
means security of the public and their freedom from danger, which includes the securing 
of public health. Therefore, prohibiting public discussion by the media on matters that are 
prejudicial to public order is constitutionally legal. 
The legality of any restriction that is not within the ambit of Article 10 (2) (a) can be 
challenged. The courts have the power to declare restriction as unconstitutional if it is not 
under one of the interests in Article 10 (2) (a). However, the courts lack judicial 
enthusiasm when it comes to protecting the right against the executive and Parliament. 
The courts are assertive on restrictions laid down by Parliament rather than being 
inquisitive on the aims and functions of the right 381 This may be due to the abdication of 
the courts power by the executive through the provision of laws. The courts are paralysed 
to exercise its judicial ability to scrutinise and check the executive conduct through 
judicial review. For instance, the Internal Security Act 1960 allows a detention without 
378 Former NST group editor-in-chief pledges support. Bernama, 24 November 2003. 
379 Asian Political News, Mahathir leaves lasting legacy to Malaysia-Japan ties. Kyodo News International, 
3 November 2003. httn: //www. findarticles. com/p/articles/mi mOWDO/is 2003 Nov 3/ai 109563574 
380 Re Tan Boo Liat [1976] 2 MLJ. 
381 Addruse, A. Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law: Their Protection by Judges. Paper presented at 
12th Commonwealth Law Conference. Kuala Lumpur. See also Ban, A. Freedom of Speech and 
Expression in Malaysia (1998) 28 INSAF 149,156. 
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trial for up to two years of any person of whom the government is satisfied that such 
detention is necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to national 
security, the maintenance of essential services or to the economic life in Malaysia. 
Detainees under the Act have no recourse to ordinary judicial remedies. They can make 
representations to an Advisory Board established under the Constitution, which reports to 
the executive. The Federal Court in Kerajaan Malaysia, Menteri Dalam Negeri dan 
Ketua Polis Negara v Nasharuddin bin Nasir382 held that it is not open to the Court to 
examine the sufficiency or relevancy of the basis upon which the Minister formed his 
conclusion. This is because he can only make decision alone. In this case, the respondent 
was arrested in pursuant to section 73 (1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA). The 
respondent filed an action at the High Court praying, inter alia, for the right of access to 
legal representation and order of harbeas corpus. However, before the application for 
harbeas corpus was heard, the Minister had issued an order for detention under section 8 
of the ISA. 
To inquire into the fairness of restriction could amount to meddling into the executive 
power. This is contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers as the scope of restrictions 
is determined by Parliament. In relation to this, Ong CJ reminds that `The duty of the 
court is to interpret and uphold the law passed by Parliament. ' 383 In addition, restriction 
on freedom of expression was raised in Lau Dak Kee V PP. 384 In this case the appellant 
was found guilty and convicted for having contravened the permit issued by the police 
under section 27 of the Police Act 1967. The judge said that `these rights (to free speech, 
assembly and association) are, however, subject to any law passed by Parliament. ' 385 The 
cases portray the attitude of the courts in accepting the superiority of the executive and 
Parliament. This is inconsistent with the fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the land. 86 The courts, through its judicial activism, should preserve the positive right of 
freedom of expression as enshrined in the Constitution. Unfortunately, the attitude of the 
382 Unreported case, Criminal Appeal No. 05-75-2002(B), mentioned in Abdullah, M. D., National Security 
Considerations under the ISA 1960 - Recent Developments. 
http: //www. mli. com. my/free/articles/dzaiddin. htm 
383 See Melan Abdullah v PP [1971] 2 MLJ 280,283. 
384 [1976] 2 MU 229. 
385 Ibid, 230. 
386 Article 4 (1) of the Federal Constitution. 
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courts in relation to free speech is similar to the executive's: it is perceived as residual in 
character. Therefore, it is submitted that there is a need for the courts to treat the right 
intrinsically as well as instrumentally so that the constitutional protection on free speech 
does not become otiose. 
In addition, Article 10 (4) provides for restriction on classified sensitive matters. The 
restriction is absolute in the sense that it cannot be challenged in the court of law. The 
article reads: 
In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the Federation or 
any part thereof or public order under Clause (2) (a), Parliament may pass 
law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, 
privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the 
provisions of Part 111, Article 152,153 or 181 otherwise than in relation to 
the implementation thereof as may be specified in such law. 
The provision excludes the role of the courts whereby the legality of restriction is not a 
subject of judicial review. The constraint on freedom of expression under this provision 
relates to subject matters that are strictly beyond scrutiny in the interest of security or 
public order. The subject matters are citizenship, national language, privileges for the 
Malays and the Rulers' sovereignty. Naturally, these subjects are common topics with no 
real threat to the national security or public order. However, considering the climate of 
the plural society in Malaysia, these are the sensitive areas which may easily lead to 
racial tension. Tun Abdul Razak, the then Prime Minister, expresses this during the 
parliamentary debate on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971. The justification for 
such a prohibition is `to redress the racial imbalance in certain sectors of the nation's life 
in so far as this imbalance can be rectified by legislation'. 87 
Lessons from the past experiences have made these sensitive issues tightly guarded in 
order to maintain security and public order. 388 Since Malaysian society and culture has 
been dominated by racial and ethnic preoccupations, thus, it is widely agreed in Malaysia 
that the greatest threat to socio-political stability, especially since the late sixties, has 
387 Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971. Kuala Lumpur, Government Printers. 
388 Yusuf, A. (1987) Freedom of the Press in Malaysia Paper presented at 10th LAWASIA Conference. 
Kuala Lumpur, 2. 
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been inter-ethnic disharmony. 389 Though efforts to foster national integration and unity39o 
are intensified, a genuine national unity remains questionable if socio-political matters 
are being polarised on the basis of ethnicity. 
The backdrop of Malaysian socio-political environment provides a strong basis to give 
priority to peace, stability and harmony at the expense of the democratic right of the 
people. The restrictions are wide to the extent that `there are likely to be very few 
possible restrictions which could not be said to come within the kinds of restriction 
permitted by Article 10.09t The extent of restriction covers all categories of expression. 
However, the next discussion will show that leverage is given to certain types of 
expression while others are strictly inhibited. 
3.5 CATEGORIES OF EXPRESSION 
3.5.1 POLITICAL EXPRESSION 
Freedom of speech and expression is a cornerstone of a functioning democracy. The 
significance of political speech in Malaysia, which stimulates discussion on public 
matters, has lessened the vitality of other categories of expression such as artistic and 
commercial expression. According to Barendt political speech refers to `all speech 
relevant to the development of public opinion on the whole range of issues which an 
intelligent citizen should think about. 392 He argues that this type of speech should be 
immuned from restriction because of its conduciveness to the operation of a 
constitutional democracy. 
Barendt's opinion may suit well in an atmosphere where mature and vibrant democracy is 
practiced in a homogeneous society. Leverage on free expression according to Barent's 
conviction, though important under liberal political philosophy, is rather a utopian 
concept and an ideal situation in the case of Malaysia. However, it is difficult to apply 
this concept in a Malaysian plural society that exercises a distinctive parliamentary 
389 Sundram, J. (2001) Malaysia's New Economic Policy and `National Unity'. Switzerland, UNRISD, 15. 
390 Recently, a new Department of National Unity and Integration was established. http: //www. pmo. og v. my 
391 Harding, A. (1996) Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia. London, 189-90. 
392 Barendt, E. (1985) Freedom of Speech. Oxford, 152. 
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democracy whereby the executive is dominant and powerful 393 Datuk Dr Rais Yatim, the 
Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, reiterates this when he said that Malaysia 
would continue with its distinctive way of practicing civil liberty. 394 An example of the 
Malaysian distinctive way is the exclusion of judicial review, a creature of common law, 
which empowers the courts to scrutinise the executive conduct. Statutory legislations that 
provide for such exclusion `must prevail over judicial review if the statute is 
unmistakably explicit in ousting judicial review by the courts. '395 
The imposition of limitations on freedom of expression in Malaysia could be influenced 
by the lessons from racial and political turmoil of the past. The real question that needs 
to be addressed is not whether there exist freedom of expression but to what extent 
freedom of speech and expression can be exercised in Malaysia. Since the independence 
in 1957, most of the efforts have been concentrated on developing the country. The quest 
for progress and development creates a sense of urgency in preserving security, political 
stability and fair distribution of economy. 396 As such, the emphasis given to nation 
building suggests that restrictive laws are necessary to achieve these goals. In this 
respect, it can be said that Malaysia adopts the position of what is good for its citizens by 
assuaging the principle of human rights. 
Preservation of security has been a continuous agenda especially with the insurgence of 
communist threat before independence. Some of the legislative efforts introduced at that 
time are still maintained and have continued to be applicable until today. 397 The necessity 
to overcome the threat has culminated in the introduction of security laws such as Internal 
Security Act 1960 and Restricted Residence Act 1933. 
Arguably, the basis of the existence of restrictive laws is no longer posing real or eminent 
threat. This raises a question of the relevance in continuing with the application of the 
laws. What seems to be initially a genuine effort to combat communist threat and 
393 Yatim, R. (1994) The Role ofLaw and Executive Power in Malaysia: A Study of Executive Supremacy. 
University of London. 
394 See, Change in laws must meet needs. NST, 8 September 2000,10. 
393 Kerajaan Malaysia, Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Ketua Polis Negara v Nasharuddin bin Nasir. 
Unreported, Criminal Appeal No. 05-75-2002(B). 
396 Abraham, C. Freedom of Speech for Whom? The Malaysian Case. (1998) 271NSAF, 4. 
397 Sedition Act 1948 and Restricted Residence Act 1933 
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subversive activities could be used to maintain political power. 
398 The use of security 
related legislations, such as the Internal Security Act 1960 and Official Secret Act 1972, 
to detain leaders of opposition political parties vindicate this point 399 However, the 
terrorists' attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States of America has made 
protection of national security even greater. This presents the government with a 
legitimate ground to justify the need to continue the application of security laws. Though 
the threat of communists and related activities no longer exist in Malaysia, the laws are 
still relevant in curbing activities that posed a threat to security and public order in 
general. The application of the law could be used to hinder threats from both external and 
internal such as drugs trafficking and religious extremism. However, a draconian 
provision such as detention without trial and absolute discretionary power of the 
executive should be repealed. 
In addition, Article 149400 and 150401 give a blanket power to Parliament to enact laws for 
the purpose of security. The validity of laws pass under the authority of both provisions 
cannot be questioned even if it contravenes the provision on fundamental liberties. The 
impact of political expression on peace, stability and harmony has widened the 
restriction. This is evident in the Constitution with a list of sensitive issues introduced by 
the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 402 In 1969, Malaysia experienced the first racial 
riot sparked by racial sentiments that later put the country under the state of emergency. 
The main factor that caused the unrest was the inflammatory speeches made during the 
general elections in 1969. 
The sensitivity of racial sentiment is stressed in Melan bin Abdullah & Anor v Public 
Prosecutor403 where a newspaper published a report of a talk given by a prominent Malay 
leader with an editorial sub-heading entitled: `Abolish Tamil or Chinese medium schools 
398 A number of political figures were detained under `Operasi Lalang' in 1987. See Shankar, M. Freedom 
of Expression: Its Extent and Limits and the Problems it Encounters. 
http: //www. mlj. com. my/free/articles. htm 
399 Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Ors. [2002] 4 MU 449. 
400 This provision empowers the Parliament to enact laws against subversion, organized violence and 
crimes prejudicial to the public. 
401 This provision refers to laws at time of emergency. 
402 Act A30171. 
403 [1971] 2 MU 280. 
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in this country'. The editor-in-chief and the author of the sub-heading were prosecuted 
under the Sedition Act 1948. Both were convicted and fined by the lower court. 
Democracy in Malaysia is shaped by politics of ethnicism. 404 The existence of political 
parties is based on ethnic support. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is 
one of the main political parties representing the Malays as the majority race in 
Malaysia. 405 In order to garner the support of the Malays, UMNO carries a political 
slogan of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay Lordship) as a reminder that the Malays rule the 
country. Although there are efforts to subdue the sentiment during Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad premiership through his liberalization programmes such as Bangsa Malaysia 
(Malaysian race), vision schools and meritocracy system, it is insufficient to defuse the 
prejudices among the races 406 
The creation of Barisan Nasional (National Front), a co-operation of several ethnic 
political parties (UMNO, MCA and MIC), as one political force is an effort towards 
integration. From the government's perspective, it is vital to maintain racial harmony and 
unity within the fragile multi-racial society. The impact of political instability will not 
only jeopardise the harmonious social milieu, but it will also bring an impact on 
economic prosperity. 
On the other hand, in the process of realizing the aspiration of becoming a developed 
country, the government seems to broaden the parameters of restriction on freedom of 
expression. This is seen as manipulating the justification for restrictions on the pretext of 
the nation well being for political gain. Political opposition leaders are detained on the 
ground of incitement of hatred, 407 public order and national security. 408 The High Court 
in Lau Dak Kee v Public Prosecutor held that the condition imposed by the police that 
404 Loh, F. (2002) Developmental ism and the limits of Democratic Discourse. Richmond, 21. 
4°5 The support from the Malays decreased during the 1999 general election where the opposition party 
PAS, another Malays dominant party, managed to take over two states in Peninsular Malaysia. 
406 A common issue such as education can simply turn into racial sentiment. This is evident in an incident 
between the Pemuda UMNO (the youth wing of UMNO) and Sui Qui, an independent Chinese education 
group, in 
' 
2000. 
Lim Guan Eng's case. http: //www. ipu. org/hr-e/161/mall I. htm 
408 In 1987 under Operasi Lalang several political leaders, academicians and social activists were arrested. 
In 1998 during the Anwar Ibrahim malaise several politicians were arrested. 
409 [1976] 2 MLJ 229. See also Madhavan Nair & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 264. 
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prohibit speeches in an assembly on the results of examination and the status of Bahasa 
Malaysia (National language) were not in contravention of Article 10 of the Federal 
Constitution. However, the court in Chai Choon Hon v Ketua Polis Daerah Kampar and 
Government of Malaysiaalo held that the condition imposed by the police limiting the 
number of speakers as unreasonable restriction. In this case the appellant had applied for 
a licence to hold a solidarity dinner organised by an opposition party. The first 
respondent issued the licence but imposed seven conditions, two of which the appellant 
sought to impugn on the ground that they were unconstitutional, null and void. The 
conditions contravened the right of freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 10 (1) (a) 
of the Federal Constitution. One of the conditions prohibited speeches on political issues. 
The trial judge held that the condition was in violation of the right to freedom of speech 
but upheld the condition as to a restriction of the number of speakers. 
Another subject of political expression that is being restricted is on religious matters. 
Religious issues are perceived as political matter as it affects unity and public order 
especially when they are associated with political parties. Religious extremism is 
inconsistent with the moderate image advocated by the government. The ruling 
government under the premiership of Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi popularizes 
the concept of `Islam Hadhari'411 (Progressive Islam) to counter the image of 
fundamentalism and extremism perceived by non-Muslims. Despite the effort to present 
the image of moderation in the practice of Islam, freedom of speech and expression is 
still under constraint 412 
The resurgence of Islam in Malaysia has made Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), an 
opposition party, as a threat in winning the Malays support. The ruling government has 
branded PAS as a political party that practices extremism, fanaticism and disuniting the 
Muslims especially the Malays. But so far, no actions have been taken especially against 
its President who once issued a controversial religious opinion that caused discomfort 
410 [198612 MLJ 203. 
all http: //www. islam. gov. my/islamhadhari/ 
412 Othman, N. (1998) Islam and the State in Malaysia: A Problem of Democratization and Pluralism, 17. 
http: //asefon2web. com/subsite/ccd/documents/othman. pdf 
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among the members of both parties, UMNO and PAS. 413 This may be due to the impact 
on local political scenario and religious unrest expected among the ardent PAS followers. 
In order to maintain a moderate approach on Islamic religious matters and the correct 
Islamic teaching in society, 414 the government through the JAKIM (Department of Islamic 
Affairs) has taken several actions that could amount to curtailing freedom of expression. 
For instance, JAKIM introduces standardisation of texts for religious sermons. The 
prepared texts are based on selected non-controversial topics that can only be delivered 
by a person approved by the relevant religious authorities 415 It is an offence to give 
speeches on Islamic matters without permission from the relevant Islamic religious 
authority. Section 11 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 
criminalizes religious teaching without tauliah (Permission). Sub-clause (1) provides: 
Any person who teaches or professes to teach any matter relating to the 
religion of Islam without a tauliah granted under section 96 of the 
Administration Act shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be 
liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding three years or to both. 
Such a provision is regarded as a filtering process to silence the conservative approach on 
Islamic matters particularly propagated by PAS. Although the government justifies the 
exercise of its judgment in the interest of the nation, it benefits the political interest of the 
ruling government. 
Freedom of speech and expression on religious matters may also come under the ambit of 
freedom of religion. The Federal Constitution guarantees the latter. Article 11 provides 
that a person is entitled to profess, practice and propagate his belief. However, clause (4) 
of the article qualifies the freedom to the effect that propagation of any doctrine or 
religious belief among Muslims can be controlled and restricted by the state and federal 
law. Therefore, freedom of religious expression is exercisable within the same faith but it 
413 The controversial edict denounces the UMNO members within the Barisan Nasional as non-believers. 414 Iman, N. (1998) Islam and the State in Malaysia: A Problem of Democratization and Pluralism, 7. 
hitp: //asefon2web. com/subsite-/Ccd/documents-/-0thman. Rdf a's At states level this is done by states Islamic religious affairs. 
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cannot be actively propagated for the purpose of converting others especially the 
Muslims. 
The propagation of religious belief other than Islam is an issue in Minister for Home 
Affairs, Malaysia & Ors v Jamaluddin Bin Othman 416 The respondent was detained 
under the ISA. The grounds for detention stated that the respondent was involved in a 
plan or programme to propagate Christianity among the Malays. It was also alleged that 
the activities of the respondent could give rise to tension and enmity between the Muslim 
community and the Christian community in Malaysia and could affect national security. 
The court decided that a mere participation in meetings and seminars could not make a 
person a threat to the security of the country. The court held that the grounds for the 
detention in the present case read in the proper context are insufficient to fall within the 
scope of the Internal Security Act 1960, which is a piece of legislation essentially to 
prevent and combat subversion and actions prejudicial to public order and national 
security. 
In the education sector, academicians and students are caught in the middle between 
freedom of academic expression and restrictions. Academicians in public educational 
institutions are obliged to abide by the General Orders 1950 and the Akufanji 
417(Covenant) introduced by the Department of Civil Service (JPA). It is an obligation for 
all civil servants including academicians and students to sign a pledge of loyalty to the 
government. Public tertiary institutions, which totally depend on government funding, 
exercise self-restraint. In relation to this, in August 2001, a secondary school teacher in 
the State of Terengganu was charged with sedition for asking his students to answer a test 
question regarding the erosion of judicial independence in the country. 418 
Consequently, the threat of disciplinary action imposes a culture of fear in educational 
institutions that affect freedom of speech and expression. The impact of which may 
suppress the development and creativity in education. 
416 [1989] 1 MLJ418. 
"" Most of the contents in this document are covered by the General Orders 1950. 
418 Malaysia: Human Rights under threat- the Internal Security Act (ISA) and other restrictive laws. 
http: //web. amnesiy. or A brary/index/engASA280312001? 
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In Malaysia, the provisions of the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 regulate 
freedom of speech and expression at tertiary level 419 Section 15 (3) of the Act states: 
No person, while he is a student of the University, shall express or do 
anything which may be construed as expressing support, sympathy or 
opposition to any political party or trade union or as expressing support or 
sympathy with any unlawful organization, body or group of persons. 
The provision is wide enough to silence a student from expressing his opinion on political 
matters that is associated with political party. However, it is unclear whether a student 
who is eligible to vote is affected by this provision. The support to a political party 
through vote is clearly in contravention of section 15 (3) of the Act. But it is argued that 
since the right to vote420 is accorded by the Federal Constitution it should prevail over the 
prohibition imposed by the Act. This is based on the provision of Article 4 (1), which 
clearly provides that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution shall be void to the 
extent of the inconsistency. Moreover, the interest under section 15 (3) does not come 
under the exceptions that permit restriction of freedom of expression in Article 10 (2) (a). 
However, the legal conundrum can only be determined by the courts awaiting a test case. 
3.5.2 ARTISTIC EXPRESSION 
Artistic expression takes many forms, primarily abstract. Artistic endeavours relate 
directly to the core values including the pursuit of truth and individual self-fulfillment. 
Art is indispensable to a modem society as a form of expression, which describes and 
comments on human, social and political conditions. The attention given to this type of 
expression is less in term of priority than political expression. Perhaps the impact of this 
expression is less threatening and presents no real danger to the well being of the nation 
especially in relation to national security. Nevertheless, it is being regulated by statutory 
regulations including Islamic law. 
419 Malaysian Act 30.15. 
420 Article 119 (1) of the Federal Constitution. 
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Restrictions on artistic expression in Malaysia are mainly on the grounds of public order 
and morality. Censorship laws have controlled artistic expression particularly in the area 
of sexual and religious contents. The main legislation that imposes restrictions on this 
type of expression is Film Censorship Act 2002. Section 5 provides that: 
No person shall, 
(a) have or cause himself to have in his possession, custody, control or 
ownership; or 
(b) circulate, exhibit, distribute, display, manufacture, produce, sell or hire, 
any film or film-publicity material which is obscene or is otherwise 
against public decency. 
Artistic expression is also being regulated under institutional mechanism such as Board 
of Censors 421 The approval of the Board is necessary in order to `circulate, exhibit, 
distribute, display, manufacture, produce, sell or hire, any film or film-publicity 
material . "422 Film of obscene in nature or against public decency 
is prohibited under 
Section 5 (1) (b) of the Film Censorships Act 2002. In 2004 the board refused to allow 
the screening of the film `The Last Temptation' directed by Mel Gibson in Malaysia. The 
decision was based on the ground of religious belief and public decency. 
Restrictions on this type of expression can also be imposed by the Perbadanan Kemajuan 
Filem Nasional Malaysia Act 1981 (FINAS), Indecent Advertisements Act 1953 and 
Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. For instance, section 6 (e) of the FINAS Act 
provides the functions of the FINAS, inter alia, to regulate and control the production, 
distribution and exhibition of films in Malaysia, and in relation thereto to provide for the 
issue of licences. In addition, section 22 (1) provides for activity or combination of 
activities to be licensed, the provision reads: 
No person shall engage in any of the activities of production, distribution 
or exhibition of films or any combination of those activities as specified in 
subsection 21(1) unless there is in force a licence authorising him to do the 
same. 
421 Film Censorship Act 2002. 
422 Section 6 (1) (b) of the Film Censorship Act 2002. 
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Artistic expression in Malaysia could be subjected to dual legal systems. First, the 
ordinary laws enacted by Parliament and second, the Islamic law which is applicable only 
to the Muslims. The application of Islamic law in Malaysia is limited in scope. The 
administration of this law is under the jurisdiction of the states 423 In relation to artistic 
expression, moral conformity in accordance with the Islamic teachings is imperative. 
Immoral conduct and behaviour as perceived by Islam are, therefore, prohibited. For 
instance, section 31 of Selangor Syariah Criminal Enactment 1995 provides against 
indecent acts in public places. According to the provision, any person who, contrary to 
Islamic Law, acts or behaves in an indecent manner in any public place shall be guilty of 
an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit 
(Malaysian currency) or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both. 
With regard to this, in 1997, three Muslim girls were convicted for taking part in a beauty 
contest in the state of Selangor, in defiant of a prohibition imposed by the state Islamic 
religious authority. 424 Prior to that, in 1995 the Selangor Islamic religious authorities 
made a ruling that the participation of Muslim women in a beauty contest is prohibited in 
Islam. 425 This case has raised constitutional issues in relation to freedom of speech and 
expression. It is uncertain whether participation in a beauty pageant is covered under the 
concept of freedom of expression in Article 10 of the Federal Constitution. Arguably, it is 
a form of expressive conducts that involve more than mere physical aspects of the 
contestants. Therefore, the prohibition made by the state authority could be challenged on 
the ground of inconsistency with Article 10 of the Constitution. This is because any 
restriction on freedom of expression can only be made by Parliament. The state 
legislative assembly does not have the power to make any law that is inconsistent with 
the Constitution. 426 However, since the case was brought under the Syariah courts 
jurisdiction, which is recognised by the Constitution, 427 the concept of morality under 
Islamic teaching is applicable. 
473 State List, Ninth schedule of the Federal Constitution. 
424 Article 75 of the Federal Constitution. See, Faruqi, S. Constitutional Supremacy, Fundamental Rights & 
Fatwa. (1998) 28 JNSAF 25. 
425 Warta Kerajaan (1995) Jil. 48, No. 10, Tambahan No. 8 Perundangan. 
426 Famgi op cit., supra, 36. 
427 Article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution. 
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3.5.3 COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 
Commercial expression could be the least protected type of expression. Barendt argues 
that the importance of certain types of information provides a strong basis for the 
exclusion of commercial speech. According to him some types of information are more 
worthy of constitutional protection than others. Protection of commercial speech is 
difficult to maintain if the concept of freedom of speech is founded in the development of 
the individual personality. He also contends that `there remain sound arguments against 
equating advertising with political and social speech. In particular, promotional slogans 
and canvassing which make no attempt to appeal to the reason of the people addressed 
and provide no information should have little or no constitutional protection' 428 In this 
context, economic gain makes commercial expression that is less coherent worthy to be 
accorded a constitutional protection. 
There is an ambiguity as to whether commercial expression comes under the purview of 
Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution. This is because of the uncertainty in 
recognising a commercial expression within the scope of freedom of speech and 
expression. An argument for excluding this type of expression from the constitutional 
framework is that the purpose of information contain in a commercial expression is 
specifically for commercial and trade purposes. 
Since there is a lack of discussion on protection of commercial expression under the 
Constitution, reference to other jurisdictions of similar constitutional provision is 
necessary. In this context, Indian Constitution has a similar provision to Article 10 of the 
Malaysian Constitution. The Supreme Court of India in Tata Press v MTNL429 held that 
commercial speech is a part of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under 
Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian Constitution. This is justifiable on the basis that it informs 
the public. 
The writer argues that commercial speech could be given a constitutional protection if it 
conveys information in the furtherance of public interest in matters affecting social and 
428 Barendt, E. (1985) Freedom of Speech. Oxford, 63. 
429 (1995) AIR 1995 SC 2438. 
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political live of the people. Nevertheless, pure economic gain should not be the basis in 
justifying constitutional protection for this type of expression. Arguably, in relation to 
this, the contribution of pure economic gain is minimum in creating and enhancing an 
informed society. Moreover, pure economic gain is beneficial only for the satisfaction of 
concerned individuals rather than the public as a whole. 
The discussion above reveals that the scope of freedom of expression in Malaysia is 
limited. This is due to the constitutional provision, which empowers Parliament to make 
laws that have the effect of curtailing free expression. The source of the power pertaining 
to this matter is discussed below. 
3.6 EXECUTIVE POWER 
Article 10 (2) provides that the Malaysian Parliament has the power to restrict freedom of 
speech and expression, as it deems necessary or expedient. It also makes the Parliament 
as the final arbiter with regard to the determination of the ground of restriction. This is 
made clear by Article 4 (2) (b) of the Constitution that provides: 
The validity of any law shall not be questioned on the ground that- 
It imposes such restrictions as are mentioned in Article 10 (2) but the 
restrictions were not deemed necessary or expedient by Parliament for the 
purposes mentioned in that Article 
Salleh Abbas LP clarifies the authority of the executive in limiting the exercise of free 
expression in Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police430 when he 
said: 
It is clear from the provisions of the Constitution, and of the ISA, the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution is that judges in the matter of 
preventive detentions relating to the security of the Federation are the 
executive 431 
The implication of this case is that the executive has absolute discretion as to the 
circumstances relating to the security and the reasoning for it. As far as the courts are 
430 [1988] 1 MLJ 293. 
431 Ibid, 296. 
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concerned, restrictions must be authorised by a statute enacted by Parliament on the 
grounds as provided by the Constitution. Therefore, the courts have the power to 
invalidate any restriction that has no connection with the permitted grounds. 
In addition, Article 10 (1) (a) confers a wide power to Parliament to set a parameter for 
restrictions. The words `necessary' and `expedient' empower Parliament to decide on the 
extent of the freedom of speech. The effect of this provision is to create a prerogative 
power in determining matters of high public importance. There is a limited space for 
judicial review by the courts to protect freedom of speech. The courts cannot use judicial 
power in situations where restrictions imposed by Parliament are in accordance with the 
law. In this instance, the real protector of the freedom is the executive instead of the 
courts. However, the situation would be different if restrictions on freedom of speech are 
qualified with the word `reasonable' as available in the Indian Constitution. Such drafting 
would give the power to the courts in deciding the reasonableness of the restriction 
envisage by Parliament. It creates a mechanism for check and balance on the executive 
power in restricting free speech. 
Nevertheless, it was the idea of the framers of the Constitution to place wide power in the 
hands of the legislature and the executive to restrict freedom of speech and expression. 
The power is evident since any law enacted on that matter could not be questioned by the 
courts. In this sense, the courts have a positive obligation to apply the law. There was an 
argument by Justice Malik, one of the framers of the Constitution, to the effect that if the 
courts are given power to question the validity of the law on the ground of 
reasonableness, then there will be no certainty. Certainly, the effect of wide prerogative 
power of the executive limits the exercise of free expressions in Malaysia. The primary 
purpose is to equip Parliament with carte blanche power. Perhaps this is the legacy of the 
British system, which introduces the supremacy of Parliament in the Malaysian 
Constitution. 
The composition of Parliament would make it easier for the executive to introduce laws 
that have the effect of inhibiting freedom of speech and expression. This is so when there 
is no strict separation of power between the executive and the legislature in Malaysia. 
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Those who command the majority of Parliament form the government. This creates a 
comfortable atmosphere for the ruling political parties that form the government to 
execute their political agenda to retain the power. For instance, as a result of the recent 
general election in 2004, the Barisan Nasional party (National Front) commands the 
majority in Parliament. This allows a smooth passage for the approval of any government 
legislation. This is possible as the ruling government can easily come up with a simple 
majority needed to pass a new law. 432 In relation to this, the case of two members of 
parliament of a component party MCA, has demonstrated that the executive determines 
the exercise of freedom of speech and expression. The two representatives were 
suspended for their action, abstaining from voting against a motion by an opposition 
party assemblyman. The motion was to postpone the RMI. 02 billion State's project 
during the Penang State Assembly. 433 The two representatives took such a stance 
because a majority of people in their constituencies opposed a project that affects their 
area but was approved by the State government. 
In addition, it is Parliament that decides what amount to a threat to security, public order 
or morality. Arguably, some of the executive actions on these matters are based on 
judgments for the attainment of specific interest particularly in maintaining the political 
power. For instance, with regard to this matter the existence of prior-restraint on press 
freedom in term of licensing requirement and absolute discretionary power of the 
executive, denies the opposition political parties an equal opportunity as enjoyed by the 
ruling party. 434 The executive ulterior motive is evident in the case of Mohamad Ezam 
bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Ors. 435 In this case, the Court questions the 
detention of the appellant on security ground. The interrogation conducted by the police 
is mainly on the political activities of the appellant. 
432 Article 66 (1) the Federal Constitution. 
433 Stop war of word says Pak Lah. MCA Online, 17 December 2002. 
http: //www. mca. org. mv/story. asp? file=/articles/news/2002/12/17/12376. html&sec=In+The+News 
434 Malaysiakini, an on-line press, application for a licence to publish a printed edition was rejected. Aliran, 
a non-governmental organization, publication is restricted to English version. The government also refused 
to allow Harakah, an opposition political party's publication, to publish daily. 
http: //www. suaram. org/update/up20010207. htm 
435 [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
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Obviously, the constitutional provisions accord a wide power to Parliament as well as to 
the executive. However, this does not necessarily mean that the courts in Malaysia are 
powerless to check any transgression within the constitutional framework. This then leads 
to another related point of discussion on judicial approach in protecting the fundamental 
liberties in Malaysia. 
3.7. JUDICIAL APPROACH 
In relation to free speech, Parliament has the power to determine the necessity or 
expediency of a law as empowered by Article 10 (2). The courts can only intervene in a 
situation where restriction is not in accordance with the requirements of Article 10 (1). It 
must be observed that Article 10 (2) of the Federal Constitution provides that only 
Parliament may by law impose those restrictions referred to in Article 10 (2), (3) and (4) 
of the Federal Constitution. 
In effect, the courts have no power to decide the necessity and expediency of laws that 
impose restriction on freedom of speech. Chang Ming Tat J clarifies the limit of the 
power of the court in this matter when he said `it is not within the competency of the 
courts to question the necessity or expediency of the legislative provision. '436 The fact is 
that the power of the courts to protect freedom of speech is limited due to a wide scope of 
constitutional restrictions. 
On the other hand, the positive approach adopted by the courts hinders them to a certain 
extent from questioning the harshness or unreasonableness of the law. The court in 
Attorney-General Malaysia v Chiow Thiam Guan 437underlined the duty of the courts 
when it said `the law may be harsh but the role of the court is only to administer the law 
as it stands' 438 The reluctance of the courts to scrutinise legislations creates gradations 
among fundamental rights. Strict interpretation of the law is practised in the case of 
436 Madhavan Nair & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 264. 
437 [1983] 1 MLJ 51. 
439 See also Public Prosecutor v Yee Kim Seng [1983] 1 MU 252 where the court said that the question of 
morality of a death sentence is for the Parliament to decide not the court. PP v Loh Kooi Choon [1977] 
MLJ. 
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political rights, but leverage is given in the case of property right. 439 The approach taken 
by the courts in relation to restriction of freedom of speech and expression, where judicial 
review cannot be exercised, renders the fundamental liberties of the citizens as illusory 
rather than real. The impact of this positivist attitude is that it virtually reduced the 
supremacy of the Constitution as the highest law of the land 440 
However, there are instances where the courts are inclined towards adopting a pragmatic 
approach in dealing with issues relating to freedom of speech and expression. Even 
though the courts admit that a frank political discussion could not be developed in an 
atmosphere of surveillance and constraint, at the same time however, other public 
interests need to be secured and promoted. This is emphasised by the court in Public 
Prosecutor v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors. 44' In this case, the court was urged to give the greatest 
possible latitude to freedom of speech and expression since the Sedition Act touched the 
very heart of free political comment. However, Raja Azian Shah J in delivering the 
judgment said that the decision whether a criticism against the government is justifiable 
or not, is not for the courts to adjudge. It is for Parliament and the people. The court in 
Fan Yew Teng v Public Prosecutor2 adopts the same approach when Lee Hun Hoe CJ 
said that: 
... we have to remember in our society we have a plural society. I will not 
profess that I am qualified to question the wisdom of Parliament for 
enacting particular legislation. This, I think, is a matter for the elected 
representatives to decide whether Malaysia, with her multi-racial society, 
and in view of the composition of her people, there is a need for a 
legislation, in the interests of security, to adequately and effectively deal 
with those words which are expressive of a tendency not to promote peace 
but to excite ill-will and hostility. 443 
Perhaps the rigidity of the constitutional provisions inspires the courts to respond in a 
pragmatic way. ' The approach would enable the courts to give meaning to the 
43 Faruqi, S. Liberal enough to give life to the law. The Star 2 September 2001,25. 
440 Bari, A. Teaching Constitutional Law in Malaysia: An Appraisal. (1999) 1 MLJclxii, clxxiii. 
441 [1971] 2 MLJ 108. 
442 [1975] 2 MLJ 235. 
443 Ibid. 
044 Yusuf, M. (1987) Freedom of the Press in Malaysia. Paper presented at 10th LawAsia Conference, 
Kuala Lumpur, 9. 
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Constitution in upholding the fundamental rights of the people. Therefore, a meaningful 
understanding of the right to freedom of speech under the Constitution must be based on 
the realities of the contemporary society in Malaysia by accommodating individual 
interest with consideration given to the general security. 
The vast power enjoyed by Parliament has made the notion of constitutional supremacy 
an elusive concept. In order to make the Constitution the supreme law of the land as 
enshrined in article 4, the courts need to renew its approach in terms of judicial activism 
by upholding the constitutional supremacy. As Jain argues, that without an independent 
organ to interpret and enforce a written constitution `it would be reduced to a mere paper 
document. '445 Therefore, the approach of the courts should be liberal and pragmatic 
rather than conservative and positive. 
A liberal approach is to give a creative and purposive interpretation to the Constitution 6 
The courts as the last bastion in protecting fundamental liberties have to detach itself 
from the executive not only in terms of influence but also in spirit. The courts as a 
separate independent body, under the doctrine of separation of power, have to be 
vigorous in maintaining freedom of speech as provided by the Constitution. There has 
been a positive indication that the courts embrace a pragmatic approach. The Court of 
Appeal in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd447 expressed that: 
There must be fairness of state action of any sort, legislative, executive or 
judicial. No one is above the law. In Malaysia, it is not the law made by 
Parliament that is supreme, it is the Federal Constitution which is the 
supreme law. In Malaysia, the ultimate constraints upon legislative power 
are not political but legal, that is to say that any law passed by Parliament 
must meet the fairness test contained in art 8 (1). 448 
In this particular case, the court held that section 72 of the Danaharta Nasional Berhad 
Act 1998 as unconstitutional being in contravention of Article 8 (1) of the Federal 
Constitution. The court stressed that the fundamental liberties guaranteed under Part II of 
the Federal Constitution, including Article 8 (1) should receive a broad, liberal and 
445 Jain, M. P. Role of the Judiciary in a Democracy (1979) JMCL 239,284. 
446 Cardozo, B. (1921) The Nature of Judicial Process. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
447 [2003] 3 MLJ 1. 
448 Ibid, 3. 
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purposive construction. According to the court when the constitutionality of a statutory 
provision is called into question, the courts are not concerned with the propriety or 
expediency of the impugned law. Hence, Parliamentary motive is irrelevant to the issue 
of constitutionality. 449 
3.8 CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The ability of the courts to question and annul restrictions on freedom of speech is 
limited. The courts can only decide on the legality of restriction if it is not grounded on 
the criteria mentioned in the Constitution. So if the impugned law is a law relating to the 
subjects enumerated under the permitted restrictions found in Article 10 (2) (a), the 
question of its reasonableness does not arise. Even if the law were unreasonable 
according to a liberal judgment, it would still be valid. This is affirmed by the court in 
Madhavan Nair v. PP450 where the judge said that any condition limiting the exercise of 
the fundamental right to freedom of speech not falling within the four comers of Article 
10 clause (2), (3) and (4) of the Federal Constitution cannot be valid. 
The court in Public Prosecutor v Pung Chen Choon expresses the same attitude. 451 In this 
case the editor of a newspaper was prosecuted on the charge of maliciously publishing 
false news in the paper and thus committing an offence under section 8A (1) of the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. The court said that the scope of the court's 
inquiry is limited to the question whether the impugned law comes within the orbit of the 
permitted restrictions. Effectively, this excludes the power of the courts to enquire into 
the decisions of Parliament on the reasons for imposing restrictions. Nevertheless, a law 
which purports to have been passed under clause (2) of Article 10 is opened to challenge 
on the ground that it is not in any of the interests set out in the clause, since any other 
more extensive meaning to be assigned to Article 4 (2) (b) would render Article 10 (2) 
otiose. 452 
449 The Federal Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal findings. See [2004] 2 MLI257. 
450 [1975] 2 MLJ 264,264. 
451 [1994] 1 MLJ 566. 
452 Sheridan, L. A. and Grove, H. E. (1987) Constitution of Malaysia. Butterworth, 74. 
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In deciding whether a particular piece of legislation falls within the orbit of the permitted 
restrictions, consideration must be given to the objects of the impugned law. It must be 
sufficiently connected to the subjects enumerated under Article 10 (2) (a). The 
connection contemplated must be real and proximate, not far-fetched or hypothetical. 
In addition, the exclusion of judicial scrutiny is also another form of constraint that can 
be found in Article 4 (2) (b). The article provides: 
The validity of any law shall not be questioned on the ground that ... 
it 
imposes such restrictions as are mentioned in article 10 (2) but those 
restrictions were not deemed necessary or expedient by Parliament for the 
purpose mentioned in that article. 
The above provision excludes judicial review on any law that has a chilling effect on free 
speech. The effect of such a provision makes the courts reluctant to intervene in 
questioning the conduct of the executive or the restrictive law. In other words, judicial 
activism in this area is very limited. 
The fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution will lose its vital characteristic if 
there is no check on the government or the legislature. The legislature and the executive 
are motivated more by political interest. This is because, for instance, the executive set 
policies and programmes, which they thought the best, in accordance with their political 
conviction in governing the country. Thus, the possibility to impose their own political 
agenda may affect the exercise of fundamental rights by the people. For instance, the 
prohibition on public rally during elections could hinder an opportunity for the opposition 
political parties to put their case to the public as enjoyed by the ruling party. The 
deployment of government agencies such as broadcasting and the press in favour of the 
ruling party creates an uneven level of playing field during election. Thus, the 
oppositions would be at a disadvantage position, as similar treatment is not given to 
them 453 
ass In 2003, RTM broadcasted a programme to expose the dubious part of the main opposition party PAS. 
The same programme was broadcasted prior to the 1999 election. 
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The approach that the courts should adopt is to adhere not only to the letters of the 
Constitution but to the spirit as well. It can be argued that the courts can still scrutinise 
the restrictions by linking its connection with the stated interest. If no real connection 
exists between the restriction and the justificatory interests, then the restriction can be set 
aside as it impinges on the constitutional right 454 
In addition, laws passed under Article 10 (2) can be challenged on the ground that it is 
not in any of the interests mentioned in the clause. 455 Apparently there is a space for the 
courts to protect freedom of speech from arbitrary restriction imposed by the executive. 
The courts should make use of this avenue to project the image as the protector of 
fundamental liberties especially at times when its integrity is looked at with a jaundice 
eye 456 
Limitation on freedom of expression on the ground of national security when there is no 
real threat to the security should be scrutinised by the courts. Even though the question of 
security remains with the executive, the question of whether a situation will jeopardise or 
relate to security, public order or moral is still for the courts to decide. For instance, the 
court in Jamaluddin Bin Othman v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor457 ruled 
that the allegations of fact upon which the Minister satisfactorily formed his decision 
could not be challenged for judicial review. However, this does not impede the court to 
look into the grounds of detention to consider whether the grounds fall within the scope 
of the law that is open to challenge. The issue in this case was whether the grounds of 
detention are inconsistent with Article 11, which guarantees freedom of religion, and thus 
outside the purview of the Internal Security Act 1960. The court held that the Minister 
has no power to deprive a person of his right to profess and practice his religion, which is 
guaranteed under Article 11 of the Constitution. The grounds of detention is outside the 
purview of the Act and therefore not valid. 
454 Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia (2000) vol. 2, Malayan Law Journal, 20.179. 
455 Sheridan and Groves, op cit., n. 459,73. 
ash Abas, S. and Das, K. (1989) May Day for Justice: The Lord President's Version. Kuala Lumpur, 
Magnus Book. See also Hector, C. Mahathir and the judges: The Judiciary during the Mahathir Era. Aliran 
Monthly 2003: 8. http: //www. aliran. com 
457 [1989] 1 MU 368. 
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A person can enjoy his constitutional freedom of speech as long as it is within the 
parameters set by Article 10 (2) (a). He can claim his constitutional right in case of 
breach and restrictions that are not founded on any of the exceptions. But the protection 
does not mean that a person can freely express himself because the protection not only 
confers right but also responsibility. The Constitutional protection ends once the legal 
parameters are encroached. Unbridled freedom of speech may destabilize the tolerance 
and harmony of a plural society. Therefore, the courts are ever watchful and maintain a 
firm hand to ensure that the concept of freedom of speech is not abused. The right to 
freedom of speech ought to be observed so long as no wrongful act is done. 
The provision of Article 10 (2) makes Parliament as the final arbiter in determining 
whether restrictions are expedient or necessary. In this regard, Parliament is supreme as it 
can introduce any law for that matter. This is inconsistent with the notion of 
constitutional supremacy as proclaimed in Article 4 (1), 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law pass 
after Merdeka Day, which is inconsistent with this Constitution, shall, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
Freedom to think as one likes and to speak as one thinks are indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of truth. Thus, without free speech, discussion in civil society may 
well be futile. But at the same time, we can only ignore at our peril the vital importance 
of our social interests. It is for this reason that the Constitution has rightly attempted to 
accommodate the various competing social interests. It has permitted imposition of 
restrictions on the citizen's right of freedom of speech and expression in the interest of, 
inter alia, national security, public order, decency or morality and impartial justice, to 
serve the larger collective interest of the nation as a whole. In this regard, the 
constitutional protection to free speech is predicated on the belief that the interest of the 
society as a whole necessitates the imposition of restriction on the freedom of expression. 
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3.9 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Freedom of speech and expression is the hallmark of an independent nation. The right is 
not absolute, as it cannot be accepted to confer a licence to violate the rights of others. 
Freedom of the press is part of the concept of freedom of speech under the Constitution. 
It is an indicator of a healthy democratic society. 458 However, press freedom is not 
freedom from the law; it is freedom to act independently. 459 Furthermore, it is also not 
absolute. The press has duties and responsibilities in disseminating balanced information, 
which the public can rely on to, form their judgments. 
The role of the press is significant in a democratic society. The press serves as a public 
`watchdog' alerting the public of any wrongdoings as well as a feeder of information to 
the public. Nevertheless, it may function as a `hound-dog' harassing the public and 
intruding into their private lives. On the other hand, a free flow of information will also 
help the society to form intelligent judgment on issues of national interest. Thus, 
misinformation or bias in reporting will affect the public in making a misleading and 
wrong judgment. 
The importance of the press has acclaimed itself a status as the `fourth estate'4° that 
makes it as important as other organs of the state. In order to be able to function and play 
its role, the press needs to be free. Freedom of the press does not only refer to the 
absence of prior restraint but also includes freedom to publish; and in relation to 
investigative journalism, freedom to report. Therefore, in order for freedom of 
expression to become meaningful, it is vital for the press to be free from unnecessary 
controls and restrictions. 
458 Gomez, J. Contempt of Court- Freedom of Expression and the Rights of the Accused. (2002) 3 MLJA 
241. 
459 Giminez, E. J. Who Watches the Watchdogs? The Status of Newsgathering Torts Against the Media in 
Light of the Food Lion Reversal. (2001) 52 Ala L. Rev. 675,676. 
460 This is the prevalent perception in the United States. 
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In Malaysia, there is no constitutional right to freedom of the press. As such the freedom 
acquires no specific constitutional protection. The Supreme Court in Public Prosecutor v 
Pung Chen Choon461 expressed that: 
Unlike the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America, which makes express reference to the freedom of the press, the 
Constitution of Malaysia says nothing about the freedom of the press. The 
relevant portion of art 19 (1) of the Indian Constitution says this: 'All 
citizens shall have the right: (a) to freedom of speech and expression; ..: . Nevertheless, a consistent current of judicial opinion in India has 
established the proposition that art 19 (1) (a) includes within its ambit the 
freedom of the press 462 
Whilst the courts would endeavour to ensure that the right to freedom of speech is 
protected, there is no special privilege accorded to the press 463 Legal protections to 
freedom of the press are available under the existing laws. The rights of the press are the 
same as available under the law to any other citizen. Freedom to write, publish and print 
does not entitle the press to damage the reputation of others, inciting communal agitation, 
inflame hatred speech and jeopardising the national security. The government perceives 
freedom of the press as a social responsibility rather than a right on its own. As such, the 
exercise of the freedom is subject to domestic law and can be curtailed by the ordinary 
law of the land. 
The position of the press in Malaysia is that they enjoy a limited freedom. The Supreme 
Court judge Edgar Joseph Jr. expresses this where the press under the Federal 
Constitution is not as free as the press in other countries such as India, England and the 
United States. 4M The press can exercise their freedom to the extent of the limit fixed by 
the law. The constitutional provisions as well as ordinary legislations are restricting 
freedom of speech and expression. By far and large, the constitutional restrictions on 
freedom of speech are applicable to the press as well. 
461 [1994] 1 MLI566. 
462 Ibid, 558. 
463 J Heng Consulting Services (Al) Sdn Bhd & Anor v The New Straits Times Press (" Bhd (2003) 5 MLJ 
481. 
464 [1994] 1 MLJ566,576. 
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3.9 STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS 
The main legislation that regulates the press in Malaysia is the Printing Press and 
Publication Act 1984. The Act imposes licensing requirement to publish newspaper. 
Application for the permit is within the discretionary power of the Minister whose 
decision cannot be challenged under judicial review. 465 Section 5 (1) provides that: 
No person shall print, import, publish, sell, circulate or distribute, or offer 
to publish, sell, circulate or distribute, any newspaper printed in Malaysia 
or Singapore unless there has been granted by the Minister in respect of 
such newspaper a permit under paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of 
section 6. 
The absolute discretion of the Minister to grant or refuse a permit is stated in section 6, 
which reads: 
(1) The Minister may in his absolute discretion grant - 
(a) to any person a permit to print and publish a newspaper in 
Malaysia; 
(2) The Minister may at any time revoke or suspend a permit for any 
period he considers desirable. 
Thus, it is an offence to print and publish a newspaper without a permit. The punishment 
upon conviction is imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine not 
exceeding twenty thousand ringgit or both 466 
The requirement for a permit is a prior-restraint on freedom of the press in Malaysia. The 
Minister is not obliged under the Act to give any reason for his decision in refusing or 
revoking a license or a permit. He can act on his own accord as the law grants him an 
absolute discretion. 467 The Minister has the power to act without prior approval nor is he 
answerable to any person except Parliament. 
465 Section 13A (1) of the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. 
466 Ibid, section 5 (2). 
467 Ibid, section 12 (2). 
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The discretionary power possessed by the Minister is beyond judicial review. He has the 
power to revoke or suspend any license or permit if he is satisfied that it is prejudicial to 
public order or national security. Section 13A (1) provides that: 
Any decision of the Minister to refuse to grant or to revoke or to suspend a 
licence or permit shall be final and shall not be called in question by any 
court on any ground whatsoever. 
There is a limited prospect in checking the power of the Minister under the Act. This is in 
relation to the offence of publishing false news! " The written consent of the Public 
Prosecutor is necessary to constitute an action for malicious publication. In this regard, a 
check on the power of the Minister seems to exist when he cannot act alone in deciding 
an action against malicious publication. However, in practice this is unlikely because of 
the influential executive in Malaysia. 
With such a discretionary power, the press cannot afford to be critical on issues that could 
affect the government and the ruling party. The threat of the power has reduced the 
potential of the press in creating a vibrant atmosphere for a democratic society. The 
government's power over licence renewal and other related policies creates an 
atmosphere that inhibits independent or investigative journalism. Consequently, the press 
practices extensive self-censorship 469 In order to avoid being shut down; media are less 
critical and monotonous in tandem with the aspiration of the ruling government. The 
press is heavily regulated by the requirements of the PPA. Thus, it makes the freedom of 
the press in Malaysia limited within the four corners of the law. In this context, Faruqi 
argues that in Malaysia there is freedom of speech but often no freedom after speech. 
Exerting political and legal pressure on journalists, which has led to a widespread self- 
censorship in their daily work, has often hindered freedom of the media in Malaysia. 470 
468 Section 8A (1) of the PPA. 
46' Ong, T. K. Wake-up call for the Malaysian Media. Sun2Surf, 18 August 2004. 
Lttp: //www. sun2surf. com/article. cftn? id=4468. See also Bari, A. Freedom of Speech and Expression in 
Malaysia. (1998) 3 INSAF 149,158. 
470 Faruqi, S. Free Speech and the Constitution. (1992) 4 CLI 34. 
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Restrictions on freedom of the press imposed by the PPA had been challenged in PP v 
Phung Chen Choon. 471 In this case the defence had raised a question whether section 8A 
of the Act imposes restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression in 
violation of Article 10 (1) (a) and (2) (a) of the Federal Constitution and was therefore 
void under Article 4 (1). The Supreme Court ruled that section 8A (1) of the Act does 
impose restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by 
Article 10 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The Court also held that though malicious 
publication of false news falls within the orbit of the permitted restrictions under Article 
10 (2) (a) of the Constitution, it could threaten national security and undermine the 
friendly relations with other countries. Therefore, section 8A of the Act could be 
supported as falling within the boundaries of permissible restrictions in Article 10 (2) (a) 
of the Constitution and was valid. 
In relation to this, a visit was made in 1998 by the Special Rapportuer under the auspice 
of United Nation's Human Rights Commission concerning allegations of violations of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression. The Special Rapporteur472 in his findings on 
the state of freedom of expression in relation to the press discloses the use of control and 
laws to limit the freedom. Attention was drawn to the fact that all major daily newspapers 
are very closely tied to companies connected to political parties in the ruling 
Government, which makes the Malaysian press dependent upon the Government. 473 
Consequently, the newspapers provide uncritical coverage of government officials and 
give only limited and selective coverage to political views of the opposition or political 
rivals. Editorial opinions frequently reflect government positions on domestic and 
international issues. 
This is apparent with the monopoly of news provider by the Malaysian National News 
Agency (Bernama) 474 Bernama is a statutory body established under the Bernama Act 
1967 with a role as the sole news and information provider in Malaysia. Even though the 
all [1994] 1 MU 556. 
an Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and the protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1998/42. See 
Report on the mission to Malaysia. http: //www. ohchr. or en lg iý 
4731bid, pars 45. 
474 http: //www. bernama. com/about/about. htm 
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subscription of the service is voluntary, most of the mainstream press is Bernama's 
subscribers. The management of Bernama is under a Board of Governors, which 
comprises of a chairman and six members each from the Federal Government and the 
newspapers475 that subscribe to Bernama. The composition of its Board of Governors 
raises a question with regard to its independence in providing news and information. 
Most of the Governors are the representatives of the mainstream press controlled by the 
ruling party. Furthermore, the affairs of Bernama are being put under the Information 
Ministry portfolio. As such it is seen as one of the government's agencies rather than an 
independent news agency. Therefore, it is not uncommon for Bernama to exercise self- 
censorship in disseminating news and information taking into consideration of the extent 
of the government's control. 
Restriction of the freedom of the press in Malaysia takes place in two stages. The first 
stage is the requirement for licenses and permits. In August 2001, the Deputy Home 
Minister said that his Ministry approved 2,141 publishing permits and 1,194 printing 
press licenses during the year. 476 The figure is used to justify that the government 
practices a liberal approach in issuing the permits. However, the figure is misleading 
because although there is an increase in the quantity of permits but most of the new press, 
periodicals and magazines are controlled by the local media giants such as the New 
Straits Times Press and Utusan Melayu. In August 2000, the Minister in the Prime 
Minister's department responsible for legal affairs said that the PPA would not be 
repealed, even if a national press council were established to regulate the media. 
Apart from the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984, the press in Malaysia has to 
face other restrictive laws such as Sedition Act 1948, Official Secret Act 1971, Police Act 
1967 and Internal Security Act 1960. -In relation to sedition, publication of seditious 
tendency matters by the press is covered under the Sedition Act 1948. Section 3 of the 
475 The representatives are from the New Strait Times, Utusan Melayu, The Star, Sin Chew Jit Poh, Borneo 
Post and The New Sabah Times which are controlled by the ruling political party. 
http: //www. bernama. com/bernama/lembaga pengelola. html 
See Nain, Z. (2002) The Structure of the Media Industry: Implication for Democracy. In Loh, F. and Khoo, 
B. T. Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices. Richmond, Curzon Press, 114-15. See also Nijar, 
G. S. Democracy and the Rule of Law in Malaysia. (1994) 23 INSAF 3,10. 
476 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 
http: //www. state. gov/ drg UJ rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8342. htm 
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Act underlines six matters of seditious tendency which include disaffection against the 
Ruler or government, procuring alteration of Ruler or government by unlawful means, 
disaffection against the administration of justice, promoting ill-will and hostility between 
races and questioning the right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative 
protected under Article 152,153 or 181 and Part III of the Federal Constitution. 
Raja Azlan Shah J has drawn the demarcation line between criticism and sedition in the 
case of Public Prosecutor v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors. 477 In distinguishing between criticism 
and sedition the courts apply an objective test. The court emphasised on the effect of the 
impugned words by looking at the object of criticism. If the object is to obtain change or 
reform of the government policy or administration, then, it is not seditious in nature. But 
if the words have the tendency of stirring up hatred, contempt or disaffection against the 
government, then the Act will be applicable. 478 The accused was alleged to utter the 
seditious words at a dinner held by an opposition party. The court held that the accused 
was guilty because the speech expressed a seditious tendency, accusing the government 
of gross partiality in favour of one group, and this was calculated to inspire feelings of 
enmity and disaffection among people of Malaysia. 
The wide scope of seditious matters especially under section 3 (1) (e) and (f) of the 
Sedition Act 1948 has curtailed the freedom of the press to cover issues of public interest. 
The restriction imposed by excluding certain matters from public domain even if they are 
of public interest has limited the function of the press as the watchdog of the society. 
These matters are not only pertaining to political issues but also include a wide spectrum 
of social and economic issues. Previous issues such as the scandal of Bumiputra Malaysia 
Finance (BMF) which involved billions of ringgit and the failure and mismanagement of 
a state owned company Perwaja Steel and Bakun hydroelectric project are suppressed 
from the public knowledge even though these issues are of public and national interest. 
With the curtailment of the press freedom, the public will be deprived of the opportunity 
to know the true fact concerning their interest as these matters involved public money. 
477 [1971] 2 MLJ 108. 
479 See section 2 of the Sedition Act 1948. 
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The repercussion of the non-disclosure affects the level of public confidence in the 
transparency and integrity of the government. 
There is no requirement of intention under the Sedition Act 1948. It is immaterial 
whether the impugned words are true or not. In Public Prosecutor v Oh Keng Seng, 479 
the accused argued that he had no intention of causing any racial trouble and his speech 
was a fair criticism of government policies. The court held that there is no obligation to 
prove that the speech is true or false or that it caused disturbance or a breach of peace. 
According to Raja Azlan Shah J the words of section 3 (3) and the subject matter repel 
any suggestion that such intention is an essential ingredients of the offence. In describing 
the concept of sedition within the local context, he said, 
Our sedition law would not necessarily be apt for other people but we 
ought always to remember that it suits our temperament 48° 
The court adopts positive approach as far as seditious law is concerned particularly in 
relation to sensitive issues 481 Emphasis is given to the letter of the laws rather than the 
rationale and philosophical foundation of the rights involved. 482 In Lim Guan Eng v 
Public Prosecutor, 483 the appellant was charged with two offences. The first charge was 
under section 8A (1) of the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 for maliciously 
publishing false news in the form of a pamphlet entitled 'Mangsa Dipenjarakan' (Victim 
Being Prisoned). The second charge was under section 4 (1) (b) of the Sedition Act 1948 
for making a speech which contained seditious words. Both charges were with regard to 
the non-prosecution of an alleged rape case involving the former Chief Minister of 
Malacca with an under-aged girl. 
However, in Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy (No 2), 484 the court found 
that the alleged statement did not have a tendency to promote ill will and hostility 
479 [1979] 2 MLJ 174. 
480 lbid, 112. See also Melan bin Abdullah & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1971] 2 MLJ 280,283. 
481 Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia. (2000) vol. 2 MLJ pars 20,182. 
482 Bari, A. Freedom of Speech and Expression in Malaysia. [1998] INSAF 156. 
483 [2000] 2 MU 577. 
4" [1986] 1 MLJ 518. 
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between the different classes of the population. The appeal was directed at the Pardons 
Board not at the Ruler, in this case, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (The King). Therefore, 
there can be no question of the statement having a tendency to bring hatred or contempt 
or to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Disaffection, in the context 
of sedition, does not mean the absence of affection and regard; it means disloyalty, 
enmity and hostility. In this particular case the court concluded that the statement did not 
contain words, which were capable of advocating or encouraging the people to disloyalty. 
There was no tendency in the words that could create antagonism, enmity and disloyalty 
among the people. 
Another piece of legislation that impinges freedom of the press is the Internal Security 
Act 1960. Originally, the Act was designed to prevent the communist insurgency after the 
independence in 1957. It deals with preventive detention promulgated under the purview 
of Article 149 of the Federal Constitution. The article protects the validity of the law even 
if it is inconsistent with fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech and expression. 
Section 8 (1) of the Act empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to detain any person 
without trial for up to two years. The section provides: 
If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary 
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential 
services therein or to the economic life thereof. 
Detention on security grounds was challenged in Minister for Home Affairs v Jamaluddin 
bin Othman 485 The grounds for the detention stated that the respondent was involved in a 
plan or programme to propagate Christianity among the Malays and it was also alleged 
that the activities of the respondent could give rise to tension and enmity between the 
Muslim community and the Christian community in Malaysia and could affect national 
security. The grounds for the detention in the present case read in the proper context are 
insufficient to fall within the scope of the Internal Security Act 1960, which is a piece of 
legislation essentially to prevent and combat subversion and actions prejudicial to public 
485 [1989] 1 MLJ 368. 
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order and national security. The purposive interpretation of the law on security by the 
court has undermined the authoritative decision of the government. 
In 1989, an amendment was made to the Act to include section 8B to prevent any 
challenge to the exercise of discretionary power by the Minister. The provision states: 
There shall be no judicial review in any court, and no court shall have or 
exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any act done or decision made by 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their 
discretionary power in accordance with the Act, save in regard to any 
question on compliance with any procedural requirement in the Act 
governing such act or decision. 
The inclusion of the new provision prevents judicial ability to review the ground of 
detention as exercised by the court in Jamaluddin Othman's case. The wide power 
accorded to the Minister without the prospect of a legal challenge has diminished the 
constitutional rights of the people. It also reduces the vitality of the Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land, which is proclaimed to guarantee the fundamental liberties in 
Malaysia. In this regard, Faruqi argues that the principle of constitutional supremacy is 
more notional than real ash 
The internal security law confers the Minister with full power to decide on the reasoning, 
manner and circumstances of detention. 487 The executive whose interpretation on security 
is final determines the value of fundamental liberty to a certain extent. Salleh Abas LP in 
Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police 488affirmed that `judges in 
the matter of preventive detentions relating to the security of the Federation are the 
executive' 489 The unnecessary implication of the provision is that the judiciary is 
stripped off its power in upholding the fundamental rights as enshrined in the 
M Farugi, S. Liberal enough to give life to the law. The Star, 2 February 2001, p. 40. 
487 The provision allows challenge on the legality of detention on procedural ground. However, according 
to Yatim the Internal Security Amendment Act 1989 disallowed judicial review in whatever form. See 
Yatim, R (1995) Executive Power in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. Endowment Publication: 285. 
488 [1988] 1 MLJ 293. 
489 [1988] 1 MLJ 135,295. 
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Constitution and thus, relinquished its function to the executive. 490 In this regard, the 
notion of constitutional supremacy in Malaysia is difficult to maintain. 
Even though the courts have no power to interfere in ascertaining what amounts to 
national security, they are not virtually powerless to decide cases under the ISA. The 
courts can always opt to rely on purposive approach in determining the actual purpose of 
a detention. If it can be proven that the purpose of a detention has no link with national 
security, then the courts can exert its judicial power to invalidate the detention. By doing 
so the courts are not interfering with the executive decision but are actually applying the 
law to check the abuse of power for ulterior motives. The nexus argument gives an 
opportunity to the courts to exert its independence as the last bastion of fundamental 
rights. 
The Court in Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Ors491case used 
the nexus argument. The Court found that the purpose of the detentions was for ulterior 
purpose and not connected to national security. In this case, the appellants appealed 
against the decision of the High Court judge in refusing the writ of habeas corpus for 
their release. The appellants were arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act 
1960 on the ground that they were planning a street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur. The 
respondent issued a press statement in relation to the detention revealing the appellants' 
involvement in militant activities that can jeopardise the national security. The court 
applied purposive approach in exerting its judicial power. In delivering the court's 
judgment, Steve Shim CJ said: 
Although a court would not question the executive's decision as to what 
national security required, the court would nevertheless examine whether 
the executive's decision was in fact based on national security 
considerations. Here, the court was entitled to inquire the basis for the 
detaining authority's reasons to believe that the appellants had acted.. . in a 
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. 492 
490 Sarwar, M. National Security & Fundamental Liberties: Are the Courts Striking the Right Balance? 
Malayan Law Journal, 4. http: //www. mli. com. my/free/articles/malik&chris. htm 
491 [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
492 thid, 480. 
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On the other hand, section 22 of the Act accorded a discretionary power to the Minister in 
charge of Printing Presses and Publication. The power given to the Minister under this 
provision is wide and subjective. It authorises the Minister to decide the extent and 
context of the grounds. For instance, the Minister can impose absolute prohibition or 
condition on publication, on the grounds of disobedience to the law, incitement to 
violence, promoting feelings of hostility between races or classes of population or 
prejudicial to the national interest. The provision also covers every aspect of political, 
social and economic issues, which are the subjects of press coverage. 
From the government's perspective, the ISA is a useful devise imposed on the press in 
order to control them from indulging into sensitive issues that can destabilise social and 
political harmony. 493 The intimidation by threatening to use the repressive laws causes 
the press, in particular the journalists, to exercise self-restraint. The restraint does not 
only involve editorial skill in the selection of news but also termination of 
employment 494 
Besides legal intimidations, the arbitrary use of administrative action and condition 
restricts the freedom of the press in Malaysia. The practice of press accreditation by the 
Information Ministry poses difficulty for certain journalists495 to do their job. The 
accreditation is necessary for the press to gain access to press conferences or government 
sources of information. It is normally given to printing press licensed under the Printing 
Presses and Publication Act 1984. Thus, the unaccredited press496has no opportunity to 
offer press coverage. To illustrate this point, in 2002 journalists from opposition party 
PAS and an independent on-line newspaper Malaysiakini were denied access to the Press 
493 The Deputy Minister of Information once threatened to apply the Internal Security Act on local media 
and to censor foreign media for undermining the country's leadership. http: //www. rsf. fr 
`% In 1999 chief editors from local newspapers, Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harlan, resigned due to 
political pressure because of their close association with the sacked Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. 
The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim caused political turmoil which contribute to the bad performance of the 
ruling party especially UMNO in 1999 general election. 
"s There is no definition of journalist under the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. 
496 On-line press such as Malaysiakini has been denied press accreditation because it is not covered by the 
Act. 
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gallery in Parliament on the basis that they were not accredited by the Information 
Mimst y. 
497 
It can be argued that the unequal treatment of the press raises a constitutional issue of 
equality before the law. Article 8 of the Federal Constitution guarantees that all persons 
are equal before the law. They are also entitled to equal protection of the law. Reliance 
on Article 8 is more promising if the treatment received by the press is based on the 
inclination of political decisions. 
An issue relating to Article 8 was raised in the Minister of Home Affairs f airs v Aliran. 498 The 
respondents argued that refusal to grant the permit has the effect of discrimination and is 
therefore contrary to Article 8. But the court summarily rejected the argument and found 
that there was no infringement of any constitutional provision without offering further 
deliberation. In this case, the respondents had applied for a permit under section 6 (1) of 
the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 to print and publish in Bahasa Malaysia a 
magazine under the name of Seruan Aliran. The Minister of Home Affairs in accordance 
with his discretionary power refused the application. However, the decision was quashed 
by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section 12 (2) of the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act 1984 gives the Minister of Home Affairs 'absolute 
discretion to refuse an application for a licence or permit'. So unless it can be clearly 
established that the Minister for Home Affairs had in any way exercised his discretion 
wrongfully, unfairly, dishonestly or in bad faith, the Court cannot question the discretion 
of the Minister. The court in this case has missed the opportunity to determine the issues 
on constitutional ground decisively. The shallow consideration given by the court is 
viewed as most unsatisfactory. 499 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the possibility of 
judicial review of the discretionary power on the ground of wrongful, unfair and 
dishonest exercise of power. 
497 Permission to attend parliamentary session was granted after protest from PAS on the ground that some 
of the Members of Parliament are from PAS. But Malaysiakini was granted conditional permission and 
restricted from asking questions during press conference or approach representatives of the ruling party. 
Reporters Sans Fronteres 2003 Annual Report, Malaysia. b! W: //www. rsf. Orp-/article. php3? id article. 
499 [1990] 1 MLJ 351. 
499 Faruqi, S. Free Speech and the Constitution [1992] 4 CLl lxiv, lxxiii. 
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Administrative actions can be invalidated on the premise of Article 10.500 In relation to 
administrative conditions imposed by the authorities, judicial review is possible on the 
ground that statutory powers must not be inconsistent with the constitutional 
requirements. 50' The court in Chai Choon Hon v Ketua Polis Daerah Kampar502 decided 
that a restriction on the number of after dinner speakers at an event allowed by the 
authority was void as being unreasonable. 
There is a shift in the courts attitude relating to reviewing the executive decision. The 
objective and purposive approach adopted by the Court in Mohamad Ezam's503 case is a 
clear departure from the previous subjective and positive approach in Theresa's504 case. 
The willingness of the Court to inquire into the legality of the executive's act is described 
by the former Chief Justice, Tun Mohd. Dzaiddin Abdullah, as `most significant in 
putting in place the necessary principle of check and balance back into the governance 
and administration of Malaysia... 'sos 
Restrictions on freedom of the press can also be made by way of suppression of 
documents and information. The Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA) empowers the 
government to deal with documents and information that can be prohibited from public 
knowledge. Though the real purpose of the law is novel in protecting the national 
security, the scope and the extent of the power conferred on the government create a 
hindrance for the press to make a balanced coverage. Another concern is that the law is 
being used as a facade to protect interests that can frustrate the real objective of the 
existence of the law. According to the Preamble of the Act, the purpose of the law is to 
combat any attempt by civil servants from indulging in activities of spying and selling 
official secrets to foreign countries. The law is created to protect the country from those 
with ill intent to inflict harm by ways of espionage and spying. The law expressly states 
50° Harding, A. (1996) Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia. London, 190. 
501 See Madhavan Nair & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 264 and Lau Dak Kee v PP [1976] 2 
MLJ 229. 
502 [1986] 2 MLJ 203. 
503 [2002] 4 MU 449. 
504 [198811 MLJ 293. 
505 Abdullah, M. D. (2003) National Security Considerations under the Internal Security Act 1960- Recent 
Developments. Paper presented at a conference on "Constitutionalism, Human Rights and Good 
Governance". Kuala Lumpur, 30 Sept to 1 Oct 2003. http: //www. mli. com. my/free/articles/dzaiddin. htm 
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that it is an offence to possess and communicate any official secret. The meaning of 
official secret is provided by section 2 which include any document, information and 
material as may be classified as top secret, secret, confidential or restricted. The 
classification of official secret is vague and wide. It empowers the government to 
categorise any document as official secret. The Federal Court in the case of Lim Kit Siang 
v Public Prosecutor506 noted that the government is entitled to classify information in any 
way the government likes. This is due to the fact that all information that belongs to the 
government can be treated as secret. Any wrong classification on the part of the 
government does not render the information any less secret. 
An issue of transparency and integrity of the OSA is raised when Mohd EzamS07 the 
Chief Youth of Keadilan Nasional, an opposition political party, exposed a document 
recommending legal prosecution against a senior Minister and a prominent politician for 
corruption by the Attorney General department He was charged under the OSA but 
acquitted by the High Court. The use of the law as a political threat and intimidation to 
silence any critical expression against the government is not unprecedented. 
The status of a secret document or information does not depend on its content or purpose. 
Once a document is classified as a government's secret pursuant to section 2B, then it 
remains so untill it is declassified in accordance with section 2C. It is the form and 
manner in which the government treats a document or information that alleviates its 
confidentiality. In Datuk Dzulkifli v Public Prosecutor508 the court held that a document 
does not lose its status as a secret document merely because it is stolen and reproduced as 
a copy. The secrecy of a document is intact even if the public already knows its content. 
The application of the law casts doubts about the transparency of the government. The 
control imposed on the press especially investigative journalism deprived the public of 
506 [1980] 1 MLJ 293. 
507 See Utusan Malaysia Online, 4 February 2005. 
http: //www. utusan. com. my/utusan/content. asp? v=2004&dt==0416&pub=Utusan Malaysia&sec=Dalam Ne 
eri& -dn 02. htm 509 
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information that may affect their legitimate interests 509 Perhaps the cautious attitude of 
the press in publishing news on political issues is a factor for the lack of discussion 
pertaining to matters of public interest but deemed to be sensitive by the government. 
Press freedom is not an objective right where it must be protected as the constitutional 
obligation of the government. The scope and limit of the freedom depend on freedom of 
expression and freedom of organisation. Therefore, journalists do not enjoy any special 
position or privilege in their works. They are subjected to the same law of the land as the 
ordinary man on the street. In a nutshell, the freedom of the press ends where the force of 
the law begins. 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
The constitutional protection accorded to the right to free expression creates an 
expectation that the right could be exercised without undue restrictions. It also gives the 
impression that the right has the exclusionary force that should be protected. However, 
there are other interests, public or private, that equally require protection in order to 
preserve the socio-political fabric of the Malaysian democratic society. 
Though it is a noble idea that right-based approach as embraced by the Western liberal 
democracy should permeate the domestic constitutional framework, transplantation of 
such approach would be inappropriate as the Western approach is grounded on 
individualism in contrast with the communitarian impulse in the national constitutional 
design. In this relation, Schauer argues that cultural differences could influence the 
different emphasis on the epithet of free speech. Notably, constitutional constraints rest 
on culturally contingent social categories. Thus, it is better to help `others to locate and 
manage their own categories than by trying to get them to accept ours. '51° 
Communitarianism gives expression to the well-being of the society and the importance 
of the public interest. Malaysia emphasises on community right rather that individual 
509 Nain, Z. (2002) The Structure of Media Industry: Implication for Democracy. In Loh, F. and Khoo, B. 
T. (eds. ) Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices. Richmond, 111. 
sio Schauer, F. (1994) Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives. 
Rosenfeld, 368. 
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rights as practiced in the West. But this does not negate the fact that Malaysia upholds 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 511 From the Malaysian constitutional 
perspective, protection of the public and society as a whole is paramount. For instance, 
the protection of freedom of religion under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution is 
imbued with communitarianism impulse. On this premise, the constitutional provision 
allows the existence and practice of minority faiths and religions such as Christianity, 
Buddhism and Hinduism alongside with Islam, which is professed by the majority. 
On the other hand, majoritarianism gives expression to decisions that are based on 
majority rule. 512 For the purpose of this study, majoritarianism in Malaysian context 
refers to the practice of parliamentary majority under the representative system. Though 
the concept takes into account the interest of the society, nevertheless, it gives primacy to 
the interest of the majority. This is evident when the Constitution gives primacy to 
Bahasa Malaysia (National language) which is widely spoken by the Malays, the 
majority race in Malaysian society. Another instance of majoritarianism practice is the 
creation of separate jurisdiction for the Syariah courts under Article 121(1A) of the 
Constitution. The effect of this is that the civil courts will no longer have the jurisdiction 
to hear cases pertaining to Islamic matters. Though both concepts communitarianism and 
majoritarianism give prominence to the society but the latter emphasises on the numerical 
aggregation of people in the society. 
Malaysia could do better by resisting transplantation that prove to be incompatible with 
the local contingent and avoiding unacceptable relativism that may halt the potentially 
full-fledge progress of freedom. Since Malaysia has moved towards economic 
betterment, serious attention could be given to improve social and political rights such as 
right of privacy. Consequently, human rights could loom more prominently in Malaysian 
politico-cultural life. 
511 Malaysian foreign affairs on human rights. See http: //www. kln. gov. my/english/Fr-foreignaffairs. htm 512 http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Majoritarianism 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRIVACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, there is no legal protection to privacy as an independent right in the United 
Kingdom. Instead, English law affords protection to privacy interests in a piecemeal 
way. 513 Privacy as a separate law has never been recognised in the United Kingdom. 
Thus, right of privacy is not a ground that constitutes a cause of action in courts of law. 
Nevertheless, privacy-related interests are encompassed within other existing tort 
principles such as nuisance, trespass, defamation, malicious falsehood and breach of 
confidence. As such, English law does not afford protections for interference with 
privacy unless the interference involves wrongful act covered by the existing cause of 
action. The development of privacy in the UK has moved towards accepting the right 
particularly with the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. There is a significant 
stride in dealing with privacy under the Act when a paradigmatic shift occurs in the 
perception of privacy from a traditional negative right to a right-based impulse. 
4.1 THE JUSTIFICATION 
Privacy is a complex and elusive concept, which defies clear definition. Hence, it can be 
expected to exert `chilling effect' on freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the difficulty 
to find a common foundation does not make the concept meaningless. The Younger 
Committee asserts that the need for privacy is nearly universal. The Committee observes 
that: 
The quest and need for privacy is a natural one, not restricted to man 
alone, but arising in the biological and social processes of all the higher 
forms of life. 514 
513 Markesinis, B. Our Patchy Law of Privacy- Time to do Something About it. (1990) MLR 53,802. 
514 Report of the Committee on Privacy. Cmnd. 5012, para 109. 
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Privacy sceptics argue that it should not be treated equally on the same platform as free 
sls speech. This is because privacy is a concept, which relates to individualism rather than 
public in its collective entity. In other words, the benefit of privacy is for individual 
whereas free speech is for public good. 
Moreover, the absence of clarification in the scope of privacy is a negating factor for 
privacy to be sidelined. 516 From the anthropological perspective, Moore argues that 
privacy is a socially created need. He observes that the diversity of desire and needs in 
societies influences the emphasis on privacy from one society to another and within the 
same society. 517 There is an expectation of degree of privacy in a person's private life 
that is not the legitimate concern of others. 518 Though privacy is rooted in individualism, 
it is implausible for a person to lead a hermetical life in today's society. 
Conceptually, privacy can be classified into physical and informational privacy. 
Seclusion and solitude can be characterised under physical privacy that involves zone, 
limit or space 519 Example of this type of privacy is the right to be let alone. 520 On the 
other hand, anonymity, secrecy and intimacy can be under informational privacy that 
relate to dissemination of personal information. Wright argues that personal information 
relates to the intimate sphere of a person's life. 521 In order to be covered under the 
concept of privacy, the information must fulfill the requirements of intimate and acutely 
sensitive facts. 522 This kind of information has the capacity to embarrass or inhibit a 
person in the free development of one's personality and relationships with others. In this 
regard, privacy serves to protect information from the public gaze. It is unsatisfactory to 
confine the scope of privacy to information as privacy can also be invaded without 
involving personal information. For instance, invasion of privacy could be perpetrated 
through an unlawful body search. 
515 Wacks, R. The Poverty of Privacy. (1980) LQ. Rev. 73,76. 
sib Ibid. 
517 Moore, B. (1984) Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History. New York, M. E Sharpe. 
5t3 DeCew, J. W. The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics. (1986) 5 Law and Phil 145,169. 519 Gavinson, R. Privacy and the Limits of Law. (1980) 89 Yale L. J. 420. 
520 Winfield. Privacy. (1931) 47 LQ Rev. 23. 
521 Wright, J. (2001) Tort Law & Human Rights. Oregon, Hart Publishing. 
522 Parent, W. Privacy, Morality and the Law. (1983) Philosophy and Public Affairs 269. See Lusky, L. 
Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts. (1972) 72 Col. L. Rev. 693. 
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4.1.1 AUTONOMY 
Privacy is important and valuable for it empowers individual to exercise control on 
information about oneself. This is a manifestation of autonomous right or freedom of 
choice within society. 523 In this context, Inness argues that privacy encompasses an 
autonomous right to make intimate decisions 524 Arguably, autonomy allows a person the 
right to make decisions on the extent of information that can be the subject of public 
perusal. Westin argues that autonomy is vital in the development of individuality 
particularly in a democratic society. 525 Autonomy as the foundation for privacy received 
judicial recognition when Sedley L. J. in Douglas v Hello! Ltd stated that, `... privacy as a 
legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy'. 526 The growth 
of individuality or human personality527 could inspire independent thought and instigate 
diversity of ideas and views that are important in a vibrant democracy. Autonomy also 
enables the protection of private sanctuary within which we shape our private lives and 
develop relationships with others. 
On the other hand, an argument based on autonomy could frustrate the public's right to 
know. There is a concern that autonomous power to determine information for public 
consumption would hinder discussion on matters that could be beneficial to the interest of 
the public. However, such a concern is misconceived since the autonomous individual 
decision-making could be exercised while respecting the legitimate interests of others. 528 
4.1.2 DIGNITY 
Justification for privacy could also be found in human dignity. 529 Dignity as a value 
worth protected give impulse to the important of privacy in a democratic society. 530 
523 Hirsleifer, J. Privacy, Its Origin, Function and Future. (1980) 9 Jo. LS 649. 
524 mess, J. (1992) Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation. Oxford, 46-47. 
su Westin, A. (1970) Privacy and Freedom. London, 34. 
526 [2001] 2 WLR 992,1025. 
Sn Wright, op cit., n. 525,163. 
528 Rehm, G. M. (2001) Privacy in the Digital Age: Vanishing Into Cyberspace? In D. Friedmann and D. B. 
Erez, (eds. ) Human Rights in Private Law. Oxford, 376. 
529 Bloustein, E. Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser. (1964) 39 NYULR 
962. 
530 Rogers, H. and Tomlinson, H. Privacy and Expression: Convention Rights and Interim Injunctions. 
(2003) EHRLR (Special Issue) 37,38. 
130 
Feldman admits that dignity is an important value for human rights law but at the same 
time cautions the right to dignity due to its complexity. 531 Reliance on dignity does not 
make privacy as a primary right but undoubtedly would upgrade the value of the right to 
privacy. The justification of dignity received judicial recognition when Sedley LJ in 
Douglas v Hello! stated that: 
Instead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable 
to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the 
protection of human autonomy and dignity--the right to control the 
dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem 
and respect of other people. 532 
Dignity is not a concept born purely of history and tradition. Every individual holds 
dignity interests by virtue of being alive and human. 533 Though society is made up of 
individuals who enjoy interests collectively as a society, yet, individuals' independent 
interests may conflict with the collective interests of society. In this context, an 
individual's dignity interest may conflict with the press freedom in informing the public 
on matters concerning them. For instance, an expose of true personal information of 
public figures such as a politician who is involved in extra-marital affairs could be 
injurious to his dignity yet informative to the public particularly in his constituency. Such 
information could be of public interest in a representative system. 
In addition, dignity is also a core interest in relation to patients' privacy. Arguably, in 
relation to this, it is the dignity of aids patients or rape victims534 that warrant protection 
of informational privacy. Nonetheless, the court in Campbell v MGN535 found that the 
protection of medical data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or 
her right to respect for private life. It could be argued that to expose a humiliating or 
embarrassing personal fact which is true may injure dignity but not reputation. Unlike 
reputation, which can be redeemed under the protection of defamation law, dignity is 
unredeemable once it is lost. Perhaps the dignitarian interest justifies the necessity to 
531 Feldman, D. Human Dignity as a Legal Value- Part 11. (2000) PL 61,75. 
532 [20011 QB 967,1001. See also Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457,472. 
533Jones, J. Common Constitutional Traditions: Can the Meaning of Human Dignity Under German Law 
Guide the European Court of Justice. (2004) PL 167,170. 
534 See per Lord Hutton in RvA (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45,98. 
535 [2004] 2 WLR 1232. See also Zv Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371. 
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protect privacy as a fundamental right in a democratic society as embedded in the ICCPR 
and the ECHR. 
4.2 PROTECTION OF PRIVACY BEFORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
Even though privacy is not recognised as a separate law, it is nevertheless not an alien 
concept in the United Kingdom. In 1361, the Justices of the Peace Act in England 
provided for the arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers. This means that privacy 
interests have been safeguarded even before the Human Rights Act 1998, though not as a 
distinctive right, but as a value associated with personal autonomy and human dignity. 536 
John Stuart Mill, an English philosopher in the19th century, said in his Essay on Liberty: 
In the part that merely concerns him, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign. 537 
Notably, privacy is an important value in English culture, asserted under local customs. 
For instance, in Hale's case 1569, the defendant pleaded a custom of London for 
freeholders to build new houses that could block the lights from entering their 
neighbour's house. 538 
Leggatt LJ described the absence of the right as a `shortcoming in our law' 539 There are 
several reasons why there is no right of privacy in the United Kingdom. One of the 
reasons is that first; privacy has not acquired the primary right that warrants legal 
protection. This is because other core interests eclipse the importance of privacy in 
English culture. For instance, the English legal tradition is more concerned to protect 
property rights and physical rights. 54o These rights work to protect certain aspects of 
privacy. Hence, protection of privacy interest is parasitised on the assertion of 
proprietary rights or other property interests. 54' The popular maxim `an Englishman's 
536 Feldman, D. Secrecy, Dignity or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as Civil Liberties. (1994) 47CLP42,54. 
537 Gray, J. (1991) John Stuart Mill on Liberty. Oxford, 14. 
538 Baker, J. H. and Milsom, S. F. C. (1990) Sources of English Legal History. London, 592. 539 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62,71. 
540 Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. London, 543. 541 Robertson, G and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, 281. 
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house is his castle', which is used in relation to an act of intrusion, explains the strong 
attachment of the law on property interest. 
This strong attachment also proves that right of privacy exists in a surrogate form. For 
instance, an owner of private property may assert privacy to prevent intrusion. In the case 
of Williams V Settle, 542 the defendant was a photographer engaged by the plaintiff. When 
the plaintiffs father was found murdered, it attracted a lot of publicity. Some 
photographs took by the defendant were sold to newspapers without authority and one 
was published in the newspapers. The defendant admitted that the copyright in the 
photographs belongs to the plaintiff. The lower court awarded punitive damages because 
of the scandalous behaviour of the defendant. The Court of Appeal in upholding the 
award of punitive damages emphasised that: 
They may act as a deterrent to others who are willing to supply to the 
Press information which they know is going to be used in a manner which 
will be so hurtful and distressing to the people involved 543 
The second reason for the lack of right of privacy is the absence of a positive right 
protection. Without such protection privacy is regarded as a residual interest that can be 
outweighed by other countervailing interests. Moreover, the residual character suppresses 
the value of privacy where the benefit is limited to personal interest, which may not 
outweigh other interest beneficial to the public at large. A Bill of Right or a statutory 
legislation would grant a positive right status to privacy. Thus privacy can be better 
protected. Without such protection, privacy would be a subservient instead of being an 
exception to other valuable interests such as freedom of expression. Any law pertaining 
to protection of privacy is perceived as a threat and would have a chilling effect on 
freedom of expression. As such, restriction on freedom of expression would be regarded 
as taking a step backward. In relation to the press, the last prior restraint law was 
544 terminated in the 17th century. 
542 [1960] 1 WLR 1072. 
343 Ibid, 1081. 
Press licensing was ended in 1694. See Curran, J. and Seaton, J. (1991) Power Without Responsibility: 
The Press and Broadcasting in Britian. London, 1. 
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The third reason is the strong attachment of the English legal culture to the notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty. This doctrine empowers Parliament with unlimited legal 
power to do anything it wishes. 545 Under this notion, political dominance by the ruling 
party can shape and influence the decision-making process. 546 For instance, in realising 
their commitment toward civil liberties, the Human Rights Act 1998 was introduced by 
the current Labour government after they came into power. 547 Recently, the government 
reiterated its unwillingness to introduce privacy law. 548 However, Dworkin argues that 
Parliament should be under law. 549 This will allow the courts to scrutinise the legislations 
passed by Parliament. 
Bagshaw argues that among the obstacles in introducing legislative protection of privacy 
is the weakness of the legislature when faced by hostile media and the government's 
dominant power. 55° Political pressure from those with vested interest, especially the 
press, could influence the government to forestall the introduction of law on privacy. 
55' 
The press forms a hegemonic force when it comes to protecting freedom of the press. 
This is evident when the press succeeded in lobbying for the inclusion of section 12 in the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
The fourth reason is the strong and influential press in upholding freedom of the press. 
Markesinis argues that the real reason for the absence of the law on privacy is the 
blocking power of the press. According to him, the press has relied on the difficulty to 
define privacy and the inhibitive effect privacy has on investigative journalism to resist 
545 According to this doctrine, individuals may say or do what they please only in accordance with the 
substantive law. See Mullender, R. Parliamentary Supremacy, the Constitution and the Judiciary. (1998) 45 
NILQ 138. See also Lord Lester and Oliver, D. (1997) Constitutional Law and Human Rights. London, 93. 
546 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Way We Live Now: Human Rights in the New Millennium. (1998) 1 
WebJCLI. http: //webicli. ncl. ac. uk/1998/issuel/binghaml. html 
sal Real rights for citizens. Labour party manifesto 1997. 
http: //www. labour-party. org. uk/manifestos/ 1997/ 1997-labour-manifesto. shtml 
548 The Government's Response to the Fifth Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee on 
Privacy and Media Intrusion (HC 458-1), Cm 5985. http: //www. culture. og v_uk 
m9 Dworkin, R. (1990) A Bill of Rights for Britain. London, 14 
550 Bagshaw, R. (1997) Obstacles on the Path to Privacy Torts. In Birks, P. (ed. ) Privacy and Loyalty. 
Oxford, 137-38. 
551 Hartman, C. J. The Emergence of a Statutory Right to Privacy Tort in England. (1995)16(1) J. L. M. & 
P., 17. 
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the law of privacy. 552 The exercise of self-regulation through the Press Complaint 
Commission has so far been able to resist the introduction of law on privacy. The press 
survived the threat of introducing the law of privacy by reviewing the Press Complaint 
Commission to the satisfaction of the government. 553 In 1995, the government rejected 
the proposal for introducing a general right to privacy following the consultation paper by 
the Lord Chancellor's Department in 1993.554 
4.2.1 JUDICIAL RECOGNITION 
The complexity of right of privacy does not diminish the value of privacy. Even the 
skeptic of the right, such as Professor Raymond Wacks, 555 argued that the problem is not 
that privacy is without value, but the existence of hybrid values under the canopy of 
privacy makes the concept inept for practical work. Nevertheless, the right of privacy is 
recognised as a protected right under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Unfortunately, similar protection is elusive in the UK amidst the incorporation of the 
Convention rights by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The need to protect privacy has received considerable supports from the public as well as 
the judges. 556 For instance, concerns on potential abuse and intrusion of privacy are the 
main reason for Liberty, a human rights movement, opposing the government's proposal 
to introduce identity card for the citizens. 557 Browne-Wilkinson VC stressed the 
importance of privacy in Marcel v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis when he 
said: 
If the information obtained by the police, the Inland Revenue, the social 
security offices, the health service and other agencies were to be gathered 
5 52 Markesinis, B. Our Patchy Law of Privacy- Time to do Something about it. (1990) MLR 53. 553 David Mellor, the then Home office minister, in 1989 said that the press was `drinking the last-chance 
saloon'. See Calcutt, D. (1990) Privacy and Related Matters. Cm. 1102. 
5m Department of National Heritage. (1995) Privacy and Media Intrusion: The Government's Response. 
Cm. 2918. 
5" Wacks, R. The Poverty of Privacy. (1980) 96 LQR 73. Thomson, J. The Right to Privacy. (1975) 4 
Philos Pub A,, ß'295. 
556 See for instance per Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello!. [2001 ] QB 967. 557 Identity cards. Liberty. htip: //www. liberty-human-ripts. om uk/privacy/id-cards. shtml 
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together in one file, the freedom of the individual would be gravely at risk. 
The dossier of private information is the badge of the totalitarian state. 558 
The courts also consider right of privacy in considering other remedies. This can be seen 
in the case of Prince Albert v Strange559 where Knight Bruce V. C. described the case as a 
`sordid spying into privacy of domestic life'. Furthermore, in Kaye v Robertson560 
Bingham LJ described the defendant's conduct towards the plaintiff as `monstrous 
invasion of his privacy. '561 
The absence of law of privacy does not mean that the right itself is absent in the domestic 
legal arena. In the case of Schering Chemicals v Falkman, 562 Lord Denning said `While 
freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, so also is the right of privacy. ' The 
same sentiment expressed by Lord Keith when he said that `... the right to personal 
privacy is clearly one which the law should in this field seek to protect. '563 
The implementation of Human Rights Act in October 2000 has provided a stimulus for 
the notion of respect for privacy as an underlying legal value. "' It encourages the 
development of common law principles particularly the breach of confidence 565in 
providing protection. In Spencer v UK566 the government argued that breach of 
confidence provides the necessary remedy for domestic privacy matters. The court 
dismissed the application on the ground that the applicant had not exhausted local 
remedy. The incorporation of the right into domestic legal landscape serves as catalyst for 
the emergence of right of privacy under common law principles. It is unfortunate for the 
558 [1992] Ch 225. 
559 (1848) 2 De G. & Sm, 652. 
560 [1991] FSR 62. 
561 See Berstein v Skyview Ltd [1978] QB 479. Griffith J. used the same expression and rejected the claim 
based on trespass and invasion of privacy. 
562 [1982] QB 1,21. 
563 AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109,255. 
564 Lord Phillips MR in H (a Healthcare Worker) v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 2081, 
Para 40. 
S Phillipson, G. and Fenwick, H. Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era 
(2000) MLR 63,449. See also Loon, N. W. Emergence of a Right to Privacy from within the Law of 
Confidence. (1996) 18(5) EIPR 307. Schilling, K. Privacy and the Press: Breach of Confidence- The 
Nemesis of the Tabloids. (1991) Ent. L R. 2. 
566 (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105. 
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English legal system if a citizen has to seek remedy in the ECtHR on the ground of lack 
of local remedy. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates privacy, which is part of the Convention rights. 
The scheme of the Act protects rights against the state infringement (vertical effect). The 
scheme is not in parallel with the nature of the right of privacy, which relates to 
individuals inter se (horizontal effect). However, there is a possibility for the horizontal 
effect under the Act. This is so when the Act creates a duty on public authorities to act 
compatibly with the Convention rights. As this issue is of grave concern, it will be 
discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
Judicial activism has made protection of privacy possible. This has enabled the existing 
legal principles to become the framework for the protection of privacy. The strongest 
judicial recognition appears in the remark of Lord Phillips in Campbell v MGN when he 
said: 
The development of the law of confidentiality since the Human Rights Act 
1998 came into force has seen information described as "confidential" not 
where it has been confided by one person to another, but where it relates 
to an aspect of an individual's private life which he does not choose to 
make public. We consider that the unjustifiable publication of such 
information would better be described as breach of privacy rather than 
breach of confidence. 567 
The judicial remark evinces that right of privacy in the UK has gained considerable 
support and recognition, which is moving towards its institutionalisation. 
4.2.2 EFFORTS TO INTRODUCE PRIVACY LAW 
Several efforts have been made to introduce right of privacy into the domestic legal 
landscape. The widespread concerns among the public and members of Parliament about 
press abuses reached its peak with the introduction of several bills on privacy. 568 The 
failure could be attributed to a succession of governments' position on the matter. For 
567 [2003] QB 633,663 
568 Lord Mancroft's Bill (1961), Mr. Lyon's Bill (1967), Mr. Walden's Bill (1969), Mr. Cash's Bill (1987), 
Mr. Browne's Bill (1988) and Lord Stoddard's Bill (1989). 
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instance, the bill introduced by Brian Walden MP was abandoned because the 
government undertook to appoint a committee to inquire into the protection of privacy. 569 
The lack of serious commitment by the government to legislate privacy law may also be 
due to the fear of press hostility. 570 The reason for the unwillingness to introduce privacy 
law is because of the apparent conflict with freedom of expression. It is remarkable that 
English law, which in many other fields has kept pace with changes in the public mores, 
should have so far failed to evolve any general concept of privacy. 571 Hostile reactions 
especially from the press towards the prospect of law on privacy are obvious. 572 For 
instance, Lord Wakeham in his final speech as the - chairman of the Press Complaint 
Commission said: 
A privacy law would provide a severe blow to the ability of newspapers to 
investigate, scrutinise and where necessary intrude in the public interest. 
The freedom of the press, which has been a central plank of Britain's 
democracy since 1689, would be seriously eroded. 573 
This is a typical justification for defending freedom of the press. Admittedly, the role of 
the press is vital for a healthy democratic society. But it does not make the press a distinct 
entity in a civil society. The press has its share in duties and responsibilities. Perhaps the 
remark by Lord Wakeham is a mere in terrorem rhetoric. 
In the past, six private member's bills on privacy have been introduced in Parliament. 
However, none has gone through to create a new legislation. Discussions and proposals 
on right of privacy have been made in seven major reports since 1970. The first main 
report to enhance privacy protection was made by Justice, the British section of the 
International Commission of Jurists. 574 The report concluded that the fragmentary and 
incomplete protection of privacy under the English law is certainly inadequate. The 
569 Michael, J. (1994) Privacy and Human Rights. Aldershort, Dartmouth, 101. 
570 Fenwick, H. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights. London, Cavendish, 537. 
s" Neill, B. The Protection of Privacy. (1962) MLR 26,400. 
572 Privacy has been labeled as bourgeois right and blockbuster tort. 
573 `Press, Privacy, Public Interest and the Human Rights Act'. Lecture given on 23 January 2002. 574 Littman, M. and Carter-Ruck, P. (1970) A Report by Justice: Privacy and the Law. London, Stevens & 
Sons Limited. 
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report found that the English law protects a man's person, property and reputation, but it 
does not specifically protect his privacy. 
4.2.3 REPORTS ON PRIVACY 
In 1972, the Younger Committee produced a report on privacy. 575 The main task of the 
Committee is `to consider whether legislation is needed to give further protection to 
individual citizen and to commercial and industrial interests against intrusion into privacy 
by private persons and organizations, or by companies, and to make recommendations. ' 
In general, the Committee noted that privacy is an important aspect of life. However, the 
Committee opined that there is no need for a general law of privacy because the effect of 
such law on other rights of great importance is unpredictable. The Committee also found 
that the difficulty to define right of privacy in a precise term is a hindrance to develop a 
satisfactory law. The Committee then suggested that public disclosure of private 
information could be addressed within the ambit of breach of confidence. It also 
suggested a study by the Law Commission into expanding its coverage in a new statutory 
tort action. 
In 1989, the government appointed the Calcutt Committee to investigate press intrusions 
into privacy. The appointment of the Committee was a reaction to the Right of Privacy 
Bill in 1989. Unlike previous Bills on privacy, the Bill presented by Mr. Browne MP had 
passed through the Committee stages in the Commons. In its Report on Privacy and 
Related Matters, the Committee recommended against the creation of a new statutory tort 
of invasion of privacy relating to publication of personal information. The Committee 
viewed that it would be possible to define invasion of privacy with sufficient precision. 
The definition relates only to information that is published without authorisation. The 
Committee recommended that a Press Complaints Commission replace the existing Press 
Council. If the establishment of the Commission does not materialised, then an 
alternative statutory body would be required. As such, this is regarded as the last 
575 Younger, K. (1972) Report of the Committee on Privacy. London, HMSO. 
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opportunity for the press to improve the self-regulatory body in adjudicating complaints 
from members of the public. 
In 1992, Sir David Calcutt was asked to review the performance of the new Press 
Complaints Commission (PCC). 576 The review of Press Self-Regulation report was 
presented to Parliament amidst public debate about press abuse of individual privacy. In 
the review, Calcutt concluded that the new Press Complaint Commission was not proven 
effective and that a statutory body should be established. There was a drastic change of 
position in the report from the previous one in relation to privacy law. Calcutt found that 
the time had come for the introduction of a new law on privacy. This was due to the 
ineffectiveness of the self- regulatory body in dealing with the press. 
National Heritage Committee produced privacy and Media Intrusion report in 1993. 
Privacy issues covered by the Committee were not limited to the print media. Its main 
overriding concerns were the privacy of private citizens and the use of invasive 
technology. Although the Committee agreed with Sir David that the Press Complaints 
Commission is not an effective regulator, they however, did not agree that a statutory 
press complaints tribunal should be established. In addition, the Committee was in favour 
with the monitoring approach over the performance of PCC. The Committee 
recommended a Protection of Privacy Bill, which would protect all citizens from 
infringement of privacy. The proposed civil offence in the Bill covers publication of 
personal materials, private information, misleading personal information and violation of 
peace by intrusion. 
The Committee also viewed that the law of confidence in relation to the proposed civil 
offence of infringement of privacy has not been fully appreciated. Therefore, the 
Committee recommended that further consideration should be given to introduce 
legislation on breach of confidence. 
In 1995 the Government responded to the reports made by the Select Committee as well 
as the review by Sir David. The Government then declined the statutory measures 
576 Calcut, D. (1993) Review of Press Self-Regulation. London, HMSO. 
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proposed earlier. The statutory controls would make the Government susceptible to 
charges of press censorship. The Government was unwilling to subscribe to the 
recommendations because of a long-standing reluctance to introduce statutory control of 
the press. The Government concluded that self-regulation is preferable by taking into 
considerations the improvements in procedures and practices, which the PCC has 
introduced over the past two years. 
Following this in 2003, the Culture, Media and Sport committee was appointed by the 
House of Commons to focus on matters relating to privacy and media intrusion. The 
measures recommended by the Committee are aimed to clarify the protection that 
individuals can expect from unwarranted intrusion by anyone into their private lives. The 
Committee firmly recommends the Government to reconsider its position and bring 
forward legislative proposals to protect the right of privacy. This is necessary to satisfy 
the obligation of the United Kingdom under the European Convention of Human 
Rights sn 
4.2.4 JUDICIAL AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL SUPPORT 
It would be a misleading notion to say that English law has not protected privacy interest. 
On a number of occasions judges have referred to right of privacy in the course of 
considering other courses of action. The courts have increasingly regarded privacy as 
fundamental and an interest that the law should protect. This judicial recognition has 
made the prospect of having legal protection in the United Kingdom as promising. In this 
relation, Lord Phillips MR said: 
The development of the law of privacy, under the stimulus of the Human 
Rights Act, under which the possibility of a new civil law right is being 
recognised as one that can be legitimately protected by the grant of an 
injunction. 78 
The views expressed by the judges emphasised that privacy is as important as other 
rights. However, the courts did not go further in the development of privacy when it 
sn Kaufman, G. (2003) Privacy and Media Intrusion. Fifth Report. London: Stationary Office Ltd. 
578 H (A Healthcare Worker) v Associated Newspapers Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 195, pars 40. 
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declined the opportunity to fashion a new law. The court in Kaye v Robertson maintains 
the legal status quo on privacy. 579 The Court of Appeal in this case decided that there is 
no right of privacy in English law. In this case, an actor involved in an accident was 
hospitalised after surgery. He was photographed and interviewed by a tabloid newspaper. 
His claim for infringement of privacy was rejected. Leggatt L. J. said that the right `has so 
long been disregarded here that it can be recognized now only by the legislature. ' 580 All 
three judges acknowledged the right of privacy but that alone does not entitle a person to 
relief in English law. Thus, privacy might be lacking distinctive legal right but not the 
value of moral right. Laws J. expressed that `the law would protect what might 
reasonably be called a right of privacy, although the name accorded to it would be breach 
of confidence. ' 581 
Despite considerable emphasis on the interest of privacy by the courts, a distinct law of 
privacy is still not forthcoming. 582 The reluctance of the courts to declare a new law on 
privacy is due to the expectation that the government would initiate the cause. 583 The 
inclination is that the government should pronounce the new law. But since the 
government has expressed its unwillingness to introduce privacy law, 584 the existence of 
privacy as legal redress could be fashioned by the courts. 
The courts have two options to provide legal redress for invasion of privacy. 585 First, by 
develop incrementally the existing common law principles as the framework for privacy 
such as breach of confidence on the basis of a case. 586 Second, proclaiming privacy as a 
distinct cause of action which is independent of the existing framework. 587 Though the 
first option is credible on the basis of established principles, there is a question of 
effectiveness. For instance, the scope of breach of confidence may only cover an aspect 
579 [1991] FSR 62. 
5801bid, 71. 
581 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 All ER 473. 
582 Wainwright v Home Secretary [2003] UKHL 53. AvB plc [2003] QB 195. Theakston v MGNLtd 
[2002] EMLR 22 and Peck v UK (2003) 36 EHHR 41. 
583 Hartman, C. The Emergence of a Statutory Right to Privacy Tort in England. (1995)16 J. L. M. & P., 10. 
584 The Government's Response to the Fifth Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee on 
Privacy and Media Intrusion (HC 458-1), Cm 5985. http: //www. culture. gov. uk 
585 Tomlinson, H., (2002) Privacy and the Media. Oxford, 10 
586 This approach is currently being adopted by the English courts. 
587 The Younger Committee and the Calcutt Committee recommended against a general right of privacy. 
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of privacy dealing with private information. On the other hand, the second option could 
provide certainty in protecting privacy. Its effectiveness may be maintained because it is 
structured on privacy-related issue. The latter option can be modeled on Prosser's 
taxanomy who had categorized privacy issues into four distinct torts: 588(1) intrusion on 
seclusion, solitude, or private affairs; (2) publication of embarrassing private facts about 
plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) 
appropriating the plaintiffs name or likeness for the defendant's advantage. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the law by the legislature is deemed to be more 
appropriate. 589 The `wait and see' attitude of the courts in creating a new cause of action 
is pending on the government's response. 590 As suggested by Legatt L. J. that `it is to be 
hoped that the making good of this signal shortcoming in our law will not be long 
delayed. ' Unfortunately, the delay is longer than it was thought. 
Consequently, the formation of several committees to look into privacy matters has 
indirectly contributed to prolong the delay. In this context, the government's reaction to 
the recommendations for such a law may seem to be an act of deference on the 
government's part. It is as if the government is buying time in order to ease the tension 
between the protection of privacy and freedom of expression. 591 Barendt and Hitchens 
suggest that the unwillingness of the government to establish a privacy right is to avoid 
the wrath of the press 592 The lack of serious commitment towards legislating law on 
privacy, suggests that the government's primary motivation may have been to stall 
privacy legislation. 593 This reflects the state of ambivalence on the government's part on 
one hand, admitting desirability to safeguard privacy but on the other, not its availability. 
588 Prosser, W. Privacy. (1960) 48 Cal. LR 383. 
589 This is unlikely because the government did not give its support to the previous Rights of Privacy Bills. 
590 Lord Kilmuir LC said in relation to right of privacy as a matter which the judges `might have at any time 
to decide. ' See Hansard, HL 1961,295. 
59' The appointment of the Calcutt Committee was a reaction to private members' bills rather than a 
government initiative. The real problems with regard to privacy law are political rather than technical. See 
The Economist November 19th 1994 at 35. 
592 Barent, E. and Hitchens, L. (2000) Media Law: Cases and Materials. Harlow, 39 and 401. See also n 15 
in chapter 10 of Fenwick, H. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights. London, 537. 
593 Whitty, N. et at (2001) Civil Liberties: The Human Rights Act Era. London, 281. 
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Judicial support for the right of privacy is not just confined to cases of invasion by the 
press. Not only has privacy as a right gained support in private law, but also in public 
law. In relation to this, the courts recognise privacy as a right to be protected in cases 
involving surveillance, trespass and telephone tapping. In the case of Marcel v 
Commissioner of Police Metropolis594 the court held that the seizure of documents by the 
police constituted infringement of an individual's fundamental rights in his property and 
privacy. The judge in Malone v Commissioner of Police gives similar support595 where a 
private telephone conversation of a suspect in a criminal matter was obtained by 
telephone tapping. Megarry V. C. observed that despite the absence of authority 
recognising a particular right of privacy, he would on the grounds of justice and common 
sense be prepared to hold there was such a right of privacy. 
43 PRIVACY UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
There have been six private members' bills on privacy since 1961 and at least eight major 
reports since the Younger Committee. The most recent report on privacy and media 
intrusion was by the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee under the chairmanship 
of Gerald Kaufiran MP. 
Although the movement for civil right to privacy has gained momentum, 596 privacy as a 
legal right is still an elusive one. Though recognitions of privacy, judicial or extra- 
judicial, are abundance, the commitment to create the right is unconvincing. 597 While a 
certain aporia may have manifested itself up to late 1990s, a more spirited response to the 
problem of invasion of privacy thereafter should have been expected. But resolution to 
the problem may be premature even with the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Nonetheless, the Act covers privacy as a right that merits protection in the UK The Act 
also paves the way for casuistic approach in resolving the issue of invasion of privacy. 
594 [1992] Ch 224. 
595 [1979] Ch 344. 
" Recently, an organization called Liberty has conducted a research on privacy at national level to review 
the state of privacy in the United Kingdom. See hiip: //www. libeM-human-rights. oriz. uk 
597 The government has refused to legislate right of privacy after the report by Sir David Calcutt. Recently, 
the Culture Secretary has made it clear that the government is not in favour of privacy law. See 
http: //www. parliament 
144 
4.3.1 INCORPORATION AND MAIN FEATURES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACT 1998 
The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 has a significant impact on the 
development of right of privacy. It has accelerated the development through the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights 598 The preamble of the Act 
declares that it is `An Act to give further effect to rights and freedom guaranteed under 
the European Convention... ' This indicates that the government is obliged to exercise 
and implement the rights enunciated in the Convention. 
Section 1 (2) clearly incorporates the rights and freedom of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It provides that Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention relating to 
freedoms and fundamental rights to have effect for the purpose of the Human Rights Act 
1998. This does not mean that the courts are bound to follow the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The courts have only a duty to take account of the 
rights as provided by section 2 (1) of the Act. However, reference to the rights is 
pertinent in fashioning a domestic law on privacy. The right must be in accordance with 
the domestic legal system in ways that are appropriate to the UK context. In this regard, 
Lord Irvine, during the debate on the Human Rights Bill, said that: 
... it will be a better law if the 
judges develop it after incorporation 
because they will have regard to Articles 8 and 10... I believe that the true 
view is that the courts will be able to adapt and develop the common law 
by relying on existing domestic principles.. . to 
fashion a common law 
right to privacy. 599 
With regard to this, there are four main features of the Human Rights Act 1998 that are 
relevant in stimulating the development of privacy law in the UK. Firstly, section 2 of 
the Act imposes an obligation on the court or tribunal to take into account any judgment, 
decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in 
determining a question that has arisen in connection with a Convention right. 
598 See Lord Philips MR in H (A Healthcare Worker) v Associated Newspapers Limited [2001] EWCA Civ 
2081, pars 40. 
599 HL. Deb. 583, c. 704. See also HC. Research Paper 98/25. The Human Rights Bill [HL] Bill 119 of 
1997-98: Privacy and the press, 11. hqp: //www. parliament. uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-025. pdf 
145 
Secondly, section 3 provides that the provisions of domestic legislations must be 
compatible with the Convention rights only to the extent it is possible to do so. However, 
it will not affect the validity of legislations that are incompatible with Convention 
rights 600As far as section 2 and 3 are concerned, the judgment, decision or declaration 
made by the European Court of Human Rights have no effect in revoking or abrogating 
domestic law. Even in case of an incompatibility being declared, the legality of primary 
and secondary legislations will not change 601 If a person cannot find a remedy under the 
domestic law then he can seek redress from the European Court of Human Rights. 
Thirdly, section 6 makes it unlawful for public authorities to act in a manner that is 
incompatible with the Convention Rights. According to section 6 (3), public authority 
includes a court or tribunal. The effect of this provision is that the courts in deciding 
cases must do so in a way that is compatible with the Convention. As such the courts are 
duty bound to act consistently with the Convention rights. 
There is an uncertainty regarding the meaning of public authority. An expansive meaning 
by assessing the role and objective of a body would include the relevant bodies other than 
courts and tribunals. In this regard, Singh argues that a corporation such as BBC whose 
functions are of public nature is likely to be considered as public authority. So is the 
Press Complaints Commission, a body created not by statute but nevertheless exercising 
some public functions. 02 The key criteria in ascertaining a body as a public authority 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 is the functional aspect as provided by section 6 (3) (b) 
6 any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature... ' 
Fourthly, section 12 in general stresses the importance of freedom of expression. The 
inclusion of section 12 was the result of a persistent lobby by the press. It provides that a 
court must have particular regards to the importance of the right to freedom of expression 
in actions against the media. Section 12 (1) reads: 
600 See section 3 (2) (b) and (c) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
601 Whitty, N. et al (2001) Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Act Era. London, 22. 
602 Singh, R. Privacy and the Media after the Human Rights Act. (1998) 6 EHRLR 712,717. 
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This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief 
that, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression. 
It also provides that the courts have a duty to give particular regards to any relevant 
privacy code in making its decision involving materials of journalistic, literary or artistic. 
In general, section 12 provides accommodation for competing interests. It makes freedom 
of expression as the most valued right especially when it clashes with a right of privacy. 
As observed by Robertson that `the original point of section 12 was to give the media a 
special privilege so it could ward off privacy claims and injunctions. '603 Arguably, the 
effect of section 12 is to give emphasis to freedom of expression. 
The emphasis on one right over the other is inconsistent with the ECHR. The right of 
privacy and freedom of expression in Article 8 and 10 of the ECHR, respectively, are 
regarded as fundamental rights. Each article is qualified in a way that allows the interests 
under the other article to be taken into account. The ECHR does not create a distinction 
between both free speech and privacy, in term of priority. Both rights are to be regarded 
as an exemption to each other. In this context, Phillipson argues that Article 8 should be 
read in the light of Article 10 and vice versa without giving priority to any particular 
right 604 Since the ECHR is constituted on a right-based principle, it could arguably be 
said that freedom of expression and privacy are equally important and fundamental. The 
ECtHR uses a proper and fair balance under the doctrine of proportionality to 
accommodate the clash between both rights. In the British context, the accommodation 
exercise is carried out based on balancing approach. Arguably, this is unsatisfactory 
because privacy issues are addressed using the framework of confidentiality instead of a 
proper privacy-orientated approach . 
605 Thus, it is unclear as to what extent the right to 
privacy should overshadow the right to freedom of expression. 
Notwithstanding the provision of section 12 (4), which emphasises freedom of 
expression, the importance of free speech does not always override the right of privacy. 
603 Robertson, N. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, 63. 
6" Phillipson, G. Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act. (2003) 66 MLR 27. 
605 Markesinis, B. et al. Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How 
Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help). (2004) 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 133,153. 
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Brooke J in Douglas v Hello! Ltd606 said that `Although the right to freedom of 
expression is not in every case the ace of trumps, it is a powerful card to which the courts 
of this country must always pay appropriate respect. ' This is so when section 12 (4) (b) 
requires the courts to have particular regard not only to freedom of expression but also to 
any relevant privacy code. The effect of this provision is to recognise the approach of 
self-regulation in dealing with invasion of privacy by the media. In relation to the press, 
the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice recognises right of privacy. Rule 3 of 
that Code reads: 
Privacy 
i) Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and 
family life, home, health and correspondence, including 
digital communications. Editors will be expected to justify 
intrusions into any individual's private life without consent. 
ii) It is unacceptable to photograph individuals in private 
places without their consent. 
Note - Private places are public or private property where 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Previously, Rule 3 (ii) of the Code specifically mentioned the prohibition to take 
photographs of people with long-lens in public or private places where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the new Code of Practice, which took effect 
from Ist June 2004, generalises the taking of photograph. 607 It could arguably be said that 
the taking of photographs conventionally or surreptitiously is unacceptable if that would 
invade the privacy of others. 
4.3.2 THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
Although the Act does not create new substantive rights, it may inspire the creation of a 
new private law right to privacy by making the Convention rights more relevant 608 
606 [2001] QB 967,982. 
607 The Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice. http: //www. pcc. org. uk/cop/cop. asp 
608 See Barrett v London Borough of Enfield [1999] 3 WLR 79,85. Lord Bingham agreed to the 
Convention rights as having the legal binding effect under the Human Rights Act 1998. See Rv DPP, ex 
parte Kebilene [1999] 3 WLR 175. 
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Clearly, the Act serves as a platform for the courts to exercise their judicial activism 
especially in developing a right of privacy. In this context, Grosz et al argues that the 
Convention rights are part of a domestic law for all practical purposes. They based their 
reason on section 6, which makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is 
incompatible with a Convention right. A public authority in exercising a discretionary 
power must respect Convention rights and its principles. In addition, section 7 allows a 
victim of a breach to take legal action against the authority and seeks remedies including 
damages as provided by section 8.609 On the other hand, Sedley LJ reasoned that by 
virtue of section 2 and section 6 of the Act, the courts must not only take into account 
jurisprudence of both the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights which 
points to a positive institutional obligation to respect privacy; but they also must act 
compatibly with the Convention rights. On this basis, it could arguably be said that 
section 2 and section 6 give the final impetus to the recognition of a right of privacy in 
English law. 610 
4.3.3 PRIVACY UNDER THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The law as it stands today is that there is no freestanding law of privacy. 611 But there are 
piecemeal protections under the common law principles. The courts are still cautious in 
exercising its judicial power. The courts are more inclined to adopt less controversial 
approach by extending the existing legal principles in breach of confidence. 
The positive attitude of the courts is translated by the readiness to recognise privacy as a 
legal right using pre-existing legal framework. In the case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd, 612 the 
claimants entered into an exclusive arrangement with OK! Ltd whereby the magazine 
would have the sole rights to take and publish photographs of their wedding. The 
claimants exercised strict security whereby all persons providing services entered into 
confidentiality agreements, and guests were requested not to take photographs or videos. 
A rival magazine Hello! Ltd managed to get pictures from an intruder who took 
609 Grosz, S. et al (2000) Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention. London, 9. 
610 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001 ] QB 967,998. 
611 Wainwright v Home Office [2002] QB 1334. 
612 [2001] QB 967. 
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photographs of the wedding and proposed to publish them. The court granted the 
application for interim injunction to restrain publication. The Court of Appeal held that a 
breach of confidence claim was - arguable. However, on the assumption that the 
photographer might have been an intruder, there was a difficulty in establishing the 
relationship of confidentiality. The court concluded that an injunction was not appropriate 
since the claimants had sold a substantial part of their privacy right and turned it into a 
commercial commodity. Sedley LJ said: 
... we 
have reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the 
law recognises and will appropriately protect a right of personal 
privacy. 61 
This is a clear departure from Glidewell LJ in Kaye v Robertson when he said there is no 
right of privacy in English law. 614 Perhaps the opinion by Sedley LJ is an indication of 
the change towards right of privacy. Though it is an obiter dictum, it nevertheless 
illustrates a new direction, which the courts are prepared to move into. This change has a 
lot to do with the application of equitable principle of confidentiality by the courts. Such 
a development has given the courts confidence to be more assertive in favouring a right 
of privacy. The main difference between Douglas case and Kaye in relation to 
recognition of right of privacy is that in Douglas, the action was based on breach of 
confidence. If there is a right of privacy in English law it has grown out of the law of 
confidentiality. 
Sedley LJ's recognition of a right of privacy has gained limited support in Venables v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd. 615 In this case an injunction was granted to preserve the 
privacy or confidentiality of the whereabouts of two convicted murderers on the basis 
that the disclosure of their new identities would put them in imminent danger involving 
616 the real and strong possibility of serious physical harm and death. It would appear that 
613 lbid, 997. 
614 Nevertheless all the members of the court were of the view that there should be a right of privacy in 
English law. See [1991] FSR 62, Glidwell LJ at p 66, Bingham LJ at p 70 and Leggatt U at p 71. 
615 [2001] Fam 430. 
616 Similar case was decided in X (A Woman Formerly Known As Mary Bell) & Anor v O'Brien & Ors 
[2003] EWHC 1101. 
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the protection of privacy in this case has prevailed. The consequences of revealing 
private information have superseded the public interest in the information. 
Judicial readiness to entertain the idea of a new cause of action exists even in case where 
there is a commercial interest in controlling publicity by private individual. For instance, 
in Attard v Greater Manchester Newspapers Ltd617 the Family Division considered the 
right to privacy of Gracie Attard, the survivor of conjoined twins, and had granted an 
injunction preventing any publication of. pictures of the twins. The parents later decided 
to sell exclusive photographs of Gracie to other newspapers. They successfully applied to 
the court to have the order varied to allow publication. The Manchester Evening News 
published photographs of Gracie taken with a long-lens camera without the consent of the 
parents. Application by the parents to ban further publication of the photographs by the 
Manchester Evening News was granted. Bennett J in refusing the application to have the 
restriction removed held that Gracie had a right to privacy, which could be sold as she 
wished. 
The positive attitude of the court in the Douglas's case was momentarily disrupted by the 
decision of Wainwright v Home Office 618 In this case, both Mrs. Wainwright and her son 
were strip searched for drugs on a prison visit. No drugs were found. The search was not 
conducted according to prison rules. As a result of the search, the claimants claimed that 
they were humiliated and distressed. The judge awarded them aggravated damages for 
infringement of their privacy right. On appeal, the Home office was successful on the 
privacy issue. Mummery LJ ruled that there was no tort of invasion of privacy. He stated 
that: 
As to the future I foresee serious definitional difficulties and conceptual 
problems in the judicial development of a `blockbuster' tort vaguely 
embracing such a potentially wide range of situations. I am not even sure 
that anybody- the public, Parliament, the press- really wants the creation 
of a new tort, which could give rise to as many problems as it sought to 
solve. 619 
617 Unreported case [2001 ] Fam. Div. The case is cited in Tugendhat, M. and Christie, I. (2002) Law of 
Privacy and Media. Oxford, 112. 
618 [2002] 3 WLR 405. 
619 Ibid, 419. 
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Mummery U's disapproval of the creation of right of privacy is an unfortunate moment 
in the development of privacy in the UK. This is rather a bemusing approach particularly 
when English law strongly protects personal reputation under defamation law, yet 
unwilling to protect dignity, a value cherished under liberal philosophy, which underlines 
the right to privacy. The case occurred before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into 
force. The Court of Appeal decided that there was no right of privacy at common law 
before the Human Rights Act 1998. The Act could not be relied on to change a 
substantive law by introducing a retrospective right to privacy. 
Invasion of privacy by the press relates to the method of gathering information and the 
publication of confidential information. 20 So far the courts find that the existing cause of 
action manages to deal with privacy-related issue. Issues on privacy involving 
photographs and private information have been decided adequately covered by breach of 
confidence. The House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd621 by majority decisions (Lord 
Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann dissenting) ruled that the publication of photographs taken 
surreptitiously outside the place where the appellant had been receiving therapy for drug 
addiction was sufficient to outweigh the defendants' right to freedom of expression. Lord 
Hope found that the respondent's decision to publish the photographs suggests that a 
greater weight was given to the wish to publish a story that would attract interest, rather 
than to the wish to maintain its credibility. The court disagreed with the finding that it 
was peripheral to the published text. The photographs revealed where the treatment was 
taking place and the text went into the frequency of her treatment. In this way not only 
did the press intrude into what had been some of the characteristics of the medical 
treatment, but it also tended to deter her from continuing the treatment, which was in her 
interest. In fact it also inhibited other persons attending the course from staying in, as 
they might be concerned that their participation might become public knowledge. The 
court also held that there was an infringement of the appellant's right to privacy that 
cannot be justified. 
620 Laws, J. The Limitations of Human Rights. (1998) PL 254,263. 
621 [2004] UKHL 22. 
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In addition, the court in AvB plc622had to decide on confidential information involving a 
public figure. The claimant, a married professional footballer, had affairs with two 
women. He applied for an injunction to protect his privacy. Jack J held that the claimant 
was likely to succeed in his claim for privacy at trial and granted an injunction to restrain 
publication of the affairs by a national newspaper. However, the injunction was 
discharged by the Court of Appeal, inter alia, the degree of confidentiality to which the 
footballer was entitled to was very modest. The court gave less weight to confidentiality 
of sexual relationship outside marriage. The court said that `the stable the relationship the 
greater would be the significance which was attached to it. ' The weight of confidentiality 
becomes less for a person who courted publicity. Although in this case the footballer had 
not courted publicity, he was inevitably a figure of whom the public and the media would 
be interested in. 
In most cases invasion of privacy by the press is predominantly concerned with 
disclosure of private information. The classification of information that amounts to 
confidential personal information that merit protection limits the scope of privacy. In 
Theakston v MGN Ltd623the essence of information that the plaintiff was seeking to 
protect from disclosure did not constitute confidential information that was worthy of 
protection. The court decided to grant an injunction to restrain publication of photographs 
but refused an injunction to restrain publication of the story. The court held that a brothel 
is not a private place because it was likely that other customers and staff would see who 
came and went. The court also took into account the claimant's previous publicity 
encounters which he never complaint. The fact that he had placed aspects of his private 
life into public domain enhanced his fame, reputation and popularity. He then could not 
complain if the publicity given to his sexual activities were less favourable. In this case 
there were two types of information considered by the court. First, was the information 
relating to the sexual activities engaged in a brothel. The court found that the 
confidentiality or privacy case in relation to the details of sexual activity was not strong 
enough to warrant the degree of restriction involved. Second was in relation to the 
photographs taken inside the place. It is interesting to note that the court held the 
622 [2002] 3 WLR 542. 
623 [2002] EWHC 137. 
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photographs of the claimant taken inside the brothel and published by the newspapers 
constitute an intrusion into his private and personal life. 624 Ouseley J said: 
I considered that the right to freedom of expression by publication of such 
photographs was outweighed by the peculiar degree of intrusion into the 
integrity of the claimant's personality... 625 
The decision evinced that the court recognized the publication of photographs as an 
intrusive act. That alone could amount to a breach of privacy even without disclosure of 
private facts. Both cases indicate that a claimant who willingly exposes to the media 
certain aspects of his private life would limit his claim to privacy relating to such future 
revelations. 
The current position in the UK is that a right of privacy is recognised yet the law of 
confidence provides the protection. The publication of personal information, which 
amount to an invasion of privacy, is dealt with through the application of the law of 
confidence. The extension of the law on confidence makes it the most appropriate area to 
accommodate a privacy issue. As stated by Lord Woolf: 
In the great majority of situations, where the protection of privacy is 
justified, relating to events after the Human Rights Act came into force, an 
action for breach of confidence now will, where this is appropriate, 
provide the necessary protection. 626 
It is unclear whether the courts will still firmly rely on the no freestanding law of privacy 
when the courts have to decide a case where neither the law of confidence nor any other 
domestic law offers adequate protection. The inadequacy of English law is demonstrated 
by the European court decision in Peck v UK617 involving the would-be suicide that was 
filmed in the street holding a knife. The effect of this case may be less profound on the 
protection of privacy in the UK. It is rather unfortunate that the case of Martin v UK628 
was struck out of the list when the final resolution of the case was constituted with the 
624 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd. [2001] QB 967, the court said that unauthorised photographs can be regarded 
as information for the purposes of the law of confidence. 625 Op. cit., n. 626, para 79. 
626 AvB plc [2002] All ER 545. 
627 (2003) 36 EHHR 41. 
628 Application no. 63608/00. European Court of Human Rights Portal 
b=: //cmiskp. echr. coe. int/t! Ml97/Vortal. 
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offer of the government to pay for damages and legal cost. This case would enlighten the 
status of privacy law in the UK because it involved the issue of invasion of privacy. On 
this premise, Lindsay J said that `That inadequacy will have to be made good and if 
Parliament does not step in then the courts will be obliged to... ' 629 This then leads to the 
next point of discussion on the proper development of privacy law. 
43.4 AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH OR STATUTORY LAW ON RIVACY? 
The debate on freestanding law of privacy is still in progress. If the UK were to have a 
privacy law, one of the key questions is should it be created by Parliament or through 
incremental development of common law principles pronounced by the courts. Perhaps 
the remark by Lindsay LJ represents the reserved stand of the judiciary in leaving the 
matter to Parliament 630 
Efforts to introduce legislation on law of privacy can be traced back since Lord 
Mancroft's bill in 1961. The bill and several others afterward failed to garner support 
especially from the government. The Review of Press Self-Regulation in 1993 and the 
National Heritage Committee on Privacy and Media Intrusion have recommended 
legislation to protect privacy. The government in responding to the recommendation of 
the latter rejected the idea of having a new law of privacy. The decision not to create law 
of privacy can be attributed to some constraints encountered by the government. 
The major constraint is the strong opposition from the press. This has to a certain extent 
influence the decision against the new law. Such a powerful influence is self-evident 
when the government accepted the inclusion of section 12 into the Human Rights Act 
1998. On the other hand, the government also needs to protect its own political agenda in 
deciding not to implement the proposals to legislate against invasions of privacy. The 
government is fully aware of the harm that the press can cause especially in term of 
political popularity. 631 The formulation of the law is not entirely dictated by the 
629 Douglas v Hello! [2003] 3 All ER 996. 630 See also per Megarry VC in Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr [1979] Ch 344,372. 
631 The pressure by the press in publishing personal information can force ministers to resign. For instance, 
David Mellor forced to resign over sex scandal exposed by the press. Steven Byers was under pressure and 
later resigned when the press highlighted the insensitive attitude of his staff. 
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government but also by the voice of majority through the representative system. 
Democratic process by way of consultation is the first step in acquiring responses from 
the public and interested parties 
632 Though statutory protection is desirable, it is difficult 
to cover every aspect of privacy with sufficiently precise terms 
633 
However, beside the negative reaction from the government and the opposition by the 
press, statutory law on privacy is still considered appropriate. The analysis by Hartmann, 
which concluded that a statutory right of privacy is about to emerge in England based on 
the impetus provided by recommendations from the Select Committee, the Calcutt's 
proposals and the Law Commission Consultation Paper is untenable. 
634 At the time this 
study is conducted, the response from the government on the matter remains the same 
635 
The position is made strong recently by Tessa Jowell, the Culture Secretary, when she 
made it clear that the government had no plans to introduce law on privacy. 
636 In this 
regards, Lord Woolf CJ in his speech during the opening of the judicial year of the 
European Court of Human Rights said that the British courts have developed a parallel 
doctrine to the margin of appreciation. 637 The doctrine is to deal with the relations 
between the domestic courts, Parliament and the executive. This so called doctrine of 
deference or respect requires the United Kingdom courts to recognise that there are 
situations where Parliament and the executive rather that the courts are in a better 
position to make difficult choices between competing interests. 
The negative response by the government on privacy law raises a doubt as to the 
government's commitment in upholding the human rights principles. In this regard, it 
632 Legislation is preferable because the law would carry the imprimatur of democratic approval. See 
Bingham, T. Should there be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy. (1996) 5 EHRLR 455,462. 
633 Eady, D. A Statutory Right To Privacy. (1996) 3 EHRLR 243,245. Eady argues that the objectives 
underlying Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights can be the basis in overcoming the 
definitional difficulty. 
634 Even a series of incidents involving the private lives of the royal family and government ministers in 
1992 and 1993 cannot give a forceful impact to persuade the government to enact statutory law of privacy. 
See Hartmann, C. The Emergence of Statutory Right to Privacy. (1995) 16 J. L. M. & P, 15. 
635 The latest development is the recommendation by the Culture, Media and Sports Committee that the 
government should introduce privacy legislation. 
36 Evidence given by Tessa Jowell before the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Tuesday I 
Aril 2003. see http: //www. parliament. the-stationary-office. co. uk 
OF Lord Woolf CJ (2003) Solemn Hearing of the European Court of Human Rights. 
hi! p: //www. echr. coe. inVengJSpeeches/Spgechby. htm 
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shows that there are freedoms in the UK but not the rights 
638 In the absence of legislation 
on privacy, judicial activism could fill the gap in English law. It is against this 
background of freedom-based law that the law of confidentiality has been developed. 
The Lord Chancellor in his response to the amendments to Human Rights Bill said that 
the judges are free to develop the common law in their own independent judicial sphere. 
In relation to the law of privacy, it will be a better law if the judges develop it after the 
incorporation because they will have regard to Articles 8 and 10. The Lord Chancellor 
also opined that the courts would be able to adapt and develop a common law by relying 
on the existing principles to fashion the common law right to privacy. 
639 Lindsay J shares 
this when he said that if Parliament does not act soon, the thrust would be upon the 
judiciary to create the law bit by bit M0 The platform for the court to do so is provided by 
section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The provision imposes an obligation on the 
courts as a public authority to act compatibly with the Convention rights, which include 
right of privacy under Article 8. 
The creation of privacy law by way of incremental development ensures protection on 
case-by-case basis. Judges who are trained within the system have the capabilities to deal 
with issues of invasion of privacy. TM' The courts are responsive to the changes in society 
by developing common law principles. Moreover, the elasticity of the common law 
principles enables the courts to adapt it to the varying conditions of society. 
642 In this 
context, Keene LJ said: 
Breach of confidence is a developing area of the law, the boundaries of 
which is not immutable but may change to reflect changes in society, 
technology and business practice. 64 3 
63s English law has been historically based on freedoms not right. Per Brooke LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
[2001] QB 967,985. See also per Lord Goff in AG v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109,283. 
639 See Hansard, H. L. Deb. 24 November 1997, cols 784-785. 
640 See Douglas v Hello! [2003] EWHC para 229. See also Wacks, R. (1995). Privacy and Press Freedom. 
London, 173. 
6" The new law of privacy is not totally strange to the judges because they have been applying common 
law principles such as breach of confidence, trespass, defamation and harassment which cover privacy 
related interest. 
642 Wason v Walter (1868) LR 4 QB 73,93. See also Invercargill v Hamlin [1996] AC 624. 
643 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd [2001 ] Q. B. 967,1011-2. 
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Dolding and Mullender define incrementalism in the context of negligence law as `a form 
adjudication involving the articulation of liability rules which are, at once, new... and yet 
are conditioned by pre-existing law... '644 There are two main ingredients for 
incrementalism according to the definition. First, the law or rules must be new. Second, 
pre-existing law must `conditioned' the new one in order to develop. They argued that a 
protection of significant interests is the main purpose in employing tort law. Protection 
can only be given if it involves a wrongful transaction where one party is harm. The 
approach of incrementalism according to this view is appropriate in case of a new law 
being developed within the framework of a pre-existing law. 645 However, there is a set 
back if the scope of the new law is wider than the pre-existing law. The real potential of 
a new law being developed would be affected because of the confinement 646 
Incremental development of privacy as a new law has already taken place through the 
willingness of the courts to address invasion of privacy under the breach of confidence. M7 
The courts have incrementally developed the extension of the law of confidence. The 
original concept of confidence applicable to a limited area of commercial and 
employment relationship were developed to cover personal and private information. This 
process will eventually build up a body of case law over time that could provide guidance 
in dealing with issues before the courts. MS The incorporation of privacy into the law of 
confidence means that the right of privacy develops accordingly. 
The incorporation of privacy into breach of confidence has a positive and a negative 
effect. The positive effect is that the courts can now accord legal protection of privacy. 
The negative effect is in relation to the distinction between privacy and breach of 
confidence. Privacy is wider in the sense that it does not only protect personal 
information but also `those who simply find themselves subject to an unwanted intrusion 
6'14 Dolding, L. and Mullender, R. Tort Law, Incrementalism, and the House of Lords. (1996) NILQ 47,13. 645 See Lord Chancellor's response to the amendment of Human Rights Bill by Lord Wakeham in Hansard, 
H. L. Deb, November 24,1997, cols 784-784. 
6" Young, A. L. Remedial and Substantive horizontality: The Common Law and Douglas v Hello! Ltd. (2002) PL, 241. 
647 See Lord Goff in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109,28 1. Laws J. in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [ 1995] 1 WLR 804,807. Lord Woolf in AvB plc [2002] All ER 545, para. 11. Lindsay J. in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2003] EWHC para 229. 648 See Younger, K. (1972) Report of the Committee on Privacy. Cmnd. 5012,11 para 40. 
158 
into their personal lives. '649 An individual's privacy can also be invaded in ways not 
involving publication of information such as strip searches. A proper growth and 
development of privacy is restricted when it is confined within the framework of breach 
of confidence. 650 
On the other hand, the creation of privacy law by the courts may lead to inconsistency. 
Inconsistency occurs when judges make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Illustration to 
this situation can be found in the articulation of the meaning of public interest by the 
courts. Lord Woolf in AvB plc65'widened the scope of public interest when he took into 
account the interest of newspapers as part of the concept. Previously, in the case of 
Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers, 652 the Court of Appeal rejected a public interest 
defence in part because the articles in question were designed to serve the newspaper's 
private commercial interest rather than public interest. In addition, the court of Appeal in 
Lion Laboratories v Evan and Express Newspapers653 made the distinction between 
matters that were in the public interest and those that was merely interesting to the public. 
The court cautioned the press for confusing the public interest with its own interest to 
increase sales. 
It would be hard to suppress the pressure for introducing the law of privacy assessing 
from the willingness of the courts in expressing judicial recognitions on right of privacy 
and the lackluster response from the government. It might be harder when the need to 
give redress for invasion of privacy is obvious and pressing 654 
The opposition of having the law mainly relies on the indeterminacy of definition and the 
scope of privacy. 655 Nevertheless, Lord Bingham is positive on the prospect of privacy 
when he said `The problems of defining and limiting a tort of privacy are formidable but 
the present case strengthens my hope that the review now in progress may prove 
649 See per Sedley U in Douglas, Zeta-Jones v Hello! Ltd [2001]2 WLR 992,126. 
6" Sing, R. and Strachan, J. The Right to irivacy in English Law. (2002) EHRLR 2,126. 
651 [2002] EWCA Civ 337. 
652 [2001] 2 All ER 437. 
653 [1985] QB 526. 
654 Bingham, T. Should There be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy. (1996) 5 EHRLR 455,462. 
655 Younger, K. (1972) Report of the Committee on Privacy. Cmnd. 5012. 
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fruitful. '656 Another reason for opposing the privacy law, which is a lame justification, is 
that the protection accorded by the law will only benefit certain groups of people in the 
society especially those who can afford legal cost 
657 Ordinary and less affordable people 
will think twice before suing others for invading their privacy due to financial reason 
658 
Naturally, the outcome of legal action is not always ascertainable. On a cost and benefit 
analysis, the fear of losing the case and the expensive legal cost would probably make 
them choose to sacrifice their right of privacy even though it is distressful and 
humiliating. In addition, lack of legal service scheme would deter ordinary people from 
seeking legal redress in case of invasion of their privacy. 
On the other hand, incremental development of privacy can also take place through a 
common law principle of willful infliction of harm as developed by the court 
in 
Wilkinson v Downton. 659The House of Lord considered this case in Wainwright v Home 
Secretary. 660 Lord Hoffman rejected the application of Downton case because `It does 
not provide a remedy for distress which does not amount to recognized psychiatric 
injury... -)661 
However, if someone actually intends to cause harm by a wrongful act and does so, there 
is ordinarily no reason why he should not have to pay compensation. Protection for 
undue invasion of privacy could be given on the ground of severe mental distress 
662 This 
argument is based on the common law recognition of nervous or mental shock in cases of 
negligence. In case of invasion of privacy, publication of private information by the 
press may be interpreted as a manifestation of intention to cause psychiatric harm. 
Perhaps with the limited scope of breach of confidence, the courts can gradually extend 
the application of the principle as a potential area to accommodate the right of privacy. 
6-56 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62,70. 
657Byrne, Privacy laws only protect the rich, editors insist. The Guardian, June 17 2003. 
http: //media. guardian. co. uk/medialaw/story 
658 In the United Kingdom, legal aids are not extended to defamation cases. The aid also is not applicable 
for privacy cases. 
659 [1897] 2 QB 57. 
660 [2003] UKHL 53. 
661 Ibid: para 47. See Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721. 
662 Neill, B. The Protection of Privacy. (1962) 25 MLR 393. 
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Is English law moving towards greater protection of privacy? Basically there are three 
views on privacy in the UK. First, there should be no law of privacy. 663 According to this 
view, privacy will have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. It maintains that 
freedom of expression is more important in a democratic society that revered open 
discussion and debate. The press subscribes to this view and to a certain extent this is 
also the view of the government. The second view is that, there should be a distinct law 
to protect the right of privacy. This is on the basis that privacy is as equally important as 
other rights such as freedom of expression under the Convention. Nevertheless, it is 
recognised that there are legitimate circumstances that can restrict the right. Third, 
privacy should 'be protected within the existing framework of law of confidence. 
According to this view, law of confidence could accommodate privacy as both areas 
involve disclosure of information without consent. Interestingly, the second and third 
views have gained support from the courts. 64 
4.4 HORIZONTAL EFFECT 
The incorporation of right of privacy under Article 8 of the Convention by the Human 
Rights Act 1998 means that the right of privacy is available in the UK. However, a 
guarantee of privacy is only available against public authorities, not against private 
persons. Arguably, a private person cannot invoke the guaranteed right to take action 
against other private individuals including the press. Section 6 (1) of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 makes it clear that only public authority has the obligation to act in accordance 
with the Convention rights. The section provides: 
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible 
with a Convention right. 
It excludes private individuals from the obligation to observe the Convention rights. At 
this juncture, it shows that the Act applies vertically in relation to the actions of public 
bodies. Section 7 (1) strengthened the vertical effect of the Act when it provides for an 
663Wacks, R. The Poverty of Privacy. (1980) 96 LQR 73. 6" See per Lord Woolf in AvB plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, para 11. Per Phillips MR in H (A Healthcare Worker) v Associated Newspapers Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 195, para 40. Campbell v MGNLtd [2004] UKHL 22. 
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action against breach of section 6 (1). A person who brings such an action may rely on 
the Convention rights only if he is a victim of the unlawful act 665 Reliance on the 
Convention rights can only be made when the public authority has acted inconsistently 
with the rights. Thus, any legal action for the breach of Convention rights can only be 
instituted if the transgressor is a public authority. 
The application of the Human Rights Act 1998 in case between private individuals is 
unclear. This area has generated considerable discussions as to whether the Act applies 
between private litigants. 666 Section 6 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 is used as the 
basis to support the existence of horizontal effect. 667 This allows for the application of 
incorporated rights between private individuals. The inclusion of the courts and tribunals 
into the meaning of public authority has made horizontal effect as a possible prospect 
668 
Generally, the possible horizontal effect of the Act can be by way of direct69 and indirect 
effect. 670 According to Wade the Human Rights Act 1998 has a direct horizontal 
effect. 671 He argued that the provisions of the Act and its spirit imply that the Act does 
provide protection against violation by private individuals. He relied on section 6 (3) of 
the Act, which makes the courts under duty not to act in a way incompatible with the 
Convention rights. Thus, in exercising its judicial functions, the courts have to decide in 
accordance with the Convention no less in a case between private litigants than in a case 
against a public authority. He also argued that the incorporation of the Convention rights 
has made the rights available to private individuals. In this regard, enforcement of the 
Convention rights against private individuals has taken place in Venables v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd672and the case of X& Anor v O'brien & Ors. 673 Although the 
Convention does not create independent causes of action, the fact that the court is obliged 
665 Section 7(1) (b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
666 Whitty, N. et al (2001) Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Era. London, 35-39. 
667 Horizontal effect refers to application of the Convention rights between private individuals. 6" See section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
669 Wade, W. Horizons of Horizontality. (2000) LQR 116,217. 
670 Hunt, M. The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act. (1998) PL 423,442. Oliver, D. The Human 
Rights Act and Public Law/Private Law Divides. (2000) EHRLR 4,343. Phillipson, G. The Human Rights 
Act, `Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper? (1999) MLR 62,824. 6" Wade, W. Horizons of Horizontality. (2000) LQR 116. 
672 [2001] Fam 430. 
673 [2003] 36 EWHC 41. 
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to act in conformity with the Convention under section 6 means that it must protect the 
rights of individual where necessary. 
On the other hand, Hunt argues that the Human Rights Act 1998 has an indirect 
horizontal effect 674 He said the position before the Act is that human rights were 
protected by the courts, including cases involving private parties. In order to be consistent 
with the Convention, the courts have exercised their power and develop a common law. 
The development of the common law continues even after the Act comes into effect. In 
addition, certain articles of the Convention impose positive obligations on the state to 
take positive steps to protect individuals against interference by other private parties. 
Article 8 has been interpreted by the ECtHR as imposing positive obligations in certain 
circumstances, including an obligation to protect an individual against violation of the 
Convention rights by other private parties. He also argued that by including courts and 
tribunals in the meaning of public authorities has made them duty bound to act 
compatibly with the Convention. This includes cases involving private disputes governed 
by the common law. 
Buxton however disagrees that the Act creates private law rights that can be asserted by 
private individual against another. 675 He argued that the Convention rights are the 
creation of European Convention on Human Rights that can only be imposed on public 
bodies. Furthermore the content of those rights does not impose obligations on private 
citizens. 
The positive obligations imposed by the Convention rights on the state require adoption 
of measures designed to protect the relations of individuals among themselves 676 This 
has created a space where the courts can exercise its judicial innovation to fashion a new 
law in accordance with the Convention rights. In Goodwin v United Kingdom677 the Court 
found that the respondent's state has violated Article 8 when the state failed to exercise 
positive obligation to review its law pertaining to post-transsexual. 
674 Hunt, M. The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act. (1998) PL 423,437. 675 Buxton, R. The Human Rights Act and Private Law. (2000) 116 LQR 48,55-6. 676 See X and Yv The Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235,239-240. 
6n (2002) 35 EHRR 447. 
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The Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report noted that it is increasingly accepted 
that the Act will have some measure of "horizontal" effect on the relationships between 
private citizens, mostly arising from the duty of courts and tribunals themselves to act in 
compliance with Convention rights. 78 The main facet of the Human Rights Act 1998 is 
to incorporate the Convention rights as proclaimed by the government in its white paper 
`Rights Brought Home'679. As such the rights should be fully embraced as perceived by 
the Convention. 
With respect to this, the lack of commitment by the government will only make the 
incorporation of the Convention rights as another political rhetoric. The European 
Convention on Human Rights clearly stated that everyone in the jurisdiction of the 
contracting states should enjoy rights and freedoms as defined in Section 1 of the 
Convention. Article 8 of the Convention confers the right to respect for private life and 
family life to everyone, which include private individuals. Ironically, in this regard, the 
incorporation of the Convention rights into the Human Rights Act 1998 is not in harmony 
with the aspiration of the Convention. Therefore, the absence of legal right to privacy in 
the United Kingdom implies that the acceptance of the Declaration of Human Rights is at 
least to some extent a sham. 680 
4.5 PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 
Privacy is a right that has been slow to develop into law. Perhaps the chilling effect it has 
on freedom of expression, in particular press freedom, is a factor for such phenomenon. 
Perennial debate on the introduction of a new law on privacy is stimulated not only by the 
transgression of public authorities but also by the conduct of the press. 81 The private 
members' Bill introduced between 1961 and 1989 were the reaction to the invasion of 
privacy by the press. 
678 See Sixth Report of Joint Committee on Human Rights. 
http: //www. parl iament. the-stationary-office. co. uk 
679 See http: //www. archive. official-documents. co. uk 
680 Ross, D. M. (1972) Minority Report. In Younger, K. (1972). Report of the Committee on Privacy. 
London. Cmnd. 5012,213. 
68' The first Royal Commission on the Press has criticised the preoccupation of some newspapers with 
triviality and sensationalism. The third Royal Commission suggested a need for the press to act according 
to some ideas of social responsibility and professional training for journalists. 
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Some complaints about invasion of privacy by the press relate to the techniques used in 
acquiring information. Others are about the publication of personal information, and 
many are about both. 682 The intrusive manner in acquiring information through 
investigative reporting, the use of paparazzi and constant surveillance are the techniques 
employed which have the effect of invading privacy. This is acknowledged by other 
jurisdiction such as the state of California in the USA where the California Privacy 
Protection Act 1998 provides protection against technological intrusion and trespass 683 
In the UK, the Code of Practice of the PCC states in general term where `it is 
unacceptable to photograph individuals in private places without their consent. '684 
The publication of personal information and disclosure of embarrassing private facts by 
the press were among the reasons for concern that prompted the UK government to set up 
Royal Commissions. The first Royal Commission on the Press in 1949 recommended the 
establishment of a voluntary General Council of the press. The second Royal 
Commission in 1962 proposed changes in the council membership, with a statutory 
council if nothing was done. The third Royal Commission in 1977 criticised the press and 
proposed a legal right to privacy and statutory Press Council if self-regulation did not 
improve. In addition, a Committee on Privacy and Related Matters was appointed with 
specific terms of reference dealing with the press attitude in relation to individual 
privacy: 
In the light of the recent public concern about intrusions into the private 
lives of individuals by certain sections of the press, to consider what 
measures (whether legislative or otherwise) are needed to give further 
protection to individual privacy from the activities of the ress and 
improve recourse against the press for the individual citizen... 685P 
Undoubtedly, the function of the press as the public watchdog is important in a 
democratic society. The press plays a role as the eyes and ears to the society. They inform 
682 Michael, J. (1994) Privacy. In McCrudden, C. and Chambers (eds. ) Individual Rights and the Law in Britain. London, 272. 
"3 Chemerinsky, E. Balancing the Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to Professor Smolla. (1999) 67 
Geo. Was. L. Rev. 1152. 
6" See, article 3 of the Press Complaints Commission's Code of Practice. httr): //www. iDcc. org. uk/copL/cop. asp 685 Calcutt, D. (1990) Privacy and Related Matters. Cm. 1102. 
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the public on matters of public interest. The role and the duty to inform entitle the press 
to exercise a degree of freedom. Restriction on this freedom will only deprive the public 
from getting information that helps to form their judgment on matters affecting their 
interests. An ill-informed society cannot contribute and participate effectively in a 
democratic goverrrnment. 
However, the press has sometimes crossed the line and abused the freedom. The press use 
private information as commodity in their publication to attract more readers, thus 
increase sales. 686 They invade individual privacy by disclosing private facts, which are 
personal and embarrassing in the name of public interest. 
687 Some publication of 
personal information is done for ulterior interest rather than the public interest 
688 Private 
facts are sensationalised to serve the interest of the public. A degree of prurient interest is 
present in the public and indulging in that interest helps sell the newspapers. 
689 Besides 
that, the media has capitalized the cult of celebrities as commodities in the society where 
affluence is the normal condition of most people. 90 Warren and Brandeis expressed their 
animosity toward the conduct of the press in their seminal writing when they said: 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has 
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To 
satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast 
in the columns of the daily papers 691 
Although there is a public interest in newsworthiness, it is difficult to maintain the press 
commercial interest in justifying the publication of personal information. In this regard, 
Stephenson W observed that `the public are interested in many private matters which are 
no real concern of theirs and which the public have no pressing need to know. '692 In most 
occasions, the press relies on public interest as their shield in disclosing personal 
information. Sometimes the invocation of public interest is mixed with the press 
"6 For instance, The Sun, originally the Daily Herald, was reoriented to attract more readership by 
increasing its entertainment coverage and human interest reporting of show business and celebrities. See 
Curran, J. and Seaton, J. (1991) Power Without Responsibility. London, Routledge, 110. 
63' This is rampant in tabloid newspapers but not in the case of the main-stream newspapers. 
688 Gobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [200112 All ER 437. 
639 Martin Cruddace, What price celebrity? The Guardian 18 March 2002. 
690 Gray, J. Fame is the Filthy Lucre of a Celebrity economy. The Sunday Times 27 October 2002. 
69' Warren, S. D and Brandeis, L. D. The Right to Privacy. (1890) 4 Nary. LR 193. 
692 Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] 2 QB 526,536. 
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commercial interest. Sir John Donaldson expresses this in Francome v Mirror Group 
Newspapers Ltd693 when he said that `they are peculiarly vulnerable to the error of 
confusing the public interest with their own interest. '694 If the commercial interest of the 
press were to be recognised as part of the public interest, the press would acquire a 
privilege, which make it a distinct organisation. In this context, the press like any other 
organisations should be treated equally under the law. 
The ambit of public interest is extended to include information that the public are 
interested in. This includes information concerning those in the public eye and who have 
courted publicity in the past. Lord Woolf opined that if the newspapers do not publish 
information which the public are interested in, then `there would be fewer newspapers 
published, which would not be in the public interest. '695 It is unclear whether Lord Woolf 
considers the commercial interest of the press when he said `fewer newspapers published' 
or fewer newspapers means that the public has less source of information. But if the 
former were the real intention then it would widen the concept of public interest. It could 
be arguably said that a commercial interest of the press is a distinctive interest of the 
organisation that does not relate to the public at large. 
The concept of public interest involves matters that are held to affect a considerable 
number of people. This is discernable in the definition proposed by Barry when he relates 
the public interest to `those interest which people have in common qua members of the 
public' 696 Amos disagrees with the interpretation of public interest by Lord Woolf 
because such a perspective is at odds with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal. In 
relation to this case, there was a public interest in the material because the footballer was 
a role model for young people and it was important that his undesirable and unfortunate 
example be exposed, not because it will sell newspapers. 97 However, what the public are 
interested in should not be equated with information of public interest. The Committee on 
Privacy and Media Intrusion defined public interest as: 
693 [1984] 1 WLR 892. 
694 Ibid, 892. 
695 AvB plc [2003] QB 195. 
696 Barry, B. (1965) Political Argument. London, 190. 
6" Amos, M. Can We Speak Freely Now? Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act. (2002) 6 
EHLR 750,757. 
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Those matters that citizens ought to be interested in: information necessary 
or helpful to participating in the democratic process, information about 
crimes and misdemeanors, information important to the ability of society 
and individuals to safeguard health, wealth and safety and generally to the 
effect of navigating through the complexities of modem life. 
On the other hand, according to the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice698 
public interest includes: 
1- Detecting or exposing crime or a serious misdemeanor. 
2- Protecting public health and safety. 
3- Preventing the public from being misled by some statement or action of an 
individual or organisation. 
Apparently, the public are interested in all sorts of information and their interests are 
varied. People rely on the press for different purposes. Some people use the press for 
education and information, others for sports and gossip columns, while there are those 
who have a prurient interest in sexual and adulterous affairs of celebrities. This type of 
news should be regarded as less important as its contribution for the betterment of society 
is minimal. The commercial pressure as a result of competition forced the press to make 
changes in publication. One of the changes, which are common today, is by prescribing 
the sex-dope. In this regard, Hoggart observes that `we are a democracy whose working 
people are exchanging their birthright for a mass of pin-ups. 699 
4.5.1 PRESS AND PUBLIC FIGURE 
In relation to public figures, the third limb of the Press Complaint Commission's public 
interest is frequently used to justify an act of invasion. It is just and fair to expose the 
hypocrisies and double standards of public figures in their private lives. Lord Denning in 
Woodward v Hutchinson 700 concluded that it is in the public interest to disclose the truth 
in case of public figure to correct the untrue image they fostered. 701 The press argues that 
the public has the right to be informed of the real facts so that they are not being misled. 
699 http: //www. pcc. orp-. uk/co/cop. asp 
699 Hoggart, R. (1957) The Uses of Literacy. London, 176-77. 
70° [1977] 1 WLR 760. 
701 Ibid, 764. 
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On this premise, it is the social obligation of the press to expose political corruptions and 
wrong doings so that check and balance in the society can be exercised. 702 
The press and public figures are not on good terms when it comes to private lives. From 
the press point of view, information on marriage life, extra-marital relationship, adultery 
and medical conditions are among stories that trigger the interest of the public. In relation 
to this, according to the Council of Europe 1165 of 1998, public figures are persons 
holding public office using public resources and, more broadly speaking, all those who 
play a role in public life, whether in politics, economy, arts, social sphere, sport or in any 
other domain. Arguably, certain aspect of their private lives can legitimately be disclosed 
on the ground that they have a role model obligation. 703 
Thus, the role model of public figures creates moral and social obligations. The 
obligation has limited the scope of privacy that public figures can enjoy. In AvB plc, 
704 
Lord Woolf acknowledged that public figures are entitled to private lives. However, 
because of their public positions, trivial facts can be of great interest and `conduct which 
in the case of a private individual would not be the appropriate subject of comment can 
be the proper subject of comment in the case of a public figure. '705 The court in Campbell 
v MGN Ltd706 implied that only private facts, which a fair-minded person would consider 
it offensive to disclose, are within the legitimate concern of the public. 07 The court 
observed that it does not mean when a person achieved prominence on the public, `his 
private life can be laid bare by the media. ' 
Hence, reliance on the role model justification should be restricted in exposing the 
duplicity of public figures and not for general application. This is affirmed by the court in 
Campbell v MGN Ltd when the court said `On principle... where a public figure chooses 
to make untrue pronouncement about his or her private life, the press will normally be 
702 The media in general have diverse roles and functions. They are the source of most of our information 
and understanding about modem world. See Grant, M. (1990) The Politics of the British Media. In Jones, 
B. (ed. ) Political issues in Britain Today. Manchester, 96. 
703 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137. See also AvB plc [2003] QB 195,208. 
704[2003] QB 195. 
705 AvB plc [2003] QB 195,208. 
706 [2002] EWCA Civ 1373. 
707 For instance, private fact of a person being a drug addict when he or she previously denied it. 
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entitled to put the record straight. '708 As such they cannot expect the same treatment by 
the press as an ordinary person. 
However, intimate private facts that are not bound by the obligation are not a legitimate 
concern of the public. Any disclosure of the facts is an unjust invasion of privacy. 
Lindsay J. in Douglas v Hello! held that the positions of the claimants as public figures 
have not lessened the right to complain of intrusion. He gave the reason that `the steps 
taken by the Douglases were not solely for reward or as `hype' but were taken in a 
genuine and reasonable belief that thereby offensive media frenzy would be avoided. '709 
In case of politicians, the role model obligation makes certain facts of their private lives 
susceptible to the public gazed who are also voters. This does not mean that they have to 
surrender their privacy on the ground of being public figures. 710 Privacy is lost when a 
person purposely exposed his private facts or directed public attention to him. 711 
The unjust invasion of privacy by the press does not only confine to public persona or 
celebrities. The invasion also involves the lives of ordinary individuals, non-publicity 
seekers, who are being put into the limelight for certain reasons. The unsought publicity 
may be due to being close relatives of those engulfed in a national tragedy or of those 
who have committed notorious crimes. Butler-Sloss P. in her decision to grant an 
injunction to protect the daughter of Mary Bell said `She is.. . entirely innocent and was 
born into situation over which she has no control. '712 For this type of individuals, they 
have no role model obligation that can justify invasion of their privacy. Unlike 
celebrities, they are not marketing themselves to become famous 713 It would be arguable 
for the press to rely on public interest in exposing their private facts. Therefore, the scope 
of privacy of ordinary individuals should be wider than public figures and celebrities. 
The press objects the law on privacy mainly because it curtails their freedom to publish 
what public desire. They also argue that the law will hamper investigative reporting, 
708 [2002] EWCA Civ 1373. See also Woodward v Hutchinson [1977] 1 WLR 760. 
709 [2003] EWCH at 35 para 201. 
710 Professor Barendt's testimony before the Select Committee of Culture, Media and Sport on Privacy and 
Media Intrusion. http: //www. parliament. the-stationery-office. co. uk 
711 Seipp, D. J. English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy. (1983) 3OJLS 325,370. 
"Z X& Anor v O'Brien & Ors [2003] EWHC 1101, para 49. 
713 Per Bridge U in Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760,765. 
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protect only the rich and famous and allow corruption to go unchecked. 714 The objection 
might be too pre-mature. The press can still enjoy their freedom and carry on with their 
investigative reporting. But this should not give them a license to transgress by stripping 
off personal dignity and causes undue distress. 715 
Since there is no free-standing law on privacy in the UK to protect personal information 
as discussed above, it is important then to examine the existing legal principle that could 
accommodate privacy. Thus, the focus next will be on the suitability of breach of 
confidence as a framework for protection of privacy. 
4.6 BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 
The original concept of breach of confidence has developed from a limited area of 
commercial and employment relationships to personal information. The willingness of 
the courts to expand the requirement of the quality of confidence and obligation of 
confidence, enable the courts to adjudge privacy matters. What seems to be a piecemeal 
and segmented protection of privacy has amalgamated under the law of confidence. Lord 
Woolf in AvB plc stated that the courts could achieve the requirement of acting 
compatibly with the Convention by absorbing the rights, which Article 8 and 10 protect 
into the long established action for breach of confidence. 
Originally, confidential information is tagged to commercial and trade related 
information. This type of information is protected from being disclosed because of the 
prejudicial and detrimental consequences. The court in the case of Coco vAN Clark 
(Engineers) Limited716 laid down the requirement of the law of confidence. First the 
information must have the necessary quality of confidence. Secondly, the information 
must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. 
714 Piers Morgan, the editor of the Daily Mirror, in his criticism of the Media and Culture Select 
Committee's findings said that privacy law would protect the rich, famous and powerful including 
members of parliament. See Byrne, Privacy laws only protect the rich, editors insist. The Guardian, June 
17 2003. http: //media. zuardian. co. uk/medialaw/story 
715 Thomas v News Group Newspapers [2001] EWCA Civ 1233. 
716 [ 1969] RPC 41. 
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Thirdly, there must be an authorised use of information to the detriment of the party 
imparting it. 
Hence, breach of confidence affords protection against disclosure or use of information 
that is not publicly available. The information has been entrusted in circumstances 
imposing an obligation not to disclose the information without the authority of the person 
who has imparted it. 717 The law of confidence can be invoked when it is unconscionable 
to publish private information. The flexibility and adaptability of the law of confidence 
have made it a viable platform to accommodate privacy matters. 718 Lord Keith clearly 
said in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) that `the right to privacy is clearly one 
which the law of confidence should seek to protect. '719 
4.6.1 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND QUALITY OF CONFIDENCE 
Information must have the necessary quality of confidence. There is no hard and fast rule 
to determine the quality of confidence. Megarry VC admits this in Thomas Marshall v 
Guinle720 when he said `It is far from easy to state in general terms what is confidential 
information or a trade secret. ' In relation to a breach of duty of confidence, confidential 
information must have some interest of a private nature that the claimant wishes to 
protect 721 Basically, the quality of confidence is diminished when information is 
published or disclosed into public domain. 722 In relation to this, Lord Keith viewed that it 
is a matter of degree whether information is in the public 723 
Information may be confidential if a person takes an active step to conceal it from being 
disclosed. Similarly, the method of acquiring information such as through a secretive or 
clandestine manner could prove the degree of confidentiality. This is illustrated in 
717 See Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, 172. 
718 The Younger Committee proposed that the law on breach of confidence as the most effective protection 
of privacy. para 630. 
719 [1990] 1 AC 109. 
no [1979] Ch 227,248. 
721 AvB plc [2003] QB 195,206. 
722 Per Megarry J in Coco vAN Clarke (Engineerings) Ltd [1969] RPC 41,47. See also AG v Guardian 
Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 260. 
723 [1990] 1 AC 260. See also Franchi v Franchi [ 1967] RPC 149. 
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Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers724 where the Court of Appeal upheld the grant of 
an injunction restraining the newspaper until trial from publishing any article based on 
the contents of the taped telephone conversations. In this particular case, the 
conversations being eavesdropped upon had been obviously private conversations. 
Private information, however, does not necessarily amount to confidentiality. This is 
established in Mills v News Group Newspaper725 where triviality of information was 
considered by the court. The court found that the publication of private information, the 
claimant's address, is without real risk. Triviality is a factor in assessing whether the 
disclosure or threatened disclosure amounts to a breach of confidence. 
The nature and extent of damage as a consequence of disclosure could also ascertain the 
degree of confidence. Protection of personal information under breach of confidence 
covers information, which is communicated as well as acquired by the confidant. It is the 
substance of information rather than its form that is assessed in giving the protection. 
There must be some interest of a private nature that the claimant wishes to protect. In this 
regard, the test to ascertain what is private is whether disclosure would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 726 Arguably, offensiveness is 
not the appropriate test because it is wide and subjective. The concept of offensiveness as 
applied by the court would extend the scope of privacy. Thus, it is relatively vague and 
subjective because it relies on the normative judgment of the audience. Some people 
might be offended with a matter that others find reasonable. 
In this relation, Fenwick argues that the objective notions of offensiveness should not be 
the essential issue if protection of informational autonomy is the paramount 
consideration. According to her, it is the person's ability to apply his or her own 
standards of openness, which is the focal point in granting the protection. 727 This 
argument presents a tautology since it is obscure to set a standard due to variability of 
personal openness. On the other hand, Mullender argues that it is questionable to use 
724 [1984] 1 WLR 892. 
'u [2001 ] EMLR 41. 
726 Per Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corpn v Lenah Game Meats Pty Lid (2001) 185 ALR 1,13, 
noted by Lord Woolf CJ in AvB plc [2003] EWCA Civ 337,206. 
' Fenwick, H. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights. London, Cavendish, 549 
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offence instead of harm as a basis to ground an invasion of privacy action. This is 
because offence is vague and might not yield a sufficient weight as opposed to some 
tangible form of harm. 728 
In addition, confidential information is not restricted only to written or printed words. An 
image may properly be regarded as confidential information. For instance, the case of 
Prince Albert v Strange729 involved private etchings and catalogue. Lord Cottenhan LC 
associated the case with a right of privacy730 and granted an injunction based on breach of 
confidence. Lord Hoffman recognises that a photograph is in principle, information no 
different from any other information. He emphasised that `the widespread publication of 
a photograph of someone which reveals him to be in a situation of humiliation or severe 
embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may be an infringement of the privacy of 
his personal information. ' 731 Likewise, the Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
accepted that photographs taken without authority on a private occasion fell within the 
meaning of confidential information. 
On the contrary, confidentiality of information is lost when it is in public domain. Prosser 
argues that there is no confidentiality in public places `since this amount to no more than 
giving publicity to what is already public and what any one present would be free to 
see. '732 Nevertheless, privacy is not lost in a semi public place where there exists a 
degree of secrecy or exclusivity. For instance, a degree of privacy is still retained in the 
case of Princess Diana when she was photographed in a gymnasium. In this relation, 
according to the Press Complaints Commission, a private place is a `public or private 
property where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Information obtained through 
clandestine or secretive observation in public places might still retain the necessary 
quality of confidence. 733 
728 Mullender, R. Privacy in New Zealand: Are There Lessons to be Learned? (1994) CLJ, 12-13. 
729(1849)1 Mac&G25. 
730 Lord Cottenham said `where privacy is the right invaded'. Ibid, 47 731 Campbell v MGNLtd [2004] 2 AC 457,478. 
732 Prosser, D. Privacy. (1960) 48 Cal. Law Review 383,396. 
733 Rv BSC ex parte BBC [2000] 3 WLR 1327,1337. 
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The scope of confidential information has also been expanded to include private 
information. Generally, private and intimate information such as medical treatment and 
health, sexual life, identity, private conduct and acts, private correspondences and 
conversations are regarded as confidential. According to Parent, personal information is 
an `information about a person, which most individuals in a given time do not want 
widely known [or which] though not generally considered personal, a particular person 
feels acutely sensitive about. '734 
Obviously, breach of confidence could be developed to accommodate privacy. The crux 
of the law of confidence actually relates to confidential information. The principles of 
confidence accord protection to confidential information, which could be extended to 
privacy by protecting the undue disclosure of personal information. The description of 
private information as confidential prompts Lord Nicholls to pass a remark that `The 
essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information. 
735 In 
addition, the court in Stephens v Avery736 held that private information relating to sexual 
conduct of an individual was capable of being protected by the law of confidence. 
Subsequently, in Argyll v Argy11737 intimate marital secrets were held to be private 
information. The court decided to grant the injunction sought to stop disclosure of 
information. The decision amounts to recognition of the right of the claimant to have her 
private life kept private. The case established that it is not a pre- requisite that the 
confider must have disclosed information. The law of confidence will protect information 
even if the confider does not directly disclose it. Information obtained from a third party 
who is obliged under duty not to reveal will still be a secret and remain confidential. 
The court in Douglas v Hello! Ltd further shows the flexibility of the law of confidence. 
In this case, the court held that the fact that the photographs must have been taken by 
someone in breach of the express duties of confidentiality was sufficient to make the 
734 Parent, W. A. A New Definition of Privacy for the Law. (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 305,326. 
Phillipson and Fenwick prefer to apply Parent's definition of personal information because it covers 
distress rather than objective offensiveness. See Phillipson, G. and Fenwick, H. Breach of Confidence as a 
Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era. (2000) MLR 63,567. 
735 [2004] UKHL 22, para 14. 
736 [1988] Ch 449. 
737 [1967] 1 Ch 302. 
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photographs confidential information. The court in Theakston v MGN Ltd extends the 
protection to prevent the publication of photograph without consent. The court said: 
this protection extended to photographs, taken without consent, of people 
who exploited the commercial value of their own image in similar 
photographs, and to photographs taken with the consent of people but who 
had not consented to that particular form of commercial exploitation, as 
well as to photographs taken in public or from a public place. 38 
Similarly, in Shelley Films Limited v Rex Features Limited, 739 an injunction was granted 
to restrain the defendant from publishing photographs taken without permission on the set 
of the film Frankenstein. 
In relation to this, there is a practical problem as far as private information is concerned. 
Not all information, either personal or private to an individual comes under the purview 
of confidentiality. Some personal information cannot be properly described as 
confidential. For instance, in a case where there is a wrongful disclosure of private 
information, the availability of information in a public domain would defeat the argument 
of confidentiality but not privacy. Publication of such information then will result in lost 
of confidentiality but not privacy. Even though information, such as photographs, is 
obtained from public places, privacy is still maintained if there is a reasonable 
expectation against a wrongful disclosure. In this regard, it could be argued that the 
extension of breach of confidence could sufficiently protect privacy. 
4.6.2 OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE 
In order to take an action for breach of confidence, traditionally, there must be a pre- 
existing relationship, which makes the confidant under a duty not to disclose. The 
requirement of obligation of confidence is stressed by Lord Greene MR in Saltman 
Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering740when he said: 
The obligation to respect confidence is not limited to cases where the 
parties are in contractual relationship ... If a defendant is proved to have 
738 [2002] EWCH 137, para 78. 
739 [1994] EMLR 134. 
740 [1963]3AllER413. 
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used confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from a 
plaintiff, with the consent, express or implied of the plaintiff, he will be 
guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff's right. 
Breach of confidence protects a disclosure not only by those whose confidence has been 
reposed but also by third parties who acquire the sensitive information. The element that 
confidential information be imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of 
confidence implies that such information must have been voluntarily disclosed or 
communicated by the confider. This interpretation has been applied in Malone v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner where the court found that the police did not owe any 
duty of confidence to the plaintiff. Megarry VC said that a person who uttered 
confidential information must accept the risk of being overhead by an unknown party. 
With regard to this mater, there are two situations where the duty will arise. First, when 
the confidential information is expressly given to the confidant and he is aware of it. 
Second, when the information is obtained under circumstances which could make him 
aware of the confidentiality. A duty of confidence exists not only when a person has an 
actual notice of confidentiality but also an ostensible notice. Lord Goff in AG v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) said that a duty of confidence arises when confidential 
information comes to the knowledge of a person in circumstances where he has noticed, 
or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential, and thus he should be 
precluded from disclosing the information to others. In this regard, Lord Woolf CJ 
adopted the same approach when he said `A duty of confidence will arise whenever the 
party subject to a duty is in a situation where he either knows or ought to know that the 
other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected. '74' 
A duty of confidence may be created simply out of a relationship between the parties 
with no requirement of any express notice from confider to confidant 742 A person who 
carries out illegal recording of private telephone conversations may come under the same 
obligation as the parties to the conversations to respect the confidential nature of the 
741 AvB plc [2002] 3 WLR 542, pars 11. 
742 Hellewell V Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804. 
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conversations. 743 It would be difficult to protect privacy if there must be a prior 
confidential relationship. The extension of confidential relationship has increased the 
potential scope of confidence in protecting privacy. As Laws J said: 
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take ... a photographs of another 
engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the photograph 
would in my judgment... amount to a breach of confidence... In such a 
case the law would protect what might reasonably be called a right of 
privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action would be 
breach of 744 
This development was noted by the court in Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltci745 
The court held that a pre-existing relationship was not required to give rise to an 
obligation of confidentiality. This approach could put the press under an obligation on the 
basis that a reasonable man would have realised that the information received should be 
kept confidential. Butler-Sloss P stated that: 
The duty of confidence may arise in equity independently of a transaction 
or relationship between parties.. .A duty of confidence does already arise 
when confidential information comes to the knowledge of the media, in 
circumstances in which the media have notice of its confidentiality. 746 
Breach of confidence has its limitation in accommodating privacy in general. The 
distinction between a breach of confidence and privacy is that, the former preserves 
secrecy and the latter is against publicity. 747 In addition, privacy is not relation-based as 
required under confidence. 748 Phillipson and Fenwick argue that the scope of law of 
confidence might possibly be inadequate to encompass situations where there has clearly 
been some invasion of privacy but does not involve personal information. 749 The 
framework of confidence could arguably be said as inappropriate to cover cases involving 
743 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 1 WLR 892. 
744 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [ 1995] 1 WLR 804,807. 
las [2001] Fain 340. 
746 Ibid, para 81. 
747 See Wacks, R. (1995) Privacy and Press Freedom. London, 78. See also Tugendhat, M. and Christie, I. 
(2002) Law of Privacy and Media. Oxford, 124. 
749 Morgan, J. Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: "Hello" Trouble. (2003) 62(2) CLJ444,449. 
749 Phillipson, G. and Fenwick, H., Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act 
Era. (2000) MLR 63,567. 
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invasion of privacy such as in the case of Kaye v Robertson. 50 Although the development 
of the law of confidence is conducive for protection of privacy, it may not be extensive 
enough to cover the situation in Peck v United Kingdom. 751 In this case the ECtHR has 
ruled that a breach of confidence is not an appropriate action in the circumstances of the 
case. Once the information is in a public domain, its repeated publication can no longer 
be considered a breach of confidence under English law but could nevertheless constitute 
an infringement of Article 8. 
The common law development with regard to breach of confidence is a welcome effort to 
fill the gap in the absence of specific law on privacy. 752 Judicial recognition on the right 
of privacy in the case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd and Campbell v MGN Ltd indicates that the 
right is as important as free speech. The courts are prepared to give horizontal effect to 
the Convention right under the existing legal framework. Campbell's case is significant 
in the evolution of right to privacy in the UK. In this case, Naomi Campbell brought an 
action for breach of confidence and breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 against the 
publishers of the Daily Mirror. The press published articles revealing that she was 
receiving treatments for drug addiction and photographs which showed her leaving a 
Narcotics Anonymous session. The decision established that there is a protection on 
informational privacy. 
A claim based on the publication of private information must establish whether the 
information is sufficiently private, thus warrant protection under Article 8. This is 
determined by satisfying the test of reasonable expectation of privacy. The House of 
Lords decided that there is a remedy for the wrongful disclosure of private information 
under breach of confidence. In relation to this, Lord Hope criticised the Court of Appeal's 
approach in emphasising on the mind of the reader rather than the mind of the person 
who is affected by the publicity. Arguably, the approach that confines the expectation of 
privacy to the affected person expands the protection of one's private life. In this regard, 
the case of Peck v UK illustrates the point where expectation of privacy of a person in a 
750 [19911 FSR 62.. 
751 [2003] 36 EI-4Rk41. 
752 In contrast, breach of confidence is not regarded as an appropriate approach for protection of privacy. 
See Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1. 
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degrading situation on a public street could be absent if the expectation is from the mind 
of the reader's perspective. 
The House of Lords in Campbell v MGN recognised the importance of both rights under 
Article 8 and Article 10. Neither right takes precedence over the other. On the premise of 
parallel analysis, both Article 8 (2) and Article 10 (2) recognise the rights and freedom of 
others. On this basis, the HOL held that the right to privacy is central to an action of 
breach of confidence. Therefore, the right must be balanced with the right of the media to 
impart information to the public, vice versa, the media's right to impart information must 
be balanced with the respect given to private life. The restrictions imposed on right to 
free expression must be rational, fair and not arbitrary. Restrictions also must not impair 
the right more than necessary. This is based on the principle of proportionality. The 
majority held that the treatment for addiction was private and akin to medical 
information. The disclosure of details could interfere with, or disrupt Campbell's 
treatment. Thus the publication of such intrusive material could not be justified. 
The development in this area may further be influenced by the decision of the ECtHR in 
Von Hannover v Germany. 753 In this case the ECtHR recognised the importance of 
private life and free expression. In relation to balancing Article 8 and 10, the ECtHR 
found that although Princess Caroline was a well known public person, she did not 
exercise any official function. The Court therefore decided that the general public did not 
have a legitimate interest in knowing about the Princess's private life, even if she 
appeared in public places and was likely to be recognised by the public. The court stated 
clearly that a fundamental distinction had to be drawn between the `watchdog' function 
of the press in reporting facts capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society, 
and reporting the details of the private life of an individual who did not exercise official 
functions. In determining the correct balance between Article 8 and 10, the ECtHR 
emphasised on the contribution of the publication to a debate of general interest. The 
Court found that such contribution was absent in the case of Princess Caroline. Thus, 
contribution to a debate of general interest is a decisive factor in protecting informational 
privacy. 
753 (2004) 40 EHRR 1. 
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The expansion of breach of confidence provides a remedy for wrongful publication of 
private information. Nevertheless, the law of confidence is not satisfactory to embrace 
unjustified invasion of privacy. The right to be let alone, such as strip-searched, is an 
aspect of privacy that does not involve disclosure of information. This is beyond the 
scope of law of confidence. An intrusion into private premises or surveillance using 
audio-visual devices does not cover unauthorised disclosure under the law of confidence. 
The case of Peck v UK754 illustrates the inadequacy of breach of confidence. The ECtHR 
held that the applicant did not have an actionable remedy in breach of confidence and had 
no effective remedy in relation to the disclosures by the local authority. The House of 
Lords in Wainwrights's case viewed that the reform of privacy law `can be achieved only 
by legislation rather than the broad brush of common law principle. ' In addition, not all 
confidential information is private. Loss or lack of confidentiality does not mean that 
there is no infringement of privacy. Therefore, the disclosure of a private photograph that 
has previously been published to the public can still amount to infringement of privacy. 
The influence of the ECHR in shaping the legal landscape in the UK is evinced by the 
incorporation of the Convention rights in the Human Rights Act 1998. However, it is 
uncertain as to what extent the ECHR influences the development of private law 
particularly with respect to privacy in the UK. The ECtHR in Von Hannover imposed 
positive obligation on the State to protect right to privacy which "may involve the 
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves". The positive obligations to protect privacy 
means the courts must accord protection to the privacy rights of private individuals 
against media intrusion. In order to have a clearer picture of the situation, the following 
discussion will examine the influence of the ECHR in the UK. 
4.7 THE INFLUENCE OF TI4E EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights through the Human 
Rights Act 1998 has changed the landscape of the national legal system. Section 2 (1) of 
the Act provides: 
754 (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 
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A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection 
with a Convention right must take into account any- 
(a) judgement, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
It is clear from the above provision that the courts have the duty to take into account the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Clayton et al suggest that the 
effect of this section imposes a duty to consider the relevant case law for the purposes of 
making adjudication. 755 However, the duty to take into account or to consider does not 
make the European case law as a binding authority on the courts in the UK. 
756 On the 
other hand, the Convention rights have become part of the domestic legal principles. This 
is clear when the protected rights under Article 8 and 10 are absorbed in the established 
action for breach of confidence. In this regard, Lord Woolf said: 
The court's approach to the issues which the applications raise has been 
modified because under section 6 of the 1998 Act, the court, as a public 
authority, is required not to act `in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right'. The court is able to achieve this by absorbing the rights 
which articles 8 and 10 protect into long-established action for breach of 
confidence. 57 
Another main impact is on the judicial system in general. In relation to the Convention 
rights, the European Court of Human Rights will be the final court for an action involving 
a breach of Convention rights. This means that the ECtHR in Strasbourg can overturn the 
House of Lords' decisions. For instance, in the case of Sunday Times v United Kingdom 
(No 2), the Court decided that the House of Lords had violated the right to free 
expression guaranteed by the Convention. 
Furthermore, a person can bring an action to the European Court for violations of the 
Convention rights only to the extent that the rights are incorporated into the national law. 
It is a requirement that the applicant must have exhausted all domestic remedies. In Earl 
Iss Clayton, R., et al (2002) The law of Human Rights. Oxford University Press. 
756 Clive, S. (2002) Freedom of Information. London: 631. Grosz concluded that the provision `must take 
into account' in section 2 (1) gives weaker direction and thus the Strasbourg jurisprudence is only 
persuasive. See Grosz, S., et al (2000) Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention. 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 16. 
757 AvB plc [2003] QB 195,202. 
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Spencer v The United Kingdom758 the Court found that the applicant had not exhausted 
his domestic remedies. In this regard, the Court concluded that the law on breach of 
confidence as extended and developed by the domestic courts could provide remedy for 
an invasion of privacy. 759 
Thus, the Convention serves as an impetus for a legal change in the national law. The 
duty to act compatibly with the Convention rights imposed by the Human Rights Act 
1998 does not only involve the courts, but the government as well in changing 
substantive laws. 760 Section 6 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides: 
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention right. 
Most of the changes in the national law occur when the European Court found that the 
state act is incompatible with the Convention. In relation to the United Kingdom, changes 
in law as a result of incompatibility are not obligatory. 761 The House of Lords in A& Ors 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department762 affirm this when Lord Bingham said that 
if primary legislation is declared to be incompatible the validity of the legislation is 
unaffected. The remedy, therefore, lies with the appropriate minister who is answerable 
to Parliament. However, this might restrict reliance on the margin of appreciation 
accorded to the state. In Goodwin v United Kingdom763 for instance, the Court found that 
the respondent's state could no longer exercise its margin of appreciation in situation 
relating to post-operative transsexual because nothing has effectively been done by the 
respondent's state to put the matter under review. 
758 [1998] 25 EHRR 105. 
759 This is in contrast with the decision in Winer v United Kingdom (1986) 48 DR 154 where the Court said 
that breach of confidence did not provide adequate remedy on the ground that the scope of the cause of 
action was uncertain. 
760 The Interception of Communication Act 1985 (now replaced by the Regulation of Investigating Powers 
Act 2000) was the response of the United Kingdom to the finding by the European Court of Human Rights 
in Malone v United Kingdom. The reform of the law of contempt by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was 
the result of Sunday Times v United Kingdom. The amendment of the Employment Act 1982 particularly 
section 2 was the result of the decision in Young James and Webster v United Kingdom. Abolition of 
corporal punishment by the Education (No 2) Act 1986 was the result of Campbell and Cosans v United 
Kingdom. Goodwin v United Kingdom led to changes involved identity of transsexuals. 
761 Starmer, K. Two Years of the Human Rights Act. (2003) 1 EHRLR 14,19. 
762 [2004] UKHL 56, pars 42. 
763 (2002) 35 EHRR 447. 
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The judgments and decisions of the ECtHR can also be useful resources in resolving 
ambiguities in domestic laws. This is pertinent since the courts in the United Kingdom 
have a duty to act compatibly with the Convention rights. In relation to this, the 
Convention helps to inform the common law in articulating some of the principles 
underlying the law. For instance, the right of privacy under Article 8 is dealt with under 
the expansion of the principles of confidence. This shows that a common law could be 
developed to fill the gap to protect individual rights in the absence of statutory provision. 
4.7.1 PRIVATE LIFE UNDER THE ECHR 
Right of privacy is guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 
8 provides: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
Although the article does not specifically provide for a right of privacy, the right to 
respect for private life implies such a right. Private life under Article 8 has been given a 
wider meaning. 7M It does not create hermitical life in which the individual may live his 
own personal life as he chooses and to exclude entirely the outside world. 
The concept of a private life covers both the physical and moral integrity of a person. In 
Bota v Italy765 the Court held that a private life `includes a person's physical and 
psychological integrity: the guarantee afforded by article 8... is primarily intended to 
ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each 
individual in his relations with other human beings. ' In Xv Iceland the court said that a 
private life comprises the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings especially in the emotional field, for the development and fulfillment of one's own 
personality. 766 The definition expounded by the Court goes beyond the protection of an 
intimate sphere of personal autonomy. 
7U See Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41, p i-a 57. The Court said that private life is a broad 
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. 
765 (1998) 26 EHRE. 241, para. 32. 
766 (1976) No 6825/74. See also Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97, para 29. 
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Even though certain acts may affect the physical or moral integrity of a person, it does 
not always necessarily amount to an interference of private life. The adversity of the act 
will determine whether it comes under the scope of Article 8. For instance, the Court in 
Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom767 held that the nature of the corporal punishment in 
a school was not sufficiently adverse to amount to a violation of Article 8. The 
implication of the right to respect for private life is that it requires the state to take 
positive steps to establish laws, which protect the right. In this regard, the Court in X and 
Yv The Netherlands said: 
In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. These 
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals 
between themselves. 768 
Obviously, the main purpose of article 8 is to protect individuals against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities. This is stated in Article 8 (2): 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety and the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others. 
The provision clearly imposes negative obligation on the public authority not to act in a 
way that interferes with a private life. In certain circumstances, the article may impose a 
positive obligation on the state to ensure protection of the right. This obligation may be in 
the form of adopting measures to secure the right by providing effective remedies 
through the law. The obligation also requires the state to take positive measures to secure 
the fulfillment of the right among private individuals. Failure to observe such an 
obligation by the state will constitute a violation of Article 8. For instance, in Regina v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department769 the claimant sought declaratory relief and 
damages under the 1998 Act against the Home Secretary on the ground that the acts or 
767 (1995) 19 EHRR 112. 
768 (1985) 8 EHRR 235,239-240. 
769 [2003] TLR 134. 
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omissions of agencies and officials had subjected him to a treatment contrary to Article 3. 
He argued that there had been an interference with his private life contrary to Article 8. 
The court relied on the test used by the court in E and Others v United Kingdom770 in 
order to establish whether a positive duty could be implied. According to the test a 
defendant would be liable for infringement of a Convention right such as those set out in 
Article 3 or 8 where: 
1. The defendant was or ought to have been aware that the claimant 
was suffering or at risk of treatment of the kind necessary to 
engage Article 3 or of harm of the kind necessary to engage Article 
8. 
2. The defendant then did not take steps reasonable open to him to 
protect the claimant from the treatment of the kind necessary to 
engage Article 3 or from the harm necessary to engage Article 8; 
and 
3. Those measures could have had a real prospect of altering or 
mitigating the harm suffered by the claimant. 
Silber J. then found that an obligation had been imposed on the Home Secretary to take 
steps reasonably open to him to protect the claimant from infringement of his Article 8 
rights. However, that obligation was not complied with. 
Additionally, Harris et al suggest that intrusive activities of private individuals such as 
newspaper reporters ought to come under the obligation to respect private life in Article 
8.77 1 This is in accordance with the Resolution 428 of the Council of Europe, which 
states that the right to privacy under Article 8 should extend to interference by private 
persons including the mass media. 
On the other hand, the requirement of positive obligation should be balanced with the 
considerations outline in Article 8 (2). The state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation 
when deciding the extent of positive obligation under Article 8.772 The Court in Rees v 
United Kingdom773 concluded that a fair balance has to be struck between the general 
no [20021 TLR 514. 
nl Harris, D. J. et al (1995) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. London, 310. 
m However, this margin goes hand in hand with the European court supervision. See Funke v. France 
(1993) 16 EHRR 297. 
"; (1986) 9 EHRR 56. 
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interest of the community and the interests of the individual. The Court took into account 
the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the state and the protection of the interests of 
others when it refused to extent positive obligations arising from Article 8 to maintain the 
secrecy of a sexual identity change. However, the Court also expressed the need for 
appropriate legal measures to be kept under review having regard to scientific and 
societal developments. In Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom774 the Court held that 
the non-recognition of change of gender by post-operative transsexual persons did not 
constitute a violation of Article 8. However, the state is still entitled to rely on the wide 
margin of appreciation to defend its refusal in recognizing the law of post-operative 
transsexual's sexual identity. The Court was critical of the United Kingdom's failure to 
take any steps to keep this area of the law under review. 
The margin of appreciation is not applicable when there is a constant failure by the state 
to review domestic law. In recent case Goodwin v United Kingdom775 the Court 
unanimously held that there had been violation of the right to respect for private and 
family life under Article 8 of the Convention. The unsatisfactory situation in which post- 
operative transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as not quite of being one gender or the 
other is no longer sustainable. The Court concluded that since there are no significant 
factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of applicant in obtaining legal 
recognition of her gender reassignment, the fair balance that is inherent in the Convention 
tilts decisively in favour of the applicant. In striking a balance in the present case, the 
Court `considers that society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain 
inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the 
sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost. s776 
Even though privacy is recognised as a fundamental right, other interests in accordance 
with the law can override it. Article 8 (2) outlines the overriding interests, which include 
national security, public safety, economic well being, prevention of health or morals and 
rights and freedoms of others. The Court in Malone v United Kingdom777 held that the 
774 (1998) 27 EHkR 163. 
ns (2002) 35 EHRR 447. 
776 Ibid, para 91. 
m (1985) 7 EHRR 14. 
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requirement, which is in accordance with the law, does not merely reflect domestic law 
but also relates to the quality of the law. The law must be accessible for the people to be 
able to have an adequate indication of the legal rules that will be applicable to any case. 
In addition, the law also must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable a person 
to regulate his conduct 778 In this case the Court decided that the UK system for 
authorising interceptions had failed according to law test. This is because at the particular 
time it could not be said with certainty which elements in the arrangements were 
incorporated in legal rules and which one depended entirely on the discretion of the 
executive. 
It is unclear whether the application of the Convention rights in the domestic law does 
give power to the courts to declare a new law. The duty imposed by section 6 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 should serve as a platform for the courts to fashion a new law, 
especially in an area that could not be consolidated sufficiently into other existing laws. 
Prior to the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, it seems unlikely for the courts 
to use the Convention as the basis to create a new law. This is because the courts are not 
duty bound to abide by the Convention. However, with the incorporation of the 
Convention rights into domestic legislation, the development of common law should be 
in tandem with the Convention. The development should be informed by the right 
principle permeates in the Convention. 
There is a distinction between privacy and confidence. This is illustrated in the case of 
Peck v United Kingdom. 779 In this case, the applicant complained that the disclosure by 
the Council of the relevant CCTV footage, which resulted in the publication and 
broadcasting of identifiable images of him, constituted a disproportionate interference 
with his right to respect for his private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 
The present applicant was in a public street but he was not there for the purposes of 
participating in any public event and he was not a public figure. The applicant's identity 
778 See Khan v United Kingdom (2000) 8 BHRC 310. The Court concluded that at the relevant time there 
existed no statutory system to regulate the use of covert recording devices by the police. The interferences 
disclosed by the measures implemented in respect of the applicant were therefore not "in accordance with 
the law" as required by the second paragraph of Article 8 and there has accordingly been a violation of this 
provision. 
779 (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 
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was not adequately, or in some cases not at all, masked in the photographs and footage so 
publicly published and broadcasted. The respondent's government submitted that the 
regime of legal protection, which existed adequately, protected the applicant's rights. 
They pointed out that the common law and statutory remedies collectively provided a 
comprehensive regime of legal protection for privacy and therefore performed 
substantially the same function as a law of privacy. They considered the breach of 
confidence as the most relevant remedy. The Court considered that the facts of this case 
were sufficiently different from those in Earl Spencer's case as to allow the Court to 
conclude that the present applicant did not have an actionable remedy in breach of 
confidence at the relevant time. In addition, the Court said that the applicant would have 
had much greater difficulty in establishing that the footage disclosed had the "necessary 
quality of confidence" about it or that the information had been "imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence". The Court then found that the 
applicant had no effective remedy in relation to the violation of his right to respect for his 
private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 
There are concerns that the long tradition of parliamentary sovereignty as the cornerstone 
of the United Kingdom's constitution might be sacrificed. The perception is that the 
Convention can dictate in shaping the domestic law especially the protection of human 
rights. 780 The main effect of the European Convention on Human Rights is the change in 
approach to the protection of human rights. It also brings about the statutory recognition 
of human rights as part of the domestic law. Nevertheless, despite changes, the ECHR 
also creates uneasiness among those who argue for national sovereignty. The introduction 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 means that the Convention as well as the European Court 
of Human Rights have played a significant role and will continue to influence the 
development of the domestic laws in the United Kingdom. Currently, as far as privacy is 
concerned, there is a progressive recognition of right of privacy in the UK but access to 
the right could only be done through the ECHR. 78I 
780 see Lord Woolf (2003) Solemn Hearing of the European Court of Human Rights. 
httb: //www. echr. coe. int/enL-/SMeches 
X81 Lord Irvine. (2003) Human Rights, Constitutional Law and the Development of the English Legal System. Oxford, 132. 
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4.7.2 EXPRESSION UNDER THE ECHR 
The UK is one of the countries that have specific legislation dealing with human rights. 
The formulation of the Human Rights Act 1998 is the result of long debates and pressure 
from within and without the United Kingdom. The Act creates a statutory scheme giving 
effect to the Convention rights without limiting pre existing common law jurisprudence. 
Section 2 (1) of the Act provides that a domestic court or tribunal in determining a matter 
that concerns the Convention rights must take into account any judgment, decision, 
declaration, or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This 
provision reflects the influence of the Convention particularly regarding the Convention 
rights. The application and reference made to the ECtHR is on the persuasive authority 
rather than binding precedent. 782 The unique common law principle of binding precedent 
(stare decisis) is applicable only to domestic courts and it does not extent to other judicial 
systems. This is the position of the United Kingdom, which adopts the dualist approach 
by delineating the executive act and legislative action. In this regard Lord Oliver said: 
Treaties, as it is sometimes expressed, are not self-executing. Quite 
simply, a treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been 
incorporated into the law by legislation. 783 
Therefore, it is safe to say that the findings of the European Court on Human Rights by 
itself is not part of the English law, though the United Kingdom government has agreed 
to abide by decisions of the Court as a signatory member, which is an executive act. On 
the other hand, the English courts, as public authorities under the Human rights Act 
1998, have an obligation to act compatibly with the Convention rights. This is provided 
in section 6 (1) of the Act that says: 
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention right. 
The provision allows the application of ECtHk jurisprudence pertaining to the 
Convention rights. In addition, section 3 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that 
782 Feldman, D. The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles. (1999) Leg. Stud, 191. 
783 See JH Rayner (Mining Lane) v Department of Trade and Industry [1900] 2 AC 418,500. 
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domestic legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with 
Convention rights. The validity of domestic legislations is not affected if there is any 
incompatibility. 784 Moreover, the requirement of compatibility is not set in imperative 
form because section 3 (1) provides `So far as it is possible to do so... ' 
Not all welcomes the application of the Convention in domestic legal landscape. The 
dissentients believe that domestic laws and system are capable to tackle domestic affairs. 
The abdication of the sovereignty is the main reason for the rejection of the application. 
To them domestic legal disputes should not be resolved by foreign judges who are not 
familiar with domestic legal culture. The application is viewed as an importation of 
foreign elements into local arena. This argument is based more on sentiments to protect 
national dignity and sovereignty. Looking from a different perspective, the application of 
the Convention is a process of amelioration at regional level that relates to matters of 
common values and characters such as human rights. 
In relation to this, the judiciary is not speaking with the same tone when it comes to the 
willingness to have regard to the Convention. Lord Keith who concurred with the 
observation of Lord Goff in A-G v Guardian Newspaper (No 2) opined that 'the common 
law of England is consistent with the obligation assumed by the Crown under the 
treaty... ' They did not find it necessary to refer to the Convention because they believed 
that the common law fully matched Article 10.785 On the other hand, in Venables v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd786 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss viewed that: 
The common law continues to evolve, as it has done for centuries, and is 
being given considerable impetus to do so by the implementation of the 
Convention into our domestic law. 787 
The Convention can be relied on in providing a contextual background in case the law is 
either unclear or ambiguous, or concerns an issue not yet ruled on as indicated by the 
House of Lord. 788 This is put into practice when the court in A-G v Guardian (No 2) 
784 Section 3 (2) (c) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
785 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534. 
786 [2001] 2 WLR 1038. 
781Ibid, 1064. 
788 Op. cit., n. 334. 
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relied on the interpretation of Article 10 as established by the ECtHR on limitation of 
free expression in the interests of national security. Article 10 of the Convention has 
become part of national law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
It is hard to deny that the Convention has also fashioned a broad perspective of freedom 
of expression. There are cases where the ECtHR weighs heavily on press freedom of 
expression. In Sunday Times v United Kingdom789 the Court held that the interference by 
the English court did not correspond to a social need sufficiently pressing to outweigh the 
public interest in freedom of expression. This case has caused the British government to 
change the law on contempt of court. In the famous Spycatcher case, the Court did not 
accept national security as a sufficient reason to prohibit publication. 
The present Labour government has pledged to modernize British politics by, among 
others, increasing individual rights based on the ECHR. One of the reasons given to 
support this move is the awareness that common law is not sufficient. 790 One pertinent 
question is that if the commitment is strong why not embrace the Convention that gives 
protection to fundamental rights? The willingness to accept the Convention without full 
implementation is the result of dualist approach practiced by the government. Perhaps the 
unwillingness to allow too much foreign influence in dictating domestic legislative 
matters contributes to the half-baked commitment to the Convention rights. More 
importantly, this is entirely an executive act. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
Obviously, the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 has a significant impact on 
the development of privacy in the UK. Though the right of privacy is recognised through 
the incorporation of the Convention rights, the scheme of the HRA creates a vertical 
application of the right. Nevertheless, the obscurity of the public authority requirement 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 could give room for a horizontal application of the 
right. This is achievable by the commitment of the judiciary through their judicial 
activism in protecting fundamental rights. 
789 (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
70 See Lord Keith in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 1011,1020. 
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The incremental development in protecting privacy through the extension of the doctrine 
of confidence is the manifestation of liberal approach and judicial activism. Undoubtedly, 
this approach could ward off permanent denial of a right of privacy. Though the effort to 
secure the right of privacy is a progressive development, the incremental development is 
rather unsatisfactory because it creates uncertainty in this area of law and provides 
incomplete protection to privacy. It is undeniable that the limit of the doctrine could not 
satisfactorily afford protection to privacy. Arguably, Parliament is better equipped and 
democratically qualified to introduce law in this area. Nevertheless, it is doubtful for such 
an introduction in the foreseeable future due to fearful of media disapproval. The 
government's rejection to a recent call for privacy law is a testimony for the 
unforthcoming legislative commitment. 
Accordingly, if full protection is to be accorded against press invasion, horizontal effect 
of the Convention rights is pertinent. A complete and direct application of the Convention 
rights could secure the protection of privacy. In the UK, judges have been cautious in 
their approach to the development of the law. If caution is warranted in the British 
context, then a cautious approach seems to be the apposite in the Malaysian context. This 
leads to the next discussion on privacy in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRIVACY IN MALAYSIA 
5.0 INTORDUCTION 
The emergence of human rights discourse in Malaysia has revitalised the constitutional 
significance of fundamental rights. It also helps towards educating and instilling a better 
awareness of fundamental rights among the public. Malaysia's active participation in the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1990's has also accelerated 
deliberations on human rights issues at the national level. The impact of this development 
has enabled the people to voice up their concerns on human rights and thus calls for its 
protection. 791 
The active propagation of the human rights agenda by independent organisations has 
brought about changes in public perception regarding the scope of the subject that is 
previously focused on bread and butter issues. This is advocated through the existence of 
several non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as SUARAM, 
792 HAKAM, 793 
ALIRAN794 and statutory bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission 
(SUHAKAM) and the Bar council of Malaysia. 
The above mentioned non-governmental organisations play an important role as a 
pressure group in lobbying the government to create a better environment and protection 
of human rights as embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR). 
Their affiliation and link with international watchdog bodies such as the Amnesty 
International has enabled domestic issues on human rights be heard and publicised 
abroad. Consequently, it creates an international pressure on the government to 795 
79' There are calls for the abolishment of restrictive laws, such as the Internal Security Act 1960, Sedition 
Act and Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. See http: //www. aliran. com/ 
792 hitp: //www. sum-am. net/ 
m bt! p: //www. hakam. org/home. htm 
794 http: //www. alitan. com/ 
795 Amnesty International produces yearly report on the condition of human rights worldwide. 
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improve its domestic situation. Though such a pressure has a minimal impact on the 
government, Malaysia needs to put into practice the commitment made under 
international treaty such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). The culmination of this development is the recognition by the government 
regarding the importance of human rights issues with the creation of the Human Rights 
Commission in 1999. 
Although Malaysia is a signatory of the UNCHR, it does not mean that Malaysia is 
legally obliged to accede to the principles enshrined in the instrument particularly in 
respect to right of privacy. The instrument has no legal binding on the domestic legal 
system. It does not constitute as part of Malaysian law, unless it is incorporated into local 
statutory legislation. Siti Norma FCJ in Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis 
Negara796 reiterates the status of such an instrument in the domestic context when she 
said: 
Reference to international standards set by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Right 1948 (`the 1948 Declaration') and several other United 
Nations documents on the right of access cannot be accepted as such 
documents were not legally binding on the Malaysian courts. 797 
Therefore, matters pertaining to fundamental rights in Malaysia must be in accordance 
with the supreme law of the land, the Federal Constitution. Article 4 (1) of the 
Constitution proclaims that: 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed 
after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
Arguably, the concept of the fundamental rights in the Constitution such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, right to life and freedom of religion is similar to those 
rights widely recognised under the international instruments. However, the application of 
796 t200214 MW 449. 
7"Ibid, 513. 
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the concept at domestic level is not align with the universal practice particularly as 
acclaimed under the Western liberal democracy. Apparently, there is a lack of consensus 
ad idem in this aspect due to the emphasis on local particularities, which necessitate the 
domestication of the fundamental rights concept. This is reflected in the next discussion 
on right of privacy, which we now turn to. 
5.1 PRIVACY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
The Federal Constitution governs human rights in Malaysia. Section 2 of the Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 provides that the meaning of `human rights' 
refers to fundamental liberties as enshrined in Part II of the Federal Constitution. This 
provision confines the scope of human rights law in Malaysia to several fundamental 
rights as provided by the Constitution. The confinement of human rights to those set out 
under the constitutional liberties is unsatisfactory. It limits the development of a wide 
range of human rights issues within the scope of fundamental rights as enshrined in the 
constitutional provisions. For instance, right of privacy is absent under the fundamental 
liberties catalogue in the Malaysian Constitution. The effect of this is that other interests 
such as free expression can always override privacy, as there is no constitutional 
protection. 
Although the fundamental rights in the Constitution are proclaimed in the form of 
positive rights, several distinct countervailing interests qualify them. 798 The scope of 
these interests is determined by Parliament whose legislative power is controlled by the 
ruling party. As a result, the human rights development in Malaysia depends on the 
commitment of the government to pursue the matter as part of its political agenda. In this 
context, a question that should be addressed, therefore, is not about the existence of 
human rights in the domestic arena but the restrictiveness of the qualifications that 
curtailed the exercise of human rights. 
Arguably, privacy as an aspect of human rights is not a priority on the human rights 
agenda in Malaysia. Privacy gains a considerable interest only after the emergence of 
7" Article 10 (2) of the Federal Constitution. 
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human rights culture and awareness in the society especially after the creation of the 
Human Rights Commission in 1999. The lack of interest in privacy can be attributed to 
several reasons. First, the Federal Constitution does not specifically recognise the right 
to privacy. However, it does provide for several related rights, such as liberty of a 
person799 and right to property. 80° Right of privacy, which is widely recognised in 1948 
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is not part of the fundamental rights 
scheme deemed necessary by the framers of the Federal Constitution in 1956. 
Nevertheless, protection of reputation under defamation, a privacy-related interest, is 
recognised under the constitutional scheme as one of the interests that can override 
freedom of speech and expression. 801 
Even though the Constitution provides for fundamental rights, the emphasis under the 
constitutional framework appears to be more on civil and political rights. This is because 
political rights are the most restricted rights under the Constitution. The immunity of 
qualifications imposed on political rights from judicial scrutiny, such as freedom of 
speech and expression, implicitly creates a gradation of right. This may be inferred from 
the interests in Article 10 (2) (a) that is wide and inhibitive. The article provides: 
Parliament may by law impose- 
On the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as 
it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, 
public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges 
of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against 
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence. 
In addition, Article 4 (2) (b) provides that: 
The validity of any law shill not be questioned on the ground that- 
7' Article 5 of the Federal Constitution. 
800 ibid Article 13. 
801 ibid Article 10 (2) (a). 
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(b) it imposes such restriction as mentioned in Article 10 (2) but those 
restrictions were not deemed necessary or expedient by Parliament for 
purposes mentioned in that Article. 
By reading both provisions together, it shows that although political rights exist in 
Malaysia, the rights are subjected to a wide scope of restrictions. 
The second reason for the lack of interest in privacy is due to the fact that there is no 
urgency in dealing with privacy issue. Perhaps, this is because the primary focus of the 
government is satisfying the basic needs of the people. Issues relating to distribution of 
wealth, security, education and eradication of poverty take priority over issues such as 
protection of individual privacy and private lives. Matters pertaining to personal privacy, 
like freedom of speech and expression, are considered as luxuries that cannot be afforded 
by the states, at least until economic development eradicates poverty and assure basic 
economic and social rights. 802 In this regard, the discourse of human rights is rather a 
bourgeois subject matter. As far as Malaysia is concerned, there is a gradation between 
civil and political rights on one hand and economic and cultural rights on the other. The 
former is given more emphasis especially in realising the government's aspiration to 
make Malaysia as a developed country under the `Vision 2020'. Even though 
SUHAKAM believes and affirms the indivisibility of all human rights, at the same time 
SUHAKAM acknowledges that economic, social and cultural rights have been in the 
shadow of civil and political rights. 803 
The third reason is, majoritarianism, where preference is given to the collective rights and 
interests of the society rather than to an individual interest, is a prevalent practice in 
Malaysia. In other words, the need to protect the well being of the society as a whole 
permits the toleration of individual right such as personal privacy. This is reiterated by 
the former Deputy Prime Minister when he said that `In Malaysia, we believe that the 
rights of the individual cannot be allowed to supersede the sanctity and security of the 
majority. In some situations, the government has no alternative option. Measures, which 
802 Abraham, C. Freedom of Speech for Whom? The Malaysian Case. (1998) 3 MLJ 1,4 803 Navaratnam, R Economic, Social and Cultural Rights- Accessibility to Basic Needs. 
htth: //www. suhakam. or. mmy/docs/press room/Speech310703 pdf 
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restrict the exercise of individual human rights, become necessary. '804 Therefore, privacy 
is not regarded as an intrinsic right that warrants specific or equal protection. 
The aspiration to turn Malaysia into a developed country intensifies activities for 
economic and social developments. The transformation of Malaysia from an agricultural 
based country to an industrial country plays a role in setting the government's policies 
and priority. Currently, the priority appears to be the well being of the nation through 
economic prosperity as well as political stability. In order to achieve this state of affairs 
there is a need for a harmonious and tolerant society. The existence of majoritianism 
suggests that the harmony and tolerance come at a price. Since the well being of the 
nation as a whole is the utmost important, the minorities must fit in with the goals 
pursued by the government. 
Fourthly, the lack of deliberation on privacy may also be attributed to the attitude of the 
society, which renders the subject more appropriate to be resolved in accordance with the 
culture and customary moral principles. Privacy as a value acclaimed a high regard in the 
social life of Malaysian society. From the perspective of the local culture, invasion of 
personal privacy is morally despicable. For instance, Malay customary practices 
abhorrence of any conduct deemed to interfere with other people's affairs. It is regarded 
as an immoral conduct to invade into other person's privacy. 805 
The customary practice may have the influence of Islamic teachings, which have been 
practiced by the Malays. The influence may find its basis on the status of Islamic law, 
which was recognised as the lex loci of the Malay Peninsular prior to the British rule. 806 
Under the Islamic teachings, privacy of a person has its normative justification associated 
with human dignity, which is an interest essential to life 807 If this interest is disregarded 
it may lead to the collapse of social order in society. However, no specific remedy is 
provided under the teaching if someone invades the privacy of others other than being a 
804 Human Rights and Good Governance, Opening Address at the Malaysian Human Rights Day 2004 
Conference. http"//www suhatani org my/en/press room/details asp? id=1153 805 There is a Malay proverb describes such an abhorrence 'Janganjaga ditepi kain orang' which is 
equivalent to the English `mind your own business'. 
8 Ibrahim, A. itid Joned, A. (1997) The Malaysian Legal System. Kuala Lumpur, 54-55. 
807 tali, M. It. (1998) Freedom of Expression in Islam. Kuala Lumpur, 22-3. 
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despicable and a sinful conduct. Thus, it could be said that the interest of privacy in 
Malay society is informed by local culture as well as divine moral principles. 
Though Malay culture takes privacy seriously, it does not mean that legal protection is 
unnecessary. There are departures from the expected moral standard that could be 
appropriately addressed by the law. These departures are among the focus of the next 
discussion. 
5.2 STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PRIVACY INTEREST 
Generally, there is no specific protection of right of privacy in Malaysia. This is similar 
to the position of privacy in the UK. The lack of protection may be due to the absence of 
a legal right of privacy and the value of privacy in the society. Even though there is no 
freestanding right of privacy in the Constitution, protection of privacy and privacy-related 
interests can be inferred from various legislative provisions. In this context, privacy is 
considered as a peripheral interest in the legal protection scheme. Therefore, it could be 
said that the protection accorded to privacy is piecemeal, incomplete and indirect. This 
state of affairs is similar to the UK except that right of privacy in the UK is recognised 
through the incorporation of the ECHR rights in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Furthermore, there is a limited protection of privacy afforded by the courts in the UK in 
relation to informational privacy. This is possible through the expansion of the existing 
legal framework particularly the principle of breach of confidence. 
Discussion on the protection of privacy in Malaysia may be made in accordance to the 
nature of privacy. For the purpose of this discussion, privacy is categorised into a 
personal zone of privacy or non-informational and informational privacy. Some 
protections are given to the personal zone of privacy and others are in relation to 
informational privacy. 
Unfortunately, a legal authority to support the existence of right of privacy in Malaysia is 
unavailable Perhaps this is due to the absence of privacy as a guaranteed constitutional 
right that could provide a separate cause of action and remedy. However, privacy as an 
interest is not totally an alien concept in the domestic legal landscape. The application of 
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the common law system, inherited from the British system, enables limited protection to 
privacy-related interests under certain legal principles such as defamation, nuisance, 
harassment and trespass. Nevertheless, there is a possibility for privacy to gain 
recognition under the constitutional framework considering the attitude of the courts in 
adopting a liberal approach in relation to fundamental rights. It is to this liberal approach 
that we now turn to. 
5.3 ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LIBERAL APPROACH 
There is no express provision on right of privacy in the Malaysian constitution. However, 
Article 5 (1) could provide the constitutional recognition for privacy. The article 
provides: 
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, save in 
accordance with law. 
There are two limbs in the provision, namely right to life and personal liberty. Both rights 
encompass privacy interest, but are distinct from each other, in the sense of a right to be 
let alone. Traditionally, the expression of life has been interpreted narrowly. A shift from 
a narrow to a broad and liberal meaning occurs when the Court of Appeal in Tan Teck 
Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor808explained that the term `life' is 
a wide concept, something more than a mere minimal existence. 809 In this regard, Gopal 
Sri Ram JCA said: 
I have reached the conclusion that the expression `life' appearing in 
Article 5 (1) does not refer to mere existence. It incorporates all those 
facets that are an integral part of life itself and those matters that go to 
form the quality of life. 810 
The liberal approach in this discussion relates to adjudication. The approach attaches 
importance to the individual's interests and perceives rights as acquiring high 
808 [1996] 1 MLJ 261. 
m See R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [ 1997] 1 MLJ 145. 
810 Ibid, 288. 
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exclusionary force. Though the approach would seem reluctant to accept public interest 
oriented arguments, nonetheless, the existence of harm or imminent danger would allow 
rights to be overridden. In this regard, the application of a liberal approach widens the 
horizon of right to life particularly in connection with the meaning of `life' in Article 5 
(1) of the constitution. 
The scope of fundamental liberties is expanded in Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v 
Liew Fook Chuan. 811 This is so when the court said that the right to livelihood is one of 
the fundamental liberties guaranteed under Part II of the Federal Constitution. A similar 
approach was adopted by the court in Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Hospital 
Besar Pulau Pinang v Utra Badi a/I K Perumal. 812 Gopal Sri Ram JCA in this case 
acknowledged that the term `life' covers a person's reputation. 813 A reputation is 
acknowledged as an interest associated with a normative value of human dignity that 
forms the basis for protection. Thus, it may be argued that deprivation of reputation 
would amount to deprivation of 'life' within Article 5 (1) of the Federal Constitution. 
Therefore, it is the right of every person in Malaysia to live with common human dignity. 
In addition, the court also affirmed that the right to life is the most precious value of 
human right. As such, the right should be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so 
as to fill it with significance and vitality by enhancing the dignity of the individual and 
the worth of the human person. 814 In expanding the scope of the right to life the court said 
that it `includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it 
namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over 
the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely 
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. '815 Thus, the 
judicial expansion of the meaning of `life' under the Constitution is wide enough to cover 
privacy as an aspect of human dignity. 
811 [1996] 1 MLJ 481,510. 
812 [2000] 3 MLJ 281. 
e13 Ibid, 296. 
814 The court referred to two Indian authorities in extending the meaning of life in article 5 (1), Francis 
Coralie v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 746 and Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v Dilipkumar AIR 
1983 SC 114. 
815 Per Bhagwati J in Francis Coralie v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 756,753. Quoted by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang v Utra Badi all K Perumal 
[2000] 3 MLJ 281. 
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Even though the cases may have shed some light on the possibility of the term `life' to 
include privacy to preserve and enhance the quality of life, there is yet a case law before 
the courts where it can be pronounced decisively. Research through Malaysian legal 
reports found only one case, Public Prosecutor v Haji Kassim, 816 where an invasion of 
privacy was mentioned in the context of Article 5 (1). Unfortunately, the court in that 
case did not deliberate on the point because the real issue was an admissibility of 
evidence. Nevertheless, support on right of privacy comes from extra judicial recognition 
when Gopal Sri Ram CJ, in delivering his keynote address at the Joint Seminar between 
the Industrial Court Malaysia Chairmen and the Bar Council Industrial Court Practice 
Committee, argued that the right of privacy is a facet of the concept of life that is 
protected by Article 5 (1). 817 The acknowledgment from a member of the bench is a 
promising prospect taking into consideration the wide scope of restrictions on 
fundamental rights. This could inspire a change in attitude as the context in which law 
operates changes. So too may the protection given by law. As basic economic needs are 
met, Malaysian society can devote more attention to privacy as an aspect of fundamental 
right in a democratic society. 
Judicial activism as shown by the courts through their willingness to depart from the 
traditional approach to a liberal and purposive approach may be a turning point for 
privacy interest becoming part of the human rights issue in the constitutional scheme. 
This is parallel with the attitude that the courts should adopt by keeping in tandem with 
the national ethos when interpreting provisions of a living document like the Federal 
Constitution. This is expressed by Raja Azlan Shah in Dato Menteri Othman bin 
Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus818 when he said that 'The 
Constitution is a living piece of legislation and that should be interpreted with less 
rigidity and more generosity than other acts'. Therefore, a constitutional provision should 
be construed `in a wide, and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of 
changing conditions and purposes so that the constitutional provision does not get 
atrophied or fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems 
: 16[1971]2MLJ114. 
817 [2001] 4 MLJA 81. 
818 [1981] 1 MU 29,32. 
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and challenges applies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by the 
Constitution. ' 819 On the basis of such an approach, it may be argued that the expansion of 
the scope of Article 5 (1) provides an opportunity for privacy to be introduced implicitly 
by the courts. 
On the other hand, although the courts have the power to extend the interpretation of the 
right of life as a fundamental right, 820 it is doubtful whether the courts are willing to 
pronounce the existence of the right of privacy. This is because of the uncertainty in the 
judicial approach in relation to the fundamental rights matter. 821 Arguably, the courts are 
inconsistent in applying a liberal and purposive approach in relation to fundamental 
rights. 822 Moreover, the impact of including privacy under the meaning of life could 
impose a positive obligation on the government's part to ensure the citizens their right of 
privacy. This could amount to meddling into the domain of the legislature and the 
executive, which the courts in Malaysia are not prepared to indulge. The role of the 
courts is to interpret the laws and whenever necessary to give effect to the purpose or 
object of the laws as enacted by the legislatures. 823 
The right of personal liberty under Article 5 (1) may also protect the interest of privacy in 
a limited sense. Personal liberty refers to rights relating to or concerning the person or 
body of the individual. 824 The courts have given a narrow interpretation to personal 
liberty. The Federal Court in Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong82s affirms 
this when Suffian LP said that: 
819 Per Bhagwati J in Francis Coralie v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 756,752. 
820 Article 128 (2) of the Federal Constitution empowers the Federal Court with a jurisdiction to determine 
a question arises as to the effect of any provision of the Constitution. 
821 Faruqi, S. Free Speech and the Constitution. (1992) 4 CLJ lxiv, lxxiii. 
822 See Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 72. See also Government of 
Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33, Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Idris [1977] 1 
MLJ 180, Jabar v Public Prosecutor [1995] and Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta [2003] 3 MLJ 1. 
e23 See per Haidar CJ in Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang Dan Seberang Perai v Shaik Zolkaffily Bin 
Shaik Natar & Ors [2003] 3 MLJ 705,715. 
824 Dicey argued that the essence of personal liberty is free from any physical restraint or coercion. See 
Dicey, A. The Introduction of Constitutional Law, 207. 
825 [1979] 2 MLJ 33. The court agreed with the interpretation given by the 
Indian court in Gopalan AIR 
1950 SC 27 that personal liberty is the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion. 
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we are convinced that the article only guarantees a person, citizen or 
otherwise, except an enemy alien, freedom from being "unlawfully 
detained"; the right, if he is arrested, to be informed as soon as may be of 
the grounds of his arrest and to consult and be defended by his own 
lawyer; the right to be released without undue delay and in any case within 
24 hours to be produced before a magistrate; and the right not to be further 
detained in custody without the magistrate's authority. It will be observed 
that these are all rights relating to the person or body of the individual. 926 
Personal liberty in Article 5 (1) does not include all facets deemed to be an integral part 
of life and those matters that form the quality of life. This is emphasised by the court in 
Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan827 when it rejected the approach 
that personal liberty in this regard should be generously interpreted to cover the aspect of 
life. Even with the strict interpretation of personal liberty, it could be argued that a person 
in Malaysia has the right to enjoy the privacy of his person from unlawful interference. 
However, the right is not absolute because it can be encroached `in accordance with the 
law'. 828 
Although there is no deliberation on privacy by the courts in the context of Article 5 (1), 
the interest it protects may include privacy in a limited sense, which is confined to a 
personal zone of privacy. This is so when personal liberty is confined to the person or 
body of an individual. On this premise, there is a constitutional issue in relation to right 
to be let alone when a group of pupils were subjected to body search for the purpose of 
detecting tattoos. 829 It may be argued that the act of searching for tattoos is unlawful as 
there is no legal provision empowering the authority to conduct body search for that 
purpose. This is a clear invasion of privacy that could invoke Article 5 (1) in relation to 
personal liberty. It is therefore suggested that the liberal and expansive approach 
exercised by the court in Utra Badi case be extended to privacy related issue. 
In the absence of an explicit constitutional right of privacy, reliance on other related 
causes of actions as the basis to establish privacy interest is required. This indirect 
826 mid, 34-5. 
827 [200213 MLJ 72. 
828 Article 5 (1) `... save in accordance with law. ' 829 Malaysian pupils strip-searched in satanic cult crackdown. 
http: //www. ananova. com/news/story/sm 362924 html 
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approach of protecting privacy has its own set back as it depends on the willingness of 
the courts to construe the relevant provision in order to give recognition to privacy. It 
may be too optimistic to assume that a positive development in this area is on the way, 
considering the reluctant attitude of the courts. 30 Although the constitutional provisions 
should be construed with less rigidity and more generosity than ordinary statutes, this 
does not mean that the courts are at a liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the 
Constitution. 831 
Arguably, if personal reputation can be accepted as part of a privacy interest, then on 
such a basis it could be argued that protection of privacy interest already exists under the 
constitutional scheme. Article 10 (2) (a) could afford support in contending that 
defamation is recognised as an interest that may restrict freedom of speech and 
expression. In other words, protecting the reputation of a person is more important in 
some circumstances than allowing the freedom of speech and expression. On this 
premise, it is inconceivable if a constitutional protection covers personal reputation but 
fail to extend to personal privacy. 
Alternatively, privacy may be included under the protection of morality as provided by 
Article 10 (2) (a) of the Constitution. The provision explicitly permits reliance on 
morality as a ground to restrict freedom of expression. However, to include privacy 
under the provision of morality could be difficult when the latter is given restrictive 
meaning. The word `morality' which appears in Article 10 (2) (a) and Article 11 (5) is 
referred to public morality and not private. 832 The court in Nordin Bin Salleh v Dewan 
Undangan Negeri Kelantan, 833 followed the interpretation in an Indian case of Mian 
Bashir v State ofJammu and Kashmir, 834 which ruled that the word morality in Article 10 
(2) (a) confined to sexual morality and not political morality. In addition, reliance on 
morality as a ground to develop privacy within the constitutional scheme is fraught with 
difficulty. This could be anticipated since Malaysia practices dual legal system where 
1930 Bari, A. Teaching Constitutional Law in Malaysia: An Appraisal. (1999) 1 MLI clxvii, clxxiv. 831 Merdeka University Bhd v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356. 832 Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 513,525. 
833 [19921 1 MLJ 343,358. 
834 AIR 1982. 
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Islamic law is part and parcel of the Malaysian legal system. The main difficulty would 
be in relation to the acceptable interpretation of morality and its application to 
Malaysians, Muslims and non-Muslims. For instance, a close proximity relationship 
between unmarried couple is considered as an immoral behavior under the Islamic 
teaching but may not be so in a secular society. 
5.4 PRIVACY UNDER THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
Another constitutional provision, which has an implicit effect on privacy interest, is right 
to property under Article 13 (1). The article provides that: 
No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law. 
The proprietary right, though considered as one of the hallmark of democracy, 835 is not 
absolute and unqualified. The same provision allows for deprivation of the right that is 
legally executed according to the law. The right enables a proprietor to have exclusive 
enjoyment of"a property against any unlawful interference. In this regard the privacy of 
the proprietor is safeguarded against unlawful act such as trespass or nuisance. 
There is implicit protection of personal privacy in proprietary right under section 44 (1) 
(a) of the National Land Code, which provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other written law for the time 
being in force, any person or body to whom (under this Act or a previous 
land law) land has been alienated, reserved land has been leased or temporary 
occupation license (including a license so styled under a previous land law) 
has been granted in respect of any land, shall be entitled to: 
(a) the exclusive use and enjoyment of so much of the column of airspace 
above the surface of the land, and so much of the land below that surface, as 
is reasonably necessary to the lawful use and enjoyment of the land; 
Thus, the exclusive use and enjoyment of land and airspace is a privacy interest. For 
instance, the court in Chen Yue Kiew (F) v Angkasamas Sdn Bhd836 found that a land 
835 Jain, M. P. and Xavier, G. Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Malaysia (Pt I) (1996) 2 MLJA 29. 836 [2003] 4 MLJ 365. See also Karuppannan v, Balakrishnen (Chong Lee Chin & Ors, third parties) 
[1994] 3 MLJ 584,584. 
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owner is entitled to an exclusive use of his land and the air space above the land. The 
court would not hesitate to grant a perpetual injunction against anyone trespassing into 
the land of another or into the air space above it. Similarly, in the UK, the court in Baron 
Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews and General Ltd837 faced with the problem of balancing the 
right of an owner to enjoy the use of his land against the rights of the general public. In 
this case the plaintiffs land was flown over and an aerial photograph of his house taken 
without his knowledge and consent. The plaintiff sued the defendant for trespassing and 
invasion of privacy. The court held that a landowner's rights in the air space above his 
property are not extended to an unlimited height. The court also held that the act of taking 
a photograph from the air space above the ordinary use and enjoyment is not unlawful. 
However, Griffiths J attributed the act as `monstrous invasion privacy. ' 
Exclusive enjoyment of property is also an issue in K Mahunaran v Osmond Chiang 
Siang Kuan. 838 In this case, the plaintiff and the defendant were owners of two premises 
respectively. The two premises comprised of double-storey terrace houses separated by a 
common party wall. The defendant concreted the common party wall at the front portion 
of the premises without the consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff applied for an order for 
the defendant to pull down and remove the wall put up by him and restores the same to its 
original position or as closely akin thereto. The plaintiff also alleged that the said 
construction had impeded and affected his light, ventilation and view. The court decided 
that the defendant had committed an act of trespass by demolishing the original party 
wall and building a new party wall. 
The above-mentioned cases show that legal protection on privacy-related interest is 
available in Malaysia. Apparently, privacy is the crux in protecting the right to property. 
However, the legal protection is not accorded to privacy per se. This establishes the fact 
that protection of privacy interest in Malaysia is indirect and piecemeal. 
837 [1978] QB 479. 
838 [1996] 5 MLJ 293. 
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5.5 PRIVACY INTEREST AND LEGISLATION 
Despite the implicit constitutional provisions on privacy interest, there are several 
ordinary statutory provisions that explicitly include privacy as an element in protecting 
other main interest. For instance, section 509 of the Penal Code criminalises words or 
gestures intended to insult the modesty of a person. The section provides: 
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any person, utters any word, 
makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such 
word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen 
by such person, or intrudes upon the privacy of such person, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or 
with fine, or with both. 
Obviously, the main interest in the provision is with regard to the modesty of a person. In 
this regard, intrusion of privacy alone does not amount to an offence. The provision can 
only be invoked if an act of intrusion is intended to insult the modesty of a person. 839 
Another relevant provision implicitly dealing with privacy is section 29b (4) of the 
Moneylenders Act 1951. Again, privacy is not the main interest in the protection scheme. 
The law provides: 
For the purposes of subsection (1), the doing of an act of harassment or 
intimidation upon another person includes the making of statements, 
sounds or gestures, or exhibiting of any object intending that such word or 
sound shall be heard or that such person shall see such gesture or object or 
intruding upon the privacy of such person. 
The main purpose of section 29b of the Moneylenders Act is to prohibit moneylenders 
from harassing or intimidating the borrowers. It is considered as harassment or an 
intimidation if the conducts mentioned in sub section (1) and (4) intrude the privacy of 
839 See Kong Lai Soo v Ito Kean [1973] 2 MLJ 150. 
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the borrower. Thus, the provision is not meant to protect the privacy of the borrower per 
se. Suffice to say, intrusion of privacy is an important element in order to establish the 
act of harassment or intimidation on the part of the moneylender. 
In addition, Child Act 2001 does provide protection of privacy of a child under eighteen 
years old. Section 15 of the Act imposes restriction on the media from reporting or 
publishing information regarding a child involves in the following situations: 
(a) any step taken against a child concerned or purportedly concerned in 
any criminal act or omission, be it at the pre-trial, trial or post-trial 
stage; 
(b) any child in respect of whom custody is taken under Part V (Children 
in need of care and protection) 
(c) any child in respect of whom any of the offences specified in the First 
Schedule has been or is suspected to have been committed; or 
(d) any proceedings under Part VI (Children in need of protection and 
rehabilitation). 840 
In addition, section 15 (1) prohibits the media from revealing the name, address, 
educational institution, or any particulars calculated to lead to the identification of the 
child. The identity of a child cannot be disclosed due to his involvement either as being 
the person against or in respect of whom action is taken or as being a witness to the 
action. 841 However, such a prohibition can be dispensed with if the Court for Children is 
satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to do so and in the case of an application by or 
with the authority of a protector. 842 
The protection of the privacy of a child under section 15 emphasises on the need to 
protect the interest of children. Admittedly, the prohibition against publication by the 
press poses a chilling effect on the freedom of the press. Since press freedom is not an 
absolute right, the freedom can be overridden by the interest of children, which is 
&10 Section 15 (1) bf the Child Act 2001. 
"'Op cit section 15 (2). 
842 Ibid. 
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regarded as important particularly in protecting their welfare and upbringing. 
843 
Apparently, the restriction imposed by the Act on press freedom to publish is deemed to 
be necessary and expedient under the provision of Article 10 (2) (a) of the Constitution. 
Thus, the courts have no power to question the legality of the restrictions. In relation to 
this, it is uncertain whether the conduct of the journalists disclosing the identity of three 
girls, aged fourteen, who had lodged a police report alleging they had been raped by their 
acquaintances, can be caught under the provision of section 15 (1) and (2) of the Act. 
844 it 
could be argued that if the stage of pre- trial in section 15 (2) (a) covers the act of making 
a police report, then the journalists may have committed an offence under the Act 
pursuant to section 15 (4) of the Act. The section provides: 
Any person who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) commits an offence and 
shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit 
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. 
Unlike in the UK where freedom of expression is weighted heavily, the privacy of a child 
is not a ground that always overrides the right under Article 10 of the Convention. 
Privacy of a child is paramount only when there is an issue of upbringing, which the 
`paramount principle' under section 1 (1) of the Children Act 1998 applies 
845 The child's 
welfare relating to upbringing automatically prevails over the rights of other parties. 
Freedom of expression acquires a primacy status in In the matter of X (a Child 
846 In 
considering section 12 (4) of the HRA and Article 10 of the Convention, the court ruled 
that `this is not a balancing exercise in which the scales are evenly positioned at the 
commencement of the exercise. On the contrary, the scales are weighted at the beginning 
so that Article 10 prevails unless one of the defined derogations applies when given a 
narrow interpretation. ' 
843 In re Z (A Minor) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [1995] 4 All ER 961. 
" Ong, A. Lapse in journalistic ethics in NST, Star draws flak. Malaysiakin, 26 January2004 
http: //www. malaysiakini. com/news/2004012600113808. ph2. 'Protect our children'? Certain media don't! 
http: //www ieffooi. com/archives/001523. php 
845 The section provides `When a court determines any question with respect to upbringing of a child or the 
administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare 
shall be the court's paramount consideration. ' 
"6 [2001] 1 FCR 541. 
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The progress in the economic and commercial sector in Malaysia has an impact on 
privacy-related interests. In order to be engaged in credible and safe commercial 
transactions, informational privacy needs to be safeguarded. In pursuant to this 
development, Malaysia has enacted a few cyber laws such as Digital Signature Act 1997, 
Telemedicine Act 1997 and proposed a Personal Data Protection Bill. These legislative 
instruments consider privacy as an important interest to necessitate legal protections. 
847 
These laws are part of the legal infrastructure in regulating information and 
communication through cyber space. The purpose of these cyber laws is to provide legal 
infrastructures and facilitate the growth of multimedia industry and electronic commerce 
in Malaysia. 848 
The Digital Signature Act 1997 lays the framework for electronic commerce by 
legalizing digital signatures for the purpose of business transactions. The interest of the 
government and business industries in digital signature technology is expanding mainly 
because electronic communication has become widespread. Digital signatures are needed 
for electronic commerce and communication so that electronic transactions can be 
executed with confidence. Section 72 (1) of the Act provides for obligation of secrecy. 
The section provides: 
Except for the purposes of this Act, no person who has access to any 
record, book, register, correspondence, information, document or other 
material obtained under this Act shall disclose such record, book, register, 
correspondence, information, document or other material to any other 
person. 
This provision safeguards personal information against disclosure. As such it also 
protects privacy interest in individual's personal information. But it is unsaved in case of 
impersonation of identity occurs by way of unauthorised use of private key849or computer 
847 Other laws include under the cyber law scheme are the Communication and Multimedia Act 1998 and 
Computer Crimes Act 1997. 
848Zainol, Z. A. Electronic Commerce: A Comparative Analysis of the Malaysia Digital Signature Act 
1997 and the Singapore Electronic Transaction Act 1998. Paper presented at the 15th BILETA Conference. 
University of Warwick, Coventry, England. http: //www. bileta. ac. uk/00papers/zainot/html 
849 Section 2 of the Act interpret privacy key as the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature. 
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hacking. This will enable the impersonator to gain access and retrieve any information 
on the certified screen. 
Similarly, Telemedicine Act 1997 contains provisions that to a certain extent protect 
informational privacy of the patient. According to section 2 of the Act, telemedicine 
means `the practice of medicine using audio, visual and data communications. ' Section 5 
(1) of the Act provides: 
Before a fully registered medical practitioner practices telemedicine in 
relation to a patient, the fully registered medical practitioner shall obtain 
the written consent of the patient. 
The consent given by the patient is not valid unless the practitioner informs the patient 
that any information obtained or disclosed in practicing the telemedicine interaction is 
protected by confidentiality. The consent also is invalid if the practitioner fails to inform 
the patient regarding sub section (2) (d), which provides: 
That any image or information communicate or used during or resulting 
from telemedicine interaction which can be identified as being that of or 
about the patient will not be disseminated to any researcher or any other 
person without the consent of the patient. 
The protection of information in sub section (2) (d) is a procedural matter related to the 
obligatory requirement to obtain the patient's consent. The protection does not exist 
independently whereby action can be taken in case of intentional disclosure of 
information without consent. In the absence of this provision, the remedy that may be 
claimed by the patient could be found under different cause of action such as breach of 
contract or breach of confidence. The Act also does not clarify on information that needs 
prior consent before disclosure. It is inconceivable to assume that the Act covers all 
types of information related to the practicing of telemedicine. 
Malaysia is in the process of finalising a personal data protection legislation that will 
balance consumer privacy with the preservation of national and public security. The 
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proposed legislation is intended to protect informational privacy of individuals and to 
ensure that data collectors use the data only for the purpose specified during collection. 
The law is part of the exercise to place Malaysia parallel to the rest of the world in 
providing legal protections for cyber matters, which is in co-ordination with the ongoing 
development of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) 850 According to the former 
Energy, Communications and Multimedia Minister Datuk Amar Leo Moggie, a personal 
data protection law would enhance privacy rights, but "it is also important to recognise 
that individual privacy rights are never absolute. i85' 
Privacy is the core interest, which form part of the main features in the proposed Personal 
Data Protection Bill. It will provide legal protections for personal data to ensure secrecy 
and integrity in the collection, processing and utilisation of data transmitted through the 
electronic network. The proposed law is an effort to make Malaysia attractive for 
commercial transaction purposes by providing legal protection to data commodity. The 
Ministry is looking at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) guidelines, European Union Data Directive and the United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong and New Zealand legislation as models for the proposed Act. 
The Bill aims to regulate the collection, possession, processing and use of personal data 
by any person/organisation, including the government, so as to provide protection to an 
individual's personal data and safeguard the individual's privacy. The legislation will also 
establish a set of common rules and guidelines on the handling and treatment of personal 
data by any person/organisation. Personal facts, which are disseminated, must be 'private' 
in order to pursue a cause of action for invasion of privacy. It may be contended that an 
individual's facts, which are contained in commercial databases, although personal in a 
literal sense, are not private in a legal capacity. This is because there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy as to those facts. The stated objectives of the Bill are: 
(i) To provide adequate security and privacy in handling personal information; 
850 Ministry of Energy, Water and Communications, Personal Data Protection. 
http: //www. ktkm. gov my/template0l ash? 851Sharif, R. Data protection law to balance private, public interest. The Star, 29 October 2001. 
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(ii) To create confidence among consumers and users of both networked and non- 
networked industries; 
(iii) To accelerate uptake of e-transactions; 
(iv) To promote a secure electronic environment in line with Multimedia Super Corridor 
objectives. 
The willingness of the government to introduce law that provides protection to 
informational privacy reflects a strengthening commitment to privacy. It is a positive 
development as far as right of privacy is concerned in Malaysia. Until such a right is 
firmly established within a constitutional scheme through either the legislature or 
judiciary, Malaysians have to rely on the existing insufficient protection of privacy that is 
a by-product of other interests. Despite the fact that the proposed law will introduce an 
aspect of informational privacy, the recognition of privacy by the courts as fundamental 
human rights remains to be seen. 
In addition, the existence of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 provides 
protection on telecommunications privacy. For instance, Section 234 of the Act prohibits 
unlawful interception of communications and unlawful disclosure of authorised 
interception. In practice, provisions in the Communications & Multimedia Act 1998 
restricting telecommunications interception can be ignored or overridden by the Internal 
Security Act 1960 and the Computer Crime Act of 1997. 
The emphasis on privacy as an individual right in Malaysia is propelled by political and 
economic reasons. It is influenced by the aspiration of the government to transform the 
country into becoming a developed country by the year 2020. This is reflected in the 
Vision 2020 master plan. The creation of Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) is a step 
toward the realisation of the aspiration. In achieving this goal the government pledges to 
ensure free flow of information on the internet by companies accredited with MSC status. 
This assurance is seen as a double standard because it applies only to those companies 
with MSC status. However, scepticism is looming as to whether this assurance can be 
maintained when the police detained four people under the Internal Security Act 1060 on 
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suspicion of spreading rumors of disturbances in Kuala Lumpur in August 1998. The 
police tracked their activities on the Internet with the assistance of the main internet 
service provider Mimos Berhad. Control on news and information on the internet is also 
exercised when the police raided the operating office of an independent online press, 
Malaysiakini, and confiscated computers on the ground of alleged seditious article 
published by the press. These instances illustrate that the constitutional blessing of 
necessity and expediency perpetuates the employment of institutional mechanism in 
restricting free expression. 
There is a dilemma between the need for internet regulation and economic development 
of the country. Given the emphasis by the Malaysian government on multimedia and 
information technology and the policy of encouraging investors, it is unlikely that strict 
regulations will be employed in this area. To do so would be a disincentive for interested 
companies to join the MSC scheme. The aspiration of making Malaysia as a hub country 
in the area of information technology particularly in Asian region requires adequate 
infrastructures in terms of physical development as well as legal protections. Needless to 
say, unprecedented advances in information technology make it possible for strangers to 
invade electronically into another person's life. It allows corporations and the 
government to accumulate vast stores of personal information in databases. Fear of 
disclosures of this kind of information has enhanced the acceptability of permitting the 
government and the courts to control the flow of information regarding citizens. 
Consequently, the right of privacy emerges as one of the highly valued right in a society, 
which reflects the profound importance of this fundamental interest in a modem society. 
The protection of privacy in the cyber arena is the result of the government's 
commitment to develop the sector of information technology in pursuing the goal of 
being a developed country by 2020. On this premise, it could be argued that protection of 
privacy is for economic purposes in information and communication technology rather 
than the prominence of the conceptual foundation of the right in a democratic society. 852 
In this sense, protection of privacy is characterised as a cost of doing business rather than 
852 Privacy is a matter of balance rather than human right. See Azmi, I. E-Commerce and Privacy Issues: 
An Analysis of the Personal Data Protection Bill. (2002) 16 IRLCT, 326. 
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ensuring a public good. 853 Nevertheless, it serves as a catalyst in promoting privacy as a 
valued interest that requires protection not only from the information technology 
perspective but also most importantly as a personal right of individuals. 
5.6 COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY INTEREST 
Historically, the common law principles were introduced into Malay Peninsular during 
the British colonial period. The law was administered through the British judicial system 
and it became part of the domestic legal system. 854 The application of the common law is 
by virtue of Article 160 (2) of the Federal Constitution, which interprets the word `law' 
as: 
Written law, the common law in so far as it is in operation in the 
Federation or any part thereof, and any custom or usage having the force 
of law in the Federation or any part thereof. 
In MBF Holdings Bhd & Anor v Houng Hai Kong & Ors855 the defendants argued that 
'existing laws' in Article 162 of the Constitution do not include the common law of 
England. It was argued in this case that the application of the common law of England is 
merely an application of precedent in the process of judicial decision making. Thus, the 
common law rules are to be regarded as valid for that purpose only. However, the court 
did not agree with the learned counsel's interpretation of Article 162. The court said that 
the common law is not a mere precedent for the purposes of making a judicial decision. 
Instead, the common law is a substantive law that has the same force and effect as written 
law. It has been accepted in this country (Malaysia) and is recognised as a binding 
authority. It is therefore, untrue to say that under Article 162 the common law has ceased 
to exist in Malaysia. 
853 At a conference in April 2000, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi stressed the 
role of the private sector in creating a safe and private environment in which electronic commerce could 
flourish. In likening on-line privacy protection to the steps banks had to take to make ATMs safe, the 
Deputy Prime Minister characterized privacy safeguards as a cost of doing business rather than a public 
good. See Sarban Singh, Match our commitment, DPM tells private firms. The New Straits Time, 19 April, 
2000. 
854 Ibrahim, A. and Joned, A. (1987) The Malaysian Legal System. Kuala Lumpur, 75. 
ass [1993] 2 MLJ 516. 
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5.6.1 COMMON LAW UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE CIVIL LAW ACT 1956 
The application of English common law principles is governed by the Civil Law Act 
1956. In the absence of local statutory provision, the courts may apply the English 
common law and equity. Section 3 (1) of the Act imports English common law and 
equity on all subjects as at the cut-off date of 7 April 1956 in all the states of Malaysia. 
However, the acceptance of English common law and equity is subject to the proviso of 
that section where `... it shall be applied so far only as the circumstances of the States of 
Malaysia and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as 
local circumstances render necessary. ' The impact of the proviso is to rule out direct 
application of English common law. This will allow the local common law to progress 
on the basis of English principles. 
The effect of the cut-off date is to exclude any subsequent development in English 
common law. 856 Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ in the Supreme Court case of Chung Khiaw 
Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor857 clarifies this effect where he explained 
that the development of the common law after 7 April 1956 is entirely in the hands of the 
courts of this country. This is illustrated in the case of Syarikat Batu Sinar Sdn Bhd & 
Ors v UMBC Finance Bhd & Ors. 858 In this case, Peh Swee Chin J refused to follow the 
decision of the English court in Moorgate case (1977) AC 890, on the point concerning 
failure to have an ownership claim registered, on the ground that the practice in West 
Malaysia combined with the statutory provisions of the Road Traffic Ordinance 1958 in 
regard to the registration of ownership claim, would constitute such a distinctive local 
circumstance of the local inhabitants of West Malaysia. With regard to the proviso of 
section 3 (1) of the Civil Law Act 1956, the judge said: 
We have to develop our own common law just like what Australia has 
been doing by directing our minds to the 'local circumstances' or 'local 
inhabitants'. 85 
856 Lee Kee Choong v Empat Nombor Ekor (NS) Sdn & Ors [197612 MW 93,95. 
857 [1990] 1 MU 356,361. 
858 [1990] 3 MU 468. 
859 Ibid, 470. 
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Moreover, the court in Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon860 explained 
that `the common law... applied and decided by our courts after 7 April 1956, by virtue 
of the Civil Law Act 1956, has become part of our law. ' Previously, the application of the 
law is also made possible by way of binding precedent whereby the courts in Malaysia 
are bound to follow decisions made by the Privy Council. However, reference to Privy 
Council is abolished in 1986, which makes the decision of the Council no longer binding 
on the local courts but reduced to persuasive authority. 
Reliance on English common law principles does not necessarily imply that the law in 
Malaysia remains static and does not develop. 61 The Malaysian judiciary is willing to 
draw upon common law principles and to consider decisions of other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions for guidance in civil as well as criminal law matters. This position is 
postulated in the judgment by Raja Azian Shah in Raja Mokhtar bin Raja Yaacob v 
Public Trustee, Malaysia862 when he concurred that the decisions of the Commonwealth 
courts though are not binding, should be given the highest respect. 
5.6.2 COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY- 
RELATED INTERESTS 
In Malaysia, common law protections are not directly accorded to privacy per se. 
Protections are mainly on the interest related to privacy, involving private facts, 
reputation and proprietary interest. Most of the protections are provided by principles in 
the area of law of tort especially trespass, nuisance, defamation and breach of confidence. 
The law of trespass does not concern privacy-related interests directly. The main object 
of the law is to protect proprietary interests. Nevertheless, it provides an indirect 
protection to privacy-related interests whereby the interest in land, by way of possession, 
cannot be encroached. Trespass to land is a direct entry on the land of another, and is 
960 [1991] 1 MLJ 167,177-78. 
861 Commonwealth ofAustralia v Midford (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 475. 
862 t197012 MLJ 151,152. 
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actionable per se, without proof of special damage. It is essentially an interference with 
possession of land rather than ownership. 863 
The court in Kwong Hing Realty Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Building Society Bhd (American 
International Assurance Co Ltd, Third Party)864 referred to an English text book entitled 
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (17th Ed) for general principles regarding trespass to land. It 
consists of any unjustifiable intrusion by one person upon the land in the possession of 
another. In this case, the respondent is the registered owner of a piece of land while the 
adjacent lot belongs to the appellant. The appellant's predecessor-in-title had applied for 
permission to build side windows protruding into the respondent's land and undertook to 
remove them so they would not obstruct the construction of any building later on. 
Subsequently, the respondent, who intended to build a hotel on his land, asked the 
appellant to remove the protrusions, but the appellant failed to do so. The respondent also 
alleged trespass against the appellant for constructing a side exit, sewerage system, 
manholes and septic tank that encroached on his land. The court held that the law has 
clearly spelt out the right of an individual over his land, inter alia, he is given the 
exclusive use of the airspace above the surface of his land. Therefore, the appellant had 
no legal right to encroach into the airspace of the land unless the respondent allowed it. 
Similarly, the court in Segar Restu (M Sdn Bhd v Wong Kai Chuan & Anor865 referred to 
English case in Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd v Dumbreck866 particularly on the 
meaning of trespasser. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had 
trespassed and constructed buildings on his land. The court decided that in law, a 
trespasser is one who wrongfully enters on land in the possession of another, and has 
neither the right nor permission to be on the land. That was a fitting description of the 
defendants and they had not satisfied the court that there was a fair or reasonable 
probability of them having a real or bona fide defence. The plaintiff is therefore entitled 
863 yip Shou Shan v Sin Heap Lee-Marubeni Sdn Bhd [2002] 5 MU 113. See also Karuppannan v 
Balakrishnen (Chong Lee Chin & Ors, Third Parties) [1994] 3 MU 584 and Julaika Bivi v Mydin [1961] 
MLJ 310. 
864 [1997] 5 MLJ 670. 
865 [1994] 3 MU 530. See also Mohamed Said v Fatimah [1962] 1 MU 328 in which the court referred to 
Thompson v Ward [1953] 2 QB, 159 per Evershed MR with regard to possession of land. 866 [1929] AC 358,371. 
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to recover damages in trespass even though he has sustained no actual loss. In defining 
who is a trespasser, the court followed Lord Dunedin's description that a trespasser is one 
who wrongfully enters on land in the possession of another, and has neither the right nor 
permission to be on the land. 
The indirect protection of privacy under trespass can also be found in nuisance. Nuisance 
is another area of common law, which is basically a substantial interference in the right to 
enjoy property. Protection of the right is available only to the complainant who has an 
interest in the land. It may thus be noted that exclusive enjoyment of land is the main 
interest that the law seeks to protect. 
In Malaysia, the law of nuisance as developed by the English courts has been followed. 
This is exercised by the court in Seong Fatt v Dunlop Malaysia Industries Sdn Bhd. 867 In 
this case the court held that the continuous fall of water from one land to the other land 
which caused a considerable damage was a nuisance. In another case, Azman Bin Mohd 
Yussof & Ors v Vasaga Sdn Bhd, 868 the plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the 
defendant from operating a disco and pub business on the grounds that the business 
disturbed their peace, tranquility and safety. The plaintiff argued that the loud music from 
the premise caused vibration to the building and others. The court held that interference 
with the enjoyment of property includes making unreasonable noises or vibration. In 
arriving at the decision, the court referred to Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltdd69that held 
that loud noises and vibration 'interferes with one's enjoyment, one's quiet, one's personal 
freedom, and anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the senses or the nerves'. 
Apparently, the existing common law principles afford protection to privacy indirectly. 
However, there are other areas of law that works to protect privacy-related interests more 
directly such as defamation and breach of confidence. 
The law of defamation is about giving protection to a person from being disrepute. It 
seeks to protect a person's dignity and honor. In any action for defamation whether for 
libel or slander, the plaintiff must prove that the matter complained of. (i) is defamatory 
867 L19841 1 MD 286. 
868 [2001] 6 MLJ 217. 
869 (1961) 1 WLR 683. 
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(defamation) (ii) refers to the plaintiff (identification) (iii) has been published to a third 
person (publication). 
It does not mean that every publication that caused a person to be ridiculed by right- 
thinking members of the public or to lower him in their estimation would result in 
liability for defamation. If the fact that was published were true, then it would serve as a 
complete defence. This makes the law of defamation unsuitable for protection of privacy 
because invasion of privacy is mainly about publication of true personal information. In 
addition, if the comment is an honest comment made based on facts, then there would be 
a qualified defense. Hence, defamation strikes at the core interest in privacy, which is a 
person's dignity. The tort involves injury not to an individual per se, but rather to an 
individual's reputation as perceived by others in that individual's community. 
Should the press not be considered differently since the press has a role to play in 
providing the public with information? Apparently, the importance of the press does not 
relinquish them from legal responsibilities. Moreover, Article 8 (1) of the Constitution 
provides for equality under the law. The effect of the provision is that the press in 
Malaysia is under the same rule of law as applicable to the rest of the citizens. The issue 
of a distinct status of the press was raised in Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman 
Ya'kub v Bre Sdn Bhd. 870 The court refused to accord the press any special status in 
considering the existence of a duty to publish a matter of public interest. Richard 
Malanjum J. explained: 
A matter of public interest does not necessarily entitle anyone to assume a 
duty to communicate it to others especially if any statement related to that 
matter may be libellous. Further, journalists, editors and newspapers do 
not have any special positions so as to entitle them to rely on the defence 
of qualified privilege on any matters which they may publish. 871 
Protection of privacy in Malaysia could also be considered in the context of trade secrets 
and confidential information. Protection of trade secrets and confidential information are 
870 [1996] 1 MLJ 393. 
sal [bid, 411. 
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based on common law principle of breach of confidence. Primarily, breach of confidence 
seeks to protect property right rather than the interest of privacy. With regard to this, the 
law protects confidential information relating to business or trade secrets. Currently, 
Malaysia adopts the common law principles of confidentiality as applied by the UK 
courts. An action for breach of confidence is not limited to circumstances where there is 
a contractual relationship. The scope of the law is widened when the courts recognised 
that breach of confidence as one of the actions in tort. One of the issues in Schmidt 
Scientific Sdn Bhd v Ong Han Suan872 was whether there is an action in tort for breach of 
confidence. This case involved a disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets 
of ex-employer. The court took into account the view expressed by Lord Denning MR in 
Seager v Copydex Ltd873 in which equity would interfere to prevent those receiving 
information in confidence from taking unfair advantage of it and decided that a breach of 
confidence should also be regarded as a tort with damages to be awarded to the 
successful plaintiff. 
The extension of the law from the law of contract to tort paves the way for privacy to be 
given protection by the court. The possibility of privacy to receive protection is 
promising when the court in Electro CAD Australia Pty Ltd & Ors v Mejati RCS Sdn Bhd 
& Ors874 extends the meaning of confidential information to include literary and artistic 
secrets, personal secrets and, public and government secrets. Although the scope of 
information is extended, the main interest under the law still relates to property right. In 
this regard, the court remarked that: 
Due to the rapid and highly volatile revolution in technology and with the 
concept and subsequent incept of the Multi Media Super Corridor, the 
courts must take a broader view of the meaning of property and include 
information as such. 8" 
In this case, the High Court addressed the problems ensued when a director of one 
company leaves and sets up a business in competition with his former company. The 
director in question had been a director of a company set up in Malaysia to market a car 
872 [1997] 5 Mt. J 632. 
g73 (1967) 2 All ER 416. 
874 [1998] 3 MLJ 422. 
873 Ibid, 451. 
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theft prevention device that had been developed in Australia. It is also worth noting that 
the judge rejected an argument by the defendants that no confidential information had 
been appropriated by them in their design because the plaintiffs had abandoned a patent 
application for their design which showed that it was not inventive and therefore could 
not rise to the level of a protected trade secret. The judge stated: 
To my mind it is necessary to note that a claim to confidential information 
does not mean that the information must pass the patent test. It is only 
necessary to show that the information is confidential and cannot be found 
in the public domain. 876 
The defendants contended that the information imparted prior to the execution of the 
confidentiality agreement was not imparted under any obligation of confidence. The court 
held that the information, although imparted before the execution of the confidentiality 
agreement, was indeed imparted under an obligation of confidence as it was imparted 
during negotiations. The need for confidence therefore must be implied and must exist 
throughout the period of negotiations. 
Though the local common law is progressing incrementally, reliance on English 
principles will still continue on persuasive basis by virtue of section 3 and 5 of the Civil 
Law Act 1965. In mature systems, the comparative method is now very prominent. 
Reference to other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, Singapore and India will 
continue to play a role in developing the domestic legal system. Nevertheless, the 
development on protection of privacy as has taken place in the UK has not, so far, 
happened in Malaysia. The protection of privacy in the UK is the result of the 
incorporation of the Convention rights by the UK Human Rights Act 1998. The 1998 
Act which heightened discussions on right of privacy in the UK, is consequently moving 
toward recognising the right of privacy. In addition, the courts in the UK have the 
opportunity to deliberate on the right of privacy when cases relating to the issue arise. 
The focus on privacy through the process of adjudication in courts helps to stimulate the 
development in the UK. In contrast, such development is lacking in Malaysia. For 
instance, the courts in Malaysia missed the opportunity to deliberate on the issue of right 
876 ibid. 
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of privacy when a case involving a celebrity was tried under the criminal law. In this 
case, her landlord who had installed a surveillance camera in her apartment without her 
knowledge invaded the privacy of the celebrity. 877 
5.7 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF MALAYSIA 
5.7.1 THE FORMATION 
Malaysia as part of the ASEAN states has displayed a general distrust of supranational 
institutions in dealing with human rights at the national level. Paragraph 24 of the 
Bangkok Declaration878 states: 
We welcome the important role played by national institutions in the 
genuine and constructive promotion of human rights, and believe that the 
conceptualisation and eventual establishment of such institutions are best 
left for the States to decide. 
Malaysia's active participation in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) stimulates the formation of the national human rights institution. The creation 
of the Human Rights Commission marks a new chapter in Malaysian human rights 
culture and awareness. Despite sceptics and critics on its establishment, the existence of 
the Commission is a significant step towards preserving and extending human rights 
issues at the national level. A strong critic comes from Lim Kit Siang, an opposition 
political leader, who argues that the Human Rights Commission Act had from the 
beginning crippled the Commission by giving a very narrow and restricted definition of 
human rights. 879 
The existence of the Human Rights Commission is under the auspice of The Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999. The Act sets out the powers and functions of 
gn I wasn't lying, says Ahmad Bakhtiar. Bernama, 18 November 2004. 
httD: //www. bemama. com/bemama/v3/news. php? id=62031 
878 The Bangkok Declaration in 1993 is adopted by thirty four Asian states at the Asian Regional Meeting, 
a preparatory to the Vienna Conference. 
$' Lim Kit Siang, Human Rights Commission- irrelevant to human rights? 
http: //malaysia. netldap/sgar9907. htm 
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the commission for the protection and promotion of human rights in Malaysia. The Act 
also states that the Commission is empowered to have regard to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 but only "to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the federal 
constitution". The inclusion of the UDHR in the 1999 Act could pave a way for the 
incorporation of the UDHR principles especially the right of privacy into the local 
statutory framework. This is an issue that will be analysed later in this chapter. 
5.7.2 BASIC FEATURES OF THE ACT 1999 
There are four basic features of the Act that put the credibility of the Commission under 
scrutiny. First, section 2 of the Act confined human rights to fundamental liberties as 
enshrined in Part II of the Federal Constitution. The confinement is criticised as 
unsatisfactory because it narrows the scope of human rights to nine areas of fundamental 
rights. The qualified nature of some of the constitutional rights such as freedom of 
speech, assembly and association, may be seen to render the function of the Commission 
in protecting human rights superficial. Implicitly, the Commission will have to recognise 
the application of the repressive laws such as the Internal Security Act 1960, the Official 
Secrets Act 1950, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1986, the Sedition Act 1948, 
the Police Act 1967, and the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 880 
Moreover, the existence of several laws that undermine human rights as referred to by 
section 2 casts a doubt as to the credibility of the Commission. With a limited role and 
mandate given to it, the Commission may not be able to effectively protect human rights. 
Nevertheless, the Commission would be able to promote a better understanding of the 
rights through education and awareness. The role of the Commission is more that of a 
watchdog rather than an arbitrator of disputes. 
The second feature of the Act is section 4 (2) which accord the powers of the 
Commission. It provides that: 
880 Netto, A. Malaysia's rights commission starts on wrong foot. Asia Times Online, 25 April 2000. 
hq: //www. atimes. com/se-asia/BD25AeOl. html 
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For the purpose of discharging its functions, the Commission may exercise 
any or all of the following powers: 
(a) to promote awareness of human rights and to undertake research by 
conducting programs, seminars and workshops and to disseminate and 
distribute the results of such research; 
(b) to advise the government and/or the relevant authorities of complaints 
against such authorities and recommend to the government and/or 
such authorities appropriate measures to be taken; 
(c) to study and verify any infringement of human rights in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act; 
(d) to visit places of detention in accordance with procedures as 
prescribed by the laws relating to the places of detention and to make 
necessary recommendations; 
(e) to issue public statements on human rights as and when necessary; and 
(f) to undertake any other appropriate activities as are necessary in 
accordance with written laws in force, if any, in relation to such 
activities. 
Even though section 4 (1) states the functions of the Commission `In furtherance of the 
protection... of human rights' but the powers accorded to the Commission do not reflect 
such a role. Instead, the six powers under sub section (2) relate to the role of promoting 
the rights in its consultative and advisory capacity. The Commission has no power to 
take affirmative action for infringement of human rights other than power of verification. 
This raises a question of whether protection of human rights is projected prominently on 
the development agenda of the government. Human rights may be part of a vital tenet in 
democracy, but it may not be the main interest that can override unity and political 
stability in Malaysia. According to Datuk Syed Hamid Albar, the then Minister of Law, 
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it is very crucial that human rights are seen in tandem with responsibility based on 
civility, politeness, discretion and reason to ensure peace and security. 9881 
Obviously, the efficacy of the Commission is in question when it is powerless to take 
positive action to protect human rights. This affects the public confidence on the role of 
the Commission. Though the Act empowers the Commission to recommend appropriate 
measures to be taken by the government, it does not necessarily mean that the 
government has to abide by such a recommendation. This is evident when the 
Commission has recommended that amendments should be made to the ISA and PPA. 
But so far there has been no action taken by the government on such recommendation. 
As a result, the impact of this situation on the public perception is that the Commission 
is a weak institution. This is due to the fact that when the Commission calls for reform, it 
is not taken very seriously. Nevertheless, the Commission's statements and remarks 
draw attention to systemic human rights violations, which require far-reaching changes 
to the existing government practices for effective redress. Publicising such abuses serves 
to call the government to account. Publicity also informs and discloses to the public 
about the performance of the government and its agencies particularly in relation to 
human rights 882 
Third, the Act does not provide for any enforcement mechanism or legal power to affect 
change or bring about actual relief. SUHAKAM does not have the power to sanction the 
government or others. To equip the Commission with an enforcement power may not be 
appropriate considering the fact that it may abdicate the judiciary power. 
Fourth, the appointment of the members of the Commission raises a question of 
independence. Even though the government emphasises that independence is the main 
feature of the Commission, a priority to ensure its credibility, it does not ward off 
sceptics especially when the appointment of the Commission's commissioners is the 
prerogative of the government. Section 5 (2) provides that the members shall be 
881 Speech on the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Bill 1999 delivered in the Dewan Rakyat on 15 
July 1999. See Rachagan, S. and Tikamdas, R. (eds. ) (1999) Human Rights and the National Commission. 
Kuala Lumpur, 104. 
882 The Commission produced several reports in pursuant to complaints on violation of human rights such 
as the Report on Freedom of Assembly. http: //www. suhakam. org. my/docs/document resource/freedom. pdf 
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appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) on recommendation of the Prime 
Minister. The direct involvement of the Prime Minister who represents the executive to a 
certain extent raises legitimate doubt as to the ability of the Commission to exercise its 
functions and powers without direct or indirect influence of the government. In order for 
the Commission to be able to maintain its integrity and command public respect, the 
Commission must not only be independent in form but also in spirit. As such, an 
independent body under the auspice of Parliament should be given the task for selecting 
and appointing the commissioners. 
There is no system of checks and balances to ensure that the appointment process is 
politically neutral. Nor is there any prescribed manner in which public consultation or 
participation is taken into account in the appointment. As human rights are matters of 
public interest, the membership of the Commission should reflect the wide interest of 
Malaysian society regardless of political inclination. The criteria of prominent 
personalities in section 5 (3) needs further clarification and expansion so that public 
interests can be served. As such there was resentment in the appointment of the second 
chairman of the Commission by local human rights movements. The chairman was a 
former Attorney General and perceived as closely associated with the government. This 
has reduced the public hope for the Commission to be an independent body. 883 
5.7.3 POWER AND AUTONOMY 
The power of inquiry of the Commission into an allegation of the infringement of the 
human rights is limited. Section 12 (1) allows the Commission to conduct an inquiry on 
its own motion or on complaint. The power is restricted to matters that are not involved 
in the proceedings of the courts. The Commission has no power to inquire into an 
allegation of infringement of human rights if it is the subject matter of proceedings 
pending in courts or finally determined by the courts. 884 In the case of an ongoing 
inquiry, the power will cease once the allegation becomes the subject matter of 
883 Still an Independent Commission? Or BN's Tool? Aliran. http: //www. aliran. com/monthly/2002/4i. html. 
Lim Kit Siang, Abu Talib's appointment- bad omen for Suhakam? 
httt): //www. malgysia. net/dgp/lkst 519. htm 
8" Section 12 (2) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999. 
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proceedings in courts. 885In this relation, the function of the Commission is limited to 
advisory capacity because it could not substitute the function of the courts in protecting 
human rights. Thus, the power of the Commission should be exercised to complement the 
role and the responsibility of the courts. Not all human rights violations are of such 
magnitude that requires arbitration. The contextual nature of human rights issues may 
render mediation as the appropriate way of addressing a matter rather than through 
adversarial approach. 
In order for the Commission to perform its functions effectively, it is necessary for the 
institution to be autonomous. The autonomy at operational level is imperative to detach 
its credibility as a statutory body from ordinary government agencies. Any kind of 
influence by the executive may affect the public confidence because the Commission 
may be perceived as functioning under the influence of the government. The image of 
being a government's agency is unacceptable especially when the functions of the 
Commission surpass political and societal barriers. However, the autonomy of the 
Commission may be questionable when section 22 allows the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to make regulations and affect the procedures the Commission follows in pursuing 
inquiries. This is directly contrary to the recommendation of the UN Handbook that the 
Commission establishes its own procedures and they may not be subjected to external 
modification. This suggests that autonomy at the policy level is also desirable. 
The government plainly has an interest in preserving and maintaining the way public 
order is being regulated. In doing so, the government is not willing to compromise on 
issues of national security and public order even if it infringes the human rights. This 
supports the view that the government thinks in term of the expediency of matters 
purportedly to be in the interest of the nation as a whole. Thus, if human rights in 
Malaysia are to be taken seriously, the Commission must be principled. In this context, 
the former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, responded rather firmly on 
SUHAKAM's recommendation for public rallies during general election when he said 
`For now, it looks like SUHAKAM seems to want to decide on everything. '886 According 
885 Op cit section 12 (3). 
886 PM: Decision on rallies not up to Suhakam. The Star On-line, 4 October 2003. 
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to him, the Commission should not interfere in making decisions. But the paramount 
interest as perceived by the government sometimes is allegedly being used to achieve 
other ulterior interest. This is established when SUHAKAM in its report on the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) found that the balance between national security and human rights is 
currently disproportionately weighted in favor of national security and there are 
inadequate safeguards against misuse or abuse of the detention provisions of the ISA. 
SUHAKAM also submits a proposal to the government to repeal and replace the ISA 
with a new comprehensive legislation. 887 
The power of the Commission to constitute an inquiry has no affirmative impact in 
bringing changes to the state of human rights particularly with regard to political rights. 
The Commission has no legal power to impose the outcome of its inquiry on the relevant 
public authorities or the government so that failure to act upon it may be penalised. 
Nevertheless, any inquiry by the Commission may serve as a moral pressure on the 
government to respond. 
The effectiveness of the Commission in executing its dual functions of protecting and 
promoting human rights is also under scrutiny. It is hard to envisage how the 
Commission could effectively carry out its task under a government that allows 
derogation of human rights such as freedom of speech and personal liberty. The sceptics 
of the Commission criticise it as a symbolic institution so as to portray the concern and 
commitment toward human rights issues to the international community. In relation to 
this, the Minister of Law in delivering his speech on the Human Rights Commission Bill 
denied that the creation of the Commission was a public relation exercise. Nevertheless, 
the Commission is powerless to act in case of abuse of right because of lack of authority 
mandated to it. The lack of power and autonomy renders the main role of the 
Commission more as a consultative and advisory body to the government on matters 
relating to human rights than protecting the rights. 
887 SUHAKAM's report on the Review of the Internal Security Act 1960 calls for new anti-subversion law. 
http: //www. suhakam. org. my/docs/document resource/isa pdf 
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5.7.4 INCORPORATION OF UNCHR AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
A positive and promising prospect for privacy to be recognised as a legal right may be 
found in section 4 (4) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999. The 
section provides: 
For the purpose of this Act, regard shall be had to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 to the extent that it is not inconsistent 
with the Federal Constitution. 
The provision specifically includes UDHR in the ambit of the Act as a source, which 
could be referred to by the Commission in exercising its function and powers. The 
inclusion of UDHR raises two main issues. First, whether the right of privacy in Article 
12 of the UDHR is consistent with the Federal Constitution. Second, whether section 4 
(4) has the effect of incorporating the principles in UDHR so as to make the principles 
applicable in the local scene. 
In relation to the first issue, there is no explicit provision in the Federal Constitution 
which guarantees right of privacy. Thus, there is a question with regard to the 
justiciability of privacy. The courts are unable to deliberate on privacy if it is not a 
justiciable matter. In this regard, the Federal Court in Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v 
Kekatong Sdn Bhd388 explained that if a matter is not justiciable, there is no right of 
access to justice in respect of that matter. The issue of justiciability of privacy could be 
determined by relying on the provision of Article 5 of the Constitution. The courts give a 
wider meaning to article which guarantees right to life to include matters that form the 
quality of life. 889 The willingness of the courts to use a liberal and expansive 
interpretation expands the scope of life, which could provide an opportunity for the 
inclusion of privacy as a value that forms the quality of life. Using the liberal and 
expansive interpretation, the right of privacy could be recognised by the courts as it is 
within the domain of the judiciary. On this basis, it is also within the Commission's 
legitimate power to address the right of privacy in pursuant to UDHR as it is not 
888 [2004] 2 MLJ 257,270. 
889 R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145,288. 
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inconsistent with the Constitution. Although the Commission may not be able to protect 
right of privacy due to lack of power, the Commission should make use of its power to 
conduct an inquiry on the state of privacy in Malaysia and publish its findings to the 
public. 
In relation to the second issue, it is rather unfortunate when the Federal Court in 
Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara890 does not favor the use of an 
international document in the domestic legal context. The inclusion of UDHR by section 
4 (4) may not be on the basis of binding effect. The Commission is not duty bound to 
take into account the principles set out in UDHR in exercising their functions and 
powers. The effect of section 4 (4) does not make the principles in UDHR to be 
incorporated in the local provision. As such UDHR is not applicable as part of the local 
provision. 
Siti Norma FCJ upholds this position when she based her fording on three reasons. First, 
the 1948 Declaration is not a convention subject to ratification instead; it is declaratory in 
nature with no force of law. Second, the provision can only be interpreted as an invitation 
to consider the 1948 Declaration. It does not create an obligation on the part of the 
Commission to apply the principles. The judge explained that: 
This is so as my understanding of the pertinent words in the subsection 
that 'regard shall be had' can only mean an invitation to look at the 1948 
Declaration if one is disposed to do so, consider the principles stated 
therein and be persuaded by them if need be. Beyond that one is not 
obliged or compelled to adhere to them. 891 
Third, section 4 (4) of the Human Rights Commission Act 1999 provides qualification 
with regard to the 1948 declaration must not be inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
impact of this qualification may impede any effort to introduce any right that is not 
covered by Part II of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the limited scope of human 
rights within the power of the Commission may hinder the prospect of right of privacy to 
receive recognition. 
890 [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
891 Ibid, 513-14. 
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However, Ram disagrees with this position. He argues that the wording of the provision 
`regard shall be had' has been consistently interpreted as imposing an obligation. The 
language of the Act emphasises substantive and not procedural law. Thus, the provision 
should be interpreted as imposing prima facie mandatory and not merely directory. 892 On 
the other hand, Whiting argues that Siti Norma FCJ misconstrued the provision of section 
4, which imposes an obligation to apply the principles of UDHR. She said that `In her 
desire to preserve the integrity of `our own laws backed by statutes and precedents' from 
the incursion of globalizing norms, the judge arguably misconstrued the mandatory sense 
of the word 'shall'. ' 893 Whiting's argument may be based on a statutory formula as being 
either mandatory or directory. This is illustrated in Sing Hoe Motor Co Ltd v Public 
Prosecutor894where the court considered the interpretation of the word `may' and `shall' 
in relation to a provision under section 92 (4) of the Road Traffic Ordinance 1958. In this 
case, Raja Azlan Shah J said that `If it is the intention of the legislature to construe "may" 
as "shall" it would have expressed so in unequivocal and comprehensive terms. '895 
Currently, Malaysian courts are no longer fettered by the literal rule of interpretation. The 
position has changed through the codification of purposive rule of construction in section 
17A of the Consolidated Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967. The provision reads: 
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would 
promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or 
object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a 
construction that would not promote that purpose or object. 
The adoption of such a liberal approach is in keeping with the purposive rule of 
interpretation and gives effect to the presumption that Parliament does not intend an 
unjust or unfair result. 896 
892 Ram, G. S. Human Rights: Incorporating International Law into the Present System. (2003) MLJ- 
hiip: //www. mli. com. mL/free/articles/gLDpaisriram. html 
893 Whiting, A. Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia's National Human 
Rights Commission. (2003) 39 Stan. Jlnt'1 L. 59,88. 
894 [1968] 2 MLJ 54. 
895 thid, 56. 
89Sri Ram, G. Independence of Judiciary and Judicial Accountability. 
http: //www. clea. org. uk/clea/paner4. htm 
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In relation to this, SUHAKAM does not elaborate on this point except merely recognises 
the provisions of UDHR and its application in Malaysia to the extent its provisions do not 
conflict with the provisions of the Federal Constitution. 897 Summarily, Siti Norma's 
position on the application of UDHR is an obiter that does not create a binding precedent. 
Relying on Ram's argument, it is difficult to ignore the assumption that there is a 
mandatory application of the principles of UDHR. 
Nevertheless, even if section 4 (4) does not have the effect of incorporating UDHR, on 
Siti Norma's account, the Commission could still regard the 1948 instrument as highly 
persuasive for the purpose of domesticating and upgrading the condition of human rights. 
It would seem unfortunate if human rights, as the crux of a democratic society, are being 
marginalised while the nation is gearing up to become a developed democratic country by 
the year 2020. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Privacy does not have a universal value that could be claim across all contexts. The value 
of privacy in a particular context depends upon the social importance of the practice of 
which it is a part. As such, Malaysia has no freestanding law on right of privacy. But by 
no means does this indicate that the right is being neglected in Malaysian society. 
Deliberation on privacy is stimulated more by the economic agenda rather than the 
emphasis as a fundamental right. Though wide interpretation of right of life under the 
Constitution may include privacy as an interest, protection of privacy is left under the 
purview of SUIIAKAM as the human rights institution in the absence of judicial 
recognition. 
The importance of privacy as a right could be informed by deontological as well as 
consequentialist moral impulses, both for its own sake and its usage. This is apparent 
with the existence of institutional mechanism that gives protection to privacy-related 
interests. Since there is no independent cause of action for invasion of privacy, the courts 
could develop the existing common law principles, though unsatisfactory, to provide the 
897 What is Human Rights? The application of UD14R in Malaysia. Suhakam. 
hgp: //www. suhakam. oriz. my/en/hr what is. asp 
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redress. This would necessitate the shift from statutory law orientation to incremental 
development under common law. The protection of privacy on this account however is 
not a revolutionary encounter. It would involve no more than a development of impulses 
already present in the law. If privacy is to be taken seriously as a fundamental right in 
Malaysia, the courts, through its judicial activism, should develop a distinct tort on 
privacy to institutionalise the right of privacy protection. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
Recognition of both privacy as an individual right and the importance of freedom of 
expression create a classic situation of a clash of interests. A tension exists when these 
two fundamental rights, which promote different interests, are in conflict. 
Accommodation of individual needs for privacy and the public's right to know through 
freedom of expression may appear uncomplicated but nevertheless entwine with practical 
difficulty. Though each could be accommodated by way of institutional design, it may be 
unsatisfactory to rank attractive options. 
Invasion of personal privacy is considered as affront to a person's dignity898 whereas 
restriction on freedom of expression is contrary to liberal democratic belief, which 
reveres free flow of information. But this is by no means to suggest that privacy and 
freedom of expression are valuable only on utilitarian account. Both can be justified in 
deontological and consequentialist terms. Whilst protection of privacy is necessary, the 
potential chilling effect it has on freedom of expression raises a question of competing 
interests. 
Thus, it is pertinent to examine the approach adopted by the courts in providing 
reconciliation between the competing interests. It is important to ensure that the 
appropriate approach does not reduce the fundamental character of both rights. 
Discussion on this matter starts with examining the balancing approach which is the 
prevalent method adopted by the courts. We now turn to a very practical matter relating 
to institutional design. 
8" Per LaForest J in Rv Dyment (1988) 2 SCR 417,429-30. 
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6.1 BALANCING APPROACH 
The issue of competing rights may seem to be a straightforward matter. A simple way to 
resolve the clash is by identifying the right that is deemed to be more important than the 
other. A common method of resolving two competing interests is by way of balancing 
exercise. Aleinikoff argues that the mechanics of balancing involve identification, 
Valuation, and comparison of competing interests 899 The balancing act operates by 
identifying interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision by explicitly or 
implicitly assigning values to the identified interest. From a constitutional point of view, 
balancing is an explicit judicial weighing of competing values or interests to determine a 
constitutional doctrine or its application. 900 
The exercise is carried out in order to determine the preferred right by taking into account 
the circumstances involved in a given case. A simple way of balancing is when the 
competing rights are weighed against each other based on presumptive common scale. 
The end result is determined by whichever is the weightier thus prevail 90' In this regard, 
Alexy argues that balancing exercise is an indispensable form of a rational practical 
discourse that protects the status of right rather than cause degradation. 902 His argument 
is partly true when the status of the weightier right on the scale prevailed but the lighter 
one is reduced to an interest under exemption scheme. 
This approach is part of adjudicatory exercise, which articulates contextual scrutiny of 
social interests by weighing the interests at stake 903 The exercise of balancing is founded 
on normative judgment of interests protected by the rights. The weight of a right is given 
according to a standard that measures the value of the right. Keene LJ explained the 
operational mechanism of the approach by stressing that the court needs `to apply its 
mind to how one right is to be balanced, on the merits against another right, without 
89 Aleinikoff, T. A. Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing. (1987) 96 Yale L J943,944. 900 Henkin, L. Infallibility under Law: Constitutional Balancing (1978) 78 Col. LR 1022,1024. 901 McHarg, A. Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal 
Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. (1999) 62 MLR 671,678. 902 Alexy, R. Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality. (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131. 903 Pound, It A Survey of Social Interests. (1943) 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1. 
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building in additional weight on either side. '904 On this account, the presumption is that 
the conflicting rights are equal in status and determinable on merits based on a common 
standard. Resolution of competing interest by way of balancing is made on the estimation 
of merits of the competing claims. The balancing scheme may be an appropriate approach 
to a resolution of conflicting rights, which are paralleled in term of standards and values. 
But it may not be so if common standards and values are absent. 
Perhaps the attractiveness of balancing is that it facilitates the growth of law by focusing 
on interests, based on a complex mixture of social, political and institutional factors. It 
also accommodates gradual change and rejects absolutes. The practical utility of the 
approach could make a judge more versatile in assuming the role of a social scientist in 
applying a deductive logic instead of an inductive investigation of interests in a social 
context 905 It is an instrumental approach that perceives law as a means to an end. In 
order for balancing to be a satisfactory method of resolving conflicting interests, the 
courts must not be seen as the arbiter of taste 906 As far as it lies within human 
limitations, it must be an impersonal judgment resting on fundamental pre-suppositions 
that are widely accepted. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ward off prejudices and 
inclinations as observed by Robertson where `British judges are wedded to a `balancing 
act'... which permits their own prejudices to tip the scales. '907 
There is an element of subjectivity in balancing particularly when the judges assess the 
relative weight of conflicting rights in each case. The problem with this approach is that 
it may subject the decision-making exercise leans towards preferential treatment. For 
instance, in law of defamation where reputation is in conflict with freedom of speech, the 
former seems to acquire a premium value, which makes its protection preferable over 
speech. The inclination to protect a reputation is far greater than speech that is presumed 
to be false. It is the task of the defendant in a defamation case to prove, inter alia, that 
the speech is true which sometimes put the press in a difficult situation particularly for 
the purpose of protecting the source. Therefore, in finding resolution to an issue of 
904 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 385,391. 
903 Aleinnikoff, T. A. Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing. (1987) 96 Yale LJ943,965. 9" AvB plc [2002] 3 WLR 542,552. 
907 Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, x. 
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competing fundamental rights, which represent different and variable interests, balancing 
exercise invites more questions than answers. 
A vexed question concerns the standard used to determine which of the competing right 
is to prevail. For example, in case of protection for journalistic confidentiality, though the 
courts recognise the importance of public interest in the free flow of information, greater 
weight is placed on the potential damage that may cause on companies or the government 
compared to the potential and abstract damage to free flow of information. 908 Harm to 
the public interest caused by a loss of free flow of information cannot be satisfactorily 
quantified. But the potential financial loss to a company or impact on the government is a 
matter to which the courts are willing to give considerable weight. 
The issue of competing rights is difficult to resolve especially when the rights in clash 
are equally recognised but involve different kinds of interests in opposite directions. 909 
Arguably, it is doubtful if balancing exercise is the appropriate approach using the scale 
standard for rights of different values and characters. Under the balancing structure, 
weight is given depending on the value of interests. The values that determine the weight 
are assessed from various criteria according to history, social consensus on the 
importance of an interest and are based on their contribution to the achievement of 
constitutional goals. It is difficult to ascertain the rank of interest on the basis of 
descriptive criteria. To do so would only invite a contention that balancing is exercised 
on the basis of taste and preference. Lord Donaldson MR remarked that: 
... but in truth this is an objective which is incapable of achievement, not least because a balance of competing rights lies at the heart of the problem 
and this must depend upon a multiplicity of factors which vary from case 
to case. 910 
908 British Steel Corporation v Granada [19811 AC 1096. X Ltd v Morgan Grampian Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1. 909 Wade, H. and iorsyth, C. (2004) Administrative Law. Oxford University Press, 178. 
910 [1990] 1 All ER 205,214. 
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6.1.1 DISTORTION IN BALANCING APPROACH 
There are some doubts and sceptics as to whether balancing can resolve competing 
interests satisfactorily. 91 ' The flexibility of the approach by taking into account the 
circumstances surrounding the interests may lead to unprincipled resolution of competing 
rights. There is a risk of making arbitrary value judgments. The outcome of balancing is 
not justifiable in term of right and wrong but only as appropriate or sufficient to varying 
degree. 912 The more facts are taken into account in the application of relative weigh in 
one case, the more likely that it will produce a different result in another. This may lead 
to an uncertainty in the adjudication and resolution of disputes involving fundamental 
rights such as between privacy and freedom of expression. Distortion in balancing 
structure may occur when freedom of expression is given a presumptive primacy by the 
courts. 
6.1.2 PRESUMPTION OF PRIMACY 
A presumption of primacy creates an imbalance that makes freedom of expression 
acquiring extra weight on the balancing scale. This occurs when protection of privacy 
requires justification whereas the importance of freedom of expression is rooted on 
assumption. The presumption also sets an inclination toward protecting freedom of 
expression which can only be set aside if it can be convincingly established that 
preserving other interest is more important. The court in Reynolds v Times Newspapers913 
adopted the position when Lord Steyn stated that: 
The starting point is now the right of freedom of expression, a right based 
on a constitutional or higher legal order foundation.... freedom of 
expression is the rule, and regulation of speech is the exception requiring 
justification. 914 
91 1 Dworkin, R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. London, 198-99. See Alder, J. Incommensurable Values 
and Judicial Review: The Case of Local Government. (2001) PL 717,718. See also the argument by the 
counsel for the press in Venables and another v News Group Newspapers [2001 ]1 All ER 908,913. 912 Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, 261. 913 1199914 All ER 609. 
1 94 Ibid, 629. See also per Lord Nicholls Reynolds v Times Newspapers Limited [2001] 2 AC 127, para 200. 
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The unequal treatment, which tilted in favour of freedom of expression, is structurally 
incoherent as it may defeat the basic scheme of fundamental rights instituted under the 
Convention. The emphasis given to freedom of expression though does not amount to a 
trump element, practically reduces the weight of other fundamental right. The press 
enjoys heavy weight when the importance of the press freedom of expression is enhanced 
by the corresponding freedom of the public to receive information. In this context, Smith 
J in Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Ltd915 said that: 
The weight to be accorded to each of the various factors will vary 
according to the circumstances of the case. If at the end of the balancing 
exercise the court is in doubt, it will resolve the doubt in favour of 
publication. 
The remark portrays a situation whereby the judges have not fashioned a clear decision- 
procedure. They are lapsing into common law multifactorialism where there is a tendency 
to identify a range of relevant considerations to which more or less weight will be given 
in light of the facts of the case at hand. On this point, Mullender argues that the 
multifactorial approach lacks of systematisation that could lead to ill-structured judicial 
discretion 916 
The status of freedom of expression as a primary right in democracy gained support by 
majority of the Law Lords in Rv Secretary of State, ex p Simms. 917 The court stated that 
without free expression an effective rule of law is not possible. However, the court also 
recognised that it is not an absolute right. Sometimes freedom of expression must yield 
to other forceful interests such as the protection of the reputation of individuals, security 
and public order. The court in Re S (FC) (a Child)918 exhibits a similar stand when Lord 
Steyn concurred with the approach of the lower court by acknowledging the force of the 
argument under Article 10 before considering whether the right of the child under Article 
8 was sufficient to outweigh freedom of expression. The court ruled that there is no 
injunction in respect of publication of the identity of the defendant or of photographs of 
the defendant or her deceased son. It could be argued that such a treatment presents an 
915 [2002] EMLR 215. 
9'6 Mullender, R. Tort, Human Rights, and Common Law Culture. (2003) 23 OJLS 301,306. 917 [2000] 2 AC 115. 
918 [2004] UKHL 47, pars 37. 
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asymmetry, which is not appropriate when there is an issue of competing fundamental 
rights that should be resolved by the courts on equal terms. Since both Articles 8 and 10 
provide for qualified rights it should be considered as independent elements. Each article 
is an exception, which allows the interest under the other article to be taken into account. 
Moreover, presumptive primacy of freedom of expression could reduce the intrinsic 
character of competing right where right of privacy `would lose its Convention status as a 
fully-fledged right. '919 This is inconsistent with the existence of the 1998 Act that 
recognises inalienable human rights based on the equal protection scheme of the 
Convention. Sedley LJ in delivering his judgment disagreed with the prioritizing of 
freedom to publish over other Convention rights because it is not consistent with the 
Parliament's design and the European Convention 920 Council of Europe Resolution 1165 
of 1998 states that right of privacy and freedom of expression are fundamental to a 
democratic society and `These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order, 
since they are of equal value. ' In relation to this, Phillipson argues that presumptive 
priority of freedom of expression is a `radical distortion' of the Convention scheme 
because it relegates the status of other Convention rights. 921 Thus, emphasis on freedom 
of expression needs to be made on evaluative basis rather than presumptively given 
primacy. 
The difficulty in measuring the respective weight of each interest requires that the 
interests be balanced is in some way commensurable on a single scale 922 Therefore, for 
balancing to become a practical mode of adjudication, the interests involved must have 
certain common characters related to each other. Relative weight given to each interest 
poses a question of standard applicable in allocating the proportion of greater or lesser 
weight to a particular interest. In this context, Dworkin argues that though liberty is 
important, some liberties are more important than others. However, identifying the more 
919 Phillipson, G. and Fenwick, H. Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human 
Rights Act Era. (2000) 63 MLR 660. 
920 Council of Europe Resolution 1165 of 1998 states that right of privacy and freedom of expression are 
fundamental to democratic society. `These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order, since 
they are of equal value. ' 
921 Phillipson, G. Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act (2003) 66 MLR 726. 
922 Campbell, T. and Goldberg, D. (1986) Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality. London. 
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important liberty based on aggregation of values is unsatisfactory. 923 Liberty represented 
by interest would make it contingent on convictions or preference. 
In addition, there does not seem to be a common scale where values of each fundamental 
right can be balanced to determine the result. It is argued that the approach of balancing 
is unsatisfactory to accommodate the competing rights between freedom of speech and 
privacy because of the absence of a common scale to perform the balancing. At the same 
time, it is difficult to balance freedom of the press in which case the core thematic 
interest is disclosure of information with privacy that stresses on retention of information. 
Thus, the absence of a common scale where competing values can be assessed creates a 
distortion in balancing exercise that leads to a legitimate query of the outcome. It 
therefore makes the metaphor of balancing as misleading. 924 
Besides the general balancing method, an accounting analysis of cost and benefit (CBA) 
can also be applied to adjudge the issue of competing rights. CBA is a decision-making 
method in which things that have no market prices are treated as if they are commodities. 
They are given a monetary value, a form of price. This is a utilitarian approach that 
considers accounting analysis in preferring the impact of interest in general. Interest that 
costs less and gives more benefit will acquire more weight. This kind of balancing is 
problematic as it imposes a formidable task on the courts. An element of distortion in the 
result of analysis may occur when the courts undervalue the real weight of competing 
interests by relying on general factors 925 
It is difficult to apply a cost and benefit analysis in a situation where one right is deemed 
to benefit the general society compared to a right that brings benefit to individuals. In 
term of cost, the acceptance of right of privacy may hinder the public's right to receive 
information or the public's interest in freedom of the press. The evaluation of cost on 
more general terms than benefit makes the application of the analysis to human rights 
Dworkin, R. (2002) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, 180-181. 924 Alder, J. Incommensurable Values and Judicial Review: The case of local government. (2001) PL 717. 925 Criag, P. (2003) Administrative Law. London, 431. 
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issues unsatisfactory. 926 Another distortion that may question the reliability of the 
analysis is when the evaluation of cost is made on more general terms than the benefit. 
Another technique employed to reconcile the issue of competing interest is to reduce the 
level of protection accorded to one interest under zero-sum method. Similarly, this 
technique portrays the difficulty in balancing two equally valuable interests with no 
certainty as to the standard used. Accommodating conflicting rights on this account is not 
satisfactory particularly if a decision has to be made on hard and controversial choice. 
But it may be sensible if the decision is based on a deductive judgment of all 
considerations, which justify the importance of one interest over the other. 
In the UK, the incorporation of European Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 
1998 creates a perennial competing rights issue. This is apparent with the clash between 
freedom of expression, which includes the public's right to know under Article 10 of the 
Convention and the protection of privacy under Article 8. The tension is inevitable when 
both rights are recognised as vital and fundamental in protecting the interests involved. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide a specific mechanism in case of conflict 
other than requiring interference with any right to be justified. For instance, interference 
with privacy must be justified according to Article 8 (2). Likewise, any restriction on 
freedom of expression must fulfill the requirements of Article 10 (2). Nevertheless, the 
courts in the UK resort to balancing approach as a way to reconcile the competing rights. 
Lord Reid recognised that public policy required a balancing of interests that might 
ultimately conflict 927 Lord Morris, on the other hand, asserted that the exercise of this 
function necessitate a fair consideration of both interests 928 Lord Woolf explained that: 
There is a tension between the two articles which requires the court to 
hold the balance between the conflicting interests they designed to protect. 
This is not an easy task but it can be achieved by the courts if, when 
926 Kennedy, D. The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? (2002) 15 Harv. HRJ 
101,102. 
927 AG V Times Newspapers Ltd t 1974] AC 272,301. 
928 Ibid, 302. 
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holding the balance, they attach proper weight to the important rights 
which both articles are designed to protect 929 
However, the application of balancing competing interests does not receive full support 
by the judiciary. For instance, Lord Widgery CJ in AG v Times Newspapers Ltd930opined 
that the balancing of public interest was an administrative rather than a judicial function. 
If such a function were left to the courts, it would give rise to an uncertainty and 
inconsistency of decision. It is not an easy task to find a proper or fair balance 93 'taking 
into consideration the variable standards relied by the courts in determining the protected 
interests. 
In striking the balance, different judges naturally weight rights and responsibilities 
differently. Fox LJ in Blackshaw v Lora032 acknowledged that on the one hand, there is 
the need that the press should be able to publish fearlessly what is necessary for the 
protection of the public, and on the other hand, there is the need to protect the individual 
from falsehoods. He disagreed with the test of 'legitimate and proper interest to English 
newspaper readers'933 in resolving the clash between freedom of expression and 
reputation where it would tilt the balance to an unacceptable degree against the 
individual. Reliance on such a test would `protect persons who disseminate 'any untrue 
defamatory information of apparently legitimate public interest, provided only that they 
honestly believed it and honestly thought that it was information which the public ought 
to have'. '934 
The absence of precise rules and principled standard creates uncertainty in the exercise of 
balancing between competing rights. Balancing is also more delicate in case of clash 
between private interests. This was encountered by the court in AvB Ltd where there was 
a clash between privacy interest and freedom of the press in the publication of facts about 
the claimant. The court took into consideration the private interest of the newspaper in 
929 AvB plc [2003] 3 WLR 542 
930 [1973] 1 QB 710,726. 
931 Approach employed by the ECtHR in adjudicating competing interests. See Sporrong v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35,52. See also per Lord Bingham in Brown v Stott [2001] 2 All ER 97,113. 932 [1984] QB 1. 
933 Webb v Times Publishing Co Ltd [ 1960] 2 QB 535,570. 
934 [1984] QB 1,42. 
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justifying the importance of press freedom on the ground of public interest. It is unclear 
as to on what merit the commercial interest of newspaper can enhance the public interest 
of the community. The standard of public interest varies when it concerns the press. 
Commercial interest is taken into consideration, as people's private lives become a highly 
lucrative commodity for certain sectors of the media. In this regard, news is treated as a 
perishable commodity. To delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive 
it of all its value and interest 935 
The ECtHR in Von Hannover v Germany considers the commercial interest of the 
press. 936 The Court ruled that the public did not have a legitimate interest in knowing 
where the applicant was and how she behaved in her private life even if she appeared in 
places that could not always be described as secluded and despite the fact that she was 
well known to the public. Even if such a public interest did exist, the interest as well as 
the magazines' commercial interest must yield to the applicant's right to effective 
protection of her family life. 
In addition, Fenwick argues that in case of privacy of a child, journalistic invasion of 
privacy tends to be driven by a desire for sensationalism, purely for commercial 
considerations. 937 Publication by the press does not meet the vital element of Article 10 
to impart `information on matters of serious concern' 938 On the other hand, Lord 
Donaldson MR939stated that a clear rule in determining the issue between protecting the 
right of the press to publish and to protect the welfare of a child is an objective that 
cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is arguable if general balancing is the appropriate 
approach in providing resolution to safeguard the welfare of a child940or other recognised 
important interests such as reputation. 
Moreover, value judgments in the balancing exercise create uncertainty in reaching the 
outcome. Nevertheless, the judgment cannot be entirely eliminated, particularly in 
935 The Observer and The Guardian v UK(1992)14 EHRR 153, para 60. 936 (2004) EMLR 21. 
937 Fenwick, H. Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act. (2004) 67 MLR 889. 938 Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHkR 125, pars 59. 939 [1990] 1 All ER 205,214. 
940 Rv Central Independent Television plc [1994] 1 All ER 641. 
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relation to rights that are usually underdeterminate. For instance, in case of determining 
public figure so as to ascertain the extent of privacy entitlement as compared to an 
ordinary person. The right to privacy according to the Parliamentary Assembly of 
Council of Europe in the declaration on mass communication media and human 
rights94'means 'the right to live one's own life with a minimum of interference'. The level 
of minimum interference may not be the same in case of public figures who are 
distinguished from the rest of the public due to their role in public life, whether in 
politics, the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any other domain. Certain 
latitude is given to the press when free expression receives an inappropriate weight, 
which may not be applicable to ordinary people. Conversely, the weight of privacy in 
case of public figures is lighter on the scale of balancing. 
One of the problems with balancing relates to subjective considerations that vary from 
case to case. Perhaps effective balancing of competing rights involves giving due 
weight. 942 The interest a right seeks to protect determines the scale. The more important 
the interest deemed to be, the heavier would be the scale of balance. For instance, the 
court in AvB pIc943 gave premium value to free expression when it said `Any 
interference with the press has to be justified because it inevitably has some effect on the 
ability of the press to perform its role in society. '9' Notably, there is no gradation of 
rights under the Convention, which could create a pre-emptive interest in case of 
conflict 945 
Nevertheless, emphasis on freedom of expression seems to exist under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 where section 12 implies a higher weighting for speech interests. It provides the 
courts to have a `particular regard' to Article 10 when making any order that might 
infringe it. However, it does not make freedom of expression as an overriding right that 
941 (1970) Resolution 428. 
942 Markesinis. B, et al. Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of Privacy. (2004) 52 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 133,152. 
943 [2002] 3 WLR 542. 
9441bid, 549. 
945 It would be much easier to adjudge the conflict if there were a prioritized interest. But this is not the 
scheme under the English law or the European Convention. 
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always prevail under balancing act. As Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd'46 said, in 
relation to free speech interest and privacy, that `neither element is a trump card. 9947 
Even though section 12 (4) requires a particular reference be made to freedom of 
expression it does not give the right a pre-eminence status over the other. 948 The majority 
of judges upheld similar position in Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee949when they rejected 
the view that freedom of expression has priority over other Convention rights. 
To give a presumptive primacy to freedom of expression is to create an imbalance on the 
scale prior to balancing exercise. The outcome of balancing is, thus, a result of weight 
distortion. It would make freedom of expression as the primary right with trump effect 
overriding other rights such as privacy. 950 Moreover, it is a disadvantage to the other 
competing right where it needs more values to tilt the scale. This is hard to achieve when 
the presumption would mean that the scale would always be in favour of freedom of 
expression. The premium weight accorded to freedom of expression would make the 
proper or fair balance appears to be superficial. Perhaps the argument forwarded by 
Markesinis et al. relying on judgment by Barak CJ could enlighten the proper balancing 
exercise. The judge said: 
... the solution of these conflicts 
does not lie in ignoring one principle and 
completely preferring another. Rather, the proper method is to place the 
principles side by side, giving appropriate weight to each, and balancing 
them at the point of conflict. This is a 'process of placing competing 
values on a scale, and choosing those that, after the weighing process, are 
stronger under the circumstances 951 
Even if the operational aspect of balancing as explained above is preferable, it does not 
make balancing as the satisfactory resolution. It could be argued that the common scale 
used to resolve two different and opposite competing interests is misconceived. The issue 
of competing rights may not be satisfactorily resolved by a general balancing exercise for 
946 [200112 All ER 289. 
947 Ibid, 323. 
9" Re S (a child) [2003] 3 WLR 1425. 
949 [2003] 2 All ER 318. 
950 This is in consistent with the scheme under the Convention which treats both rights as equally important. 951 Cited in Markesinis, B. et al. Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of Privacy. (2004) 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 133,156. 
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`there is no objective measure against which the competing interests can be weighed. '952 
Balancing approach deprives constitutional rights of their normative power. By means of 
balancing, rights are downgraded to the level of goals, policies, and values. As Habermas 
argues that there are no rational standards for balancing. Weighing takes place either 
arbitrarily or unreflectively, according to customary standards and hierarchies 953 
Another way of giving primacy status to freedom of expression is the requirement that 
interference with the freedom must be justified in exceptional circumstances 954 The 
English courts have so far reluctant to recognise the existence of right of privacy even 
though the right is incorporated by the HRA. Without such recognition, which would 
allow right of privacy to be regarded in pari passu with free speech, the traditional 
emphasis on the latter would prevail. This attitude accords wide latitude to freedom of 
expression while limiting the extent of its interference. Consequently, this creates an 
indirect gradation of rights where privacy is relegated to any other social interest under 
Article 10 (2). From this perspective, privacy is regarded as an exception that can inhibit 
the primary right. It needs justification to make the exception prominent in order to 
outweigh the right. But the courts rule that exception to free speech needs to be 
interpreted narrowly 955 It also reduces the role of the courts to exercising a technical 
task of checking whether interference is within the objectives sanctioned by the law. 
Distortion may also occur when the courts give high regard to freedom of expression. 
This happens when high value is given to the right, which has a pre-eminence effect over 
other rights such as right of privacy. The right acquires an added value through the 
benefit it brings to the public as a whole rather than an individual's interest. This attitude 
is adopted by the court in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd956 when Lord Nicholls 
stressed on the interest of a democratic society in giving heavy weight on free press. The 
same approach is discernable in AvB plc957 when Lord Woolf took into account the role 
of the press in society in requiring justification for interference with the press. The public 
952 Alder, J. (2002) General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law. Palgrave, 446. 953 Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, 259. 954 Mills v News Group Newspapers [2001 ] EMLR 41. 
955 See Theakston v MGN [2002] EMLR 22, pars 31. 
956 [200112 AC 127. 
957 [2002] 3 WLR 542,549. 
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interest in free flow of information and the public right to know may override the 
protection of individual's privacy. Thus, the wider benefit consideration enhances the 
importance of freedom of expression in the society. In this context, Sir John Donaldson 
MR in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) explained the importance of protecting 
freedom of expression and the press by saying: 
It is because the media are the eyes and ears of the general public. They 
act on behalf of the general public. Their right to know and their right to 
publish is neither more nor less than that of the general public. Indeed it is 
that of the general public for whom they are trustees 958 
In addition, another possible reason for prioritising expression is the absence of a distinct 
law of privacy where the right can be specifically protected against infringement. This is 
exacerbated by the uncertainty of the application of the Convention right of privacy 
horizontally between private individuals. The penumbra of right of privacy may give 
mileage to freedom of expression, which is well established and widely recognised. 
The nature of the right to free expression carries extra weight that always gives an 
advantage on balancing scale. The attitude of the courts in giving broad appreciation to 
freedom of expression makes balancing a misleading metaphor in producing a 
satisfactory outcome. However, the nature of the right and its benefit to larger interest 
should not be the sole criteria for carrying extra weight. There exists misappropriation of 
weight where premium is given prior to balancing exercise that contributes to 
unjustifiable distortion. 
On the other hand, balancing may be of a practical assistance if it can be accepted that the 
importance of freedom of expression does not make it immune from being overridden by 
other rights. Other competing rights should not be treated as mere exceptions, but instead 
as equal as freedom of expression in term of status. The inclusion of relevant privacy 
code which the courts must have regard in section 12 (4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 
denies the notion of primacy of freedom of expression. It makes the invocation of press 
freedom conditional upon adherence of the code. Freedom of expression only has a high 
95S [1990] 1 AC 109,183. 
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degree of exclusionary force where the right is exercised in ways that advance or promote 
its informing purposes. 
Therefore, balancing cannot be properly construed as requiring the courts to give any 
priority to freedom of expression when the exercise of it is subjected to fulfillment of 
certain requirement. In this regard, section 12 (4) also implies that any breach of privacy 
code may be used as a justification for inhibiting freedom of expression 959 Sedley IJ 
disagreed with prioritising the freedom to publish because it gives an edge to the press, 
which is unbecoming of Parliament's design. He said that `everything will ultimately 
depend on the proper balance between privacy and publicity... '960The metaphor of proper 
balance or fair balance may imply the equal emphasis on fundamental character of both 
rights. 
6.1.3 PRESUMPTION OF EQUALITY 
There is a presumptive equality with regard to freedom of expression under Article 10 
and privacy under Article 8 961 Both articles do not create an explicit distinction that 
could make one override the other because each right qualifies the other. Article 10 (2) 
recognises that the exercise of the right may be subject to `... protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence... ' 
Therefore, it is untenable to have particular regard to freedom of expression without 
having the same regard to Article 8.962 Moreover, the Council of Europe's Resolution 
1165 of 1990 stated that: 
11. The Assembly reaffirms the importance of every person's right to 
privacy, and of the right to freedom of expression, as fundamental to a 
democratic society. These rights are neither absolute nor in any 
hierarchical order, since they are of equal value. 
There are two basic components in balancing namely the scale and weight. Structural 
problem of the approach rests on the misleading scale employed. It is difficult to defend 
959 Brooke U in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967,994. 
960 Ibid, 1004. 
961 Rogers, H. and Tomlinson, H. Privacy and Expression: Convention Rights and Interim Injunctions. 
(2003) EHRLR. See Hale LJ. in Re S (a Child) [2003] 3 WLR 1425,1450. 
962 MacDonald, J. and Jones, C. H. (eds. ) (2003) Freedom of Information. Oxford, 645. 
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balancing act when the scale used is presumed to be applicable to distinct interests such 
as free expression and privacy. Unequal treatment of the competing rights may result in 
unequal balancing scale. Whereas, a proper balancing act require the scale to be equally 
set. 963 It is contended that balancing is not the correct approach when there is a 
presumption in favour of free expression, which is a primary right in democracy. 64 
This argument leads to the next approach in resolving competing interests where 
weighing is done in a seemingly structured and scientific manner. 965 
6.2 PROPORTIONALITY: A MEDIATING PRINCIPLE 
Another approach of resolving the issue of competing rights is by relying on 
proportionality principle. Proportionality requires a reasonable relationship between a 
particular objective to be achieved and the means used to achieve that objective 966 It is 
an approach to find a balance between the interests of the individual and the interest of 
the wider community. 67 Feldman argues that this is not an exercise of balancing the right 
against the interference, but instead balances the nature and extent of the interference 
against the reasons for interfering. 968 
The incorporation of the Convention rights by the Human Rights Act 1998 brings the 
application of proportionality into local cases involving the Convention rights 969 
Proportionality as a mediating principle, described as `the discretionary area of judgment 
in a national court', 970 accommodates competing rights by emphasising on the necessity 
of right. Necessity is determined in accordance with the standard of a democratic society. 
The structure of the society, which is characterised by `pluralism, tolerance and 
963 See Douglas v Hello I Ltd [2001] QB 967,1004. 
964 See argument by counsel representing the press in Venables v News Group Newspapers [2001] 1 All ER 
908,913. 
965 Blake, N. Importing Proportionality: Clarification or Confusion. (2002) 1 EHRLR 19,26. 966 Halsbury's Laws of England, 0 ed. Vol 1(1). Butterworth, para 78. %7 Taylor, N. Policing, Privacy and Proportionality. (2003) EHRLR (Special issue). See also Lord Lester 
and Pannick, D. (1999) Human Rights and Practice. London, Butterworth, para 3.09. m Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford, 57. 969 Since proportionality is inherent in the Convention jurisprudence and not in English courts, it is 
considered as developing in the local scene. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4`s edn. Vol 1 (1) para 88. 970 Lester, A. The Human Rights Act 1998-Five Years On. (2004) 3 EHRLR 259,265. 
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broadmindedness', 971enables the use of an objective standard in order to justify 
interference with a Convention right. Though the standard is measured on a yardstick of 
a democratic society, the diversity of local values and conditions gives different emphasis 
on the requirement of necessity. 
Proportionality does not provide any guidance on evaluative assessment of the relative 
weight to be given to different but competing fundamental rights. More fundamentally, 
proportionality only becomes salient when the question `to override or not to override? ' 
arises. It relies on the pressing social need in a democratic society to determine the 
victorious interest. It is not sufficient to prove that a right is only desirable in a society. 
There must exist a pressing social need in a society which makes the right really 
needed972and thus worthy of protection. The merits of the right in a democratic society 
enhance its values, which determine the weight in the process of balancing. This is made 
possible by way of deductive judgment of factual context. It makes proportionality as an 
alternative approach to resolve competing rights as it requires reasoned and proportionate 
arguments to justify the decision made 973 
The ECtHR holds that the principle of proportionality as being particularly relevant in 
determining whether or not a restriction under Article 8 (2) is necessary in a democratic 
society. The notion of necessity co-exists with the requirement of a pressing social need. 
This allows some measure of protection extended to the rights. This also means that a 
right such as freedom of expression has already been privileged. The application of 
proportionality is to determine that interference with a Convention right is within the 
specified legitimate objective. 974 It is regarded as the crux of fair balance exercise in the 
Convention jurisprudence 975 
"' Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, pars 49. 972 Lord Griffiths in Re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Trading) Act 1985 [1988] AC 
660,704. 
973 Mullender, R. (2002) Freedom of Expression and Competing Private Interests. In Alder, J. General 
Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law. Houndmills, 508. 94 Greer, S. Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights. (2003) 23 OJLS 405,409. 
975 Lord Lester and Pannick, D. (1999) Human Rights and Practice. London, para 3.09. 
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Proportionality as a mediating mechanism is developing in the English judicial system 
and the courts have considered it on several occasions976 including in judicial review 
proceedings. 77 In relation to the balancing of freedom of expression and other rights, the 
approach has judicial support. Sedley LJ, for example, said that: 
It replaces an elastic concept with which political scientists are more at 
home than lawyers with a structured inquiry. Does the measure meet a 
recognised and pressing social need? Does it negate the primary right or 
restrict it more than necessary? Are the reasons given for it logical? 978 
Lord Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian (No 2) recognised the application of 
proportionality when he said that `I have no reason to believe that English law, as applied 
in the courts, leads to any different conclusion. ' 979 In addition, Lord Bingham in 
McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd980 whilst stressing the cardinal 
importance of press freedom expressed that any restriction on that freedom to be 
proportionate and no more than is necessary to promote the legitimate object of the 
restriction. 
Proportionality serves as a vehicle for the courts to conduct a balancing act 981 It affords a 
means by which to structure judicial discretion or the exercise of judgment 982 The court 
in Douglas v Hello! Ltd adopts this when Sedley LJ treated freedom of expression and 
right of privacy on an equal term as both are qualified by each other. He rejected the 
notion that freedom of expression under Article 10 (1) acquires a presumptive priority 
over other rights. He said that: 
976 See Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspaper [1992] QB 770,817 and Rantzen v Mirror Group 
Newspapers Ltd [1994] QB 670,692. 
977 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374,410. Rv Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [ 1991 ]1 AC 696,750. Rv Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Daly [2001 ] UKHL 26. 
m Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001 ]1 QB 967, para 137. 
9" [1990] 1 AC 109,283. 
980 [2001] 2 AC 277,29 1. See also per Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 
127,200 
981 Feldman, D. (2002) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. Oxford, 57. 982 See Mullender, R. Theorizing the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the Proportionality Principle, 
and the New Social Democracy. (2000) 27 J of Law and Society 493,503. 
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Neither element is a trump card. They will be articulated by the principles 
of legality and proportionality, which, as always, constitute the mechanism 
by which the court reaches its conclusion on countervailing or qualified 
rights 983 
The court in Campbell v MGN 984 follows the approach. In this case, the tests, which the 
court must apply, are whether publication of the material pursues a legitimate aim and 
whether the benefits that will be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm 
that may be done by the interference with the right to privacy. Where the values under 
Articles 8 and 10 are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the 
specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. In Campbell's case, 
freedom of expression is invoked to justify limitation on privacy-related protection. In 
this regard, proportionality principle is used to guide the exercise of discretion in the 
decision making process. 
The normative evaluation through the pressing social needs influences the decision in 
making one right prevails over the other. For instance, the interest of a democratic 
society in ensuring a free press weighs heavily in the balance in deciding whether any 
curtailment of this freedom bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the 
curtailment. It is undemocratic to give primacy to collective goals of a right in making 
decision because it will suppress the fundamental characteristic of an individual's right in 
a democratic society. If the interests of a single individual are balanced against a whole 
social policy, the individual will almost certainly be at the losing side. 
This way of balancing is disadvantageous to individual's interests because more widely 
shared communitarian interests can easily outweigh the interests of dissenting individuals 
or groups. On the other hand, it is also indefensible for individual's right to override the 
collective goals because it denies the need of the public at large. The society should 
determine matters pertaining to social goals in accordance with its values, particularities 
and social fabric. The society appears to be a better forum to decide its own needs. To 
M [2001] QB 967,1005. 
984 [2004] UKHL 22, pars 20. 
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ignore this would raise an objection that judges apply their own views, which amount to 
an encroachment of democratic process 985 
In addition, there is also a question of ascertaining objective standards of democratic 
necessity. The diversity of such standard may be illustrated by Bowman v UK986 where 
the ECtHR held that the statutory limit on publications in favour of a particular candidate 
in the period just before an election was disproportionate and so unnecessary in a 
democratic society. The court in Hatton v United Kingdom987 also implied that the 
standard differs when it ruled that `In matters of general policy, on which opinions within 
a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy maker 
should be given special weight. ' The case involved a complaint under Article 8 about 
environmental pollution by aircraft noise resulting from night flights at Heathrow 
Airport. The court considered a wide margin of appreciation in implementing social and 
economic policies that suit local needs and conditions. Moreover, different standard may 
appear in cases involving freedom of expression where the criminalisation of religious 
hatred under the Anti-Terrorism, Security and Crime Act reflects the necessity of the 
democratic society in the UK but may not be so under the Convention jurisprudence that 
jealously protects freedom of expression. 
In the context of European jurisprudence, the margin of appreciation allows the states to 
apply local particularities in term of cultures, norms and values. This doctrine recognises 
that different contracting states have different cultural and societal standards. The 
national authorities are recognised to be the best arbiters of what measures are suitable or 
necessary considering the local circumstances. In view of this, the ECtHR considers that 
the domestic authorities of those states are better placed than an international court to 
determine the propriety of particular measures. The ECtHR in Wingrove v UK988 
pronounces this when the Court said: 
"5 McHarg, A. Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal 
Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. (1999) 62 MLR 671. 996 (1998) 26 EHRR 1. 
99' (2003) Application No 36022/97, paragraph 97. "s (1996) 24 EHRR 1. 
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Whereas there is little scope under article 10(2) of the Convention for 
restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public interest, 
a wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the contracting 
states when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable 
to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, 
especially, religion. 89 
This indicates that the national states are at a greater liberty to choose between more or 
less liberal or conservative regimes. Therefore, the scope of the margin of appreciation 
depends at least in part upon the court's judgment of the extent to which, giving full 
weight to local culture and practice, there may in principle be a range of different views 
and approaches relating to the matter in hand. The question that arises in each case is 
whether and to what extent it is proportionate to restrict one Convention right in order to 
protect another. The application of margin of appreciation provides different answers as 
the emphasis at national state level varies. For instance, recognition of right of privacy is 
explicitly strong in ECtHR but uncertain in the UK. 
Alder ° argues that proportionality cannot avoid subjective choice. The choice between 
competing interests that fulfill the requirement of pressing social needs cannot rationally 
be madel The courts must decide on the basis of valued judgment where one right is 
prioritised over the other. For instance, in Re S (a Child)992 the House of Lords ruled that 
the freedom of the press to report the proceedings of a criminal trial required that 
newspapers would not be restrained from publishing the identity of a defendant in order 
to protect the privacy of the defendant's child who was not involved in the proceedings. 
Lord Steyn reasoned that the interference with Article 8 right, however distressing for the 
child, was not of the same order when compared with cases of juveniles who were 
directly involved in criminal trials. Inhibition on reporting criminal trials would occur if 
injunctions were to be granted. Consequently, informed debate about criminal justice 
would suffer. 
9991bid, 30. 
Alder, J. (2002) General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law. Houndmills: 448-49. 991 Proportionality is an approach with no fixed standard. The pressing social need requirement creates 
variable of subjective nature. See Leigh, I. Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human 
Rights Act and Strasbourg. (2002) PL 265,278. 992 [2004] UKHL 
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On the contrary, the court in Mary Bell993 case granted a lifetime injunction prohibiting 
disclosure of the children's identities or whereabouts. The court took into account; inter 
alia, the serious risk of potential harassment, vilification and ostracism, and the 
possibility of physical harm. 994 Prohibition on disclosure of identity also has been given 
by the court in Re C (No 2) 995 particularly to avoid adding further to the stress that the 
case had placed on C's carers, other hospital staff and the hospital itself. The court found 
that the related prohibition on soliciting information from carers and staff was needed to 
prevent media encampment at the hospital as well as a more vaguely stated threat. It 
could be argued that the value judgment for imposing prohibition on disclosure in this 
case appears to be less well founded. 996 
In addition, in the event that a clash between privacy and press freedom involves medical 
data, privacy is likely to take priority. This is because of the high importance that the 
domestic courts and the ECtHR attach to the protection of medical confidentiality. 7 The 
importance of protecting the record is stressed in Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN 
Ltct98when the House of Lords upheld the Court of Appeal's decision in view of the need 
for the integrity of a health authority's records to be protected and so as to identify and 
punish the informant. Thus, an order requiring MGN to disclose the source from which it 
had obtained the records was appropriate. 
In order to strike an appropriate balance between two sets of rights, Phillipson suggests 
the `rights reversed' method. He argued that instead of treating Article 8 merely as an 
exception to Article 10, which is a one-way consideration, the courts should also consider 
from the standpoint of Article 8. Both articles are qualified by each other. There is a 
parallel test, which requires the courts to focus not only on interference with freedom of 
993X (formerly known as Merry Bell) & Yv News Group Newspapers & Ors [2003] EWCH 1101. "4 The effect of mental state is important under article 8. See Xv Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, Bona v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 and Bensaid v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 10. '`'S [1990] Fain 39. 
996 Cram, I. Minors' Privacy, Free Speech and the Courts. (1997) PL 410,419. 997 Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackryod [2003] EWCA 663. Zv Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371, para 95. 9" [2003] 1 WLR 2033. 
"9 Phillipson, G. Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act (2003) 66 MLR 726,752. 
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expression under Article 10 but also with privacy under Article 8.100° On the same 
premise, Tomlinson and Rogers suggest `parallel analysis' where a descending scale 
exists in favour of freedom of expression as well as privacy interests. 1001 They argued 
that the more valuable the form of expression is, the more difficult it is to justify the 
restriction. In parallel to this, the more intimate the information the more difficult it is to 
justify an interference with Article 8. 
This approach is considered as the correct approach in cases dealing with identity of a 
minor. '002 It allows the media the maximum freedom to publish whilst rendering 
maximum protection to the children. This is possible by allowing the media to publish 
without disclosing the identity of the children. The court in Re Mand N1 °°3 decided to set 
aside the injunction restraining all publicity about the children involved but imposed 
anonymity. This method of balancing does not give emphasis on one particular right. 
Instead, the importance of both rights counter balances each other. But what make one 
right outstanding depends on the factual context in each case. This is where the courts 
have to decide between protection of private interest and upholding the general interest of 
the community. 
There are various normative considerations that influence the courts in deciding which 
right should prevail. A decision based on proportionality involves a degree of deference 
where the need of a democratic society is taken into account. From a democracy 
perspective, public's interest of the majority does not always prevail but individual's 
interests may occasionally be suppressed to give way to the interests of majority. 1004 
However, Lester argues that the argument based on the democratic imperative prone to a 
form of majoritarianism. 10°5 Perhaps the remark made by Lord Hoffman in 
Alconbury10°6case presents the pragmatic resolution. He said: 
10°° The court in Re S (a child) [2003] WLR 1425 concurred with Sedley LJ remarked in Douglas v Hello! 
Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289 that neither is a trump card. 10°' Tomlinson, H. and Rogers, H. Privacy injunctions: Reviewing the Approach. (2003) 153 NLJ 818. 10°2 Fenwick, H. Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act. (2004) 67 MLR 889. 1003 [1990] 1 All ER 205. 
10°4 Chassagnou and others v France para 12. Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 38, pars 63. 
10°' Lester, A. The Human Rights Act 1998-Five Years On. (2004) 3 EHRLR 259,266. 1006 Rv Ex p Holding and Barnes Plc [2001 ] UKHL 23. 
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There is no conflict between human rights and the democratic principle. 
Respect for human rights requires that certain basic rights of individuals 
should not be capable in any circumstances of being overridden by the 
majority, even if they think that the public interest so requires. Other rights 
should be capable of being overridden only in very restricted 
circumstances. These are rights that belong to individuals sim by virtue 
of their humanity, independently of any utilitarian calculation. 11 7 
The existence of several Acts such as the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, the 
Harassment Act 1997, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 illustrates the 
point that an individual's freedom though revered by liberal society could be restricted to 
uphold the wider interest of plural society in maintaining a peaceful and harmonious 
social life. There is undoubtedly a public interest in freedom of expression but other 
interests such as reputational interest, welfare of children, proprietary interest and privacy 
interest may sometimes override this. 
The question is on what basis do the courts ground their decision in assessing the diverse 
values of competing rights? Perhaps burdens of judgment as propounded by Rawls could 
help to direct the courts in making the hard and controversial judgment. 10°8 Rawls 
argument relates to the sources of disagreement between reasonable persons. The courts 
encounter the burdens in fording a resolution on the basis of fair terms of the rights. 
Furthermore, the requirement of compatibility between the burdens and the 
reasonableness of the parties may fit in the framework of proportionality principle. This 
is vital so that the principle of proportionality may not only recognise both rights but 
most importantly does not suppress other competing right. 
The exercise of proportionality as contemplated above would at least avoid the outcome 
of resolving competing interests by way of preference, taste, biasness or prejudice. 
Balancing act according to proportionality perspective is not about giving edge to 
community interests; it is to enable fair allocation of benefit and burdens within society 
based on the ideal of distributive justice. 10°9 In this regard, it can be said that the basic 
10°7 lbid, para 70. 
10°8 Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press. 
10°9 Walzer, M. (1994) Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. University of Notre Dame 
Press, 21. 
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concept of distributive justice informs the proportionality principle. This is so when 
distributive justice relates to the outcomes of decision-making of who benefits and who 
bears the costs. In relation to competing interests of the Convention rights, the ECtHR 
jurisprudence requires fair balance where `judges stake out positions that are intended 
adequately to accommodate the interests of all those affected by the law's operations. "°'° 
Privacy and freedom of expression might be described as social primary goods. Article 8 
and 10 of the Convention set the scheme that is receptive to the notion of distributive 
justice. Both articles contain exceptions, which permit interference with the protected 
right. Even though freedom of expression is protected by Article 10 but under certain 
circumstances, the right can be curtailed by another beneficial countervailing interest 
such as privacy. It may not be plausible to claim the benefit of freedom of expression 
without considering the importance of privacy in a society. However, it is necessary to 
justify that preserving privacy is more imperative than maintaining freedom of expression 
or vice versa. The scheme is workable in spreading the benefit of rights as well as the 
burden of proving exception across society. 
Nevertheless, a resolution by way of proportionality is not free from controversy. The 
outcome of the process is arrived at through balancing where the courts have to make a 
decision between the benefit of the right and the justification of the exception. If the 
courts decide to uphold individual's interest, they may be criticised of sidelining the 
public's interest in freedom of expression. The role of the courts in this situation seems 
to be limited to giving effect of democratic view of society. 
Presumptive priority or presumptive equality could not avoid the difficulty of balancing 
exercise in resolving competing rights between freedom of expression and privacy. 
Priority of one right over the other is determined on the basis of relative weights given to 
both privacy and free expression. This is ascertained by relying on the assessment of 
normative judgment, which is a subjective judicial decision-making. This method is 
exercisable on the presumption that a common decisive scale is available to assess the 
competing rights of commensurable value on the basis of relative weights. The 
'°'° Mullender, R. Tort, Human Rights, and Common Law Culture. (2003) 23 WS 301. 
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application of balancing approach to reconcile the competing rights is misleading. This is 
because both rights protect different interests and seek to serve opposite objectives. 
Freedom of expression allows dissemination of information, either favourable or 
unfavourable, to flow within society. On the contrary, privacy seeks to retain personal 
private information from the gaze of public knowledge. 
The significance of preserving the rights in a society requires both to be treated 
distinctively but equally. The plurality of values that elevate the characteristic and status 
of rights make it impossible for them to be ranked against one another. '°" The courts for 
the purpose of giving weight value the merits of the rights. In doing so the courts are 
guided by certain vague standard such as public interest. The difficulty in weighing 
different nature of rights raises a question as to the application of balancing approach in 
case of incommensurable rights. For balancing to be of practical utility it must, therefore, 
be demonstrated that the types of considerations to be balanced are in some way 
commensurable. 1012 
6.3 INCOMMENSURABILITY AND INCOMBINABILITY 
The absence of a single scale of value enabling a precise measurement of competing 
interests leads to the notion of incommensurability. 1013 Paz argues that 
incommensurability occurs when it is neither true, that one is better than the other nor are 
they of equal value. '0'4 On this account, it may be possible to discern that 
incommensurability does not entertain the notion of presumptive priority nor presumptive 
equality. Incommensurability exists if we are unable to evaluate between two interests, 
in terms of their relation to one another, and this is because there is no means or scale of 
evaluation of them. '°'5 
However, the existence of incommensurables should not be understood as a reflection of 
our inability to make fine discriminations between divergent ways of life. Rather, there 
'o" Galston, W. Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory. (1999) 93 APSR 769,770. 1012 Campbell, T. and Goldberg, D. (1986) Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality. London, Blackwell. 1013 Chang, R. (1997) Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Cambridge, 2. 1014 
1014 
Raz, J. (1997) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, 322. 
Glenn, P. Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable? (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 133. 
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are no comparisons to be made because there is no common metric in terms of which 
values can be graded. In this regard, incommensurables reflect the plurality aspect of 
human life. The rights are irreducible and differ on their standards of evaluation. As 
such, they may be distinguished according to their distinct standards and goals. For 
instance, the need to protect security which requires the citizens to prove identification 
may be incomparable to the value of a democratic society in the right to be let alone. 
Moreover, freedom of expression is distinctively about disclosure of information to the 
world at large as oppose to privacy, which concerns retention of private facts. The 
variability of purposes both seek to protect makes the rights as incommensurables, 
standing on different equations that make ordinal ranking as inappropriate. Thus, 
elevation of a particular right does not affect or reduces the value of the other. 
Incommensurability requires distinction of competing interests, as it is not possible to 
compromise them. It makes them uncombinable in terms and standard. Gray argues that 
'Ultimate values are objective and knowable, but they are many, they often come into 
conflict with one another and are uncombinable in a single human being or a single 
society and .... in many of such conflicts there 
is no overarching standard whereby the 
competing claims of such ultimate values are rationally arbitrable. '1016 There is no single 
scale of value that can precisely measure the rights. Unlike balancing which assumes a 
common scale to accommodate the competing rights, incommensurability denies the 
existence of such a scale. The diversity of incommensurables such as freedom of 
expression and privacy renders assessment on a common measure as unachievable. 
What is the resolution then when faced with two incommensurables? In contrast with 
balancing exercise, which relies on relative weight to determine the outcome, 
incommensurability ensures a pragmatic resolution. It does not involve comparative 
evaluation between the less and more values or concerning individual and community 
interests. Decision on competing interests is not a matter of evaluative consideration on a 
balancing scale but rather a matter of choice that simply needs to be made. Building on a 
democratic framework, the people are empowered with a capacity to make a choice, 
which reflects their needs. Raz makes the point by saying that "we are in a sense free to 
1016 Gray, J. (1993) Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought. New York, 65. 
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choose which course to follow. " 1017 The people should be entrusted with the choice 
involving diverse kinds of valuation. '018 A resolution of clash between incommensurable 
values is unachievable through accommodative effort. Instead, it is a tragic choice as 
described by Isaiah Berlin. 1019 Values in human life are heterogeneous not neatly rank- 
ordered, and cannot be combined into a single harmonious package. To live well is to 
choose a good life, which inevitably means excluding other worthy possibilities. The 
philosophical justification for social pluralism is the diversity of legitimate human 
goods. 1020 On the premise of this view, a brute stand is necessary to resolve the clash in a 
practical manner. 
There is no objective means of measuring the value of different interests between 
freedom of expression and privacy. It is tragic that there will be a lost to society where 
one of the fundamental rights has to be tolerated to give way to the other. This does not 
necessarily make the chosen interest gains preferential status permanently nor reducing 
the fundamental character of the other. Though the impact is regrettable' 
°2'but it provides 
an appropriate accommodation of competing rights within a democratic framework. For 
instance, in R (Prolife Alliance) v BBC102, the issue is about the censorship of political 
speech. It concerns the question of what constraints may lawfully be imposed upon the 
choice of a registered political party as to the content of a party election broadcast to be 
transmitted on television on its behalf at the time of a general election. The House of 
Lords applied the standards laid down by Parliament, held that on the basis accepted by 
the claimant that party political broadcasts were subject to the same restriction on the 
transmission of offensive material as other programmes. There had been no ground for 
interfering with the decision of the BBC that the claimant's video should not be 
transmitted. 
1017 Raz, J. (1997) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, 334 101" Sunstein, C. Incommensurability and Valuation in Law. (1994) 92 Mich L. Rev. 779. 1019 Berlin, I. (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. London, Oxford University Press. 1020 Galston, W. Who's a Liberal? (2001) The Public Interest, 416 1021 Galston, W. Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory. (1999) 93 APSR 769,771. 1022 [2003] UKHL 23. 
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In relation to this, Alder argues that reconciliation under the notion of 
incommensurability should be tentative and provisional in nature. 1023 The perception that 
people have towards interests is changeable. The qualitative nature of values, which give 
primacy to interest in society, is susceptible to change. This is influenced by the climate 
of social, political and economic conditions in the society. The vicissitude of social and 
political life, thus, influences the emphasis in society. For instance, the horrendous 
impact of the September 11 2001 tragedy in the United States of America illustrates the 
impermanent status of values. The tragedy alters the landscape of domestic and 
international affairs. It fortifies the need to strengthen national security, which makes 
protection of the interests of the people as paramount. This is a matter of a brute choice 
that needs determination. On this basis, perhaps the existence of the Anti-Terrorism Act 
in the UK and the Internal Security Act in Malaysia, which limit personal liberty to a 
certain extent, is justifiable. The renewed priority compromises other aspects of life such 
as personal liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of movement. It may be 
justifiable to be pro-active in this sort of condition in order to prevent terrorism by 
restricting freedom of expression or privacy. As such, it is difficult to maintain that a 
democratic legal system can rationally provide coherent scheme of values. Therefore, 
permanent adherence to any particular value or interest does not reflect the pragmatic 
characteristic of a democratic framework in this sense. 
The choice between incommensurable competing interests may not be difficult and is less 
controversial in case of exceptional circumstances. For instance, the necessity of 
protecting national security against terrorism permits restrictions on individual rights. 
The introduction of Anti-Terrorism, Security and Crime Act, though inhibits personal 
liberty with regard to fair trial, is deemed to be necessary as a pre-emptive action to avoid 
harm to the nation. This is a collective decision democratically acted upon. The priority 
accorded to security interest is being proclaimed and coercively imposed as the 
overriding interest in society. Nevertheless, a detention without trial provided by the Act 
accords a vast discretionary power to the executive that may lead to abuse of power. The 
law was introduced in accordance with a democratic framework peculiar to the UK, 
1023 Alder, J. Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choice? (2000) 20(2) OJLS 221 
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which embraces the principle of parliamentary supremacy. It is the choice deemed fit by 
the government and can only be proven wrong by the majority voice through ballot box. 
In this context, there is a sense of expediency exercised by the UK government that is 
similar in the case of Malaysia. In 2004, the House of Lords ruled that the Anti- 
Terrorism, Security and Crime Act 2001 is incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the 
European Convention insofar as it is disproportionate and permits detention of suspected 
international terrorists in a way that discriminates on the ground of nationality or 
immigration status. 1024 
Similarly, the competing interests with regard to the proposed Identity Card Bill by the 
UK government may be reconciled from the incommensurability perspective. Arguably, 
the interest in privacy and security are incommensurable. Though it is valid to argue that 
the card leads to the erosion of personal liberty as far as personal information is 
concerned, the management of personal information at national level for security 
purposes is equally important. The erosion occurs at the operational stage relating to the 
effectiveness in managing database. Considering the present social climate on issues such 
as asylum seekers, illegal immigrants and social benefit fraudsters, identity card is 
deemed as a necessary apparatus and instrumentally serves as a preventive measure for 
the betterment of life of the people. 
Another area where incommensurability is a coherent resolution is the protection of 
individuals who are seriously at risk. The court in Carr v News Group Newspapers Ltd & 
Others concludes this when the court granted an injunction to protect the identity of the 
individual concerned from being disclosed. '025 The injunction was granted on the 
evidence that there were death threats that the police believed to be credible. In addition, 
protection of welfare of a child may also override the interest in freedom of expression. 
The application of overriding interests under these exceptional circumstances is dictated 
by the need of a democratic society. The requirement of necessity in a democratic society 
and pressing social needs shows that certain values are recognised as having 
1°24 A (FC) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL. 1025 Similar injunction was also given by the court in Venables & Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001 ]1 All ER 908 and X& Anor v O'Brien & Ors [2003] EWHC 1101. 
267 
determinative influence in deciding primary interests. Therefore, it may be unjustifiable 
to give primacy to an interest that is less important from the society's point of view. 
Under democracy where the voice of majority prevails, the interest of the public as a 
whole is deemed paramount. It is a democratic way to preserve this interest whilst 
sacrificing interest that only serves minority. But this does not necessarily create an 
overarching principle for majority rule in all circumstances. Hoffman J in Re 
Goodwin'°26explained the democratic way in dealing with two important public interests: 
The conflict is between two public interests... the free availability of 
information and the fair administration of justice. The administration of 
justice is a matter of high public interest.. . In a democratic society these 
differences of opinion (which public interests are more important) are 
decided by the elected representatives of the people. Parliament decides 
which public interest should have priority and, while that remains the law, 
the people accept and obey what Parliament has decided. 1027 
The absence of a common standard capable of resolving the inconunensurables implies 
the dissatisfactory of relying on relative values to determine the outcome. This is why 
balancing exercise is doubtful in providing a satisfactory resolution for incommensurable 
interests. It is difficult to balance between two seemingly conflicting interests, and 
solutions are often imperfect. Infringement can only be justified in cases of overriding 
necessity to prevent demonstrable harm to other citizens. 1028 
It could arguably be said that the interest in free speech and privacy are not susceptible 
under harmonisation scheme as they are also uncombinable. In this situation, the 
prevalence need of the people should lead the course in determining between the 
competing interests. The people are seen to be the appropriate party to determine the 
priority of their own interests. Since the matter will affect their individual rights, a degree 
of deference should be accorded to them under the aegis of a democratic framework. In 
other words, the issue should be decided by making a choice of preference determinable 
in accordance with the accepted structure through the representative system. It is not a 
1026 [1990] 1 All ER 608. 
1027 Ibid, 615. 
1028 Robertson and Nicol argue that this should be the new test replacing balancing test. Their argument based on the primacy of free expression in article 10 which is a common standard by which all restraints on 
publication may be judged. See Robertson, G. and Nicol, A. (2002) Media Law. London, x. 
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question of forming a relative judgment in order to make a decision but simply exercising 
the ability to make a choice between the incommensurables. 
Decisions through democratic process are the outcome of participative deliberation on a 
voluntary basis. Such a process may give way for individual's interests to override 
community's interests on a contextual basis. In a functioning democracy, democratic 
processes and structures serve to manage conflict in the direction of tolerance and 
compromise. However, there are circumstances whereby compromise is indefensible 
such as in case of abortion or right to die. Therefore, in a situation where there is a clash 
between individual's interests and community's interests, the latter do not always prevail. 
There is a flaw in determining the prevalent interest based on the size of recipient. The 
larger the size, in this case the public, does not mean the better justice will be served. 
Sometimes the interest of a minority public is important in preserving peace and order 
such as in case of racial and religious hatred under the Anti-Terrorism, Security and 
Crime Act 2001. In addition, to accept community interests as the overriding interests 
may lead to the existence of trump factor. The effect is that it suppresses the individual's 
interests whenever a clash takes place. This may not attune to the pragmatic aspect of a 
democratic process, which gives space for both kinds of interests under the principle of 
distributive judgment. Strict adherence to any particular values or interests is an alien 
concept in a democratic framework. 1029 
The Human Rights Act 1998 may provide the platform for accommodative approach 
between two fundamental interests in a democratic society such as freedom of the press, 
representing public interest in the right to be informed, and privacy of individual. Though 
section 12 (2) requires a particular regard to freedom of expression, at the same time it 
permits the exclusion of the right for the purpose of protecting individual's interest such 
as reputation or confidence. The mediation exercise helps to maintain the importance of 
both rights without degrading each other. 
1029 Privileging any particular values permanently is against democratic principles because it narrows the possibility of change. See Alder, J. Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices? (2000) 20(2) OJIS 221,222. 
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Perhaps it is appropriate to reconcile the competing interests by considering the intrinsic 
nature and the relevant peripheral considerations informed by qualified deontology. 1030 In 
this context, free speech and privacy under Article 10 and 8 respectively, can be regarded 
as presupposing the intrinsic value of the autonomy that both seek to protect. Both 
countervail each other and can be overridden if it can be shown that protecting a 
particular interest at the expanse of another is necessary in a functioning democratic 
society. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
To apply a general balancing exercise involving competing interests is misleading. There 
exists an imbalance in the approach where the scale tilts in favour of free expression in 
term of weight. Since privacy and freedom of expression represent distinct and different 
interests, balancing is unsatisfactory due to lack of a single common scale. 
Reconciliation could be found in the doctrine of proportionality that embodies a basic 
principle of fairness. 
The application of distributive justice could help to inform value judgements in 
reconciling the competing interests under this approach. Perhaps balancing is possible 
between competing but combinable interests such as those under the aegis of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 of the United Nation, respectively. 1031 
Although judicial recognition of the primary of freedom of expression over privacy is 
divisive, but the cases seem to indicate that great emphasis is given by the English 
courts1032 and ECtHR'°33 to freedom of expression especially with regard to political 
expression. 
1030 Mullender, R. Privacy, Paedophilia and the European Convention on Human Rights: A Deontological 
Approach. (1998) PL 384. 
1031 Unlike Malaysia, the UK government disagree with the distinction between civil and political rights on 
one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. See Human Rights: Annual Report 2003: 144. CM 5967. 
'032AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 543 and Rv Secretary of State, ex p Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400. 
1033Sunday Times v UK (1980) 2 EHRR 245, Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, Prager and Obserchlik v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 1, Bladet Tromso v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, Bergens Tidende v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16 and Arslan v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 9. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PRESS AND PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN MALAYSIA: A WAY 
FORWARD 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia adopts democratic principles. 1034This is manifested by the thrust of 
constitutional democracy where the citizens have the right to participate in shaping the 
nation. The existence of diversity in terms of race, culture, religion and language 
continues to influence the application of relative democratic values at the national level. 
However, the relativism that places great emphasis on local values does not resonant well 
with the concept of universality of human rights under the United Nation (UN). 
The idea of universality of human rights as subscribed by most of the Western liberal 
countries such as the UK is an intricate application in Malaysia. The intricacy is due to 
the social and political diversity, which is peculiar to the country. This creates divergence 
in the practice of human rights that may challenge the coherency of the idea of 
universalism. This is obvious when Malaysia recognises a dual judicial system where 
Islamic law, with limited application to the Muslims, is being implemented alongside 
with secular common law system. As such, there are areas where the perception on 
certain matters is different. For example, being in close proximity with a member of the 
opposite sex, unmarried, is not only a highly immoral conduct but also a criminal 
offence. 1035 This is absence in the Western liberal societies such as the UK. Another 
example that may question the coherency of universalism in Malaysia is the absence of a 
right to leave one's religion particularly in case of the Muslims, which is in contravention 
with Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
The question is: `does that make Malaysia undemocratic from the Western's democracy 
point of view? ' The writer argues that there is a flaw in one version of democracy that 
1034 Article 119 of the Federal Constitution ensures the citizens their right to vote and to elect the 
government of their choice. °35 Section 27 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997. 
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suits all. This is justifiable with regard to the fact that local needs and requirements create 
divergence in exercising democratic principles in various parts of jurisdictions. In this 
regard, Walzer argues that moral maximalism gives expression to particularities of 
society laden with relativist impulse. 1036 Since societies have culture, customary practices 
and values `there is no singular human way of having them. ' 1037 For instance, the 
diversity in judicial system, with the application of the Islamic law in Malaysia, creates 
incommensurables that have no resemblance to the worldview of the Western liberal 
democracy. Thus, there exists plurality in practicing democratic principles that is 
acknowledged widely. This is illustrated in the different emphasis that appears in the joint 
Declaration and Programme of Action in Vienna 1993 and with the adopted stand by 
Asian governments at their United Nations regional consultation in Bangkok 1993. 
A common factor for the spectrum of perception on human rights is attributed to cultures, 
norms and values. Faruqi argues that cultural differences are an anthropological fact, 
whereas human rights are about moral and not a cultural doctrine. 
1038 Universal 
formulations of human rights ignore the fact that human societies evolve on 
particularities according to their own needs and demands. Furthermore, societies at times 
define some of their core values in retrospect to their very self-understanding. For 
example, in relation to freedom of expression, blasphemous expression against Islam is 
an offence in Malaysia but it is not so in the UK. 
Arguably, it is indefensible to denounce local particularities in applying universal 
principle at the national level. The existence of plurality of values and diversity of views 
creates a divergence of perception on rights and wrongs. For instance, the application of 
death sentence is a subject of different perception on right to life in Malaysia and the UK. 
As such the application of margin of appreciation, which is the touchstone under the 
ECHR, points out that the universality of human rights needs adjustment to suit local 
conditions. For example, in relation to protection of reputation, which is universally 
recognised, the question of defamatory statement depends on peculiarities and values of 
1036 Walzer, M. (1994) Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame, x. 1037 ibid, S. 
10311 Faruqi, S. (1994) A Comparative Constitutional Approach ) to Human Rights. Paper presented at Bengkel Human Rights: An Inventory of Propositions, University Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
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the society concerned. Therefore, whether a statement tends to lower a person in the 
estimation of the right-thinking members of society in Malaysia may not be the same in 
the UK. This is illustrated in the case of Hasnul Bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat Bin Mohamed & 
Anor'°39 where the court held that to call a man `Abu Jahal' is a defamatory, and 
publication of the words is actionable per se. Ibrahim J in his judgment said that: 
As the description of plaintiff as "Abu Jahal" was qualified by the reason 
that it was on account of his very big lies it would appear to me that the 
words used were likely to be understood by the ordinary right-thinking 
and reasonable Malay of ordinary intelligence with the ordinary man's 
general knowledge of the Islamic religion and experience of worldly 
affairs to mean that plaintiff was a very big liar and an irresponsible 
person just as "Abu Jahal" was ... 
1040 
The particularity as illustrated by the above case raises the issue of approach to protect 
fundamental freedom most appropriately. In this context, there are three approaches of 
model for Malaysia to adopt in practicing human rights at the national level namely, 
universalism, relativism and reflective equilibrium. '04' The writer argues that the third 
approach may suit Malaysia considering the distinctiveness of its socio-political and 
economic background. The approach stresses on discrimination in absorbing external 
values, yet at the same time avoid blanket rejection and extremes of relativism. The next 
discussion will focus on the nature and suitability of the above-mentioned approaches in 
relation to Malaysia. 
7.1 UNIVERSALISM AND TOP DOWN APPROACH 
Malaysia subscribes to the particularities of local condition in justifying restrictions on 
individual rights. The practice of individual rights as perceived under the international 
documents such as UNCHR are regarded as an effort to impose the Western ideals of 
human rights. The Western liberal approach, which based its account of rights on 
individualism, is in contradiction with Asian values that stress on communitarianism. 1042 
With regard to freedom of expression in Malaysia, Hashim argues that `When balanced 
1039 (1978) 1 MLJ 75. 
1040 Ibid, 77 
1041 See Mullender, R. Human Rights: Universalism and Cultural Relativism. (2003) 6 CRISPP 70. 1042 Farugi, S. Human Rights, Globalisation and the Asian Economic Crisis. (1999) 28 INSAF 39,54. 
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against the public's right to know, the rights of the individual must always be balanced 
against the needs of the community. ' i°43 
The decadence of social fabric under the concept of individualism is perceived as a 
failure of the Western liberal approach. This is capitalised to justify that the West is not a 
good model for the Asian societies to follow suit. On this account, any effort to introduce 
by way of transplantation of a Western concept of freedom would face criticism and 
rejection. 1044 Reliance on international instruments on rights and freedom such as UDHR 
and ICCPR by the West to introduce freedom and democracy is regarded as an attempt to 
impose alien norms and values. In this context, Yasuaki argues that the colonial past 
endured by most of the Asian societies has made them sceptical and critical of western 
concept. 1045 The propagation of rights and freedom by the colonial governments under 
the concept of humanity, civilisation and human rights `looks like nothing more than 
another beautiful slogan by which great powers rationalize their interventionist 
policies. ' 1046 
On the other hand, the sentiment of sceptical view of western human rights is criticised as 
an attempt to gain popular support at the national level especially to maintain political 
power. The capitalisation of the sentiment of West-East dichotomy is to repel foreign 
intervention for political gain. The human rights such as freedom of expression and 
privacy are not confined within local boundaries. The exercise of the rights is by no mean 
associated to any geographical area as the privilege of the developed countries. The rights 
are inalienable to human beings regardless of nationality 
Freedom to speak up against injustice, corruption, and abuse of power is a right of a 
person in any democratic society. Therefore, there is a fallacy in the view that there is a 
difference between the rights as practice by the West and by those in Malaysia. Notably, 
the rights are a constituent part of a democratic society associated to the people. The real 
1043 Hashim, H. Freedom of Speech, Communication and the Press. (2003) MLI. httD: //www. mli-com-mv/fr, -, -/articles/harunhashim. htm (Retrieved 10 June 2004) ' Bakar, 0. Asian Values or Universal Values Championed by Asia? Implications for East-West Understanding. (1998) 8 (2) Social Semiotics 169. '045 Yasuaki, 0. (1999) Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights. In Bauer, J. and Bell, D. (ed. ) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge, 103. 10461bid, 105. 
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issue is not the distinction of the nature of the rights but the extent of the exercise of the 
right. It is acceptable to say that there is a distinction between the practice of human 
rights in the West and in the East. This is due to the application of the rights in the 
domestic context. The concept that the rights convey is universal but the application is 
subject to local suitability. Needless to say, the plurality in term of cultures and values 
requires adaptation and adjustment of the rights in accordance with the local conditions. 
In this regard, the top down approach where the rights are applied as a matter of principle 
regardless of the plurality of the local conditions may not be appropriate in case of 
Malaysia. This leads to a question whether local particularities must be given priority in 
applying universal human rights principles such as expression and privacy. 
7.2 LOCAL PARTICULARITIES AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
The question of diversity in the human rights discourse threatened the coherency of the 
idea of universality. Moreover, the conflicts of values that exist at transnational level 
create complexities in the universal language of human rights. Thus, local perspective is 
vital in determining the scope of human rights. 
The bottom-up approach on Mullender's account gives expression to local perspectives 
and local practices. 1047 In Malaysian context, religious principles play an important role 
particularly in the Muslims' social life. The federal Constitution expressly stated that 
Islam is the official religion. 1048 In addition, there is also a provision for a separate 
jurisdiction for Islamic law matters. The principles are even used as the basis for 
formulating certain policies at the national level that is absent in the Western approach. 
Naturally, national agenda involves priorities that affect the way of life of the citizens. 
The priorities may not be at tandem with the universality of human rights. Thus, Vision 
2020, Malaysia's ambitious vision is set. The goal of the vision is to become a developed 
country. In pursuant of the goal, the National Information Technology Agenda (NITA) 
was developed as a major strategy for national development. The National IT Council 
1047 See footnote 25 in Mullender, R. Human Rights: Universalism and Cultural Relativism. (2003) 6 
CRISPP 70. 
1048 Article 3 of the Malaysian Constitution. 
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(NITC) launched NITA in December 1996. It provides the foundation and framework for 
the utilization of information and communication technology (ICT) to transform 
Malaysia into a developed nation in accordance with the Malaysian mould in realising the 
nation's aspiration. NITA's vision is to use ICT to transform Malaysia, across all sectors, 
into an information society, then a knowledged society, and fmally a "value-based" 
knowledge society. The main emphasis here is on local content and culture 
compatibility. '049 
However, privileging local particularities, conditions and mould could be a facade for 
allowing authoritarian policies. It also could be used by the government to resist the 
universality of the human rights on the sentiment that past colonial countries promote 
it 
as a new form of imperialism. Nonetheless, there is a genuine concern of ignorance of the 
local factors that may not be at tandem with the universality as preached by the West. 
Protection of human rights in accordance with the local mould appears justifiable. Yet, 
there is an uncertainty in relation to the mould. It conveys a paternalistic expression, 
which the government relies on to justify its action that amount to restriction of 
individual freedom. Perhaps the local mould is based on the accepted norms, cultures and 
values peculiar to the local society. These particularities are different with the Western 
practices not only in form but substance. In this regard, Faruqi argues that the differences 
between the orient and the occident make adaptation of universal concept of human rights 
such as freedom of expression to local situation as necessary. 
1°5° 
The generality of the mould is a good excuse for failure to accord the society its 
democratic entitlements. The connection between the West and the new form of 
imperialism is unconvincing. Freedom of expression and privacy are not the rights 
attribute to the states but it is the empowerment of individual person against infringement 
of personal autonomy. To reject these rights on the basis of differences between nations 
1049 ft: //www. nitc. org. my/nita/index. shtml 
1050 Key differences such as Western secularism, individualism, universalism, priority on civil and political 
rights over socio-economic rights and right-based political theory make the practice of human rights from 
Western perspective as unsuitable to Malaysian condition. See Farugi, S. (1999) Human Rights and the 
Constitution. In S. Rachagan and R. Tikamdas (eds. ) Human Rights and the National Commission. Kuala 
Lumpur, 130. 
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is to deny the inherent part of humanity. However, there may be differences as to the 
scope of the rights. The extent of the rights is determined by the state in accordance with 
the local elements. 
The real disagreement then is in relation to the extent of the rights. Some countries are 
criticised as being too restrictive compared to others. In Malaysia, the parameter of local 
mould serves as insulation in the process of adopting foreign legal principles. It enables 
Malaysia to apply principles that are suitable to Malaysian plural society. Whilst 
recognition is given to the importance of freedom of expression, and to a certain extent 
privacy, restrictions are being imposed which make the scope of the freedom becomes 
narrow. This is where the government is criticised for failure to emulate the practice of 
other democratic countries in giving more space to freedom. 
The criticism may be unfair because the local conditions and particularities of Malaysia 
are dissimilar to the other countries. It fails to consider the emphasis and priority of the 
government in the furtherance of the nation's well being. For instance, the introduction 
of restrictive laws such as the ISA was to prevent subversive activities that can inflict 
harm to the nation. On the same premise, the introduction of Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 in the UK and the Patriot Act in the US which allows detention 
without trial is a commitment based on particularity of local situations. The extent and 
scope of freedom may vary due to different considerations on national interest, social 
stability, peace and harmony. 
Socio-economic equality may be the main agenda of developing countries like Malaysia, 
compared to developed countries that emphasise civil and political rights. Striving for 
socio-economic betterment in pursuing the Vision 2020 may allow, to a certain extent, 
restrictions on individual rights. Different emphasis seems to create polarity where 
developing countries are seen as practicing less freedom. This misconception occurs due 
to patronising attitude where the practice of individual rights in developed countries is 
perceived as more liberal than developing or less developing countries. However, the 
application of several pre and post Merdeka (Independence) restrictive laws shows that 
Malaysia embraces the idea of the goodness of the laws instead of right to the people. It is 
277 
in this context that the writer believes that reformation informed by the principle of 
distributive justice is needed. Thus, Malaysia's commitment should be predicated on 
what is right for the people. 
On the other hand, the application of local perspective could not be defended in the 
situation where it is used to maintain political power. The basic values of a democratic 
society in leading their lives and shaping the country are not dictated by physical 
boundary. The right to criticize the performance and wrongdoings of the government 
should not be curbed on the ground of local condition. Any restriction on such right will 
only diminish the characteristic of a prudent democratic society. On the other hand, the 
application of local perspective can be a ground for the government to justify the 
imposition of restrictions on individual rights. The use of local peculiarities in this way is 
an autocratic exercise of power. It is a form of coercion exercised on the people to 
maintain status quo especially in relation to political control. The application of security 
laws such as the Internal Security Act 1960 and the Sedition Act 1948 against political 
oppositions and NGO movements is the manifestation of an authoritarian practice. This is 
in contradiction with the democratic principles espouses by the government and 
Malaysian constitutional values under the fundamental liberties. 
The practice of individual rights by the developed countries such as the UK may not 
always be compatible with the local considerations. Failure to allow the practice of wider 
individual rights and personal liberties on the basis of inaptness with local condition is 
based on political justification rather than legal. The writer argues that this may only 
widen the sentiment that creates a perception gap and dichotomy in the practice of 
individual rights between developed and developing countries. In Malaysia, the 
application of local perspective and mould in exercising personal liberties reflects the 
influence of the executive branch. Reliance on the local mould by the government is for 
the purpose of preserving domestic social harmony within a plural society. But, to some 
extent, it is used to insulate the western social practices, which are perceived as more 
open and liberal, particularly in relation to issues involving moral values such as 
homosexual. In this regard, the former minister, Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim in his reaction 
to the proposed human rights resolution in the UN to punish nations which banned 
278 
homosexual activities said that `There are countries, including Malaysia, that do not 
recognize sexual relations between males and such a law is sovereign and basic to us. "°5' 
Preservation of a harmonious environment and the resistance of inappropriate foreign 
practices are the issues being capitalised by the ruling party to ensure political 
dominance. For the past forty-seven years, the same political party, Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) has been governing Malaysia. Though the setup of the Malaysian 
constitution provides for separation of power among the executive, legislature and 
judiciary, the separation is vague in practice. There is no real separation between the 
executive and legislature because most of the members of the executive are from the 
legislature. The majority voice in Parliament enjoyed by the ruling party enables the 
executive to introduce laws without hassle. Under the Federal Constitution, Malaysian 
laws can only be legislated by Parliament. Article 66 (1) provides that in order for a bill 
to become law it must be passed by both houses, Dewan Rakyat (lower house) and 
Dewan Negara (Upper house) and assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Therefore, 
according to the provision there must be three parties involve in the making of laws. It is 
difficult to defeat a government's bill in Dewan Rakyat because the ruling party controls 
the majority power. They form a hegemonic force in supporting the government. 
Hegemony exists when there is a convergence of effort towards general direction 
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group. Such a force is readily 
exercised when the ruling party appoints the majority of the members of the Dewan 
Negara. As such, the government enjoys a convincing control of both legislative houses, 
which makes the process of endorsing the government's action as a procedural 
convenience. It is unlikely for the representatives to go against the government's will 
because they represent the government's voice in the legislative assemblies. In this regard 
the Dewan Negara is merely functioning as a rubber stamp. 
The only party that may affect the passing of a bill from becoming a law is the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong (the King). Prior to 1988 Agong has the power to refuse to give his royal 
assent to a bill. In the event where Agong decides to exercise this power, a bill will cease 
1051 Atan, H. Rais: UN ill-advised on homosexual laws. New Straits Times, 2nd February 2004. 
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from becoming law. However, Article 66 was amended with the inclusion of new sub 
Article (4A) that provides: 
If a Bill is not assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong within the time 
specified in Clause (4), it shall become law at the expiration of the time 
specified in that Clause in the like manner as if he had assented thereto. 
The effect of the new provision is that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's power to give his 
royal assent in order for a bill to become a law is withdrawn. Therefore, a law can be 
passed effectively only by both houses which are controlled by the executive. The role of 
Agong is thus reduced to a symbolic role. The members of Parliament from the ruling 
party are expected to fully support the executive policies and pass any legislation 
throughout the parliamentary process. The executive upholds the idea that local 
particularities necessitate the exercise of individual rights to be in accordance with the 
local mould. '°52 They seek to justify the idea by continuing the existence of several laws 
such as Internal Security Act 1960, Official Secret Act 1972, Printing Presses and 
Publication Act 1986 and University and University Colleges Act 1971, deemed to be 
repressive by human rights organisations. There seems to be a clash with the aspiration to 
create a developed society under the vision 2020 with the restrictive action of the 
government. 
The constitutional qualifications make the freedom of expression the most restricted 
individual's right. The qualifications empower the executive to restrict the freedom. The 
approach of regulating rights in accordance with the executive interest may lead to an 
authoritarian government. The democratic process that takes place in Malaysian 
Parliament may portray that there exists a vibrant democracy. However, under close 
scrutiny there may be a false representation of the existence of such a vibrant democracy. 
For instance, the case of the two state legislative assembly members from the ruling party 
who were put under disciplinary action for being neutral during the passing of legislation 
introduce by the government discloses an element of autocracy. It shows that there is a 
strict unquestionable duty to always support and uphold the government's policies. A 
1052 Hate Journalism should not be allowed to take root- Khalil. BERNAM4,17 December 2003. httn: //www. bernama. com/bernama/state news/new php? id=35633 (Accessed 18 December 2003) 
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similar situation is applicable to government's civil servants where they are under the 
obligation not to engage in any kind of activities that may be interpreted as against the 
government. 
The exercise of individual rights subject to local conditions does not appeal to the 
domestic human rights movements. In 1994, fifty NGOs have endorsed the Malaysian 
Charter of Human Rights that expressed the universality of human rights. It also points 
out that those cultural practices that derogate from universally accepted human rights 
must not be tolerated. However, the position of these NGOs is difficult to be translated 
into practice in Malaysia. The obscurity of universal value of human rights raises a 
question of the standard used to assess local cultural practices that are not acceptable. On 
the other hand, the approach of local mould, which implies cultural relativism, may create 
a rule by law, which coerces the people to follow the state of affair as paternalistically 
determined by the government. This approach involves minimal democratic 
participation. It may also isolate Malaysia from the widely accepted principle of human 
rights practiced by other democratic countries under the auspices of UNCHR. The 
repercussion is not only on the socio-political environment in Malaysia but also economic 
activities. It may be less attractive for foreign business to invest and set up businesses 
under the Malaysian Super Corridor project if the human rights practices such as freedom 
of expression and privacy are not protected. Perhaps this is part of the reason for the 
government to make a pledge to allow leverage on freedom of expression on the internet 
and proposes a new law on personal data protection. 
Human rights in Malaysia exist within the constitutional framework. However, interests 
of communalism impulse qualify the exercise of the rights. The rights are exercised in 
accordance with the peculiarities of socio-political environment. Cultural plurality in 
multiracial society requires the exercise of individual rights to be in accordance with the 
local condition. The application of local condition does not amount to denying the 
universality of the rights in principle. The difference is mainly on the substance and to 
certain extent the practicality of the rights. There are other paramount considerations such 
as social stability, peace and harmony that could override individual rights. 
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Public discussion on several issues that are deemed to be sensitive in the context of 
Malaysian society, such as the Malays privilege, may cause disruption and is harmful to 
social and public order. This is vindicated by past experiences of racial riot and political 
crisis, which leave a grave impact on the nation well being. The current political 
environment, which is still dominated by ethnicity, may be a factor for the need to 
regulate liberal discussions. The maintenance of peace and harmony through racial 
integration will be affected if open discussion on racially aggravated issues is permitted. 
Furthermore, the exercise of individual rights as perceived by developed countries such 
as the UK may not be appropriate in Malaysian context where dual legal system is 
practiced. For instance, the UK recognises the matrimonial relationship between couple 
of the same sex. On the contrary, this kind of relationship is prohibited in Malaysia. 
Besides the common law system, Malaysia also gives limited scope to Islamic law. To 
apply the universality of human rights, which are informed by secular perception into a 
society that incorporates part of religious law in the legal system, is incompatible. 
Compatibility is an issue when it comes to the exercise of freedom of expression as 
practiced by other developed countries such as the UK on issues, for instance, regarding 
the right of gays, lesbians and same sex marriage. It is a misconception to exercise the 
freedom relying on universalism on this point because it could be seen as importing 
foreign elements. In this regard, it is unfair to criticise a country as undemocratic on the 
basis of its failure to allow freedom of expression as practice by other countries without 
giving due consideration to the local conditions. On the same premise, the exercise of 
rights based on individualism should also give way to communitarianism. Thus, free 
expression as an individual right could be curtailed to avoid harmful effect on the 
community. Nevertheless, it could be difficult to achieve the objective of being a 
developed country when the exercise of fundamental freedom such as freedom of 
expression is restricted for the purpose of political advantage. Strict adherence to either 
universalism or relativism is incoherent in a pluralistic environment. Arguably, the 
adoption of universalism could interrupt the harmonious environment and tolerance in 
Malaysian plural society. This is due to the difficulty in reaching a meeting of minds as to 
the universally acceptable principles in such a society. Thus, an accommodative approach 
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that take into account both, universalism and relativism, is practical in a plural society 
such as Malaysia. This is the approach to which we now turn the focus. 
7.3 REFLECTIVE EQUALIBRIUM 
The current socio-political fabric of Malaysian society requires a pragmatic approach in 
exercising fundamental rights. This may be possible by way of adopting the reflective 
equilibrium approach. 1053 This approach encourages synergic application of particularism 
and universal principles in achieving a desired end-state. Reflective equilibrium is a 
deliberative process of `going back and forth', '°54 where `our considered judgments about 
substantial justice in particular case coincide with our most deeply held convictions about 
moral principles. ' loss Reflective equilibrium does not merely emphasise on local 
conditions so as to make it prominence. It allows the integration of universal principle 
whilst maintaining the importance of local elements. Thus, the approach rejects 
privileging any particular considered judgment or guiding principles in the process of 
practical deliberation. 
The approach is also flexible in the sense that the exercise of over-arching principles such 
as free expression are upheld as long as they are resonant to the reality of local 
environment. In this sense, the adaptation of universalism is mainly by way of 
adjustment to a desired end-state where equal weight is given to guiding principles and 
considered judgments. '°56 In defending the coherency of reflective equilibrium, 
Mullender argues that the approach highlights the interconnection of the general aim of 
human rights law and the practical means by which that aim is pursued. The approach 
also `forestall both grandstanding (windy appeals to the general aim of human rights law) 
and complacency (the lazy assumption that in such-and-such a jurisdiction `we know how 
to protect human rights'). ' 1057 On this account, it could arguably be said that reflective 
equilibrium is an accommodative approach amenable to cosmopolitan 
1053 The approach is given prominence by John Rawls. See Rawls, J. (1971) Theory of Justice. Cambridge, 
48-9. 
1054 Ibid, 20. 
'°SS Schwartz, J. Relativism, reflective equilibrium, and justice. (1997) Leg. Stud 128,131. 
1056 Ibid, 48. 
1057 Mullender, R. Human Rights: Universalism and Cultural Relativism. (2003) 6(3) CRISPP 70,86. 
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arrangements' 058 whilst judgmental towards a dogmatic paternalism in achieving the 
general aim of human rights law. 
With regard to Malaysia, the exercise of reflective equilibrium as a coherent approach is 
reflected in section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956. Although the provision is confined to 
the issue of the applicability of English legal principles, it sets a framework for the 
approach, which makes Malaysian legalism receptive towards the application of foreign 
principles. However, the framework gives prominence to particularism whereby foreign 
principles need to past the test of local condition as a contingent requirement in order for 
the principles to be applicable. In this context, the ubiquitous of local condition informed 
by relativism renders reflective equilibrium as a constraint on conception of justice. '°59 
Although this could be the case in a divided society where there is a favoured conception 
of justice, Malaysia could do better by subscribing to the process that take into account 
various considerations from relativism as well as universalism point of view. 
There is a platform for the exercise of reflective equilibrium under section 4 (4) of the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1999.1060 The provision allows the Malaysian Human 
Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) to have regard to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948. Though it is uncertain as to whether the provision incorporates the UDHR 
in clear term, the provision, nevertheless, paves the way for universalism under the 
UDHR in the effort of protecting and promoting human rights at national level. The 
impact of this is a degree of flexibility in expanding the perception on the underpinning 
principle of free expression and privacy that are confined by the Constitution. 
7.4 ARGUMENTS FOR PRESS LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA 
Freedom of the press is one of the fundamental characters of a democratic society. The 
press plays a pivotal role in creating awareness among the public by being a watchdog on 
matters of public interest. But sometimes the noble role reverse to by being a hound-dog 
unjustifiably invading the privacy of others by disclosing private information. 
1038 Op cit., supra. 1059 Schwartz, J. Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, and Justice. (1997) Leg. Stud 128,168. 1060 Malaysian Act 597. 
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Nonetheless, it is undeniable that in order for the press to function effectively in 
gathering, informing and publishing information they should be free from governmental 
or political influence. 
There is a question on the extent of freedom the press should enjoy. Although the press 
is widely recognised as an important organisation, they however do not enjoy an absolute 
freedom. In this context, Malaysian constitutional commitment to freedom of speech and 
expression is predicated on the belief that the interest of the society as a whole 
necessitates the imposition of restriction on the freedom. 
The Federal Constitution recognises the right of the citizens to freedom of speech and 
expression. However, there are qualifications that render freedom of expression in 
Malaysia as not an intrinsic right on its own. 1061 The existence of several laws such as 
Official Secret Act 1972, Internal Security Act 1960, Sedition Act 1948 and Printing 
Presses and Publication Act 1984 has the effect of inhibiting freedom of expression 
including press freedom in Malaysia. With the application of these laws, Malaysia is 
ranked at 122°d in the world in term of press freedom. This observation is conducted by 
Reporter Sans Frontieres, an independent international watchdog on press freedom, 
published in their report on press freedom index. 1062 Though the ranking is done in 
accordance with universal standard of press practice which may not be the practice at 
domestic level, nevertheless, the report exposes restrictions on press freedom that is not 
befitting to a government professes to subscribe to democratic principles. The residual 
character of freedom of the press in Malaysia permits the press to indulge in matters that 
are within the constitutional limitation only. As far as the government is concerned, there 
is a legitimate need to curtail the press freedom in the interest of the multiracial society. 
The diversity of culture and religious belief of Malaysian society requires prudence in 
maintaining stability and harmony. Certain issues are therefore prohibited from public 
discussion due to its sensitivity, which is harmful to the harmonious and tolerance 
environment in Malaysia's plural society. Past experiences in relation to social and 
public disorder are taken as lessons by the government. In this regard, unregulated 
1061 Press freedom which is part and parcel of freedom of expression subjects to the same qualifications. 1062 Third Annual Worldwide Press Index. htty: //www. rsf. org/article. php3? id article= 11715 
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freedom of expression managed to destabilise and threaten the harmonious social and 
public order. 1063 Therefore, preventive measures are thought to be effective and 
appropriate under the local condition. 
On the other hand, this authoritarian approach is contrary to the constitutional democracy 
where rule of law is one of the main attributes of the Constitution. The pre-emptive 
approach in protecting the communal goals may disintegrate the democratic values where 
rule by law becomes predominant. The use of law to curb press freedom on the ground of 
security and order could be queried particularly when it relates to issues where the 
interest of the ruling party is involved. In this context, reliance on security and order to 
justify autocratic actions in fact is a process of legitimisation of the ulterior purpose, 
which is to maintain political power. Thus, the fundamental liberties as enshrined in the 
Constitution should be upheld as rights that must be protected. Exceptions to the rights 
must be strictly interpreted. 
Freedom of the press is part of the manifestation of a functional democracy. The essential 
role of the press in a democratic society in imparting ideas and communicating 
information is recognised as providing the means by which freedom of expression may 
be exercised. Participative democracy allows only a small minority of citizens to 
participate directly in the discussions and decisions that shape the public lives of that 
society. The majority can participate indirectly through their votes, opinions, 
representations and public consultations. But these kinds of participation are pointless if 
the majority is not alerted and informed about matters that call or may call for 
considerations and actions. 10M Therefore, the proper functioning of a modem 
participatory democracy requires that the press be free and active. Freedom of the press 
to publish any news or information acclaimed its legitimacy from the freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Federal Constitution. Under the Constitution, freedom 
of expression is a form of negative right. In other words, there are legitimate exceptions 
1063 News on incident of Kampung Medan in the state of Selangor, allegedly sparked by racial sentiment, 
which caused deaths was suppressed by local newspapers. The government promised a report on the incident but the report is not forthcoming up to date. 
httr): //www. suhakam. ore. my/docs/document resource/Annual%20Report%202001 pdf '"°' See per Lord Bingham in McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277,291. 
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to the exercise of the right. Consequently, it makes the press in Malaysia enjoy a limited 
freedom. 
Strict regulation on press freedom is perpetuated by legislations as well as common law 
principles. As far as regulation is concerned, Malaysia exercises pre-restraint. It is 
mandatory for the press to acquire a license in order to operate. The PPA under section 7 
provides the licensing requirement. Once the minister in charge gives an approval, the 
press can publish and print on matters that are in accordance with the constitutional 
guarantee. Therefore, for the press to invoke the constitutional right of freedom of 
expression, it must be able to operate legally in the first place. The imposition of pre- 
restraint through licensing requirement imposed by the government is inconsistent with 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the exceptions in 
Article 10 (2) (a) are wide enough to allow the practice of pre-restraint. 
In addition, there is a two-tier press-monitoring scheme under the PPA. The first tier is 
the vast discretionary power accorded to the Minister under the Act. Second is the 
absolute power of the Minister to revoke the license at any time. Thus, the study proposes 
that the licensing requirement be relaxed and flexible by making it as a procedural 
requirement rather than a substantive matter. Licensing requirement may serve as a useful 
tool for administrative purposes but it should not be used as a controlling apparatus to 
restrict press freedom. Therefore, a license should be issued once an application is in 
accordance with procedural requirement. It should not be subjected to approval under the 
wide discretionary power of the executive, in this regard the Minister. This is in line with 
the spirit of constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. 
Furthermore, the control of the mainstream press by the ruling political parties does not 
help to flourish the exercise of freedom of expression. The interest of political parties in 
maintaining political power to a certain extent silences the press from indulging in 
matters that is prejudicial to the interest. It creates an attitude of compliance to the 
influence of the controlling party. This contributes to the practices of self-censorship and 
avoidance by the press. In certain circumstances, the press is also used as a tool to 
propagate the political agenda of political parties especially during election. There is a 
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difference between the press taking sides by supporting a particular political party and the 
press being controlled by political parties to strengthen their political agenda. The support 
given to any political party does not mean that the press is being manipulated to 
orchestrate one-sided political ideology. Political support is an approval of the policies of 
a political party believed to be beneficial for the public interest and the nation as a whole. 
Under the former, the press can still be free to get involve in any issue without 
interference and dictation. 
Therefore, the mainstream press should ideally be free from being controlled by political 
parties. This can be done through the government's commitment by introducing statutory 
prohibition or limiting the equity that can be held by political parties. However, based on 
the current political climate, this is unlikely to happen because of the powerful executive 
branch in Malaysia. ' 065 In addition, judging from the recent 2004 election where the 
ruling party obtained an impressive victory to maintain political power, the vast majority 
of people seem to be comfortable with the current policies of the government. 
Alternatively, there should be no restriction in relation to the establishment of the press 
except under normal business and company law. 
In relation to this, Safar argues that the local press cannot be assessed through the 
Western concept of press. The role of the press in Malaysia is in actual fact wider than 
merely imparting information. Historically, the Malay press helped in the struggle for 
independence and led the course to forge racial unity. According to him, the particularity 
of local conditions allows for indigenisation of the press in Malaysia to take place. This is 
vindicated by the contribution of the press in preserving peace and harmony in resonant 
with the aspiration of the nation. However, the indigenisation of the press on his account 
may only strengthen the point that reliance on local mould is not for the purpose of 
liberalizing freedom of the press but mainly for political reason. Subsequently, the 
mainstream press controlled by political party is attuned to the government's ideas and 
policies. As such it is difficult for the press to break away from the dominance of the 
government especially the executive. 
1°65 Yatim, R. (1994) The Rule of Law and Executive Power in Malaysia: A Study of Executive Supremacy. 
University of London. 
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The writer argues that there should be no differences of role of the press in democratic 
countries, be it in the UK or Malaysia. The demarcation according to geographical and 
demographical area should not be the reason for indigenisation of the press. Instead, it is 
the scope of freedom that determines the extent of press freedom in different countries. 
Certain subject matters, which are considered as acceptable under freedom of expression 
according to western liberal perspective, may not be so in Malaysia. But that does not 
make Malaysia as less democratic because the yardstick, Western liberal democracy, is 
misconceived. 
The importance of the press in a democratic society does not thwart the necessity to 
regulate the press. Although regulation on the press in Malaysia exists under legislations 
but it does not relate to regulating the conduct and standard of the press. The following 
discussion will examine the need to form a specific institution for this purpose in 
Malaysia. 
7.5 MEDIA COUNCIL: IS IT RELEVANT? 
The commoditisation of information requires the press to employ means capable of 
attracting readers. Like any other business, the press has to win over readers to increase 
their circulation to make profit. Most of the press particularly the tabloids rely on 
sensationalism in their coverage. But some press sensationalised coverage to make it 
attractive to entice the interest of the readers. The latter type of press practices tabloid 
journalism, which focuses on revealing private lives of public figures, celebrities 
capitalising on the lurid curiosity of certain group of readers. The practice of this type of 
journalism does not contribute in a progressive way towards developing informed 
society. 
Newsworthiness is determined by the press, which finds its justification on the interest of 
the public. The uncertainty in assessing what amounts to newsworthiness sometimes put 
the press in a legal predicament. From the press point of view this is regarded as a 
restriction on freedom of expression. Sometimes the press conjures up the protection of 
freedom of expression in order to protect their commercial interest. Though the objective 
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of the press may vary, they form a hegemonic force when it comes to protecting freedom 
of expression and the press. 1066 
In Malaysia, there is no organisation or body with an authority to deal with matters 
pertaining to press. The existing organisation such as National Union of Journalists, 
which is formed under the Trade Union Act, is confined to the social aspect and welfare 
of journalists rather than to the press as a whole. The Malaysian Press Institute is a non- 
governmental organisation that aspires to sustain the ideals of free and responsible press. 
But it has no legal authority to govern the press. Consequently, the institute that is 
regarded as conservative in dealing with press freedom does not seem to get full support 
from the press and journalists. 
7.5.1 SUHAKAM AND RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
On the other hand, the Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) plays a limited role in 
relation to the press on the platform of freedom of expression as a human right issue. 
Even though SUHAKAM is empowered to inquire into complaints and makes report on 
matters concerning free expression, '067 it is powerless as far as adjudication and remedial 
action is concerned. SUHAKAM is not equipped with adjudicatory power to deal with 
complaints involving breach of human rights. Nevertheless, it has the power to inquire 
into matters pertaining to human rights issues such as freedom of expression and right of 
privacy but not the press as a whole. Although SUHAKAM is not a regulatory body such 
as the Press Complaint Commission in the UK, the authority vested in it could make 
SUHAKAM as the appropriate body to protect right of privacy in Malaysia. 
SUHAKAM could be accorded the quasi-judicial power to deal with matters pertaining to 
breach of human rights. However, it is still uncertain as to whether invasion of privacy 
can be addressed effectively by SUHAKAM even if its role is expanded to such an 
extent. The main reason is due to the lack of recognition of privacy as part of 
fundamental liberties under the Constitution. As such, right of privacy will still be elusive 
under the proposed expansion of power. This is because the scope of human rights in 
1066 Such a force has resulted in the introduction of section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK. 1067 Section 4 (1) (d) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999. 
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Malaysia, which is the thrust of SUHAKAM's existence, is based on the constitutional 
provisions. It would be difficult to amend the Human Rights Commission Act for this 
particular purpose assessing from the government's reaction to the reports and 
suggestions forwarded by SUHAKAM. In 2004, SUHAKAM established the Media 
Complaints Working Committee (Committee). 1068 The purpose of this Committee is `to 
receive and deal with complaints pertaining to human rights violations in relation to the 
print media and journalists and editors. ' 1069 The jurisdiction of the Committee emanated 
from section 12 (1) of the Human Rights Commission Act 1999. 
The terms of reference of the Committee state that the provisions will guide it on 
fundamental liberties in the constitution. It also allows the Committee to refer to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights particularly Article 19 regarding freedom of expression. 1070 It could 
arguably be said that the application of Article 19 of the UDHR is inconsistent with 
Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution. The scope of freedom of expression under 
UHDR is wider than the Malaysian Constitution. The exercise of freedom of expression 
under Article 10 is limited by Article 10 (2) (a) and (4) of the Constitution. Even if it is 
recognized that the UDHR is incorporated into domestic law on the basis of section 4 (4) 
of the Human Rights Commission Act 1999, the exercise of free expression as interpreted 
under the UDHR must be consistent with the provision of the Malaysian Constitution. 
Therefore, section 4 (4) of the 1999 Act must be read together with Article 4 of the 
Malaysian Constitution. 
Interestingly, the Committee is empowered to inquire into complaints in relation with the 
conduct of reporting1071 and complaints on `infringement of the privacy of individuals 
and their family life, home, health and correspondence. ' 1072 At this juncture, there is a 
question of justiciability on privacy issue. It is unclear as to on what legal basis will the 
1068 http: //www. suhakam. org. my/docs/nress room/ps MediaCouncil 250804 pdf 
1069 Terms of reference of the Media Complaints Working Committee. 
1070 Ibid, no. 5 and 6. 
1071 This is referred as norms of journalistic conduct such as accuracy, opportunity to reply, gender bias, 
communalism, biased reporting and objectivity. See terms of reference no. 7 of the Media Complaints 
Working Committee. 
1072 Ibid. 
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committee act upon in case of invasion of privacy by the press when there is no legal 
recognition of the existence of right of privacy in domestic law. Moreover, the absence 
of a uniform code of conduct to regulate press behavior in Malaysia would also raise a 
question on the ability of the Committee in dealing with the press invasive act. 
Unless the courts extend the meaning of life under Article 5 of the Constitution to include 
personal privacy of individuals or recognise the existence of right of privacy by way of 
free-standing or existing cause of action, the Committee will have to rely on the existing 
laws especially the common law principles such as defamation, nuisance and breach of 
confidence. On the other hand, this conundrum could be overcome if the effect of section 
4 (4) of the 1999 Act is to incorporate the principles under the UDHR. Article 12 of the 
UDHR, which provides for protection of privacy, may be used as a guiding principle in 
articulating issue on privacy in relation to the press at the national level. 
On the other hand, the ability of the Committee to function is unquestionable as it is 
formed under the authority of the 1999 Act. However, its effectiveness in dealing with 
the invasive act of the press is rather doubtful. The role of the Committee is to act as a 
mediator. '°73 The outcome of the mediation has no legal consequences on the parties 
involved. It is not within the jurisdiction of this working committee and SUHAKAM as a 
whole to function as a regulator or compel any alleged wrongful party to comply with its 
recommendations. Moreover, the formation of the Committee is regarded as a unilateral 
act of SUHAKAM by the press. The resentment by the press as shown toward the 
proposed Media Council will have an effect on the credibility of the Committee. At the 
moment, it seems that the role of the Committee is limited to receiving complaints in its 
supervisory capacity. 
7.5.2 MEDIA COUNCIL AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The inadequacy of the Human Rights Commission renders an alternative institution such 
as Media Council, important in dealing specifically with matters pertaining to the press. 
The primary role of the Media Council in Malaysia should be promoted as a conciliatory 
1073 SUHAKAM. Media Complaints Working Committee to Protect the Rights of Individuals and the 
Public's Right to Know. htto: //www. suhakam. org. my/docs/press room/ps MediaCouncil 250804. p df 
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institution. The role in relation to regulating and governing the press should be regarded 
as ancillary. However, the existence of several restrictive laws in regulating the press in 
Malaysia may subjugate the role of the Council as a regulatory body. The inability of the 
Human Rights Commission to accommodate privacy could be rectified through the 
Council. Even though right of privacy is inexistence in Malaysia, the government 
recognises the importance of the right. This is so with the proposed Data Protection Bill 
that contains provisions relating to right of privacy. The effect of this legislation on 
protection of privacy in Malaysia is yet to be seen because the legislation is awaiting the 
parliamentary approval. 
In addition, Media Council could also play an important role in protecting right of 
privacy against invasion by the press. The Council is a specific body with expertise and 
specialised knowledge in relation to the press. The Council could overcome the absence 
of specific laws on right of privacy with the introduction of a code of ethics. The 
existence of specific and clear codes may serve as guidelines in the absence of law on 
privacy. The advantage of having a code is that it is flexible and it does not involve 
complex procedural process. It is drawn up on a consensual basis for the purpose of 
governing the conduct of the press. Adherence to the code under the auspice of the 
Council should be made obligatory. This is to ensure a full commitment from the press 
in order for the code to be meaningful and effective. Though the code may not be of a 
legal binding document and has no legal force, 1074 its application is significant in 
protecting privacy. It is relevant especially when there is no specific law to protect right 
of privacy. 
With regard to this, there is a code of ethics for journalists drawn up by the Malaysian 
National Union of Journalists. However, its application is confined to journalists under 
the patronage of the union. Thus, the code is relatively ineffective because of its limited 
application and lack of binding effect. The code has a binding effect only on the union's 
members in the press industry as recognised by the PPA. Therefore, the code does not 
govern the press as a whole. The efficacy of the code is also doubtful due to the fact that 
journalists within the fraternity draw it up. The existence of the code seems to tailor more 
1074 However adherence can be made compulsory by way of subscription. 
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to the affair of journalists rather than the need of the public. As such, the code is 
regarded as protecting the interest of journalists rather than the interest of the public. 
Hence, it exists more as a statement of ethics of journalism rather than a commitment to 
abide by the principles that govern the press as a whole. 
Arguably, the NUJ as a union is incapable to deal with matters pertaining to public 
complaints in relation to privacy. The union is not an authoritative organisation 
representing the press. It is a trade union, which the main function is to protect the 
interest of its members. The union can only take action against its member for violating 
internal rules and regulations. Any action taken against its member is more likely as part 
of a disciplinary action. The result of the action will only affect the member per se. It is 
doubtful if the result will have any impact on the press in particular and the society in 
general. 
Likewise, the attitude of the press in discharging their role sometimes creates strain 
relationship with the government and the people. In discharging their role as a watchdog 
in a democratic society, the press sometimes crosses the legal limit that makes them 
susceptible to legal action. Even though there is a degree of appreciation where the press 
could exercise their discretion in determining the way news or reports are being 
presented, that does not amount to legitimising the press to indulge in defamatory 
statements, disclosure of private information, invasion of privacy or matters prejudicial to 
security and public disorder. Summarily, the conduct of the press that does not merit 
high standard of journalistic professionalism contributes towards the necessity of setting 
up a body that specifically deals with the press. 
The idea of Media or Press Council (Council) in Malaysia has been mooted since 1970s. 
Although there was an effort to establish the council but it has never been 
materialised. 1075 In actual fact, the purpose of having the Council as a regulatory body is 
to monitor and defend press freedom. The Council as an authoritative body governing 
the press may play a role in streamlining the conduct of the press particularly in being 
1075 In 1987, the president of NUJ said that a special memorandum to propose the setting up of a press 
council would be submitted to the government. But there was no response from the government. See Ali, A. R., NUJ dan Kebebasan Akhbar (1987) 8 SASARAN 16,17. 
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responsible and accountable to in exercising their freedom. Subsequently, the credibility 
of the press in the society can be upheld. 
With a clear authority and mandate it would enable the council to command respect and 
commitment from the press in order to maintain high ethical and professional standard. 
On the other hand, the Council should not be seen as a guardian of the press, otherwise it 
will undermine the regulatory function of the Council. The ability of the Council to 
discharge its role adjudicating a clash of interest in a fair manner may be under scrutiny. 
This is due to the press involvement in the Council. It is difficult to see how an 
organisation whose main function is to uphold and protect free expression can effectively 
provide protection to right of privacy. Furthermore, it may also affect the public's 
confidence especially when the interest of the public is in clash with the press. The 
Council also needs to create good relation with the public to maintain its credibility and 
fairness. As such, the Council should be free from the image of protecting the interest of 
the press by reducing the involvement of the press at adjudicatory level. Since the 
Council is a specific body dealing with the press, a member of the public can forward any 
grievances and complaints against the press. 
With regard to this, a working committee was set up by the Malaysian Press Institute 
(MPI) in pursuance of the government's request to look into the feasibility of establishing 
a council for the media. 1076 In November 2001, a report was submitted to the Home 
Affairs Ministry for further action. Since then the government has not responded to the 
report and thus, further revelation on the proposed council has not been forthcoming. 1077 
Hence, it is the stand of the MPI that journalists and not the government should establish 
the council. '078 
On the other hand, the idea of setting up a council for the media in Malaysia on the MPI 
view is opposed by several pressure groups such as Aliran, Charter 2000 and Kumpulan 
'076 The Media Council initiative began in 2000 with several meetings organized by the Home Affairs 
Ministry, followed by a task force set up by the MPI. See Theophilus, C. Media council will only happen 
with journalists' go-ahead. Malaysiakin, 26 April 2002. 
ion According to the director of the MPI, the government can only make revelation on the details of the 
report. See Malaysiakin, Press council report cannot be made public for now: MPI. 
httD: //www. malaysiakini. com/news/2002040200015112. XLhp 107 ibid. 
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Aktivis Media Inde enden KAMI . 
1079 These p() groups are sceptical of the role of the 
Council in defending press freedom whilst the repressive laws are still applicable. The 
application of the law against the press impedes journalists from embarking on 
investigative and critical journalism for fear of persecution. The effect of the government 
having an upper hand creates the practice of stringent self-censorship. This is prevalent 
especially in the mainstream press, which is controlled by the ruling party, the same 
scenario where the influence and intervention of the government may occur in case of 
Media Council. Moreover, the Council is perceived as another governmental agency, a 
controlled body, to further regulates the press. 1080 On this premise, the existence of the 
Council could not contribute for the betterment of press freedom as well as freedom of 
expression in general. 
The scepticism over the establishment of Media Council is justifiable considering the 
existence of several repressive and inhibitive legislations such as ISA, OSA, Sedition Act 
and PPA. However, there is another aspect of the role of the Council that makes its 
existence relevant, particularly with regard to complaints against the press behavior. The 
idea of having Media Council is not to suppress press freedom by creating another layer 
of regulation. Instead, it is to uphold the freedom by ensuring the practice of high 
standard of professionalism. Such a standard requires the press to be accountable to and 
responsible for their conduct in exercising the freedom. Currently in Malaysia, there is no 
specific body like the Press Complaint Commission (PCC) in the UK, a body that can 
receive and act upon complaints from individuals affected by the press invasive conduct. 
With this effect however, it is pertinent to establish whether the self-regulation modeling 
on the PCC is appropriate for Malaysia. Before any recommendations could be made, it 
is only appropriate to scrutinise the system at hand. 
7.6 SELF-REGULATION IN THE UK 
The application of self-regulation by a private sector is to regulate and detach itself from 
the government's control. It is to ensure high ethical standards within the circle in 
'079 http: //www. aliran. com/ 
1080 Netto, A. Op-press-ive council in the making. Aliran. 
hgp: //www. malaysia. net/aliran/monthlv/2001/5i. html 
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accordance with the accepted practice. This system emphasises that the industry or 
profession rather than the government determines the mechanism of regulation. 
The question of establishing self-regulation or statutory body depends on several factors 
where local conditions are pertinent. '08' Arguably, self-regulation could function 
effectively in a vibrant democracy where freedom of expression and the press is 
safeguarded. On the contrary, the system is not compatible in situations where regulations 
on free expression and the press are dictated by statutory legislations. In case of 
Malaysia, the writer is unconvinced that self-regulation is the answer to govern press 
activities. The existence of the restrictive legislation particularly the PPA that only 
recognizes licensed press would defeat the purpose of self-regulation. This is due to the 
fact that matters pertaining to the press are under the discretionary power of the Minister. 
In retrospective, one of the purposes of establishing media council is to protect freedom 
of expression. The nature of self-regulation whereby the framework as well as the 
substance is determined by the private sector rather than the government provides a solid 
foundation for the freedom to proliferate. However, restrictions on freedom of 
expression imposed by the government may only fossilize the purpose. 
Evidently, any form of control imposes on the press may limit their potential in creating 
an informed society by disclosing issues of public interest. In fact, it contradicts the 
essence of self-regulation, which seeks to detach its existence from the government's 
influence and control. Therefore, prior-restraint on press freedom such as licensing 
requirement may only defeat the purpose of self-regulation, as the press is still required to 
observe the conditions that come with the license. Failure to abide by the conditions may 
cause a revocation of license. Obviously, this is a form of coercion that influences the 
press to practice self-censorship under the pressure of loosing the license. 
On the other hand, full commitment from the press fraternity is vital in order for a self- 
regulatory body to function effectively. Arguably, it is futile to have self-regulation if 
there is lack of support and willingness to comply with the system by the press 
1081 Pinker, R. Press Freedom and Press Regulation - Current Trends in Their European Contact. (2002) 4 Comm. L 102,105. 
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themselves. Most importantly, lack of cooperation among the press to embrace self- 
regulation will polarise the industry. For instance, part of the inefficiency of the Press 
Council in 1964 was due to its inability to command the respect of the industry itself 
Not only did it affect the public's confidence on the efficacy of the system, but it also 
forms a basis for introducing a statutory regulation. 
One of the benefits of having self-regulation is its practicality in resolving complaints 
against the press. It is effective for the aggrieved individual to seek redress against 
newspapers because of its accessibility, flexibility and quickness. There is no strict 
procedural requirement for a complaint to be heard. It is also inexpensive to bring an 
action under the system, as the cost is minimal compared to those under the court system. 
The expertise possessed by the regulators means resolution of complaints in relation to 
the press can be dealt with professionally and convincingly. This may garner public 
confidence in the system. In relation to the PCC, Silber J. in Anna Ford v PCC1082 said 
that: 
The Commission is a body whose membership and expertise makes it 
much better equipped than the courts to resolve the difficult exercise of 
balancing the conflicting rights.. " 
1083 
Since the press mainly supports PCC, naturally the main purpose would be to protect the 
interest of the industry. PCC cannot be too vocal and harsh on the press because this will 
wane the much-needed support in order for the system to be fully operational. In this 
regard, Sir Christopher Meyer reminded the press that `Indeed, without this willingness, 
and the support of all members of the industry for the work of the PCC in upholding the 
Code, it will not in the end be possible to avoid other, infinitely less desirable and less 
workable, forms of regulation. ' 1084 
In the UK, self-regulation is adopted as the mechanism to govern and regulate the 
conduct of the press. The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was set up in 1991 as a 
revised body from its predecessor, the Press Council. The Council was a regulatory body 
1082 (2001] EWHC Admin 683. 
Boas Ibid, para. 28. 
1054 Speech given at the Society of Editors' Annual Lecture, 12 October 2003. 
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whose primary objectives were advancement of the freedom of the press and the 
promotion of adherence to high ethical standards. It is a non-statutory body formed by the 
press. The inability of the Council to regulate the industry and deal with privacy matters 
satisfactorily lead to criticism and its demise. 
The PCC was established on recommendation of the Calcutt Committee. '°85 Nonetheless, 
in his review of press self-regulation in 1993,1086 Calcutt concluded that the self- 
regulation under PCC had not proven effective and that a statutory body should be 
established. The press's influence and control, to certain extent, affect the PCC in 
functioning as an independent body. The failure of the PCC to act effectively in 
regulating the press in relation to privacy matters intensifies a call for introduction of a 
new tort of infringement of privacy. 
Obviously, financial support and stability is very important in a self-regulation system. In 
the UK, the Press Council Board of Finance (Pressbof) was set up in 1990 to maintain the 
characteristic of independent self-regulatory body. Pressbof is the body that currently 
levies from the industry to fund the PCC. This financial support is to ensure the 
independence of the Commission from the government. This image is significant for 
self- regulation not only to woe public confidence but also self-confidence in discharging 
its function without any form of influence from the government. Financial contribution 
from the government in this respect may raise an issue of influence and control that is 
inconsistent with self-regulation mechanism. Thus, with financial independence, the 
integrity of PCC as an independent body could be maintained. 
Although PCC manages to raise the standard of journalism through its code of 
practice, 1087 self-regulation does not always work. Even with the implementation of the 
code, PCC is still unable to stop breaches. Thus, the power of the PCC to prevent 
publication of offending materials or further publication is deemed necessary. The Daily 
Mirror scandal in publishing fake photographs of alleged abused prisoners in Iraq that has 
1085 Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (1990) Cm 1102. 
1086 Review of Press Self-Regulation. Cm 2135 (1993). 
1087 Coad, J. The Press Complaints Commission - Some Myths About Self-Regulation. 2003. 
hiip: //www. simkins. co. uk/articles/JKCPressComplaintsCommission aspx 
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adverse effects on the integrity and morale of the British force vindicates for such a 
power. The number of adjudications against the press shows that even those who are 
bound by the code commit quite a number of breaches. 
The fact that the code is composed and reviewed by a special committee of editors may 
raise concern that it is to protect the interest of the industry. Independence of self- 
regulatory body does not only mean free from the government's control but the industry 
as well. There is a need for independent individuals outside the industry to review the 
code so that the PCC is not seen as the guardian of the press industry. ' 088 Thus, the code, 
`written by editors and for editors', 1089 which is supposed to protect unduly interference 
of private lives should not be the exclusive domain of the press. 
In addition, there is an issue of the degree of independence of any self-regulatory body. 
Naturally, there is a degree of connection with the industry that it regulates. 1090 For 
instance, the PCC is depending on the support from the press industry for it's funding. 
Although the representatives of the press in the PCC is minority but they command a 
powerful influential voice. Moreover, the lay members have no say except to obediently 
apply the code designed by the committee of editors. Therefore, the press industry is able 
to a certain extent influence the course of the PCC. 
There seem to be unequal treatment by the PCC in relation to freedom of expression and 
privacy. PCC is more protective of the former rather than the latter. 
'°91 Perhaps the PCC 
which was formed `with almost indecent haste' 1092to avoid government intervention by 
way of statutory regulation is a proxy of the press industry rather than a truly independent 
body. Moreover, the code does not provide in its strongest term for preventing intrusion 
of privacy. The unequal treatment may be discerned from the requirement of justification 
1088 Kennedy, H. (2004) Just Law. Chatto & Windus, 256. 
1089 Key Benefits of the System of Self Regulation. 
http: //www. pcc. oru. uk/about/benefits. htm 
1090 Pearce, D. The Press Council and Self-regulation. 
httn: //www. presscouncil. org au/pcsitg/apcnews/nov99/self. html 
1091 Boom Cooper, L. and Pruitt, L. Privacy Jurisprudence of the Press Complaints Commission. (1994) 23 
Anglo-American Lk 133. 
1092 Monro, C., Self-regulation in the Media (1997) PL, 6. 
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based on broad public interest in case of intrusion by the press. 1093 In order to protect 
press freedom, which is the reason for the PCC's existence, the scope of public interest 
justification may be widened. On the other hand, to adopt a narrow scope of public 
interest will only affect the press freedom in discharging their function as a public 
watchdog. In addition, the absence of law on right of privacy may be a reason for the 
indifferent attitude of the PCC on privacy. The obscurity with regard to the scope of 
privacy presents a good excuse for the press to indulge in matters that amount to intrusion 
of privacy. ' N4 This is likely in the absence of a specific law on right of privacy. 1w5 
Though the PCC possesses the expertise in matters pertaining to the press, its 
commitment toward protecting personal privacy is unconvincing. The PCC's position on 
right of privacy is portrayed by Pinker when he emphasises that `it is worth noting the 
intrinsically paradoxical nature of privacy as a concept. ' 1096 This is illustrated in the case 
of Anna Ford and Sara Cox when both celebrities took their case to the court against the 
PCC rulings. 1097 Moreover, the press frequently invokes public interest justification under 
the PCC code of practice particularly with regard to `preventing the public from being 
misled by some statement or action of an individual or organization. ' 
Public figures are most at risk of press harassment and exposure of their private lives. 
This is so when their public personalities appear to be inconsistent with their private 
lives. Reliance on such a public interest justification raises a question of the extent of 
disclosure for the purpose of preventing the public from being misled. Arguably, a broad 
interpretation would allow the press to intrude and disclose details of private lives that are 
irrelevant to the misleading statement or action. 1098 For instance, the alleged abuse of 
1093 The PCC code of practice 3 (i). 
1094 Munro argued that the workability of the concept of privacy and public interest may contribute to the 
lack of coherence in the Commission's privacy jurisprudence. See Munro, C., Self-regulation in the Media 
(1997) PL, S. 
1°95 Unlike defamation where there is a clear law prohibiting the press from indulging in defamatory 
matters. 
1096 Pinker, It, Press Freedom and Press Regulation - Current Trends in their European Context. (2002) 4 Comm. L. 102,103. 
1097 41% of complainants are not satisfied with PCC rulings. See Kennedy, H. (20(4) Just Law. Chatto & 
Windus, 256. 
10" See Campbell v MGN [2003] UKHL. 
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power by the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, does not legitimize the press to expose his 
personal affairs. 
Although the PCC undertakes to handle a complaint in a quick manner but the lack of 
compensatory justice affect its effectiveness. Moreover, the PCC is not equipped to 
impose sanction except through publicity. This is in accordance with the PCC 
requirement that `any publication which is criticised by the PCC under one of the 
following clauses is duty bound to print the adjudication which follows in full and with 
due prominence. ' Arguably, the phrase `with due prominence' is vague, so much so that 
the press are considered as fulfilling its obligation, though unsatisfactorily, even if the 
adjudication or apology is printed in a small column in the back page of the publication. 
This inadequacy is a point of criticism that makes the PCC being described as `toothless 
and ineffective'109and `a committee with few teeth'. ' 100 Perhaps the unwillingness of the 
PCC to impose remedial sanction other than admonition is to maintain the support of the 
industry for self-regulation. If damage to reputation can be remedied by way of 
compensation, " 01 it should also be the case for damage to human dignity that is the core 
value of personhood. 1102 
The PCC claims that self-regulation is beneficial to ordinary people who could not afford 
legal action. However, the accessibility of self-regulation by ordinary people who are 
affected by the conduct of the press to seek justice is questionable. Though the cost 
involve in pursuing a complaint is `nothing more than the price of a stamp, '1103a 
complainant who chooses to proceed has to take the chance on his own. Usually the press 
will enjoy the advantage of being represented by a legal team with enormous sources and 
experience. 1104 On the other hand, if the complainant decides to employ a legal 
assistance, he must bear the cost. 
10" Op cit., supra. n. 1079,15. 
1100 Macdonald, J. and Jones, C. (2003) The Law of Freedom of Information. Oxford, 603. 
1101 See per Neill J. in Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers [1993] 4 All ER 975,994. 
1102 Privacy, once lost, can never be restored. Unlike reputation which can be regained after some corrective 
actions to remedy the damage inflicted. 
1103 h! M: //www. pcc. orit. uk/complaint/fM. asp 
104 Coad, J. The Press Complaints Commission - Some Myths about Self-regulation. 
http: //www. simkins. co. uk/articles/JKCPressComplaintsCommission. aspx 
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The PCC in its 2003 annual report admits that rulings on complaints that were made 
through solicitors took an average of fifty percent longer to be made and when lawyers 
become involved in the process it ceases to be particularly fast; and it is, thus, not 
free. ' Moreover, the press has the advantage of being represented by a legal team in 
defending their case compared to ordinary individual complainant. In this sense, the PCC 
does not provide an equal playing field for the purpose of fairness. Therefore, there is a 
clear disadvantage in the process of pursuing remedy, either at the stage of mediation or 
adjudication, under self-regulation. Perhaps direct involvement of legal representative in 
the process is inappropriate for self-regulation that commits to `fast, free and fair'. Undue 
delay in handling complaints and additional cost incurred for what supposed to be free 
are the unbecoming characteristics of self-regulation. In addition, as there is no financial 
penalty liable to be imposed on the press or award of compensation, the incurred cost is 
irrecoverable. 
The government prolongs the existence of the press self-regulation in the UK when it 
gives the support to maintain the current system. This is reiterated by the Department of 
Culture Media and Sport when it expresses the government's unwillingness to introduce 
any legislation in this area or to interfere with the affairs of the PCC. The stand could be 
politically motivated as the government may not be willing to create a strained 
relationship with the press. Otherwise, the government could be seen as restraining the 
freedom of the press. 
7.7 THE PROSPECT OF INDEPENDENT SELF-REGULATION IN 
MALAYSIA 
Malaysia is a democratic country, which exercises a strict regime of regulation on press 
freedom. ' 106 Although the Federal Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and 
expression, but the nature of negative right of the freedom allows for certain restrictions 
on the freedom. The existence of restrictive laws in Malaysia affects freedom of the press 
at two stages. First, at the formation stage where license is required to operate and print 
newspapers. Second, the operational stage where the enjoyment of press freedom is 
1105 Statistics and Analysis, Annual Report 2003. http: //www. pcc. org. uk/2003/statistics. html 1106 Licensing requirement under the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984 is a form of prior restraint. 
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limited by other interests as stated by laws. The main legislation regulating the press is 
the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984 (PPA). ' logy The licensing requirement under 
the PPA is applicable only to print press. ' 108 The Act also empowers the Minister with 
absolute discretion to revoke any permit. 11°9 Neither can the Minister be accountable to 
for exercising his power, nor can the court quash his decision. 1110 Therefore, independent 
self-regulation may not be able to function effectively in defending press freedom with 
the application of PPA that restricts the freedom. 
Furthermore, independent self-regulation may not be able to function properly because of 
the vast power vested in the executive by the Act. The role of the independent self- 
regulation cannot supersede the role and function of the Minister under the PPA. Since 
matters concerning press in Malaysia come under the purview of PPA, the role of self 
regulation in defending press freedom is confined to the extent permitted by the Act. For 
instance, section 7 (1) of the PPA grants a power to the Minister to prohibit the printing, 
importation, production, reproduction, publishing, sale, issue, circulation, distribution or 
possession of publication which is prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to public order, 
morality, security, public interest or national interest. The interpretation or meaning of 
the interests such as public order, morality and public interest by the Minister would 
prevail. "" This is evident in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v Alirant112 when the 
Supreme Court held that the ministerial power under section 12 (2) of the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act 1984 was not justiciable. Therefore, independent self- 
regulation must abide by the interpretation of the minister. Consequently, this will 
diminish the significance of independent self-regulation in forming its own interpretation 
relating to the interests. In addition, the application of code of practice formulated under 
self-regulation would be of less significant. This is because the code has no legal binding 
unless it is incorporated in legislation. However, this is unlikely since the code must also 
be consistent with the provisions of PPA. 
1 107 Act 301. 
1108 Section 5 (1) of Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. 
109 Section 6 (1) of Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. 
1110 Section 13A of Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. 1111 Section 7 (1) provides that the order to prohibit is based upon the satisfaction of the Minister. 1112 [1990] 1 MLJ 351. 
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The advancement in information and communication technology enables an on-line press 
to be in operation. In Malaysian context, on-line press version does not come under the 
purview of the PPA because the Act is applicable only to print press. As such, on-line 
press does not need a license from the government in order to operate. There are 
independent on-line press that operates on subscription basis such as Malaysiakini 11 Band 
Agenda Daily. l l to Even though on-line press may allude the PPA but it may not escape 
the application of other laws such as the Police Act 1967 and Sedition Act 1948. 
The implication of classification of press into conventional print press and on-line is that 
it renders the scope of the PPA in regulating the press limited to the former. As far as the 
government is concerned independent on-line press are not recognised as accredited press 
though it receives payment from the public through subscription fee. Lack of 
government's recognition is a disadvantage to on-line press because they are not given 
permission to conduct press coverage at government's press conferences and official 
functions. For instance, the journalists who represent independent on-line press such as 
Malaysiakini are refused press accreditation by the government and received a second- 
class treatment by not allowing them to make coverage at any government's official 
function. 
Obviously, co-operation and support from the press industry is important in ensuring the 
success of self-regulation mechanism. ' 1u This factor may be difficult to achieve among 
the press in Malaysia. This is because of the control and ownership of the press by 
political parties. Nevertheless, co-operation among the mainstream press is possible 
because of the control by the ruling political party. Such co-operation may not be 
forthcoming from other licensed periodical such as Aliran, which is vocal in its stand 
against the restriction on press freedom. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to get full support in 
situation where the mainstream press is criticised of being the mouthpiece of the 
government and practice imbalance coverage on the oppositions' point of view. 
113 http: //www. malgysiakini. com/ 
1114 hiip: //www. ap-endadaily. com: 8080/cms/index,. *s 
"p 's Pinker. R. Press Freedom and Press Regulation - Current Trends in their European Context. (2002) 7 
Comm. L, 105. 
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On the other hand, the existence of several periodicals regarded as the voice of the 
opposition political parties such as Harakah (PAS) and Rocket (DAP) may reduce the 
possibility of getting full co-operation for self-regulation. Although, these periodicals are 
licensed under the PPA but their publications are not as frequent as the mainstream press. 
Their objectives and functions are different from that of the mainstream press. They are 
more politically motivated and focus on building the image and political aspiration of the 
party they represent. Moreover, their circulation is limited to the members only. 
In addition, investigative journalism is actively practiced by the opposition periodicals 
particularly in disclosing malpractices, abuse of power and corruptions in the 
government. But the mainstream press less practices this kind of journalism. 1116 By their 
nature, the political periodicals are critical of the government especially with regard to 
freedom of expression. The diversity in objective, function and aspiration of the press in 
Malaysia is a hurdle to the realisation of independent self-regulation. It also negates co- 
operation that is the thrust in ensuring the success of self-regulation. This is an aspect 
which distinguish the practice of self-regulation in the UK 
On the other hand, co-operation may not be difficult to obtain if the press is confined to 
the mainstream press. This is because of the common interest and background of the 
press that are controlled by the ruling party. For instance, such co-operation exists in 
BERNAMA"where six members of the board of governor are also representatives from 
the mainstream newspapers. ' 118 However, to limit the scope of the press in such a way 
may defeat the purpose of the self-regulation in regulating the press in general regardless 
of its nature. Moreover, it is in contradiction with the PPA where the Act does not 
provide for classification or differentiate the nature of the press. 
It could be said that the idea of having self-regulation received strong support from the 
pressure groups particularly those formed by journalists such as Charter 2000 and Centre 
1116 Lent, J. (1982) Newspapers in Asia: Contemporary Trends and Problems. Hong Kong, 265. 
1117 The Malaysian news agency, a statutory body set up under the BERNAMA Act 1967. 
1118 The representatives are from The New Straits TimeslBerita Harian, Utusan Melayu, The Star, Sin 
Chew Jit Poh, Borneo Post and The New Sabah Times. 
http //www. bernama. com/bernama/lembagapengelola. html 
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for Independent Journalism (CIJ). "19 These groups argue that such mechanism could 
create a situation whereby the press is free from the government's influence and control. 
Although the idea is noble but it is rather unconvincing considering the fact that most of 
the mainstream press are controlled and owned by the ruling political party. 
Two local media giants, the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and Utusan Melayu Berhad, 
dominate the Malaysian press industry. These corporate organisations have interests in 
other media related activities such as distribution and broadcasting. Groups closely 
connected to the ruling political party also control them. 1120 It is doubtful if self- 
regulation can function independently in all aspects when the ruling political party has 
considerable interests in the matter. Unlike in the UK, though the mainstream press is 
partisans, which is not unusual, political parties do not own them. This could minimise 
influence from the government or any political party on the press in discharging their role 
as the public watchdog. In this respect, the domestic conditions involving the press make 
independent self-regulation in the UK as tenable. In addition, there is no prior restraint 
and absolute discretionary power of the executive on press freedom in the UK. These 
conditions are pre-requisites for self-regulation to function effectively, which are absence 
in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, the appointment of editors in the mainstream press who are closely 
associated with the ruling party is also a factor against the setting up of self- 
regulation. 112' Self-regulation will lose its integrity if its members are those who 
represent the government's aspiration. This influence is apparent after the change in the 
ownership structure of the Malaysian Press with the amendment to the legislation in 
1974. The amendment enabled Malaysian citizens to maintain majority shares in all 
newspapers. With such influence in place, the press is selective in reporting issues of 
public interest especially on political issues. In relation to this, Lent observes that `Print 
media, operating under virtually a guided press concept, stress developmental news 
1119 http: //www. ciimalaysia. org/ 120 Nain, Z. (1998) The Structure of the Media Industry: Implications for Democracy. In Loh, F. and Khoo, 
T. (eds. ) Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices. Richmond, 112. 
1121 Ibid, 130. 
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through statements made by officials and press releases issued by the Department of 
Information, press agents of various ministries and Bernama News Agency. ' 1122 
The unique and diverse Malaysian press industry does not provide a common platform 
for them to consolidate into a hegemonic force to regulate the industry based on self- 
regulation mechanism. This is unlike in the UK where there is a common platform, 
which drives the industry to vehemently uphold self-regulation; to avoid statutory 
regulation. There is an expectation that the exercise of freedom of expression in the UK 
incorporates the independence of media from the government's intervention. 1123 
Moreover, the looming threat of statutory regulation stimulates the press to ensure that 
self-regulation works. ' 124 The commitment of the press to defend self-regulation after 
being criticised by several reports since the review of press self regulation by Calcutt, is 
manifested by several changes to the PCC set-up. The changes include the appointment 
of lay members, amendments to its code of practice and the implementation of the code 
by way of incorporating it into the contract of employment. 
Another point, which is against the formation of independent self-regulation in Malaysia, 
is the matter of funding. Ideally, an independent source of fund is vital to ensure the 
credibility of self-regulation. Conversely, self-regulation will be regarded as another layer 
of control mechanism on press freedom if the government or its agencies are the main 
source of financial support. To avoid the dubious image, the fund should come from 
within the industry as exercised by the Press Complaints Commission in the UK. This 
may prove to be difficult in case of Malaysia. With the oligopoly of press ownership by 
the ruling party, funding by the industry may not help in portraying an independent self- 
regulation. In this regard, there is dissimilarity between the two countries as the press in 
the UK is funded through the levy on the industry. This is made possible through the 
existence of Press Standards Board of Finance (Presto fl, which is committed in 
maintaining the independence of the Press Complaints Commission. 
1122 Lent, J. (1982) Newspapers in Asia: Contemporary Trends and Problems. Hong Kong, 265. 1123 Munro, C. Self-regulation in the Media. (1997) PL, 16. 
1124 Duty to abide by the code is included in contract of employment. 
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The opposition to having an independent self-regulation in Malaysia is not because of the 
resistance of the idea by the journalists but more so by the existence of restrictive law on 
press freedom and the entrenchment of executive body. The press argues that the 
existence of restrictive laws would not help in advancing the purpose of self-regulation in 
defending freedom of the press. 1125 The argument seems to focus only on the impact of 
the formation of the council on the press, whereas in actual fact there is another important 
aspect of the council, which is to ensure high standard of journalistic ethic in relation 
with the public. It vindicates the importance of having specific institution to regulate the 
press in carrying out their duties and obligations. 
Thus, the formation of a specific institution such as the press council is relevant in 
Malaysia to look after the conduct of the press especially in dealing with the public. It is 
a frivolous argument to oppose the formation of the council on the ground that it is a 
form of control on press freedom. Self-regulation may not function objectively on the 
grounds discussed above. Perhaps statutory regulation may offer a viable solution in 
dealing with the press considering the legal and political environment in Malaysia. 
7.8 IS THE PCC MODEL APPROPRIATE? 
Freedom of the press represents the core and dynamism of democratic societies. The 
freedom provides a space wherein only by means of discussion and public participation 
the government remains responsive to the will of the people. At the same time, the press 
as a standard vehicle for the dissemination of public opinion helps Parliament to keep its 
surveillance thereby ensuring the accountability of the executive. 
The press, as the eyes and ears of the public, 1126 shoulder an onerous responsibility to put 
forth any unbiased news and information. In order to attain this, the press needs to be 
free as well as responsible. Thus, a free and responsible press is an asset `as one of the 
great bulwarks of liberty. ' 1127 But sometimes the press is guided by pecuniary interest 
1 125 Netto, A. An Oppressive Council in the Making? ALIRAN, 
htti): //www. malgysia. net/aliran/monthly! 2001/5i. html 112 Per Lord Bingham in McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277,292. See 
also per Nicholls LJ in In re C. (Wardship: Treatment) (No. 2) [1989] 3 WLR 252,262. 
1 127 Per Lord Denning in Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1,17. 
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rather than public interest. They capitalise sensational issues that interest the public in 
pursuant of their commercial interest. They take refuge in public interest claiming to 
justify their pervasive conduct. This type of conduct often makes them vulnerable to 
legal action such as libel. However, to institute an action in court is costly and can only 
be done by those who can afford it. Even though there is a legal aid to help low-income 
people to take actions in courts through legal aid bureau, but it does not cover matters 
pertaining to civil action such as defamation. 
Arguably, there is a need to regulate the conduct of the press. The purpose is not only to 
ensure that the press act responsibly in exercising their freedom, but also to protect the 
public from unacceptable conduct such as intrusion of privacy and harassment by the 
press. Therefore, press freedom should not be used as a shield to protect the press from 
public grievances. The conducts of the press are sometimes too appalling that it may 
affect public safety and national security. For example, in the UK, the case of Daily 
Mirror, which published a faked photograph of abused prisoners by British soldiers, 
inflicts harm to British forces as well as the general public. 1128 In Malaysia, press 
reporting of a murder case of a young Muslim girl involved in an illicit sexual act that 
was reported with graphic depiction of the event based on the trial in court, prompted 
public criticism especially among the Muslims. In another instance, the press was 
criticised for publishing photograph of young girls in a rape case that is in contradiction 
with the Child Act 2001. Perhaps such informational communication possesses negligible 
social utility. Therefore, personal tragedies, such as previously cited, deemed as 
intolerable by the society should not be within the right to publish or the public right to 
know. To accept otherwise would immunise the press from liability, which leaves the 
press free to `rake up long forgotten personal tragedies for the entertainment of new 
generations of readers. ' 1129 
Unlike the position in the Uk, where the public can voice up their dissatisfactions or even 
take actions against the press through the PCC, Malaysia does not have the same 
"28 Milmo, D. and Carter, H. Mirror editor sacked over hoax. Media Guardian, 15 May 2004. 
httt): //media. L-uardian. co. uk/site/story/O. 14173.1217377.00. html 
1129 Lusky, L. Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts. (1972) 72 Col. L. R 693,702. 
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regulatory mechanism. The absence of a specific channel where the public could forward 
a complaint at times when press conduct is under scrutiny needs to be rectified. As 
mentioned before, not all members of the public can afford to bring their case for 
settlement through the courts system because of the cost and lengthy procedure under 
adversarial system. On the other hand, complaints by a member of the public to the press 
industry may be futile because of protective attitude in protecting journalists. This is 
apparent even in situations of grave misconduct on the part of a journalist such as the 
publishing of a photograph of a young girl in a rape case as reported by the Sun, a local 
newspaper, in Malaysia. Though the publication is against section 15 of the Child Act 
2001 but the press treated it as lapse of journalistic ethic. 113' The question of integrity and 
credibility of an independent self-regulation in Malaysia as discussed above may pave the 
way for having statutory regulation. This can be done either through incorporating the 
regulatory mechanism into an existing framework or by establishing a new specific 
regulatory body. 
The existing mechanism, which may suit the purpose of providing an avenue for the 
public to voice out their complaints or grievances, is the Human Rights Commission 
(SUHAKAM). The credential and integrity of SUHAKAM in dealing with issues on 
human rights may help to gamer public confidence. Even though SUHAKAM is a 
statutory body supported by the government but it is quite vocal and critical of 
government's policies and conduct pertaining to human rights issue. The government 
rebuffs SUHAKAM's view on certain human rights issue. 
1131 The critical attitude of 
SUHAKAM in defending human rights puts the government on a defensive side. For 
instance, in 2002 SUHAKAM had issued a report on the incident of KESAS highway that 
was critical for the government particularly in relation to the police mishandling of the 
incident. 1132 In addition, SUHAKAM also recommends for the review of restrictive laws 
such as the ISA. SUHAKAM also supports the idea of having public rallies during 
130 Ooi, J. Protect our children? Certain media don't. 
htta: //www. ieffooi. com/archives/2004/01/protect our chi. nhn 
113Whiting, A. Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia's National Human 
Rights Commission. (2003) 39 Stan. JInt'1 L. 59. 
13 See Freedom of Assembly, SUHAKAM. 
http: //www. suhakam. org. my/docs/document resource/freedom. pdf 
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election so that political parties can have equal opportunity to present their visions to the 
public. In reaction to this, the former Prime Minister said that the decision on whether 
public rallies could be held was not up to SUHAKAM. He sarcastically said that `For 
now, it looks like SUHAKAM seems to want to decide on everything. ' 1133 
Although issues relating to press freedom may well be within SUHAKAM's ambit as it 
relates to human rights issue, its authority is not wide enough to enable SUHAKAM to 
function as a regulatory body. There are some constraints for SUHAKAM to become an 
effective body in dealing with complaints against the press. Thus, amendment to the law 
is necessary in order to empower SUHAKAM to regulate the press. However, even with 
the expansion of power, the ability of SUHAKAM to deal with issues relating to privacy 
remains unclear. The narrow scope of human rights, in particular the absence of right of 
privacy in the Constitution, will confine the ability of SUHAKAM to deal effectively 
with intrusion of privacy by the press. Therefore, it is sceptical if SUHAKAM is the 
appropriate body to deal with issues on privacy in particular and the press in general. 
On the other hand, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), an organisation looking after 
the well fare of journalists rather than the industry, is not the appropriate body to shoulder 
the responsibility to regulate the press. Though NUJ has its own code of ethics but the 
application of the code is confined to the members only. Moreover, it is inconsistent with 
the objective of NUJ in defending press freedom if it were to have a regulatory function. 
This is because any form of regulation on the press tantamount to impeding the freedom. 
In addition, it would be in contradiction with the very existence of the NUJ whose main 
interest is to protect the journalists whilst at the same time administers restrictions on 
press freedom. 
Alternatively, a specific body responsible for governing the relationship of the press and 
the public is possible. A press council can play a significant role in preserving the press 
freedom and improving the standards of the press. There are bodies of similar nature in 
Malaysia specifically responsible for a particular profession such as the Malaysian Bar 
Council, a statutory governing body set up under the Legal Profession Act 1976. In 
1133 PM: Decision on rallies not up to Suhakam. The Star Online, 4 October 2003. 
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addition, there are several statutory commissions that exist in Malaysia for specific 
purposes such as the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission. The 
commission is a statutory body with powers to supervise and regulate the 
communications and multimedia activities in Malaysia. 1134 
In general, objection to statutory regulation is mainly grounded on sceptical perception 
that regulatory body of this nature functions under the government's influence. It is 
feared that the body will be used to further restrict freedom of expression and press 
freedom. Considering the powerful influence of the executive in Malaysia, such fear and 
skeptical views may have found its basis. However, it may be overcome if statutory body 
is made accountable to Parliament. By doing so, there is a check and balance to ensure 
the body's integrity and credibility as its affairs is open to scrutiny. On the other hand, it 
is argued that the climate of press freedom in Malaysia, where prior restraint and 
restrictions are imposed, is not conducive for independent self-regulation. This type of 
regulatory mechanism is feasible in situation where there are no restrictive laws and 
absolute discretionary power, which empowers the executive to determine matters 
pertaining to the press. 
Although right of privacy is undervalued in Malaysia, it does not mean that the press is 
free from duties and responsibilities. The situation in Malaysia is that the aggrieved 
person is unable to seek redress in case of invasion of privacy perpetuated by the press. 
Unlike the UK, where the law on privacy develops incrementally, privacy in Malaysia as 
an aspect of human rights issue is still under develop. Privacy may not be a subject of 
particular concern in Malaysia especially when Malaysia seems to place high regard on 
communitarian interest rather than stressing on individual right. 
"35 The decision of the 
House of Lords in the recent case Campbell v MGN«36 may shed some light on the 
incremental development of the right in the UK. Even though the position in the UK after 
this particular case is that there is no separate law on privacy, the Campbell's case 
1134 See the preamble of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act 1998. Act 589. 
1135 Eldridge, P. Human Rights and Democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia: Emerging Contexts and 
Discourse. (1996) 18 Contemporary Southeast Asia 298,311. 
1136 [2004] UKHL 22. 
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recognised the existence of an aspect of right of privacy surrogating on the law of breach 
of confidence. 
In addition, the significance of right of privacy in the UK is heightened with the 
introduction of Human Rights Act 1998. Although the Act incorporates the Convention 
rights but there is still an uncertainty on the horizontal application of right of privacy 
under Article 8 of the ECHR in the UK. This does not arise in relation to freedom of 
expression, which is specifically provided, by section 12 of the HRA. Historically, 
section 12 is included at a later stage after the intervention of the press industry. Right of 
privacy is unenforceable under the 1998 Act since the right is mainly pertaining to private 
persons. The provision of public authorities renders the incorporation of the Convention 
rights applicable vertically. The irony of the situation is that even if a person may not get 
remedy under the domestic judicial system, the person can bring his case further to 
regional jurisdiction under the European Court of Human Rights. He may claim his right 
of privacy under Article 8 of the Convention. 
The uncertainty may also be due to the absence of a written constitution that spells out 
the rights of the people in clear terms. The absence of such a constitutional provision 
makes Parliament as the supreme authority in legislating laws. The supremacy of 
Parliament means that the institution can enact any law even if it is against the principles 
of a democratic society, such as fair trial and justice, like detention without trial under the 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act. The courts have no power to annul any law 
enacted by Parliament. Since the people's representatives make up Parliament, thus it 
could be said that its law making power is a representation of the interests of the society. 
However, sometimes the power is influenced by the vested interest of certain quarters 
such as the press in case of section 12 of the HRA. 
Even though Malaysia has a written constitution but there is no specific provision on 
right of privacy. However, this does not necessarily mean that privacy is not an important 
concept in Malaysian society. The importance of the right is emphasised elsewhere under 
other ordinary laws including Islamic law. On the other hand, the development in relation 
to right of privacy in the UK receives judicial supports to the extent that the right exists in 
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the form of breach of confidence. Being a common law country that regards the UK 
courts' decisions as persuasive, Malaysia may refer to the development of right of 
privacy in the UK as a yardstick to transform its law in the discussed area. Statutory 
recognition of the right in Malaysia may also take place through the proposed Data 
Protection Bill. Nevertheless, the law is confined to information privacy, and thus the 
recognition is not extensive enough to cover the concept of privacy in its wider sense. 
Legal action based on right of privacy per se is unjusticiable because of lack of legal 
recognition. However, other privacy related cause of action might be used to pursue legal 
action in order to enforce privacy interest. Action for trespassing, nuisance, defamation 
and breach of confidence involve privacy interest but in limited forms. Protection of 
privacy under these causes of action is, nonetheless, insufficient and inappropriate. 
Recent development on breach of confidence in the UK's courts provides an avenue for 
protection of privacy. 
However, it is unclear if the courts in Malaysia are willing to follow their counter part in 
the UK to protect privacy by adopting the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence. 
There may be a positive prospect for the law to be adopted by the domestic courts 
considering the close relations of the two judicial systems particularly in relation to legal 
principles. This is expressed by the High Court in Teoh Peng Phe v Dato' Seri Dr Ting 
Chew Peh1137 where the judge acknowledged the development in English law through the 
extension of Norwich Pharmacal1138 principle by the English Court of Appeal in 
Ashworth Hospita11139 case. The judge found that the application of the principle to 
`mere tort' cases following the decision by the Supreme Court in First Malaysia Finance 
Bhd v Dato' Mohd Fathi bin Haji Ahmad1140 was mistaken. The judge said that: 
But I earnestly and respectfully hope that it would not be long before our 
Federal Court is presented with the opportunity of reconsidering First 
1 137 [2004] 5 MLJ 241. See also per Gopal Sri Ram CJ in Attorney General Of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan 
Chik & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 620,632. 
1138 [1973]2AllER943. 
1 139 [2001] 1 All ER 991. 
1140 [1993] 2 MLJ 497. 
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Malaysia Finance with a view to developing the law on the subject 
bearing in mind the judgment in Ashworth Hospital. 1 4' 
If privacy is to be construed in a wider sense to include right to be let alone, than it is 
doubtful whether the principles of breach of confidence is extensive enough to serve as a 
sufficient platform for right of privacy. 
In addition, the purposive approach of constitutional interpretation may include privacy 
under the provision of right to life in Article 5. It is uncertain as to the acceptance of the 
right within the constitutional framework as there is no specific legal issue on the matter 
before the courts. Nevertheless, it could be argued on the premise of legal protection on 
reputational interest and its recognition as a restriction to freedom of expression, it would 
be untenable to exclude privacy that reflects the value of human dignity, an essence of 
humanity. 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
The distinctiveness of Malaysian plural society requires prudent democratic governance. 
Although the government has managed, thus far, to preserve harmony and tolerance that 
contribute towards economic prosperity, civil and political rights do not enjoy similar 
progress. The discourse of fundamental rights is confined within the constitutional 
framework, which empowers the executive and the legislature to determine the scope of 
the rights. This is made possible by the constitutional provision of `necessity and 
expedient' that imbue with relativist expression. 
Though it is justifiable to maintain the view that the practice of fundamental rights in 
accordance with Western liberal philosophy, to a certain extent, is incompatible with the 
indigenous condition, it is also valid to defend the fact that fundamental rights such as 
free expression and privacy are precious assets of a democratic society regardless of the 
geo-political parameters. Arguably, reliance on local distinctiveness and particularities to 
trump the universality of fundamental rights would not instigate an ambience of a vibrant 
democratic society. Thus, in pursuing the national aim of becoming a developed 
1141 Ibid, pars 20. 
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democratic state, Malaysia could do better by adopting reflective equilibrium approach. 
This is an holistic approach in the sense that it takes into account the practice of 
inalienable fundamental rights in accordance with the nation's aspiration. This is in 
harmony with the general aim of human rights law, which is to establish practical 
arrangements in which the interests of all relevant persons are defensibly accommodated. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this study, the writer has pondered a tension in Malaysian law between freedom of 
expression and privacy. The writer has also found in British law, other bodies of law, and 
academic comment materials and arguments that speak to this tension in potentially 
constructive ways. At various points in this study, the writer has noted ways in which this 
tension might be addressed. The most important of these points will be highlighted in this 
chapter. Finally, some proposals will be made that are intended to provide a basis on 
which to reform Malaysian law in attractive ways in pursuant to the aim and objectives as 
stated in chapter 1. 
8.1 FOCAL POINTS OF THE STUDY 
To recapture the essence of the thesis, the writer will firstly make a brief summary on 
issues that have been discussed in chapter 2 to chapter 7. Chapter 2 examines the state of 
freedom of expression in the UK. It reveals that freedom of expression is not an absolute 
right. Nevertheless, free expression is highly regarded as a fundamental right, 
intrinsically and instrumentally for the attainment of truth, autonomy or democracy. 
Before the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, freedom of expression is treated 
as a residual right exercisable as long as there is no legal restraint. The introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 has incorporated the Convention rights into the UK law. The Act 
has institutionalised the protection of freedom of expression as a fundamental right. This 
is strengthened by section 12 of the Act, which requires the courts to give particular 
regard to the right in granting any relief that might affect freedom of expression. The 
emphasis on human rights clearly shows that the law in the UK has been responsive to 
cultural change. 
Though freedom of expression is protected as of right, there are exceptions that restrict 
the right. The exceptions to protect public and private interests such as security and 
public order for the former, reputation and privacy for the latter create a formidable 
conflict of interest. A variety of institutional mechanisms has been employed to 
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accommodate competing interests. This shows the plurality aspect of the UK law that 
sees some uneasy compromises between competing interests. Nevertheless, the judicial 
commitment as well as the cultural commitment to freedom of expression is strong. This 
is so when restrictions are given narrow interpretation and need to be convincingly 
established. This point then leads to the finding that though freedom of expression is not 
a primary right but the emphasis on right of freedom of expression makes it more 
important than privacy. The emphasis in section 12 of the Human Rights Act and section 
32 of the Data Protection Act 1998 illustrate the commitment toward freedom of 
expression and the press. This is substantiated by the refusal of the government to 
introduce law on privacy until to date. 
The strong commitment on freedom of expression is reflected on freedom of the press. 
The writer fords that the press in the UK exercises more freedom than the press in 
Malaysia because there is no prior restraint in terms of licensing requirement in the UK. 
The press in the UK forms a hegemonic force in defending the freedom. Such a force 
enables them to practice self-regulation, which withstands the threat of replacing the 
system with statutory regulation. The writer also finds that the present self-regulatory 
system is suitable in accordance with the local (UK) situations. This is due to the support 
from the press industries that morally and financially enables the system to function. 
However, the existing regulatory body, the PCC, is ill equipped in preventing invasive act 
by the press. Thus, the efficacy and accountability of the system is doubtful. The 
unwillingness of the press to liberalise its dominance in relation to the code of practice 
adds to the scepticism on its effectiveness in protecting privacy. 
The study continues with Chapter 3, which examines the state of freedom of expression 
in Malaysia. Freedom of expression is protected as a constitutional right. However, the 
chapter reveals that the protection accorded to the right is limited. The Constitution 
empowers Parliament to determine the scope of the right when the latter has the exclusive 
power to introduce restrictions on freedom of expression. This power emanates from 
Article 10 (2) (a) of the Constitution when it places the question of necessity and 
expediency of law in the hand of Parliament. In this regard, the writer finds that even 
though freedom of expression is recognised as a positive right under the Constitution, but 
319 
in practice it is actually a residual right. This is due to the existence of countervailing 
interests such as security, public order and morality, which are more important than 
protecting freedom of expression. The application of the doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy renders the role of the courts to be in accordance with the constitutional 
provisions. The courts apply strict interpretation of constitutional provision and avoid 
inquiring into the necessity and expediency of any restrictive law introduced by 
Parliament. However, judicial activism in this matter helps to protect freedom of 
expression. This is when the courts can question the nexus between restrictions imposed 
on the right with the stated interests in the Constitution. The courts have the power to 
declare that restrictions on freedom of expression are unconstitutional if there is no 
connection between the restriction and the stated interests. 
The writer finds that the doctrine of proportionality is useful in preserving the 
inviolability of the constitutional right while ensuring that the national and public interest 
can be safeguarded. The requirement of necessity and pressing needs in a democratic 
society allow the courts to check the exclusive power of Parliament. In order to achieve 
this, the writer finds that the courts in Malaysia need to revitalise its approach to establish 
the sanctity of the institution and its independence. This would be possible through the 
application of liberal approach in interpreting the constitutional provision. This approach 
would give expression to fundamental liberties particularly under Part two of the 
Malaysian Constitution. The approach also would give emphasis on the intrinsic nature of 
the liberties, such as freedom of expression, as a pre-requisite of vibrant democratic 
society. 
In relation to the freedom of the press in Malaysia, the chapter reveals that the press is 
heavily regulated. The press in Malaysia is subjected to prior-restraint whereby licensing 
requirement is a pre-requisite in order for the press to operate. In addition, the writer 
finds that censorship is prevalent particularly in relation to political expression. This is 
because political parties control most of the mainstream press. Another fording in relation 
to the state of press freedom in Malaysia is that a vibrant democracy is difficult to 
flourish when the freedom is inhibited. Thus, in view of the existence of restrictive laws 
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on press freedom in Malaysia, the writer fords that there is a need for liberalisation of the 
press in Malaysia. 
In pursuing the main aim of the study, the writer then proceeds to Chapter 4 on the issue 
of protection of privacy in the UK. Privacy is not an alien concept in the UK. Before the 
Human Rights Act 1998, privacy had been protected under various privacy related 
principles such as nuisance, trespass, defamation and breach of confidence. The chapter 
reveals that there is no free standing law on privacy. It also reveals that protection on 
privacy is piecemeal and inadequate under the existing legal framework. 
The writer finds that there is a state of uncertainty in the UK with regard to the protection 
of privacy. On one hand, the government is committed in protecting human rights with 
the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. But on the other hand, the inclusion of 
the Convention rights, which is highly regarded in the ECHR, is not in its totality. The 
incorporation of the Convention right on privacy does not mean that the UK is obliged to 
create a specific law to protect the right. Even though privacy is recognised as a 
fundamental right, its protection is less certain. 
The writer also finds that though there is no clear term on its direct horizontal application, 
there is a possibility for indirect horizontal application. This is possible when the 
interpretation of public authority is to include the courts. Consequently, it will enable the 
right of privacy to be enforced under the duty to act compatibly with the Convention 
rights. The chapter also reveals that there is a development in the UK toward accepting 
the right. Such development is incrementally taking place by expanding the principles of 
common law under breach of confidence. However, the writer finds that the limitations of 
the existing legal framework are unable to cover the issue of privacy satisfactorily. 
Therefore, a separate cause of action for privacy cases is required. In this regard, the 
courts play an important role for this particular purpose. 
The discussion on right of privacy in chapter 4 serves as guidance for the following 
discussion in chapter 5. This chapter examines the protection of privacy in Malaysia. It 
reveals that there is no freestanding law on privacy. There is no clear provision to include 
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right of privacy as part of the fundamental liberties under the Federal Constitution. The 
writer further finds that the courts are unable to deliberate on the right of privacy in 
relation to the Constitution, since the issue has never been raised before them. In 
addition, the chapter reveals that privacy is not an alien concept in Malaysia. There are 
legal principles under common law that provide protection to privacy related interests. 
The writer finds that the application of common law, which is receptive and adaptive 
toward changes of current social needs, could provide protection to privacy. This is 
achievable through judicial activism in developing principles following the development 
on the same issue in the UK. However since there is a possibility of incorporating the 
right under the constitutional scheme, development of common law principles should 
only be made in the absence of legislative protection. 
In addition, similar protection could also be found in public law. The law acknowledges 
the right to privacy when it criminalises certain invasive acts. The writer fords that there 
is a lack of serious commitment on right of privacy as a human right issue in Malaysia. 
This is attributed primarily to the socio-political priority of the government. The 
dichotomy of cultural-political rights on one hand, and social-economic rights on the 
other, contributes to the fact that the main focus on economic matters overwhelms the 
issue on individual right to privacy. In relation to this, the formation of the Malaysian 
Human Rights Commission helps to promote the discourse on human rights issue. As a 
result, there is an increase in awareness over the perception on human rights issues. This 
is evident from the increase of complaints to the Commission with regards to violation of 
human rights in Malaysia. 
There is also a considerable change of commitment by the government in addressing the 
issue of human rights. This is marked by the creation of the Commission and the 
proposed new law on data protection that incorporates protection of informational 
privacy. The writer finds that the power of the Commission to protect human rights in 
Malaysia is limited. This is so when the scope of human rights is subjected to 
fundamental liberties under the Constitution. Nevertheless, there are some progressive 
developments in relation to human rights in general. 
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The issue on competing interests as mentioned in the previous chapters is the main thrust 
of the next chapter. Chapter 6 analyses the accommodating approach to resolve the issue 
of competing interests. It reveals that the approach to the issue can be categorised into 
two main categories. First, is balancing-based approach and second, non-balancing 
exercise. The writer finds that balancing approach is not satisfactory due to the absence 
of a common scale to weigh the value of two fundamental rights, freedom of expression 
and privacy. This is so when the Human Rights Act 1998 recognises the importance of 
both and each serves as an exception to each other. Furthermore, the distortions in 
balancing exercise would make freedom of expression heavier on the balancing scale. 
Thus, it acquires a priority treatment, which is against the spirit of equal fundamental 
right. 
The next approach under scrutiny is the doctrine of proportionality. Though it involves 
balancing exercise, the requirements of necessity and pressing need in a democratic 
society makes the approach more structured and principled in providing a resolution to 
the issue of competing interest compared to general balancing approach. The writer also 
finds that proportionality is appropriate in resolving the issue of competing interests as it 
is informed by the principle of distributive justice. Human right is about the 
empowerment of individuals against the governmental authority. But at the same time, 
the government also needs to protect public interests that sometimes affect individual 
rights. There are occasions when the state-public relationship requires some drastic 
measure. For instance, the state needs to regulate the conduct of its subject when the 
national security or public order is in jeopardy. Making choices between the conflicting 
incommensurables is justifiable. Thus, it is legitimate to take such measure for the 
interest of the nation as a whole, since the government in a democratic society is 
empowered by the people. 
The exposition of the issues on freedom of expression and privacy in chapter 2,3,4 and 5 
builds up the context for the next discussion. Chapter 7 presents a comparative analysis 
in order to achieve the aim of the study that is to reform and develop law on the press and 
privacy in Malaysia. The chapter reveals that there are three possible models that can be 
adopted in the effort to make human rights as prominent in Malaysia. The top-down 
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model propagates the idea of adherence to universal standards or principles. It overlooks 
local needs and requirements in pursuing the ideal of unitary justice. On the other hand, 
bottom-up approach would promote dogmatism whereby any development is dictated by 
local particularities. It allows the government of the day to capitalise the sentiment of 
nationalism to hinder foreign elements. Discussion on the models reveals that reflective 
equilibrium is more attuned to Malaysian climate. The convergence of the universal value 
of rights and the requirements of local conditions would provide for the pluralistic social 
practice of human rights at national level. The approach would encourage pragmatism in 
the process of shaping the domestic legal landscape, attuned to the acceptable universal 
value. 
The argument on local conditions leads to further discussion on the freedom of the press 
in Malaysia. There is no constitutional guarantee on freedom of the press. The scope of 
freedom of expression under the Constitution determines the extent of freedom that the 
press can enjoy. The chapter reveals that political expression is strictly guarded by the 
application of several restrictive laws. The control exerted on the press is exercised 
through wide discretionary power of the executive as well as political ownership of the 
press. This is mainly in relation to the press-state relationship. 
Nevertheless, the press enjoys more freedom in commercial and artistic expression than 
in political expression. As far as the press-people relationship is concerned, there is no 
specific body legally responsible in regulating the conduct of the press in Malaysia. The 
writer finds that the existing institutions such as the National Union of Journalists and 
Malaysian Press Institute could not effectively regulate the conduct of the press due to 
want of authority. The writer argues that self-regulation is not appropriate under the 
present circumstances particularly with the existence of the Printing Presses and 
Publication Act 1984. Alternatively, statutory body is able to command co-operation 
from the press. The autonomy of the body in setting its goals and functions could garner 
the support from the press industries as well as the public. Nevertheless, the objective of 
having a specific regulatory body is futile if the government is insensitive towards 
reforming the law particularly the PPA. 
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8.2 RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
The discourse of rights at the domestic socio-political level is mainly informed by 
utilitarian impulse. This is so when sacrificing one person's good is permissible in order 
to maximize the overall good. Although Malaysia affirms its commitment on 
fundamental rights, which is embedded in the Constitution, the commitment is predicated 
on the belief that the interest of the society as a whole necessitates restriction on the 
rights. Universal values under the language of human rights are often being suppressed 
by a priori of local political and ideological agendas. Undoubtedly, Malaysia has every 
right to determine her own priorities for the interest of the nation. However, it could 
arguably be said that emphasis on local particularities as an insulation of acceptable 
democratic values would preserve dogmatism instead of pragmatism. This is contrary to 
the Malaysian aspiration of becoming a developed nation among the legion of liberal 
democratic countries. 
This study argues that privacy is an important fundamental right that should be accorded 
legal protection. There is a need to incorporate the right within the constitutional 
framework to accord an individual the right to privacy. It would impose positive 
obligation on the government to ensure that the right is available to every citizen. In 
order to attain this, the courts need to apply liberal and pragmatic approach in giving 
expansive interpretation to the existing provision in the Constitution particularly Article 
5. This is in line with the spirit of the Constitution to protect fundamental liberties of the 
citizens. 
Undoubtedly, the development of privacy in the UK, which has an inclination toward 
accepting the right, is relevant in Malaysia. In the absence of a freestanding law on 
privacy in Malaysia, the writer argues that the courts should refer to the development in 
the UK on the basis of highly persuasive authority. This is in view of close historical 
relationship between the two jurisdictions particularly with regard to the common law 
system. Even though the Malaysian courts are not duty bound to accept the English 
common law, section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 allows the courts to apply the law if 
the courts deem suitable in accordance with local conditions. In the absence of statutory 
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provision, the courts can develop the common law to fill the gap. In this regard, the 
development in the UK could play a role in creating principles at domestic level. The 
courts in Malaysia can either develop the existing principles such as breach of 
confidence, modeling on the development in the UK or introduce a new tort law on 
invasion of privacy as adopted by the USA. As far as the subject of this study is 
concerned, the invasive act perpetrated by the press, by way of public disclosure of 
personal information, could satisfactorily be covered under breach of confidence. 
However, on a broader perspective, the ability of breach of confidence to protect privacy 
is limited and insufficient. Hence, there is a need for a new law on privacy. The 
pragmatism of common law would make it an appropriate legal framework for 
development of principles on privacy to take place incrementally. 
8.2.1 SHORT TERM MEASURES 
This is in relation to the empowerment of institutional mechanism in dealing with 
specific matters. The existing institutional bodies such as SUHAKAM and BERNAMA 
have their own limitations (as discussed in Chapter 7) that disable them from dealing with 
issues relating to the press specifically. In this context, the writer supports the 
establishment of Media or Press Council (the Council) as a specific regulatory body. The 
proposed Media Council has attracted various reactions. While the proponents defend 
that the Council can promote and maintain a high standard of journalistic practices, the 
opponents argue that the existence of the Council does not help in preserving freedom of 
expression. The ability of the Council to discharge its functions effectively also raises 
some doubts since there are restrictive laws that affect freedom of the media. The idea of 
establishing the Council had also received a negative reaction from the press. The press 
argues that the existence of the Council would further restrict the press freedom in 
Malaysia. On the contrary, the writer defends the idea of establishing the Council because 
the independence and autonomous power of the Council would empower the press to set 
and navigate their own course in accordance with the legal parameter. 
In addition to this, the Council would have two objectives. First, in relation to press-state 
relationship, the Council can help to protect the freedom of speech and the press in its 
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consultative and supervisory role. Secondly, with regard to press-people relationship, the 
Council can act as a regulator and mediator to protect privacy. The writer argues that 
based on the present circumstances, ' 142 the Council should be established in the form of a 
statutory body. This is to give legal effect to its formation as well as operation. As a 
statutory body, the Council could play a role in providing protection on privacy through a 
uniform code of conduct. Adherence to the code is an obligatory requirement. 
Incorporating the code in the contract of employment can do this. The existing piecemeal 
code for the press is ineffective and unsatisfactory because of the confinement of its 
application. Furthermore, the application of the existing code is without legal obligation. 
In contrast with the practice in the UK, where mainly the press editors construct the code, 
the preparation of the code in Malaysia should include people outside the industry. This 
is to maintain the integrity and credibility of the code especially among the public since 
the role of the Council is not limited to upholding the freedom of the press per se but 
encompassing the right of others as well. 
The writer would, however, resist the idea of establishing an independent self-regulation 
modeling on the PCC in the UK. There is a question of integrity in protecting privacy 
under such a system. Arguably, privacy would be a peripheral issue under an organisation 
that exists mainly to defend the countervailing interest, freedom of the press. Moreover, 
the domination and influence of the press in such an organisation would create an 
element of bias and discrimination. In addition, there is lack of accountability under such 
a system in case of failure to give equal emphasis on protection of privacy. 
Alternatively, Malaysia could adopt a co-regulation system. In contrast with self- 
regulation, this system combines the interested parties under one functioning 
organisation. There are several positive aspects of co-regulation. This system would 
enable the combination of several aspects such as expertise and interest. The system 
encourages a wider commitment to protect both free speech and privacy. Co-regulation 
could exist under the existing framework. This could be done through changes in the 
modus operandi of SUHAKAM. Although SUHAKAM has created a Working 
1142 For instance, the dominance of ethnic-based political party and the unwillingness of the government to 
relax restrictive provisions in the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1986. 
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Committee to look into matters relating to press freedom and privacy, the effectiveness of 
the Committee is questionable. This is because the composition of the Committee does 
not involve the press. Thus, the Committee could be extended to include the press so that 
the latter can make contribution in designing a system that affects their interest. 
Besides the short term measures, the writer also proposes a long-term measure in 
pursuing the central theme of the study relating to protection of privacy. 
8.2.2 LONG TERM MEASURES 
The study establishes that the existence of restrictive laws affect the freedom of the press 
in Malaysia. Thus, development in this area, which in the opinion of the writer is long 
overdue, should be on evolutionary basis rather than revolution. This is in view of the 
fact that the government is not willing to abolish the licensing system. Instead of arguing 
for deregulation, the writer argues that regulation on the press is necessary. 
Although the writer agrees that the press needs freedom to function effectively in a 
democratic society, it is unreasonable to allow unregulated press considering the plurality 
of values in Malaysia. Due to this fact, therefore, the Malaysian constitutional 
commitment to freedom of speech needs liberal and pragmatic approach. In order for this 
to be effective, the judiciary must play its role as an independent institution through 
judicial activism. It requires the courts to apply liberal and purposive approach in 
upholding the right to freedom of speech and expression. On one hand, the liberal 
approach in this context is to give extensive meaning and latitude to the exercise of the 
right and thus upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. On the other, pragmatic 
approach gives expression to the needs that are necessary in a democratic society whilst 
taking into account the particularities of the society. 
Based on this premise, it is part of the thematic argument throughout the study that 
reflective equilibrium-based approach should be the guiding principle. This approach 
would enable the development of fundamental rights discourse at domestic level to 
flourish by taking into account the universality of fundamental rights such as free speech 
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and privacy. At the same time, the approach could avoid a crude transplantation of 
foreign principles by maintaining the suitability of the principles within local framework. 
Besides the role of the judiciary, the legislature also has a direct influence in the 
reformation process. Part of the reformation to liberalise the press is to amend both the 
licensing requirement and discretionary power of the executive in the PPA. The writer 
argues vehemently against the practice of prior-restraint. Arguably, it is difficult to rely 
on antithetical views about the indigenous conditions to legitimise prior-restraint. 
Moreover, prior-restraint does not reflect the constitutional commitment to freedom of 
speech and the practice of democratic values. 
However, contrary to the call for abolishing licensing requirement, the writer argues for 
relaxation of the requirement. Instead of making it as an imperative requirement, it 
should be made available upon application for administrative purposes. In addition, 
absolute discretionary power of the executive in the issuance of license should be 
abolished. Nevertheless, the power of revocation should be maintained but not on the 
basis of absolute discretionary power. 
In view of the development at domestic level, the writer argues that there is a prospect for 
reflective equilibrium to be exercised base on judicial activism and pragmatism. This is 
justifiable from the judicial commitment of the Court of Appeal (COA) in Lim Teck Kong 
v Dr. Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid 1143 The COA decided to depart from the House of 
Lords' decisions regarding right to award damages on pure economic loss. The COA 
said: 
We have been too long in the shadow of the House of Lords' decisions of 
Murphy and D&F Estates. We are of the view that it is time for us to 
move out of the shadow and move along with other Commonwealth 
countries where damages could be awarded on pure economic loss. 
Though a long historical relationship exist, legal or non-legal, between Malaysia and the 
UK, the above case envisages that the Malaysian judiciary acts independently in 
developing Malaysian common law principle. The case shows the maturity of the courts 
in establishing domestic legal principles. On this premise, the writer argues that reflective 
1143 hU: //www. kehakiman. ggv. mL/jugdment/coa/archiveB-02-757-98. htm 
329 
equilibrium is in practice. The above case also vindicate that local conditions and 
particularities serve as insulations in determining the applicability of a well-established 
principle deemed to be incongruent with the domestic set up. 
The exercise of reflective equilibrium can also be discerned through the judicial activism 
portrayed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Kerajaan Negeri Selangor v Sagong Bin 
Tasi & Ors. 1144 This case involved the right of aboriginal people over land. The COA's 
decision has been heralded as a landmark decision because of the pragmatic approach and 
the willingness of the COA to apply an expansive construction in favour of the aborigines 
in enhancing their rights rather than curtailing them. "45 The COA explains that 
`... ordinarily we, the judges, are not permitted by our own jurisprudence, to do this. But 
here you have a direction by the supreme law of the Federation that such modifications as 
the present must be done. That is why we can resort to this extraordinary method of 
interpretation'. ' 146 In this case, the COA recognised the right of the aboriginal people 
over land and the right to receive adequate compensation for the acquisition of their land. 
Drawing on the current judicial commitment in dealing with the fundamental rights issues 
by employing liberal and expansive interpretation of constitutional provisions, the writer 
believes that similar treatment would be extended in protecting right to privacy within the 
ambit of the constitutional right to life. The writer realises that judicial commitment in 
this regard could only be exercised if the individual's level of awareness towards their 
civil and political rights is high. At present, such awareness continues to develop. This is 
based on the existence of organisations such as the Human Rights Commission, several 
human rights based NGOs and institutions such as the parliamentary Human Rights 
Caucus. In addition, the media also contributes towards increasing the awareness by 
highlighting news on infringement of human rights. As far as the courts are concerned, 
they can only deliberate on the issue of privacy if they are presented with the opportunity. 
Unfortunately, the courts are being deprived from such an opportunity when issues on 
privacy are eclipsed by other causes of action. 
1144 [2005] 6 MU 289. 
iias hgp: //www. malqysianbar. oriz. myLcontent/view/2423/2/ 
1 46 Supra, 310. 
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At this juncture, based on the judicial commitment, the role of the media and the political 
will of the ruling government, the writer is of the view that protection of fundamental 
rights in Malaysia, is moving incrementally towards a right-based approach informed by 
communitarian impulse. If the current development on fundamental rights is moving 
progressively, the writer believes that by the year 2020, Malaysians could enjoy 
protection of their inalienable rights. However, the protection is not akin to the practice in 
the West, which is on the basis of strong individual right-based approach, because 
Malaysia subscribes to multiculturalism that gives emphasis to local condition. 
This study contributes to the on-going debate on freedom of the press and right of privacy 
in Malaysia. As far as Malaysia is concerned, the study defends the idea for liberalisation 
of the press instead of indigenisation. It extends the argument for reformation at the 
policymaking level as well as at the application level. The analysis conducted in this 
study particularly in relation to the competing interests involving free expression and 
privacy could help the relevant parties for instance, the government agencies, NGOs and 
the press in Malaysia to assess the issue of privacy in making judgment for future actions. 
In relation to the right of privacy in Malaysia, this study makes an inroad on the issue. As 
far as the writer is aware, this study is the first to examine the right of privacy in 
Malaysia comparatively. It discusses the possibility of the inclusion of privacy within the 
constitutional framework, which is the stand of the writer, by way of expansive 
interpretation of the current provision. It also examines the inadequate and piecemeal 
protection of privacy in Malaysia. Deliberations on this subject could have a springboard 
effect in view of the development of human rights awareness at the national level. One of 
the foreseeable effects is the increase of awareness on the need to make right of privacy 
as a fundamental issue. Unfortunately, hitherto the issue of privacy as a fundamental 
individual right in Malaysia is still underdeveloped. Thus, the study has set the 
foundation by examining the state of privacy in Malaysia and proposing several 
recommendations. 
For future study on privacy in Malaysia, issue such as the appropriateness of law on 
privacy by way of statute or common law should be considered in relation to the local 
particularities. However, considering the fact that Malaysia gives more emphasis on 
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social and economic interests than on civil and political interests, it is most unlikely for 
the introduction of statutory law on privacy. Thus, the courts would be the potential 
institution to develop the law. 
The writer realises that restriction on freedom of the press would be less forbidding to 
investors used to press freedom, particularly in media sector. This could affect economic 
development. Nevertheless, the writer argues that such effect is minimal since economic 
development in Malaysia as a whole depends on trade and commercial activities. Even 
with the current restrictions on press freedom, Malaysia manages to increase her bilateral 
trade with the United States of America and the European Union1147 , 
despite the fact that 
the US and EU adopt more liberal approach towards press freedom. Perhaps the ability of 
the ruling government in maintaining political stability could be one of the core factors in 
attracting investors. 
Moreover, restriction on freedom of the press in Malaysia relates more on political 
information rather than commercial. Arguably, the press enjoy more freedom in 
commercial expression compared to political expression. Although Malaysia upholds 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, emphasis is given on the satisfaction of basic 
human needs and conditions created for the realisation and fulfillment of the needs .1 
48 
Nevertheless, the writer argues that as Malaysian society develop progressively towards 
vision 2020, the commitment to protect fundamental freedoms and to satisfy basic human 
needs should be exercised in parallel. This is in tandem with the aim to become a 
developed society. 
It is hoped that this study would pave the way for future researchers to focus on the issue 
as to whether the law should be of multifactorial or a solitary tort on privacy. The writer 
would also like to suggest that a future study on this subject matter should cover the 
scope and the impact of on-line press and its regulations on the right to privacy. 
1147 www. aseanindia. net/asean/countryprofiles/ malaysia/trade-policy. htm 
1148 http: //www. kin. oý v. my/english/Fr-foreipnaffairs. htm 
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